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Abstract 
Whistleblowing is an action that not only can assist in exposing organizations‟ 
illegal activities to the public, but also can give employers an opportunity to find out 
irregularities that occur in the workplace and to rectify those mistakes in advance. As 
for corporate governance, it can be regarded as a structure, a system, or a means that 
companies set up to monitor the operation of business, to make firms‟ policies, and to 
achieve objectives more effectively and successfully. The purpose of this dissertation, 
on the one hand, is to research the connection between whistleblowing and corporate 
governance and to use whistleblowers to promote internal corporate control. On the 
other hand, I wish to establish a complete whistleblower provision under SOX Section 
806 to prevent employees who make the disclosure from being retaliated against by 
companies, and to enhance the function of Section 806 to deter corporate corruption. 
The introduction describes how whistleblowing promotes corporate governance. The 
second part discusses the background of whistleblowing and employs different points 
of view to study whistleblowing. The third part researches on common laws, state and 
federal statutes that have the provision of whistleblower protection and attempts to 
compare their differences. The fourth part analyzes SOX Section 806 and discovers its 
defects on shielding corporate whistleblowers. The fifth part refers to legal articles or 
academic materials, and presents my suggestions or ideas for future amendments of 
SOX Section 806. In conclusion, I briefly review the advantages of whistleblowing in 
internal corporate governance and society at large. In addition, I would like to show 
my expectations on this dissertation, and wish that the dilemma and obstacles in SOX 
Section 806 can be clarified and resolved. 
Keywords: whistleblowing, whistleblower, blow the whistle, SOX Section 806, SOX, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance 
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We could make no greater mistake than to be lulled into a 
sense of false security by believing that some disembodied 
force called the government will act like a beneficent big 
brother and make certain that the special interests will not 
predominate. If the general welfare is to be protected, it will 
be protected by the actions of people, not the government.   
 
-- Dr. A. Dale Console 
 
Whistleblowing has received considerable attention in the 
media via regular newspaper stories, magazine articles, and 
television documentaries. It has eclipsed political protect as 
a newsworthy item, and for good reason. The whistleblowers 
of the 1970s and 1980s bear the mantle worn by the civil 
disobedients of the 1960s, shifting the object of dissent from 
government atrocities in Vietnam to corporate wrongdoing in 
the workplace. 
-- Frederick Elliston et al. 
 
Too much misinformation has proven the basis for the 
conventional wisdom about whistle-blowers that we see 
promulgated in the media, in legislatures, and elsewhere. 
Whistle-blowing can be a force for constructive 
organizational and societal change, but only if we learn 
more about why it happens and how to best deal with its 
impact. 
                                                -- Marcia P. Miceli et al. 
 
                                     
                                                           
 
 
1 
Chapter I. Introduction
A. Organization of the Dissertation 
Whistleblowing is an essential element of internal corporate governance. The 
effectiveness of whistleblowing is able to be enhanced through amendments under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 806. The purpose of this dissertation is to find out 
the defects of whistleblower protection under SOX and provide some suggestions for 
future amendments. The first part of dissertation is the introduction. In this portion, I 
introduce what corporate governance is, and what role it can play in the operation of 
public companies. In addition, I would like to briefly describe the important function 
of whistleblower protection in corporate governance. 
Second, I talk about background information in regard to whistleblowing and use 
different perspectives to research the whistleblower. In background information, I ma- 
ke a definition of whistleblowing and find out who will be the whistleblower; likewise, 
I study the origin and evolution of whistleblowing. As to the perspectives on the whis- 
tleblower, I intend to make use of the individual‟s, the professional‟s, and the public‟s 
views to discuss whistleblowing. 
Third, I am going to employ a typical whistleblower case to do research and co- 
mpare whistleblower protection among common law, state and federal statutes. In this 
part, the discussion puts emphasis on how to balance the conflict between the doctrine 
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of employment-at-will and the public policy exception. In the portion of common law, 
I attempt to use the precedent case of SOX Section 806, Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares 
Corp., to study this topic. In the part of state laws, I select California, Louisiana, and 
Delaware to find out their differences in the whistleblower protection. The reason that 
I choose the state of California is since it has enacted a friendly statute to protect the 
whistleblower. By contrast, Louisiana is the state that has loose protection toward wh- 
istleblowing. As regards Delaware, because of its company-friendly status, I would li- 
ke to know how Delaware addresses whistleblower issues under its jurisdiction. Later, 
in the part of federal laws, I trace back to federal legislative history and study the pro- 
cess that presented how federal legislators shielded the whistleblower in different are- 
as. At last, I mention the first federal statute that is enacted to safeguard the whistlebl- 
ower serving in the public company, that is, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 806, and 
introduce its legislative background. 
Fourth, I select two American corporate scandals that happened in the beginning 
of this century -- Enron and WorldCom -- to start the research upon SOX Section 806. 
My concerns in this part are to discover the obstacle and difficulty for corporate whis- 
tleblowers to unveil public companies‟ securities violations or related frauds, and find 
out how these companies make responses to employees‟ accusations. Besides, I bring 
up empirical critiques on SOX Section 806 about its insufficient protection, and point 
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out practical problems that Congress did not notice when it enacted SOX to deter pub- 
lic companies from breaching securities laws. 
Fifth, not only will I refer to the advice from legal articles, materials, and acade- 
mic dissertations for modifying the defects of SOX Section 806, but I will also prese- 
nt my suggestions and ideas for future amendments. 
At last, I make a conclusion on all discussions. My expectations on this dissertat- 
ion are to make the whistleblower protection in SOX Section 806 more complete, to 
avoid corporate employees from being afraid of disclosing public companies‟ fraudul- 
ent activities, to strengthen stockholders‟ confidence in corporate business operation, 
and further to promote the integrity of the public stock market. 
B. What Corporate Governance Is and What Role It Plays in a Corporation or an 
Organization 
1. History of Corporate Governance 
In recent years, the term of corporate governance has been spoken of by le- 
gal academics and economists in diverse discussions due to a series of corporate scan- 
dals and financial catastrophes. In the early 1800s of American public company‟s hist- 
ory, few people talked about the role that corporate governance can play in the public 
company owing to the cohesion of organization, ownership, and the limitation of org- 
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anizational size.
1
 During that time, the corporation was managed by its shareholders, 
who not only had the ownership of company, but also took the manager‟s duties for 
their responsibilities.
2
 However, as state legislatures canceled the restrictions on the 
purpose of company listed on the companies‟ charter, the corporation was permitted to 
do any business in lawful purposes, and this change resulted in the growth of the size 
and complexity of company.
3
 Observing this transformation, in 1930, the notable ec- 
onomists Berle and Means stated that the separation of ownership and control gradua- 
lly becomes the specific characteristic for the corporation. As they said, “The central 
mass of the twentieth century American economic revolution is a massive collectiviz- 
ation of property devoted to production, with an accompanying decline of individual 
decision-making and control, and a massive dissociation of wealth from active mana- 
gement.”
4
 At that time, the ownership of company was characterized not only by “a 
large numbers of shareholders,”
5
 but also by “dispersal of shareholdings.”
6
 It means 
“patterns of shareholdings in which no single individual, firm, or compact group owns 
                                                     
1
 Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management 
Treaties, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 562 (1981). 
2
 Id. 
3
 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 664 
(1974). 
4
 Adolf A. Berle & Gariner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 129 (rev. ed. 
1968). 
5
 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations 154 (2005). 
6
 Id. 
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more than a tiny fraction of a corporation‟s stock.”
7
 
From Berle and Mean‟s points of view, the company‟s operation may be no long- 
er controlled by its shareholders, who actually have the ownership of corporation, but 
the managerial power is transferred to corporate managements. In this way, even thou- 
gh shareholders are the substantial owners of company, they do not have actual power 
to manage the corporation and make a decision regarding business affairs. By contrast, 
corporate managers do not own the corporation, but they do have power to control all 
business matters and affect the company‟s performance. Due to this phenomenon, Be- 
rle and Means commented that the separation of ownership and control may cause the 
consequence of diverged interests. This means corporate managers probably will not 
devote themselves to promoting business and putting focus on making the maximum 
profit for the corporation and its shareholders. Though, they are inclined to pursue th- 
eir own pecuniary gains and private benefit at the expense of shareholders‟ interests.
8
 
This danger is called the agency cost in the academic area. 
2. Definition of Corporate Governance 
Since corporate governance has become a prevalent term followed by entr- 
epreneurial corruption, academic fields employ a variety of means to define corporate 
governance. It not only makes the term of corporate governance have flexible usage in 
                                                     
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
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different fields, but also shows this term‟s multi-faceted definitions in different situati- 
ons. Generally speaking, corporate governance is able to be defined as “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled,”
9
 or can be described as “the set of str- 
uctures and behaviours by which a company or other entity is directed and managed.” 
10
 The definition made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) states that corporate governance provides “the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.”
11
 In addition, it says that corporate govern- 
ance should “provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue obje- 
ctives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilita- 
te effective monitoring.”
12
 Therefore, good corporate governance can improve econo- 
mic efficiency; also, it is able to enhance investors‟ confidence in companies‟ operati- 
on and the integrity of the financial market, to decrease transaction costs, and to avoid 
potential investment risks.
13
 In the academic field, there are two theories employed to 
study corporate governance; one is called the communitarianism theory, and the other 
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is the contractarianism theory.  
a. Communitarianism 
Under the communitarianism theory, the goal of corporation is not only 
to maximize shareholders‟ fortunes and to promote their benefit, but it has to consider 
other stakeholders‟ interests. “Stakeholders are seen as those who have a formal, offic- 
ial, or contractual relationship with the corporation, and without whom the corporati- 
on could not function.”
14
 Primary stakeholders include financiers, customers, supplie- 
rs, employees, and shareholders; however, other stakeholder theorists intend to cover 
communities.
15
 Typically, corporate managers have social responsibilities beyond th- 
ose duties originally owed to shareholders. It means that as corporate managers make 
decisions on business policies, they are obligated to consider other stakeholders‟ bene- 
fit at the same time, not simply think about shareholders‟ interests. Stakeholders‟ ben- 
efit is advocated by communitarians, and is guaranteed under legislative protection.
16
 
Under communitarianism, because communitarians put focus on employees‟ loyalty 
to the company, several features are valued by the firm. For instance, the communitar- 
ian regime emphasizes corporate employees‟ integrity, identity, solidarity, and empat- 
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8 
hy for the company.
17
 Those features “give employees greater incentives to develop 
and supply firm-specific human capital.”
18
 In addition, they promote team efforts and 
make employees stand on the same side with the company when it has suffered finan- 
cial distress or other business threats.  
Even if communitarians think managers should consider non-shareholders‟ inter- 
ests when making corporate policies, communitarianism still has some drawbacks to 
think over. First, communitarians emphasize the function of an individual‟s identity in 
the corporation, but this cannot be active in a gigantic organization. A mammoth com- 
pany restricts an individual to participate in activities that enable to develop personal 
identities. This type of company denies opportunities for an individual to form constr- 
uctive identities.
19
 Second, communitarians put emphasis on an employee‟s loyalty to 
the company, but it suppresses an employee‟s inspiration, creativity, and initiative in 
the workplace. This perhaps affects the company‟s competition in the market, and det- 
eriorates the vitality of the whole group.
20
 Third, the communitarianism theory prote- 
cts stockholders‟ interests and assures stakeholders‟ benefit; yet, in reality, when dive- 
rse interests conflict with each other, it is difficult to decide which interest is more im- 
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portant than others, and is tough to safeguard these interests at the same time. As Call- 
ahan states this consequence as follows: 
“Another drawback of communitarianism is the inevitable divergence of the inte- 
rests of various claimants, which makes them virtually impossible to protect si- 
multaneously. Large bureaucratic organizations, in particular, simply cannot be 
operated for the benefit of all stakeholders and may come to operate primarily 
to further powerful, centralized interests.”
21
  
In this way, it can be concluded that different interests can coexist, but they are unable 
to be protected concurrently. While these interests are crashing against with each other, 
the most influential and vigorous one is going to win out. 
b. Contractarianism  
On the contrary, in the contractarianism theory, contractarians think cor- 
porate managers ought to put shareholders‟ interests in the first place because they in- 
fer that when corporate managers take their efforts to maximize shareholders‟ fortunes, 
non-shareholders‟ benefit can be promoted simultaneously.
22
 In the contractarianism 
theory, the relationship between the corporation and the shareholder is composed by a 
nexus of contracts, voluntary agreements, and market forces.
23
 Contractarians tend to 
adjust or balance managers and shareholders‟ interests by making use of voluntary co- 
ntracts, agreements, and market forces.
24
 Market forces, which consist of the capital 
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market, the product market, and the managerial labor market, help shareholders obser- 
ve corporate wrongdoing or examine inefficiencies of company‟s operation caused by 
managers‟ carelessness or ignorance, and then let shareholders be able to change subs- 
equent contracts or agreements with the firm in time. The contractarianism theory de- 
pends upon sound public policy and complete law regime to protect and to strengthen 
the freedom of contract. Also, it can be facilitated by information transparency and ef- 
ficient corporate operation.
25
 Hence, the healthy market is the necessity for the contr- 
actarianism theory to operate well. 
However, actually, many uncertain factors perhaps dampen or restrict the market 
to operate under a high expectation, and to become an ideal or efficient condition. For 
example, information asymmetry lets investors to make incorrect decisions, and mak- 
es them suffer potential risks of investment; the non-transparency market makes stoc- 
kholders hesitate to go to the public stock market to purchase stocks owing to unfores- 
een situations; potential dangers of transactions let investors get away due to unantici- 
pated damage. In addition, corporate fraud frightens shareholders from making contr- 
acts with the company because shareholders have had negative experiences on losing 
money. Further, as contracts are made in international business transaction, the barrie- 
rs of language, legal regimes, and customs probably cause inefficient and poor contra- 
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cts. At times, property rights cannot be safeguarded because of the misunderstanding 
on the terms of contracts, and the confusion with domestic business matters.
26
 Those 
are shortcomings of the contractarianism theory. 
3. How Is Corporate Governance Practiced in Business Entities? 
         As mentioned above, corporate governance is the set of structures and be- 
haviour by which a company or organization is directed and managed.
27
 Yet, it is diff- 
icult to know if a corporation has followed a right direction to achieve its goals, and 
obeyed regulated policies; if corporate managers are reckless of doing business or are 
trying to embezzle a company‟s capital for pursuing private interests, those are issues 
that need to be urgently resolved. Owing to these concerns, the concept of monitoring 
gradually becomes an important subject matter for corporate governance. As Foucault 
in his book says, “Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance.”
28
 This ph- 
enomenon is able to be observed by extensive legal punishment on criminal activities 
happening in society. Nonetheless, nowadays, this proverb also transforms to a maxim 
that gives the state authority to regulate the disorder of corporate operation in the Uni- 
ted States. In view of the surveillance cannot self-effectuate, it still needs other syste- 
ms or policies to make it active. Thus, for this reason, some mechanisms and agencies 
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12 
are required to act as indispensable devices to enforce the action of monitoring.  
Among diverse mechanisms used to monitor corporate activities and manageme- 
nts, the primary and traditional tools probably include:
29
 
 Companies‟ board of directors supervising managers;  
 Accounting firms auditing publicly-held corporations‟ financial statements 
or related materials;  
 Credit-rating agencies helping the public to estimate which company is wor- 
th to be invested;  
 Financial markets acting as an indirect punishment on managers for poor 
business performance;  
 Stock exchange markets promulgating rules to promote corporate governan- 
ce and regulating IPOs of public companies; 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulating stock markets, 
watching over the disclosure of corporations‟ substantial information, and 
making policies with regard to corporate governance for publicly-owned co- 
mpanies.  
Besides, Macey said that whistleblowing is quirky governance on monitoring corpora- 
te operation, and perhaps plays a limited role in monitoring. However, in reality, whis- 
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tleblowing gradually takes an influential position on enhancing corporate governance 
due to a series of corporate scandals.
30
  
Above mechanisms can be divided into internal and external corporate governan- 
ce. Internal governance contains the supervision of board of directors, the accountant 
and auditor, the shareholder and the shareholder activism, and corporate whistleblowi- 
ng. External governance includes the creditor and the credit-rating agency, the invest- 
ment bank and the securities analyst, corporate takeover, and the SEC‟s examination. 
The function of these mechanisms is going to be analyzed below. 
a. Internal Corporate Governance 
   i. The Board of Directors 
            Followed by the guideline of the Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act (RMBCA) that describes the authority of board of directors, it states “[a]ll corpor- 
ate power shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the business affairs of a cor- 
poration shall be managed under the direction of a board of directors.”
31
 Also, in Del- 
aware General Corporation Law (DGCL), it says “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation organized … shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of dir- 
ectors …”
32
 In this way, the duty of board of directors on corporate governance is tw- 
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14 
ofold. First, they are experienced advisors for corporate managers when making deci- 
sions or business policies. Second, they are sincere monitors or gatekeepers of corpor- 
ate management.
33
 The board of directors holds fiduciary duties to stockholders when 
they manage the company and execute policies. Those fiduciary duties include the du- 
ty of loyalty that demands the board of directors to place shareholders‟ interests in the 
first place beyond their private interests, and the duty of care that requires the board of 
directors to do what an ordinary prudent person will do as they are in the same circu- 
mstance and position. Nevertheless, most important of all, the board of directors holds 
the duty of supervision. This duty not only asks the board of directors to confirm the 
authenticity of disclosed information, but also requests directors to pay more attention 
to corporate performance, operation, and to make sure financial statements and accou- 
nting are accurate.
34
 Hence, those can be inferred that the board of directors represen- 
ts shareholders‟ interests, and has an important function on corporate internal control. 
   ii. Accountants and Auditors 
             Accountants and auditors are also parts of monitoring mechanisms in 
corporate governance. Accountants take duties to report, gather, and compile corpora- 
te financial statements, and to make companies‟ accounting accurate. In order to avoid 
accountants from making mistakes on financial statements, auditors‟ duties are to rev- 
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15 
iew these financial materials, find out errors in business documents, and then correct 
these faults. During the process of examination, because auditors can access confiden- 
tial information, which others are hardly able to know, this advantage makes it easier 
for them to find the authenticity of financial documents, and to decide whether these 
materials show genuine financial conditions of corporations. Financial documents cre- 
ated by accountants and auditors play a critical role in corporate governance since co- 
mpanies‟ creditors, investment banks, and other interest groups depend on this infor- 
mation to realize corporate performance and business affairs. Shareholders rely on th- 
ese materials to make decisions and anticipate the profit or cost for their investments. 
Importantly, accountants and auditors can disclose malfeasance committed by compa- 
nies as soon as possible in order to prevent unlawful actions from going worse and ca- 
using losses to stockholders as they examine those financial statements.
35
 
   iii. Shareholders and Shareholder Activism 
          Corporate shareholders can be seen as a good mechanism for corpor- 
ate governance when they fervently participate in companies‟ business matters. Share- 
holders‟ behaviour can be regarded as the shareholder activism as the following situat- 
ions are satisfied. First, when shareholders like to present their opinions about busine- 
ss operation and try to affect managers‟ decisions, these actions can indicate that shar- 
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eholders are acting as a form of shareholder activism. Second, as shareholders regula- 
rly attend annual meetings, eagerly participate in voting, or have an experience of su- 
bmitting a proposal in the meeting, these activities reveal that shareholders are active 
in business affairs.
36
 Third, with respect to the issue of public policy or the reform of 
corporate operation, shareholders have private opportunities to discuss or enjoy public 
communication with the board of directors or managements, these can be inferred that 
shareholders have played an active role in corporations.
37
 Hence, when stockholders 
positively participate in business affairs, and have chances to voice their thoughts and 
comments to the upper management, their actions can be named as the shareholder ac- 
tivism. Usually, this activism is exercised by three categories of shareholders: individ- 
ual shareholders, large shareholders (stockholders who own a big portion of shares of 
companies) and institutional shareholders.
38
  
In the U.S., institutional shareholders include public and private pension plans, 
banks, investment corporations, insurance companies, and foundations.
39
 The fact th- 
at institutional investors‟ actions act as the shareholder activism is because “institutio- 
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nal shareholdings tend to be concentrated rather than dispersed.”
40
 As Eisenberg des- 
cribes: 
    “The increased concentration of shareholdings … by institutional investors, has 
set the stage for a dramatic increase in the shareholder role in the modern publ- 
icly held corporation. As shareholders get more sophisticated, the costs of play- 
ing an active shareholder role decrease. As shareholdings get larger, the cost- 
-benefit ratio for investing time in playing that role improves. As sharehold- 
ings become more concentrated, coordination between shareholders becomes 
easier.”
41
 
Hence, it is cost-effective for institutional investors to spend a substantial amount of 
time on corporations‟ business affairs. 
    Institutional shareholders play several meaningful roles in companies‟ operation. 
They can access corporate affairs, such as corporations‟ governance structures, propo- 
sed structural changes, and overall managements‟ performance. Also, they may take a 
leading role in adjusting companies‟ policies or business strategies, and decide the re- 
placement of chief executive officers (CEOs).
42
 Yet, a number of legal and social for- 
ces restrict the role of institutional investors in the U.S. corporate governance.
43
 The- 
se factors hamper the effectiveness of institutional shareholders to take participate in 
the process of shareholder activism. Among social forces, the conflict of interest is the 
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paramount problem, and it arises from two aspects of conflict.
44
 First, “many institut- 
ional investors have tied to management that inhibit voting against management‟s wi- 
shes.”
45
 Given that institutional investors have a variety of commercial contacts with 
corporations, they tend to support managements‟ proposals instead of ruining their bu- 
siness. Second, the Wall Street Rule – If you don‟t like management, sell – has beco- 
me a cultural norm among institutional investors. Institutional investors are inclined to 
support managements‟ decisions and business policies, if they choose not to sell their 
shareholderings.
46
  
As to legal forces, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) imp- 
oses some fiduciary obligations upon the managers of pension plans. ERISA requires 
that “whoever exercises discretion over plan assets must manage those assets solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of prov- 
iding benefit to participants and their beneficiaries.”
47
 ERISA asks the trustees of pe- 
nsion plans to be well-informed and take each decision seriously. Under ERISA, the 
Wall Street Rule cannot be adopted, and those exercising plan assets have to put bene- 
ficiaries‟ interests in the first place. In addition to social and legal forces that restrict 
the effectiveness of institutional investors in corporate governance, the free-rider issue 
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is another factor to confine the function of institutional shareholders.
48
 Eisenberg des- 
cribes this issue as follows: 
    “The significance of limited holdings by any given institutional investor in any 
given portfolio corporation is that it reduces the investor‟s cost-benefit ratio for 
active involvement, and leads to a free-rider problem…. The free rider problem 
shows that institutional investor are not likely to engage in monitoring or voting 
activity that (i) goes beyond the monitoring and voting activity in which the in- 
vestor can be expected to engage in the normal course of its shareholding capa- 
city; (ii) would require significant expenditures; (iii) would increase the value  
of the institution‟s holding in its portfolio companies by less than the costs of 
the activity; and (iv) would result in no private economic benefit to the investor 
beyond the increased value of that holding.”
49
 
Due to limited holdings of firms‟ shares, institutional shareholders are inclined to con- 
sider the cost-benefit ratio, and decide the extent that they would like to involve in co- 
rporate operation. 
   iv. Corporate Whistleblowing 
             Whistleblowing is able to be viewed as quirky corporate governance 
as Macey has mentioned above.
50
 Initially, whistleblowers are alienated by social gr- 
oups because not only are they seen as tattletales, but their intentions are also conside- 
red suspicious and vindictive.
51
 Though, when a series of corporate financial scandals 
were disclosed by corporate employees in the beginning of this century, the attitude of 
the public toward whistleblowers gradually changed and did not disdain them any- 
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20 
more. Whistleblowers are regarded as folk heroes and pour new power into reforming 
corporate governance, which are not expected historically. Once Macey states, “Whis- 
tleblowers are now thought of as an integral component of the recently regulated syst- 
em of corporate governance that is supposed to result in better monitoring and control 
of managerial misconduct (agency costs) in large publicly held corporations.”
52
 Obs- 
erving recent corporate misconduct committed by managers and cooperative entities, 
it cannot be denied that employees are the most efficient instrument to do internal co- 
ntrol and to detect organizational illegitimacy when the system of corporate supervisi- 
on has collapsed. 
 b. External Corporate Governance 
   i. Creditors and Credit-Rating Agencies 
            Shareholders care about corporate performance because they pour the- 
ir money into companies and look forward to gaining plentiful repayments. Due to 
this expectation, stockholders can be viewed as one type of monitors to promote corp- 
orate governance. As for the gathering of capital, not only can companies obtain funds 
from the public, but they also can turn to other lenders to borrow indispensable capital. 
These lenders are called creditors. Basically, there are two kinds of creditors; one is 
called institutional lenders, like commercial banks, and another is bondholders. Bond- 
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holders are individual lenders since they buy corporate bonds publicly issued by com- 
panies. Like corporate shareholders can trade their shares in the public stock market, 
creditors also can sell their loans or bonds to other institutions or investors. When the 
performance of companies is influenced by poor management, the price of bonds and 
the value of loans is going to decline, and that is the same as the value of stocks. Wor- 
se, when firms collapse owing to awful corporate operation, creditors‟ investments pr- 
obably turn to nothing, and the remnant will be zero.
53
 Neither shareholders nor cred- 
itors are willing to bear a huge amount of losses. Then, creditors similarly play an im- 
portant role in monitoring corporate operation, and indirectly promoting corporate go- 
vernance in order to make sure their investments will be repaid at last. 
At times, corporations have to establish a close relationship with specific banks 
because, on the one hand, they can get a lower interest rate of loans, and on the other 
hand, it is easier to negotiate the debt contract with a single creditor than with separate 
lenders, such as bondholders. For the sake of gaining a satisfactory interest rate, com- 
panies are required to disclose confidential information to institutional lenders. In this 
way, banks have more opportunities to estimate if corporations have healthy financial 
conditions and admirable business performance.
54
 As to an individual bondholder, he/ 
she fails to have such power to scrutinize corporations‟ affairs. Thus, he/she needs as- 
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sistance from credit-rating agencies to help him/her realize financial conditions of in- 
vested companies and make decisions. Credit-rating agencies can resolve the problem 
of information asymmetry, and provide an individual lender with information regardi- 
ng the credibility of borrowers.
55
 Therefore, not only do bondholders have a good ch- 
ance to examine and evaluate corporate operation, but they also do not fear of being 
damaged because of insufficient information to make decisions. 
   ii. Investment Banks and Securities Analysts 
             The function of investment banks is to assist corporations in selling 
newly-created securities and raising funds. When private companies want to become 
publicly-traded firms, investment banks give them a hand to design a new stock and 
help those companies to sell stocks in the public market. This process is called under- 
writing, and investment banks are named as underwriters. In addition, although firms 
have been publicly-held companies, at times, they still need additional capital to cont- 
inue business or prepare for upcoming expansions. In this way, public companies still 
require the services of investment banks to raise money from the public market, and 
make their plans or tactics practicable.
56
 As regards securities analysts, their primary 
work is to evaluate securities and provide recommendations about the time of purcha- 
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sing and selling stocks. Securities analysts‟ reports and recommendations play a critic- 
al role in influencing the prices of corporate stocks in the public market;
57
 further, th- 
ese analysts are able to make a forecast of earnings on investment and assist their clie- 
nts in making a decision regarding whether to purchase or sell stocks.
58
 
   As a result of having a function on the disclosure of information, both investment 
banks and securities analysts hold the positions to promote corporate governance. As 
investment banks design a new stock for clients, banks not only can assess companies‟ 
structures, financial conditions, and business performance, but they also can simultan- 
eously provide information and disclose potential risks about investment to the public. 
Likewise, when securities analysts provide recommendations in regard to the purcha- 
se or selling of stocks for clients, securities analysts are placed in the better position to 
approach information than the public.
59
 Both investment banks and securities analysts 
have a chance to monitor companies and detect corporate irregularity earlier. Then, in- 
vestment banks and securities analysts can be seen as an integral part of external corp- 
orate governance. 
   iii. Corporate Takeovers (The Market for Corporate Control) 
             Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are able be regarded as mechanis- 
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ms to enhance corporate governance. When corporate managers cannot do a good job 
on promoting companies‟ performance or breach their fiduciary duties to stockholders 
because of pursuing self-interest instead of investors‟ benefit, there is a high possibili- 
ty for managers to be taken over by other corporations and lose their positions. Due to 
the fear of being replaced, potential corporate takeover might be seen as a disciplinary 
measure to ensure that not only will managers do their best for companies‟ interests, 
but also managerial authority will not be abused because managers urge to go for self- 
interest and to cheat shareholders‟ investments.
60
 
   iv. Role of the SEC 
             Whether the SEC is able to enhance corporate governance, it still lea- 
ves several arguments in academic fields. Originally, the purpose to establish the SEC 
was because the U.S. government tried to fix the crisis of investors‟ confidence under 
economic depression during the early 1930s. Federal government expected the SEC 
can become the investor‟s protector, and take efforts to restore investors‟ confidence 
in the public stock market, and to regain their passion for investment. However, whet- 
her this function can be practiced by the SEC as Congress originally expected, the an- 
swer is still unclear, and the debate continues until today.
61
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Even though the role of the SEC is still arguable, I take a positive position on the 
contribution of the SEC because its regulations and rules can help rectifying compani- 
es‟ misconduct and maintaining the order of the financial market. For example, when 
the SEC takes actions against corporations for the violations of securities laws or reg- 
ulations, the value of corporate stocks is going to decline instantly as the SEC‟s punis- 
hment is widely reported to the public.
62
 The SEC‟s penalty can remind corporations 
that good corporate governance will survive their business reputation; otherwise, da- 
mage or the collapse of business is expectable. Thus, the SEC not only has a function 
to give a warning and prevent wrongdoings from happening in public companies, but 
also can regulate the disorder of the financial market and enhance investors‟ confiden- 
ce in the operation of the national economic system. 
4. Effective Whistleblowing Can Save Weak Traditional Corporate Monitors 
        As described above, different mechanisms of corporate governance are div- 
ided into internal and external monitors. Each character has its own specific function 
to promote corporate governance. Good corporate governance keeps corporate operat- 
ion on the right track and brings benefit to shareholders, employees, and further to the 
public.
63
 Since those monitors supervise companies‟ activities, these actors make cor- 
                                                     
62
 Mahmoud M. Nourayi, Stock Price Responses to the SEC’s Enforcement Actions, 13 J. of Acct. & 
Pub. Pol‟y 333, 333-47 (1994). 
63
 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 
                                                           
 
 
26 
porate governance more complete and develop a sound monitoring system. Take the 
board of directors for example. The duty of board of directors is to monitor senior ma- 
nagers and prevent fraudulent conduct from harming the interests of shareholders and 
firms. The board of directors represents shareholders to assure their interests because 
stockholders in public firms are dispersed and diverse, this specific characteristic da- 
mpens shareholders‟ function to monitor corporate management.
64
 Similarly, the acc- 
ounting industry plays a critical role in supervising companies‟ operation and enhanc- 
ing corporate governance. By scrutinizing corporate financial documents, accountants 
and auditors can access confidential materials more easily than ordinary people, and is 
able to rapidly detect corporate misconduct.
65
 As to governmental securities agencies, 
they help shareholders keep an eye on whether corporations fulfill their obligations to 
disclose necessary and sufficient information to the public, and impose punishment on 
those companies as they violate securities laws or related regulations.
66
 
Why do these mechanisms promote corporate governance effectively? The prim- 
ary feature among them probably is their independence. Independent directors on the 
board execute their duties by standing outside corporate systems, and provide dispass- 
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ionate supervision on the management.
67
 Accountants and auditors coming from acc- 
ounting firms with good reputations perform their duties detachedly, examine corpor- 
ate business materials thoughtfully, and provide conscientious and careful monitoring. 
68
 The SEC makes detailed rules and policies to regulate the financial market. It supe- 
rvises companies and ensures they are doing business on the right track. Likewise, the 
SEC sustains investors‟ confidence in corporate operation, and promotes the transpar- 
ency of the public stock market.
69
 
Ostensibly, it seems that those monitors‟ actions will not be affected by compani- 
es‟ conduct due to independence; however, being the outsider is the obstacle for them 
to oversee corporate activities, and that has a significant impact on those monitors to 
obtain accurate information and do efficient supervision.
70
 This means monitoring ac- 
tors have to depend on the information provided by corporate management to practice 
their duties of inspection.
71
 This information asymmetry weakens the function of mo- 
nitors, and reduces their efficiency to act as the mechanisms of corporate governance. 
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Even though corporate executives or subordinate managers agree to disclose informat- 
ion, sometimes, this information is deficient, or has been distorted and filtered by ma- 
nagements. In this way, traditional corporate monitors fail to know companies‟ actual 
financial conditions thanks to insufficient information.
72
 
In the worse situation, as corporate executives purposely hide, block, or misrepr- 
esent information, their purposes are apparent to hinder the inspection of these monit- 
ors. In this circumstance, the public cannot receive accurate information until the exp- 
losion of corporate financial crisis or the collapse of companies. Those consequences 
probably cause social problems and bring damage on the society. Hence, deficient ac- 
cess to corporate information is the central issue for federal government to think over 
why traditional mechanisms of corporate governance cannot deter corporate scandals 
from happening again. 
5. How to Resolve the Problem of Information Asymmetry – Making Using of 
Corporate Employees as the Monitor 
       Few people think that corporate employees can be employed as a mechani- 
sm to monitor companies‟ operation and oversee the management. However, observi- 
ng recent corporate corruption, the lower or middle level of employees indeed plays a 
significant role in disclosing employers‟ misconduct due to their familiarity of busine- 
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ss operation.
73
 Corporate employees have a better information advantage than traditi- 
onal monitoring actors since employees have more knowledge with regard to corpora- 
te business and are sensitive to ordinary activities occurring in companies.
74
 Besides, 
concerning financial materials, professional employees are able to perceive and recog- 
nize inaccurate data immediately, and detect whether corporate actions have fallen ou- 
tside the legal boundary.
75
 Hence, it can be said that employees are the persons of for- 
esight on mismanagement and any illegal actions committed by the management. 
A recent research has showed that nearly one-third of economic crimes and frau- 
dulent conduct occurring in companies were disclosed by corporate employees.
76
 No- 
wadays, corporate employees not only are viewed as agents, who originally have to be 
loyal to their principles and be subject to their control, but they also are empowered to 
act as the representatives of public interest. In addition, employees are required to rep- 
ort corporate wrongdoing by timely methods, and do their best to decrease damage on 
shareholders and the public. In this way, how to set up a sound system to protect and 
encourage corporate employees to unveil employers‟ misconduct is an important subj- 
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ect matter to study. 
C. What Is the Function of Whistleblower Protection in Corporate Governance? 
   1. Whistleblowing Employees Play a Critical Role in Recent Companies‟ Scandals 
         Observing recent corporate corruption, such as WorldCom, Enron, Symbol 
Technologies, and Kmart, whistleblowing employees surely have a critical function to 
disclose corporate misbehavior. In principle, corporate whistleblowers who share the 
knowledge of companies‟ irregularities can be categorized by three types. First, whist- 
leblowing employees directly disclose corporate deceptive conduct to the public. Sec- 
ond, those employees disclose their information to traditional corporate monitors rath- 
er than to companies‟ executives or other managers. Third, whistleblowers do not turn 
to the public or traditional corporate monitors; yet, they seek assistance from compan- 
ies‟ in-house consulting or supervising departments to report their detection of manag- 
ers‟ misbehavior.
77
 
The typical and the most successful whistleblowing on recent corporate scandals 
probably was Cynthia Cooper, who was the former vice president of internal auditing 
in WorldCom.
78
 Cooper disclosed false accounting and directly spoke to WorldCom‟s 
board of directors in regard to this illegitimacy. As this scandal spread out to the publ- 
ic, the WorldCom‟s Board confessed to those accounting frauds and immediately disc- 
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harged WorldCom‟s CFO, Scott Sullivan, who alleged to manipulate financial cheati- 
ng and had tried to deter Cooper from investigating financial wrongdoings.
79
 Because 
of Cooper‟s endeavor and disclosure, Sullivan‟s fraudulent actions did not succeed, 
and Cooper cleared out the obstacle that blocked the disclosure of fraudulent account- 
ing made by WorldCom‟s management.
80
 
2. What Problems May Whistleblowing Employees Encounter as Disclosing Their 
Knowledge? 
       Corporate employees bear fiduciary duties to employers and to companies. 
Primarily, employees have duties of obedience, loyalty, and confidentiality when they 
keep employment relationship with organizations they serve. Among those duties, the 
duty of loyalty is the most important since it requires an employee 
“to act solely for the benefit of the principal in matters entrusted to him, … to 
take no unfair advantage of his position, … and not to act or speak disloyally in 
matters which are connected with his employment except in the protection of 
his own interests or those of others.”
81
  
Because the duty of loyalty asks employees to do everything that benefits their emplo- 
yers and organizations, whistleblowing that makes employees disclose corporate wro- 
ngdoing or employers‟ misconduct, conflicts with employees‟ fundamental duties ow- 
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ed to employers and companies they serve. 
When corporate employees decide to blow the whistle on employers‟ or compan- 
ies‟ deceitful conduct, not only do they bear the risk of retaliation taken by employers, 
but their careers may also be devastated following their disclosures.
82
 Retaliation ap- 
pears in the form of wrongful termination, demotion, co-workers‟ harassment, the de- 
nial of advancement, or other manners of discrimination.
83
 In employers‟ points of vi- 
ew, they rationalize adverse treatment on whistleblowing employees since employers 
want to sustain traditional values in the employment relationship. At times, Employers 
even assert that expelling is an inevitable means to keep employees loyal, avoid empl- 
oyees‟ morale from collapsing, maintain companies‟ internal supervising systems and 
procedures to work, and to reduce the likelihood that employers would be blamed by 
the public because of whistleblowers‟ intentional defamation.
84
  
Besides bearing the threat of being retaliated against by employers, whistleblow- 
ing employees are also alienated by colleagues, and feel a lonely existence in the wor- 
kplace. Likewise, Werhane observes, “The history of whistleblowers, most of whom 
have been fired, blackballed from their industry or profession, and have suffered pers- 
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onal problems.”
85
 These personal problems include unaffordable legal expenses that 
employees spend against employers‟ retaliatory actions;
86
 also, those involve misfort- 
unes of loss of homes and marriages.
87
 Because of a high possibility to be blacklisted 
in professional areas, whistleblowing employees may find it difficult to seek other oc- 
cupations after being terminated since prospective employers might be afraid of hiring 
discharged employees due to their disloyal records to previous employers.
88
 
3. Insufficient Protection for Whistleblowers under SOX Section 806 
a. Brief Overview of SOX Section 806  
Following a series of corporate scandals and mismanagement in the wa- 
ke of WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, and other corrupt companies, in ord- 
er to regain investors‟ confidence in corporate operation and rebuild the accountability 
of the financial market, Congress enacted the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Account- 
ability Act, which is also called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
89
 to regulate ineffect- 
ive corporate governance.
90
 SOX sweepingly reforms the disclosure requirements in 
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federal securities laws for publicly-traded companies;
91
 likewise, it provides motives 
and complete protection for employees bringing corporate financial frauds to light.
92
 
The whistleblower protection in SOX originated from the enactments of state and fed- 
eral whistleblower laws during the late twentieth century
93
 when the public‟s propen- 
sity was antagonistic and suspicious of the government and gigantic enterprises. How- 
ever, the explosion of the latest corporate scandals was the crucial impetus for Congr- 
ess to urge the birth of SOX.
94
 The provision of whistleblower protection plays a sig- 
nificant role against companies‟ securities violation. Congress attempted to encourage 
corporate officers, directors, and employees to be foot soldiers to detect and deter cor- 
porate misconduct,
95
 and required them to report irregularities occurring in the public 
company.
96
 
SOX Section 806 states that  
“[n]o company with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Secu- 
rities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under Section 15(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or any officer, employee, contractor, 
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subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, thre- 
aten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the ter- 
ms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the emplo- 
yee…”
97
  
This provision delineates the protected subject, the protected activity, and the regulat- 
ed object that ought to be noticed, and those are going to be analyzed below: 
i. Who Are to be Protected and be Regulated? 
           The protected subject in SOX Section 806 is employees. Although the 
statute does not clearly make a definition of employee, observing the legislative histo- 
ry and the statutory policy, it can be inferred that covered employees include current 
and former employees, and applicants.
98
 As for covered employers, SOX not only ap- 
plies to public corporations, but extends to contractors, subcontractors, and agents co- 
ntrolled or manipulated by those public firms.
99
 Hence, the scope of protected subject 
and regulated object are quite broad, and the policy to shield applicants is an unprece- 
dented breakthrough compared to other whistleblower statutes.
100
 When covered em- 
ployees determine to unveil corporate securities violation, they are not required to pr- 
ove the wrongdoing actually occurs, but they have to show that they reasonably belie- 
ve disclosed misconduct breaches federal securities laws, regulations, the SEC‟s rules, 
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or regulated frauds.
101
 
ii. What Are to be Protected? 
           SOX Section 806 regulates covered employers cannot “discharge, de- 
mote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate” against employ- 
ees who blow the whistle to federal regulatory agencies and courts, Congress, or som- 
eone who “has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct” in the 
company.
102
 Hence, protected activities are diversified; these activities not only inclu- 
de usual corporate punishment, but cover other unequal discrimination. Unlike former 
federal whistleblower statutes did not specify the outlet for employees to make a repo- 
rt,
103
 SOX clearly provides legitimate channels for employees to disclose information 
about corporate wrongdoings. In SOX, employees are able to select federal regulatory 
or enforcement agencies, or any member or committee of Congress to share their kno- 
wledge on securities violations; or they are capable of choosing to make internal disc- 
losure to someone in charge in the corporation. 
iii. How Is Whistleblowers to be Protected? 
    (1) Process 
              When employees are retaliated against by employers thanks to th- 
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eir disclosures, they are able to file a claim to the Department of Labor (DOL) in nin- 
ety days after getting a notice of adverse actions.
104
 The DOL will hand the claim ov- 
er to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to investigate if em- 
ployees‟ allegations are merited.
105
 In the investigation, the employee has to “make a 
prima facie showing that the alleged protected activity was a contributing factor” for 
adverse actions taken by the employer.
106
 As the employee‟s showing is satisfied, the 
employer has twenty days to meet OSHA from receiving the complaint in order to de- 
fend his/her position.
107
 For the sake of meeting the employer‟s evidentiary duty, the 
employer has to show by “clear and convincing evidence that he[/she] would have ta- 
ken the same unfavorable personal action in the absence of the protected activity.”
108
 
When the employer cannot satisfy his/her burden of proof, and the OSHA investigator 
is also certain that a retaliatory action has been taken by the employer, the OSHA inv- 
estigator will make a preliminary order for the employee to relieve his/her losses bec- 
ause of adverse action.
109
 As receiving a preliminary order, both parties still can app- 
eal the claim and ask for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in thir- 
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ty days; otherwise, the employee‟s claim will be settled.
110
 
In order to request a hearing before an ALJ, the employee has to ultimately prove 
by a preponderance of evidence,
111
 and shows that (1) he/she has engaged in protect- 
ed activities in Section 806, (2) the employer was aware of the protected activity, (3) 
he/she has suffered adverse employment actions, and (4) the protected activity was li- 
kely a contributing factor in the employer‟s decision to take adverse actions.
112
 In or- 
der to avoid the time-consuming administrative procedure, Congress required OSHA 
to issue the final order in 180 days under this proceeding.
113
 If the employee‟s claim 
still cannot be settled in this framed time, the employee is able to bring a civil suit to 
federal district court for a de novo review.
114
 
    (2) Remedies 
As for remedies, the statute describes that “[a]n employee prevail- 
ing in any action … shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee wh- 
ole.”
115
 The relief includes “(1) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the 
employee would have had, but for the discrimination; (2) the amount of back pay, wi- 
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th interest; and (3) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the 
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney 
fees.”
116
 Hence, an employee blowing the whistle under SOX not only can be protect- 
ed by being repaid his/her expenses against an employer‟s retaliatory action, but also 
his/her original occupation will be assured and restored. 
Due to sound whistleblower protection in SOX Section 806, it not only provides 
a motive for employees to unveil corporate securities violations without fearing of be- 
aring discrimination, financial losses, and misfortunes, but it also ameliorates the defi- 
ciency of information asymmetry that happens in traditional mechanisms of corporate 
governance.  
b. Inadequate Protection under SOX Section 806 
Although SOX Section 806 provides the whole protection for employe- 
es who blow the whistle on corporate securities violations, some details have not been 
anticipated by Congress when it enacted the statute; these defects make SOX hard to 
achieve its statutory purposes. Observing the statistics compiled by the DOL,
117
 it sh- 
owed that covered employees have a low probability to be granted a preliminary order 
issued by OSHA and to receive satisfying relief. Even though employees file an appe- 
al and ask for a hearing before an ALJ, they still fail to change their inferior positions 
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and reverse unsatisfactory results. These phenomena might be inferred that traditional 
bias and hostility toward whistleblowers have appeared in the administrative procedu- 
re.
118
 Below, I am going to exemplify several problems in SOX Section 806 that have 
been discussed by some commentators and legal scholars in academic articles. 
       i. Procedural Problems 
         (1) Problem of Timelines Obedience 
                SOX Section 806 has set up the framed time at each stage under 
the investigation of OSHA; the administrative agency designed these regulations fav- 
orably for whistleblowing employees. However, the DOL does not truly execute those 
timelines,
119
 and this circumstance causes the imbalanced protection of interests bet- 
ween the employee and the employer. 
         (2) One-Side Submission and Issue of Accessing Witnesses 
                The procedure of investigation permits accused employers to ma- 
ke a submission to the OSHA investigator; yet, whistleblowing employees do not enj- 
oy this right,
120
 and this privilege results in information asymmetry. The one-side su- 
bmission is harmful to employees because not only can inaccurate information be pro- 
vided by employers, but those imprecise materials may also have a crucial impact on 
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the investigator‟s decision. Besides, accused employers are able to freely access witn- 
esses, and these actions probably affect the authenticity of evidence. 
         (3) The Administrative Procedure Might be a Forced Waiting Period for 
Whistleblowing Employees 
The administrative procedure is regarded as a forced waiting peri- 
od for employees who suffer adverse actions. For example, when OSHA does not iss- 
ue a final preliminary order to covered employees in 180 days, employees can file a 
civil lawsuit to federal district court for a de novo review. However, between the filing 
and the start of de novo review, damaged employees are forced to wait until the revie- 
wing procedure begins. This waiting period frustrates damaged employees and exhau- 
sts their energies for litigation.
121
 
       ii. Substantive Problems 
         (1) Issue of Burden of Proof 
                As covered employees file a claim to the DOL, they have to prove 
that protected activities have been taken by their employers. As for the evidence, SOX 
does not describe what kind of evidence that employees have to present. However, ob- 
serving former discrimination cases, courts might consent the plaintiff (employee) to 
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show discrimination with circumstantial evidence
122
 or with proof of a pattern of past 
discrimination.
123
 Nevertheless, when covered employees are the first person to discl- 
ose companies‟ wrongdoings, this type of evidence or information is not available for 
them to receive, and this situation increases the difficulty for employees to satisfy the- 
ir burden of proof.
124
 
         (2) Issue of Shifting of Burden of Proof 
                The shifting of burden of proof is another obstacle for whistleblo- 
wing employees to receive a satisfying result when filing a claim in SOX. As employ- 
ees appeal the claim and request a hearing before an ALJ, they have to satisfy evident- 
iary duty by a preponderance of evidence to hold their positions.
125
 Yet, due to a fee- 
ble position of employees to gather information, and employers‟ managerial power to 
discharge employees at any time, it is hard for employees to obtain persuasive eviden- 
ce against employers‟ adverse actions. This inferior position raises the possibility that 
employees might lose their claims in the administrative procedure; likewise, it increa- 
ses the difficulty for damaged employees to make up for losses thanks to the disclosu- 
re of corporate securities violation. 
       iii. Difficulties to Practice SOX Whistleblower Protection 
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          (1) Pressure of Humiliation and Lay-Offs 
                 Employees who disclose fraudulent activities taken by corporate 
managers have to bear the pressure from colleagues‟ harassment and suffer potential 
public disgraces. Besides, in the worst situation, it is highly probable that employees 
may be terminated after reporting irregularities, and then have no financial support to 
fight against dishonest employers and formidable companies.
126
 These weak positio- 
ns impose economic burdens and mental effects upon employees, and make them face 
unexpected and unknown consequences alone. 
          (2) Asymmetry of Information and Limited Resources 
                 Thanks to the inferior position to access information and witnes- 
ses in the procedure of investigation, and restricted resources to file a claim, it is hard 
for employees to challenge powerful, influential enterprises.
127
 Corporate employers 
are placed in the advantageous position to access information, to receive corporate fi- 
nancial supports, and to be supplied by incomparable resources to refute employees‟ 
accusations. Hence, it can be observed that covered employees cannot call the shots in 
the administrative procedure under SOX whistleblower protection, and may have a di- 
fficult time fighting against employers and companies. 
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          (3) Few Witnesses to Share Knowledge of Fraud 
                 Corporate whistleblowers have a dilemma as they have the kno- 
wledge with regard to deceitful conduct committed by companies. Whistleblowers do 
not like to share information with colleagues or supervisors since they fear to be betr- 
ayed by those people. Those whistleblowers may be seen as uncooperative
128
 and un- 
friendly team players in the workplace, and are easily alienated by colleagues. In add- 
ition to being isolated by coworkers, whistleblowers also tend to alienate themselves. 
Because of feeling frustrated in the working atmosphere, whistleblowers have no pas- 
sion for working and depreciate the values in the employment relationship. They rare- 
ly participate in companies‟ activities since they want to feel safer in the place of work; 
yet, they are inclined to take more time on gaining information about corporate wron- 
gdoings, and strengthen their positions on the disclosure as filing a claim against com- 
panies.
129
 Thus, it may be said that whistleblowers are alone in the way of disclosure 
on corporate irregularities. 
          (4) Mandatory Arbitration Agreement 
                 A mandatory arbitration agreement is an obstacle that makes wh- 
istleblower protection in SOX unsuccessful. Because at least one court‟s decision stat- 
ed corporate whistleblowers are subject to private arbitration agreements, this preced- 
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ent made SOX Section 806 cannot achieve its statutory purpose even if SOX is a typi- 
cal means to resolve employment disputes, and prevent employees from being retalia- 
ted against by employers.
130
 Though, courts‟ positive positions on mandatory arbitrat- 
ion agreements are harmful to SOX Section 806 because those preliminary agreemen- 
ts tend to be unfavorable to damaged employees.
131
 
 
Chapter II. The Background and Various Perspectives of Whistleblowing 
A. What Is Whistleblowing and Who Can Blow the Whistle? 
In order to define whistleblowing, it is not easy to find a specific term and asc- 
ertain its meaning in recent English dictionaries. In addition, the writer may suppose 
that he/she has misspelled the word since the word processing is unable to recognize 
this term. However, the writer‟s wonder is rationale because the term of “whistleblow- 
ing” is newly-created and combined by the word – “blow” and “whistle”. Once a cou- 
rt traced back the source and stated that “whistleblowing” derived from the English 
bobby‟s action, which tried to get attention from the public and other law enforcement 
officers when he/she detected the occurrence of crimes in danger areas.
132
 Unlike the 
alarm given by the police when he/she perceives crimes have been committed, curren- 
tly, “whistleblowing” is being used more often on describing the disclosures of private 
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corporations‟ or organizations‟ unlawful activities made by their employees, managers, 
and other professional parties. 
Hence, what is the meaning of whistleblowing, and which actions can be covered? 
Several legal scholars try their best to make a definition for the sake of clarifying the 
term of whistleblowing. For example, Elliston describes that the act of whistleblowing 
occurs when four conditions are met.  
“First, an individual performs an action or series of actions intended to make inf- 
ormation public; second, the information is made a matter of public record; thi- 
rd, the information is about possible or actual, nontrivial wrongdoing in an org- 
anization; fourth, the individual who performs the action is a member or former 
member of the organization.”
133
 
Rubinstein notes that whistleblowing is “an attempt by an employee of a corporation 
or business firm to disclose what he or she believes to be wrongdoing in or by the org- 
anization.”
134
 Similarly, Jones states “[w]histleblowing is an employee‟s disclosure of 
his supervisor‟s or employer‟s illegal activities to management or law enforcement of- 
ficials.… [O]bjectives of whistleblowing are „to expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoin- 
gs.‟”
135
 In addition, Berry describes that “[w]histleblowing is an avenue for maintain- 
ing integrity by speaking one‟s truth about what is right and what is wrong. It is a stra- 
tegy for asserting rights, protecting interests, influencing justice, and righting wrongs. 
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Whistleblowing is the voice of conscience.”
136
 
Even though these scholars use a variety of ways to describe whistleblowing, the 
function and the goal of whistleblowing are the same. That is, a discloser not only wa- 
nts to be a reminder of organizations he/she serves, but attempts to make those bodies 
aware that illegitimate, immoral or fraudulent activities should be ended since misco- 
nduct has been detected and cannot be hided any more. This discloser is called a “wh- 
istleblower” and can be defined when someone (1) takes actions stemming from appr- 
opriate moral motives of preventing unnecessary harm to others; (2) uses all available 
internal procedures for rectifying the problematic behaviour before public disclosure, 
although special circumstances may preclude this; (3) has evidence that would persua- 
de a reasonable person; (4) perceives serious danger that can result from the violation; 
(5) acts in accordance with his or her responsibilities for avoiding and/or exposing the 
moral violation; (6) takes actions having some reasonable chance of success.
137
 As to 
the violation that a whistleblower intends to preclude from occurring and causing ha- 
rm to others, sometimes, it is physical, like “dumping toxic wastes or marketing unsa- 
fe drugs and cars”; financial, like “camouflaging huge cost overruns in the developm- 
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ent of weapon systems or misusing public funds”;
 138
 or legal, like breaking the law 
or violating codes of ethics. Yet, no matter what violation a whistleblower discloses, 
his/her motive to report organizational illegitimacy is almost unselfish because his/her 
“primary motivation for blowing the whistle is to correct wrongdoing and get the org- 
anization „back on track.‟”
139
 
In this way, whistleblowing can be seen as “the disclosure by organizational me- 
mbers (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the contr- 
ol of their employers to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action."
140
 
This description is the most commonly-accepted definition for whistleblowing. In the 
next section, I am going to employ this definition to analyze the elements of whistleb- 
lowing, and this will refer to Miceli & Near‟s book.
141
 
1. Disclosure to Persons or Divisions That May be able to Affect Actions 
Whistleblowing will be complete as a discloser presents his/her concern to 
someone or a division in charge.
142
 At times, the observers of questionable activities 
are powerless because they cannot right those wrongdoings, and are unable to prevent 
damage from harming an organization and the public. If fraudulent actions fail to be 
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rectified by a person or a department in charge, whistleblowing will be meaningless 
and have no function to put organizational misconduct back on the right track. Hence, 
based on this standard, the following situations cannot be regarded as a complete acti- 
on of whistleblowing.  
First, it is not whistleblowing when an observer turns a blind eye and does not ta- 
ke any action to disclose unlawful activities. Second, the behaviour cannot be called 
whistleblowing when an observer only chats about misconduct or related matters with 
their colleagues, but does not seek assistance from others who can make things correct. 
Third, when perceiving illegal activities, an observer does not request others who ha- 
ve authority to rectify, but simply requires the wrongdoer to cease his/ her actions wit- 
hout disclosing. Fourth, it should not be called whistleblowing when an observer noti- 
ces misbehavior, but chooses to quit from the organization he/she serves and not bring 
unlawful conduct to light.
143
 None of these situations is whistleblowing because eith- 
er non-reporting or reporting misbehavior to an observer‟s family, friends, or cowork- 
rs cannot right wrongdoings, and all of these outlets are not the person or the division 
having the power to control misconduct and having abilities to affect the consequenc- 
es of unlawful activities. 
2. Constituents of an Organization 
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For the sake of blowing the whistle, it is quite important for a discloser to 
be a member of organization when unveiling fraudulent actions. Becoming a member 
of organization makes a discloser have more opportunities to access and to detect ille- 
gal activities than any outsider. In addition, thanks to a discloser‟s profession or famil- 
iarity with job-related processes, it is easier for him/her to be a whistleblower than ot- 
hers who do not have knowledge or expertise in regard to the operation of organizati- 
on. Thus, it is generally accepted that a whistleblower ought to be a constituent of org- 
anization when disclosing illegal conduct to the person or other institutions that have 
authority to rectify those mistakes.
144
 It does not matter if a discloser is a member of 
organization when misconduct has been righted or disclosed to the public;
145
 however, 
the status of discloser as reporting organizational wrongdoing is the only factor to be 
considered in this portion. 
3. Illegal, Immoral, or Illegitimate Practices 
Whenever starting to undertake a mission or work, there should be a moti- 
ve or reason to act. Due to this concept, without observing the wrongdoing or miscon- 
duct occurring in an organization, there is no sufficient ground for an employee to dis- 
close an employer‟s fraudulent action, and remind others that a manager is out of con- 
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trol. Thus, the action of whistleblowing needs a “triggering event,”
146
 and “there must 
be someone in the woods to hear the tree falling.”
147
 
However, what kinds of organizational activities can become the target for a dis- 
closer to blow the whistle? If a suspected activity cannot be viewed as wrongfulness, 
there is no motive for an employee to take care others‟ business. Generally speaking, a 
triggering event for an employee to make a disclosure is “an activity that is considered 
wrongful, rather than simply an acceptable but not optimal organizational activity.”
148
 
Besides, the “wrongdoing may constitute corporate crime, which is „any act punishab- 
le by the state, regardless of whether it is punished by administrative or civil law, whi- 
ch it usually is, or under the criminal law.‟”
149
 Further, Miceli & Near said that even 
if the activity seems to be legal and not criminal, it still can be considered as illegitim- 
acy.
150
 The reason is that the observer of suspected activity may view this action ope- 
rated by the organization is beyond “the realm of the organization‟s authority.”
151
 In 
this way, an organization‟s conduct seems to be illegal as it is neither authorized nor 
has right to involve in the matter or the business in specific or restricted areas.  
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As for omission, Miceli & Near noted that it also can be seen as a wrongful acti- 
vity, even though omission is not a discrete event.
152
 Miceli & Near took a pharmace- 
utical company for example and described that when “a pharmaceutical company may 
fail to inform customers or regulatory agencies of risks or dangers inherent in a drug 
they produce,”
153
 the company is responsible to the harm imposed upon society beca- 
use of omitting material information. Hence, as omission occurs, an organization is li- 
able to its conduct and cannot get rid of punishment under the law. 
As a whistleblower tries to make a disclosure, and his/her intent to disclose is not 
motivated to right an organization‟s illegal, immoral conduct, his/her action cannot be 
regarded as whistleblowing.
154
 Studying the goal of whistleblowing, a discloser tends 
to make misconduct be rectified and wishes that a person or a division in charge can 
truly affect those illegal actions and correct wrongdoings. If the communication to a 
recipient will not bring any difference regarding misbehavior, and wrongful activities 
still proceed, not only does the goal of whistleblowing fail to be achieved, but a discl- 
oser also take a risk of being retaliated against and suffering adverse actions taken by 
his/her employer or organization. 
4. Activities under the Control of an Organization 
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Sometimes, the act of discloser is not only to battle with a single wrongdo- 
er, but he/she probably struggles with a whole organization. Observing recent corpor- 
ate corruption in the beginning of this century, companies‟ irregularities were controll- 
ed by corporate management. In the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 and § 2.03, 
the management is considered to have actual and apparent authority on behalf of a co- 
rporation to do business.
155
 Most of the time, corporate managers in the highest auth- 
ority are the agents of companies, what they do is on behalf of those companies. Foll- 
owing these concepts, it can be said that the wrongdoing committed by corporate ma- 
nagers is also regarded as organizational misbehavior. 
According to a research that studied organizational crime, it said that poor corpo- 
rate financial performance is one of the factors that makes managers commit financial 
fraudulent conduct.
156
 The reason is that, on the one hand, managers are afraid of bei- 
ng distrusted by corporations and stockholders regarding their abilities to promote the 
business, and worry those inabilities affect their positions in companies. On the other 
hand, managers are responsible to pursue the best interest of corporations and shareh- 
olders; thus, losses are not allowable, and profits are expected by shareholders and co- 
mpanies. Due to potential pressures coming from companies and stockholders, mana- 
gers are required to present satisfactory financial performance, and must prepare to fa- 
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ce criticisms when profits fail to meet stockholders‟ and companies‟ expectations. As 
a result of these concerns, as managers notice corporate financial performance is not 
as good as they originally expect, they tend to start making up fraudulent financial st- 
atements to conceal losses. Hence, this is the primary motive for managers to commit 
organizational illegitimacy and try to hide all disadvantageous materials. 
Although the research has pointed out that poor corporate financial performance 
has a connection with managers‟ fraudulent activities, it also described this relationsh- 
ip has gotten weaker in recent corporate corruption. The research found corporate fra- 
ud gradually results from managers‟ personal greed, even though the company‟s fina- 
ncial condition is healthy and sound. Due to the prevalence of stock options as a prim- 
ary feature of executive compensation, those “stock option programs adopted by publ- 
ic companies yield unprecedented gains for senior executive.”
157
 Because the value 
of stock options is tied to the profit of the company, this compensation causes manag- 
ers to have a strong personal monetary incentive to falsify financial information and 
materials. Since the management puts much emphasis on pursuing self-interest, inste- 
ad of paying attention to corporate business and future performance, this situation not 
only makes fraudulent activities increase, but also changes managers‟ faith to be loyal 
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to companies and take care of stockholders‟ interests and firms‟ benefit.
158
 
B. Origin of Whistleblower Protection and Its Evolution  
   1. Overview 
         Before starting to study whistleblowing, it is better to be familiar with the 
historical process and know how the law began to protect the whistleblower. The for- 
mer society did not pay too much attention to whistleblower protection since business 
transactions and social conditions were not as complicated as those in the present soc- 
iety. Then, employees did not used to be shielded from retaliation when they disclosed 
organizational wrongdoings in the early labor laws and regulations. Yet, followed by 
the increase of organizational fraud, the legislature has spent many years to realize the 
need of society, and enact ordinances to prevent whistleblowers from being retaliated 
against by employers due to the disclosure.
159
 In addition, federal and state legislatur- 
es recognize that whistleblower protection is necessary in complex business activities 
because corporate employees can be the monitor to hamper employers‟ fraudulent act- 
ions; also, they are capable of unveiling organizations‟ misconduct before the misbeh- 
avior is out of control. 
The primary reason to protect a whistleblower might be attributed by two aspects. 
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First, the interaction of human relationships has been changed.
160
 Different from the 
complexity of political or commercial environment in the late 20
th
 century, in the 19
th
 
century, an individual tended to sustain a self-sufficient life, and few large-scale orga- 
nizations could affect each person‟s livelihood and the whole economy. Yet, following 
the growth of organizations and their abilities to control varied business activities, an 
individual gradually realized his/her life connects to others, and he/she might be easi- 
ly damaged due to others‟ anti-social behaviour.
161
 Since the economic condition was 
rapidly changed, the model of interaction in human relationships was transformed fr- 
om the individualism of the nineteenth century to the interdependence of individuals 
of the twentieth century.
162
 Considering an individual‟s perception on social structur- 
es had changed, the public not only required the government to provide more protecti- 
on on economic activities, but also asked the legislature to take necessary steps to det- 
er organizational fraud from happening.
163
  
Second, it resulted from the observations of the legislature and courts when reso- 
lving the issues of whistleblowing in the workplace. The legislature and courts recog- 
nized whistleblower protection is required because there is an imbalance in the bargai- 
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ning power in the employment relationship.
164
 In organizations, employers have man- 
agerial power to assign the job, distribute the wage and welfare, decide the promotion 
or the discharge of employees, and address business affairs. This authority accompan- 
ying social, economic, and emotional consequences has a great influence on employe- 
es‟ feelings and performance when they serve in organizations. In view of imbalanced 
power between employers and employees, the legislature enacted many statutes to pr- 
eclude employers from abusing their managerial power on employees; likewise, cour- 
ts have formed several exceptions to restrict employers‟ authority to discharge emplo- 
yees at will.
165
 
    Complete whistleblower protection cannot simply depend on limited statutes, but 
it has to be a convergent effort made by the legislature and courts in different periods. 
Examining the legislative history and different whistleblower laws are the required pr- 
ocess to realize the evolution of whistleblower protection. Under earlier whistleblow- 
er protection statutes, limited protected activities made it hard for employees to be sh- 
ielded after disclosing employers‟ misconduct and organizations‟ wrongdoings.
166
 In- 
stead of protecting all employees, several statutes limited the scope of protection for 
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employees who were the members of labor union only.
167
 When employees disclosed 
employers‟ misbehavior, but have not become the members of union, they are not co- 
vered employees in these statutes. Hence, earlier whistleblower protection laws could 
not safeguard all employees from suffering employers‟ adverse actions, but only gave 
limited anti-retaliation protection for employees as specific requirements have been 
satisfied.
168
 Below, some typical whistleblower statutes are going to be briefly introd- 
uced, and several common features regarding remedy for a whistleblower can be fou- 
nd in these regulations. 
    The 1863 False Claims Act (FCA)
169
 is an important federal whistleblower stat- 
ute to mention as starting reviewing the evolution of whistleblower protection. FCA is 
the cornerstone of whistleblower protection law enacted during the U.S. Civil War.
170
 
Unlike other federal whistleblower statutes, FCA does not provide limited protection 
for shielding whistleblowers. Yet, its protection covers all employees no matter whet- 
her they are the members of labor union or not.
171
 The origin to enact FCA was to pr- 
ohibit private entities from taking advantage of any opportunity to gain unlawful prof- 
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its or benefit owing to the shortage of resources during the American Civil War.
172
 In 
the FCA, a citizen could sue on behalf of the United States to companies that supplied 
deficient goods or products to the U.S. federal government in the Civil War.
173
 In ad- 
dition, FCA gives a financial incentive for citizens who accurately disclose corporate 
irregularities when those firms keep a business relationship with the U.S. federal gov- 
ernment.
174
 Thanks to a financial incentive, FCA probably can be regarded as the mo- 
st successful whistleblower protection law to deter organizational fraud since not only 
can a good faith whistleblower be rewarded when corporate fraudulent acts are corre- 
ctly proved, but FCA also can hold back the intent of companies to cheat the gover- 
nment.
175
 Even today, FCA is still an effective whistleblower statute against corporate  
misbehavior that attempts to gain illegal benefit and to deceive the public.
176
 
Differing from FCA provides a financial incentive to a discloser, other whistlebl- 
ower statutes turn to set up an anti-retaliation provision to protect a reporter.
177
 Anti- 
retaliation protection resulted from various labor activities that accompanied the form- 
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ation of labor union and social unrest.
178
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
is a good example. NLRA forms an anti-retaliation provision to safeguard employees 
from suffering employers‟ reprisals,
179
 and inhibits employers from taking revenge on 
employees who participate in peaceful labor activities or on those who are the organi- 
zers of these activities.
180
  
Originally, NLRA was enacted after the Great Depression, and was the statute th- 
at Congress attempted to follow a new public policy that encouraged collective barga- 
ining.
181
 The preface of NLRA not only describes that the function of forming a labor 
union promotes collective bargaining, but it also notes a labor union is a measures of 
“safeguarding commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promoting the 
flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unr- 
est.”
182
 Because of this rationale formed by NLRA, collective bargaining can be seen 
as a tool to assure employees‟ rights and interests, and employers are restricted to em- 
ploy managerial power to retaliate against employees because of their participation in 
the activities of labor union.
183
 
    During the 1960s and 1970s, the legislature‟s attention to protect a whistleblower 
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changed from the issues of economic matters to the concerns of “civil rights, consum- 
er protection, workplace safety, environmental pollution and public health.”
184
 This 
transformation was because the public started to doubt whether the integrity of corpo- 
rations had been lost and could not be relied on again.
185
 Because of this doubtfulness, 
numerous ordinances were enacted to prohibit private organizations‟ misconduct from 
harming public interest. Likewise, Congress tried to maintain the public‟s confidence 
in business activities and the financial market by regulating a sound statutory system. 
186
 Hence, in order to restore the public‟s lost faith, Congress decided to intervene in 
the matters of private workplaces and rebuild the trustworthiness that was held by pri- 
vate organizations. For achieving this goal, federal legislators found complete protect- 
ion that prevents employees from being retaliated against by employers when making 
a disclosure is a good means to deter organizations‟ wrongdoings. This policy decrea- 
ses the defects that arise from the imbalanced power in employment relationship; sim- 
ilarly, it assures employees‟ job security and avoids them from being menaced by em- 
ployers.
187
 
    In addition, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)
188
 and the Whistlebl- 
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ower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) (CSRA was amended by WPA)
189
 play important 
roles in the development of whistleblower protection. The origin to enact CSRA was 
because of the Watergate scandal happening in the Nixon administration. In order to 
restore Americans‟ confidence in the U.S. government, federal legislators enacted CS- 
RA to encourage federal employees to report wastes, frauds, or corruption in the fede- 
ral government to the authorized institution. Also, CSRA provides protection for fede- 
ral employees and prevents them from being suffering retaliation taken by their empl- 
oyers.
190
 As regards WPA, it is an amended version of CSRA and provides the same 
protection for federal employees against their supervisors. The difference between th- 
ese two statutes is that WPA establishes the Office of Special Counsel to address whi- 
stleblowers‟ arguments. This department‟s duty is to solve employees‟ complaints, in- 
vestigate the truthfulness of employees‟ allegations, and preclude employers from tak- 
ing revenge on these employees.
191
 
   2. Negative Attitudes toward Whistleblowers 
         It is quite important to think about the reason why federal legislators enact- 
ed so many statutes to protect whistleblowers from being retaliated against by emplo- 
yers. If reporting organizational wrongdoings can prevent employers from committing 
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frauds and protect public interest, is it admirable to be a whistleblower and receive a 
good reputation from others? Yet, the real situation is that whistleblowing is not as po- 
pular as it seems to be because people are inclined to conceal true feelings and thoug- 
hts in their minds. People not only tend to employ false language to interact with pers- 
ons they dislike, but they are used to catering to the majority opinion even if those op- 
inions are morally wrong. Because of those phenomena, it is rational to hold that peo- 
ple have a negative attitude to whistleblowers. However, recently, this attitude may be 
changing when the media creates the impression of “heroism” on whistleblowers. The 
media causes the public to reverse their bad impression on whistleblowing and accept 
it as worthy of compliment. Despite this trend, the negative points of view of others 
and personal undesirable experiences still cannot instantly disappear in a short time. 
Below, I am going to briefly discuss the origin of the public‟s negative views on whis- 
tleblowers and study those influences on whistleblowing. 
The first source of negative attitude toward whistleblowers results from an indiv- 
idual‟s childhood experiences.
192
 A negative impression from being snitched on incl- 
udes not only being punished by teachers and victimized by reporters, but self-esteem 
is also injured and cannot be recovered instantly. The image that reporters were stand- 
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ing aside with sniggers while being blamed is unable to be vanished in our minds.
193
 
Hence, from that day on, it is obvious to know snitching or squealing is a betrayal of 
human relationships, and its damage is not easy to make up.
194
 Besides, parents and 
home educations not only inculcate that a tattletale‟s action is despicable and can ruin 
the trust of friendships, but they indirectly give a message that interfering with others‟ 
business is superfluous.
195
 Those experiences and instructions let people to have host- 
ile and negative attitudes toward whistleblowers. In addition, these attitudes obstruct 
people from being involved in others‟ business, and make them avoid getting into any 
trouble. 
    Second, the mass media has a significant function to form negative points of vi- 
ew toward whistleblowers.
196
 People betraying their organizations and losing trust 
among their friends and colleagues can be called by different names. “To mobster, he 
is a „rat‟
197
; to drug dealers, a „snitch.‟
198
 To school children, he is a „tattletale‟
199
; to 
corporate executives, a „whistleblower.‟ To cops, he is an „informant”; to prosecutor, 
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a „cooperator.‟”
200
 Besides, they are named as “cheese-eaters,”
201
 “M&Ms,”
202
 or 
worse.
203
 However, no matter which name these people are labeled, they are establi- 
shed as the figures who are “disloyal, deceitful, greedy, selfish, and weak”
204
 in mo- 
vies, in newspapers or on television, and in literature or fiction. Also, the power of 
the mass media cannot be ignored since it has a great influence on our society today. 
The media not only is a source from which people are able to receive the latest infor- 
mation and comments, but it also is a kind of medium that helps an individual to rea- 
ch social agreements and consensus on popular issues, and to form a tasteful or dist- 
asteful impression on specific public characters, places, or events. Establishing a ne- 
gative attitude to squealing is a good example here. Even though people did not have 
any unpleasant experience with a tattletale in their childhoods, they still might be ea- 
sily influenced by the media that establishes a poor figure of tattletales in various fil- 
ms and movies; let alone those who had been betrayed by classmates, friends, relati- 
ves, colleagues, or other associates. 
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    Though the public‟s perception of squealing is negative, is it any possible to cha- 
nge citizens‟ attitudes toward whistleblowers due to gradual prevalence of whistleblo- 
wing and the actions taken by the federal government to protect whistleblowers? By 
observing recent social phenomena to whistleblowing, the goal to form a commonly- 
accepted view on whistleblowing still needs lots of efforts.
205
 In the school, the tattle- 
tale remains, and children still hate to become the victims of betrayers.
206
 The instru- 
ctions coming from parents or home education are still kept in children‟s minds. That 
is, being a tattletale is devalued behaviour, and is the quickest way to lose trust among 
friends. Nobody wants to be isolated by their groups because no one is willing to be a 
kind of loner in society. In the workplace, employees still fear of being a whistleblow- 
er because of colleagues‟ negative perception of whistleblowing. Employees still pref- 
er making use of a confidential name when reporting organizations‟ illegal actions si- 
nce they “often face ostracism from long-time friends and colleagues once it becomes 
known that they volunteered information of wrongdoing.”
207
 Because employees are 
unwilling to be called an un-cooperator or a trouble-maker in the workplace, they tend 
to turn a blind eye on organizational fraud and go away from the frustrating environ- 
ment when observing employers‟ misconduct. 
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By contrast, as employers support whistleblowing, and colleagues do not ostraci- 
ze whistleblowers, it is probable that the federal legislature might not have to provide 
a financial incentive or give protection for employees to disclose organizational fraud. 
208
 Because a good impression toward whistleblowing has been rooted in the public, 
it is not necessary to provide any motive for whistleblowing employees to take an act- 
ion. However, forming a positive attitude toward whistleblowing still need to take so- 
me time because “„minding one‟s own business‟ is still firmly rooted in the contempo- 
rary U.S. society.”
209
 
   3. Modern Business Enterprises Need Whistleblowing 
         Before the late nineteenth century, people used to support and maintain th- 
eir livelihoods by self-sufficiency, and the individual store or single commercial unit 
was regarded as the mainstream of business activities. At that time, business transacti- 
ons and exchanged goods were simple; each person believed that this model of transa- 
ction would remain unchanged. Yet, technological innovations and a rapid flow of inf- 
ormation made gigantic and powerful business organizations spring up, these changes 
altered the method of transaction and caused commerce to be more diversified and co- 
mplex. Gradually, the individual store was replaced by chain stores and large-scale fi- 
rms; in addition, commercial goods could be produced more efficiently and on a large 
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scale.
210
 Further, complicated business models need more professionals to participate 
in the operation of organizations, and the division of labor requires more expertise and 
special skills.  
However, what is the connection between whistleblowing and the transformation 
of manufacturing? Which factor makes employees have a critical function on disclosi- 
ng organizations‟ frauds? Miethe describes these points as follows:  
“Workers in the modern era rarely are involved in the total production process 
from the selecting of the raw materials to the finished product. Instead, modern 
work is piecemeal, fragmented, and specialized. The greater distancing of the 
worker from the final product, specialized tasks and areas of expertise, the invi- 
sible executive structure and absentee ownership in complex bureaucratic orga- 
nizations, and the greater number of workers with direct involvement in the pr- 
oduction process and service delivery have created a wider opportunity for ille- 
gal activity and more people to blame if something goes wrong. This division of 
labor in modern industrial societies has resulted in the growth of specialized po- 
sitions and greater vertical differentiation based on power. Workers whose tasks 
have now been finely subdivided in the modern workplace often experience di- 
minished power because they have less control over the entire production or se- 
rvice activity. This reduced power of workers to take their own corrective action 
may account for the greater reliance upon whistleblowing as a control measure 
in modern work organization.”
211
  
Following this observation, it may be inferred that complex organizational structures 
and large-scale business entities are primary reasons for the need of whistleblowing. 
The division of labor is more specialized, and specific knowledge is indispensable for 
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employees to hold positions in particular areas.
212
 Also, the revolution of information 
and technology makes an organization‟s operation more complicated and increases the 
probability of serious business corruption to occur.
213
 However, employees equipped 
with expertise have more opportunities to access confidential information and percei- 
ve frauds than others do.
214
 These employees are able to reduce fraud to happen beca- 
use they can detect wrongdoings earlier and prevent organizational irregularities from 
harming shareholders, stakeholders, and an organization itself; likewise, they can less- 
en the threats imposed upon the health and safety of society.
215
 
Although whistleblowing can avoid the public from being damaged by organizat- 
ional fraud, it is not easy for whistleblowing employees to challenge the authority set 
up by organizations. First, the commonly-accepted norm requesting employees to be 
loyal to organizations and employers is the biggest obstacle and controversial issue to 
address. Second, gigantic organizations are inclined to be more conservative and not 
good at responding to change. They tend to ignore dissenting voices from the middle 
and lower level employees and treat their advice like ordinary employees‟ meaningle- 
ss complaints. Third, large-scale organizations suspect whistleblowing and are doubtf- 
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ul of the actions of whistleblowing employees. As a result, most of the time, employe- 
es‟ disclosures fail to be paid attention to under in-house channels, and those respons- 
es make employees turn to outsiders for assistance. Once Elliston noted this issue as 
follows:  
“The larger the organization and the more technologically complex the task envi- 
ronment, the more an organization is susceptible to whistleblowing. This occurs 
because of the inherent inertia and rigidity of large-scale, complex organization- 
s. The whistleblower attempts to change the behavior or activities of individuals 
inside of the organization in some manner and feels compelled to go outside 
when he or she has exhausted all internal procedures.”
216
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the more rigid structure an organization has, the higher 
possibility an organization discourages employees from disclosing its frauds. Also, an 
organizations‟ inflexibility affects employees‟ actions to make an internal disclosure. 
When those employees feel an in-house channel cannot rectify the problem, they tend 
to go outside and seek external assistance. 
    Even if employees probably have a hard time reporting organizations‟ misbehav- 
ior, the whistleblower‟s irreplaceable role in uncovering frauds still cannot be disrega- 
rded. As Sander says, “The state has other tools to fight fraud, but the reality is that 
we need whistleblowers …We don‟t have the resources to have free-flowing investig- 
ators just looking for fraud. We rely on complaints from whistleblowers to bring cert- 
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ain kinds of fraud to our attention.”
217
 Therefore, whistleblowing can be viewed as an 
efficient method to detect and disclose organizational illegitimacy. 
People increasingly realize the importance of whistleblowing since it can be reg- 
arded as a tool to provide the public assistance to regain social control from powerful 
organizations.
218
 Whistleblowing prevents the public from being cheated and manip- 
ulated by organizations.
219
 Besides, whistleblowers have more information than othe- 
rs in regard to the details of illegitimacy;
220
 whistleblowing uses employees‟ familiar- 
ity with organizations‟ operation to disclose misconduct, and prevents those wrongdo- 
ings from getting worse.
221
 Hence, “whistleblowers are a check on management prer- 
ogative”
222
 and are the monitor to see whether employers do business on the right tra- 
ck. No matter where whistleblowing happens, whistleblowing employees are not only 
“critical component[s] to effective law enforcement in a complex society,”
223
 but they 
also are the firsthand witnesses of organizational corruption. 
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   4. Influence of Whistleblowing on an Organization and Society 
Whistleblowing is viewed as “a form of organizational dissent.”
224
 On the 
one hand, it improves decision-making in the upper management; on the other hand, it 
has a function to “break information cascades, in which a group of people uniformly 
fall in line with a few influential people who may or may not have complete access to 
full information.”
225
 Moreover, because whistleblowing is able to be seen as a kind of 
social control,
226
 whistleblowers not only avoid the public from being exposed to pot- 
ential hazards or being damaged by organizational illegal behaviour, but they also en- 
hance employers‟ integrity and promote corporate governance.
227
 
    As for the function of whistleblowing to the public, once a court stated, “Without 
employees who are willing to risk adverse employment consequences as a result of 
whistleblowing activities, the public would remain unaware of large-scale and potent- 
ially dangerous abuses.”
228
 In addition, being insiders, whistleblowers are able to em- 
ploy their positions to observe wrongdoings and to deter misbehavior.
229
 Once Macey 
said, “Tip-offs from insiders have been described as „by far the most common method 
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of detecting fraud.‟”
230
 Further, disclosures and information provided by whistleblo- 
wers enable to reduce the costs of discovering and investigating organizational frauds 
for the public.
231
 
With regard to the role of whistleblowing for managements and organizations, it 
also can play a positive role in enhancing the safety of organizations and in promoting 
the quality of managements‟ decision-making. Dworkin & Callahan describe this poi- 
nt as follows: 
“Whistleblowers may be seen as reformers whose actions often benefit the orga- 
nization. They are one of the least expensive and most efficient sources of feed- 
back about mistakes the firm may be making. They can help identify unsafe pr- 
oducts or practices, wasteful or fraudulent actions, and other harmful or crimin- 
al behavior. Whistleblowers can bypass the institutional barriers to communica- 
tion found especially in large organizations, benefitting their employers not on- 
ly by identifying problems, but also by suggesting solutions.”
232
  
Then, whistleblowers are capable of finding serious hazards to business operation bef- 
orehand, which might negatively affect organizations‟ interests, performance, and rep- 
utations. By means of whistleblowers‟ disclosures, managements can rectify these pr- 
oblems in time and avoid damage or losses for organizations. 
Further, because organizations have to be flexible and adjust structures immedia- 
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tely in order to make a response to any changes in the market, whistleblowers also pl- 
ay a role in these changes. As Elliston says:  
“Organizations must adapt to their environments if they are to survive. With the 
continued acceleration of change, adaptation is becoming more difficult. Chan- 
ges in technology, the economy, government regulations, consumer preferences, 
work patterns, and media coverage are occurring rapidly and require that organ- 
izations become more involved with forecasting changes before they occur. 
Whistleblowing can be taken as an attempt at warning the organization of some 
undesirable changes in its environment that might arise if certain adaptations 
are not made.”
233
  
In this way, a whistleblower of organizations not only can be regarded as having the 
foresight to the changes, but he/she also can be viewed as the reminder of organizatio- 
ns about these changes. A whistleblower is able to benefit an organization‟s activities 
since he/she assists an organization in knowing which interests it can go for, and what 
losses it should avoid. 
Making a reference to Miceli and Near‟s book, it analyzes the costs and benefit 
of whistleblowing.
234
 Miceli and Near make comparisons on potential costs and ben- 
efit of whistleblowing and inaction between an organization and society at large. The- 
se consequences are going to be categorized below.  
a. Potential Costs and Benefit of Not Blowing the Whistle 
i. Potential Costs to the Employing Organization 
          Two problems probably arise when there is no whistleblowing in the 
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organization. First, keeping silence on organizational fraud makes employees work in- 
efficiently. Employees might not be willing to devote themselves to working because 
they think that the upper management does not care about their thoughts and opinions. 
Instead, employees turn to complain among families, friends, and colleagues, and ch- 
oose not to present their worries to promote the management‟s decision-making. Thus, 
the organization perhaps suffers negative consequences. On the one hand, the organiz- 
ation‟s performance may go down and fail to compete with business competitors. On 
the other hand, employees may lose their passion for working and do not want to stir 
their brains to think of creative ideas for work. In addition, they may not be adventur- 
ous employees since the frustrating working atmosphere decreases their willingness to 
grab any chance to succeed and create massive fortunes for their organizations.  
Second, if employees fail to disclose employers‟ misconduct, employers may not 
be frightened to do anything wrong because employees are unable to stop employers 
from committing illegal actions. Hence, unlawful activities cannot be rectified if there 
is no whistleblower to unveil organizational illegitimacy. In the whistleblower‟s point 
of view, not only will employers‟ fraudulent activities bring the failure of organizatio- 
ns‟ business, but also employers‟ concerns in private interests will cause severe dama- 
ge on organizations and public good. 
ii. Potential Benefit to the Employing Organization 
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          The operation of bureaucratic organizations depends on the power of 
management. Employers‟ managerial power lets organizations‟ policies and orders be 
practiced smoothly and properly. When employees show their respect for employers‟ 
managerial authority, the atmosphere of workplaces will be harmonious, not hostile. 
Pleasant working environments can promote employees‟ efficiency in work and create 
a cooperative atmosphere to increase the productivity of organizations. Hostility does 
not exist in the employment relationship, and there is no distrust among colleagues. In 
this way, conflicts in the workplace can be avoided; adverse actions imposed on empl- 
oyees are unnecessary and may be thrown away. In employees‟ minds, absolute obedi- 
ence to employers is the only faith. They do not second-guess employers‟ power since 
they believe that employers‟ decisions are trustworthy and accurate. In addition, if th- 
ere are few complaints made by employees, organizations do not have to waste resou- 
rces on investigating the truthfulness of arguments. Hence, time, money, and labor are 
able to be saved and be used in other ways to promote organizations‟ profits. Further, 
the decrease of complaints not only stabilizes the operation of organizations, but it al- 
so makes employees more concentrate on their work. 
iii. Potential Costs to Society at Large 
           Considering that most organizations‟ frauds may damage social inte- 
rest, if employees cannot report employers‟ fraudulent actions outside of organizations, 
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the consequence will jeopardize the public‟s health and safety at last. Issues on pollut- 
ion, potential environmental hazards, or the government‟s abuse of citizens‟ privacy 
are closely related to our daily lives. Whistleblowers in these areas not only can discl- 
ose organizations‟ wrongdoings to citizens who care about those issues, but also can 
be the medium that assists the public in accessing information, which people are hard- 
ly to reach. Besides, it is important to notice that the costs of not blowing the whistle 
to society are in proportion to the extent of the public‟s acceptance to whistleblowing. 
The more positive attitude of citizens supports whistleblowers, the greater the costs of 
not blowing the whistle will impose upon society. 
iv. Potential Benefit to Society at Large 
           Like the benefit to organizations, if there is no whistleblower in soc- 
iety, the public will not be disturbed by frivolous complaints, and unrest will be decre- 
ased. Because few arguments are made, the public can save its time, money, and labor 
to investigate and fight against organizational illegitimacy. Likewise, the society will 
benefit from organizations‟ performance if few whistleblowing happens in organizati- 
ons. Without whistleblowers‟ disclosures, managers are encouraged to make adventur- 
ous, but risky decisions, and can be more flexible to adjust business strategies. Mana- 
gers will not worry to be second-guessed by employees and can take uncertain actions 
with no fear. After all, business success relies on any risky chance that managers are 
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willing to take, and bases on any method that managers would like to give it a shot. 
Thus, the public probably benefits from this phenomenon since managers do not give 
up any opportunity to achieve the goal. Organizations served by hard-working emplo- 
yees and adventurous managers promote the national economy and bring a big fortune 
to society.  
b. Potential Costs and Benefit of Blowing the Whistle 
     i. Potential Costs to the Employing Organization 
       (1) Challenge to Authority Structure 
              Whistleblowing can be seen as a challenge to the chain of comm- 
and because it weakens the authority established by the management. In organizations, 
employees are asked to be loyal and obedient to employers. Dissenting voices are not 
allowable, and second-guesses on managers‟ power are not permissible. When emplo- 
yers‟ managerial authority is challenged, employers probably feel their power is restri- 
cted because they are afraid of making decisions that may raise arguments from disse- 
nting employees. Employers are inclined to see these employees as “having gone beh- 
ind their backs or over their heads.”
235
 Thus, losing authority is viewed as the cost for 
employers and organizations.  
However, as organizations intend to encourage employees to report wrongdoings 
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and establish in-house channels for employees to present their concerns, whistleblow- 
ing is not a challenge for the management‟s authority anymore. Instead, it is an altern- 
ative form of communication between the management and employees. Hence, whet- 
her whistleblowing should be regarded as the cost for organizations, the result still has 
to be decided by the attitude of management and organizations. 
       (2) Threats to Organizational Viability 
              Whistleblowing has a great influence on the survival of organizat- 
ions. When employers think that immoral activities are probable to survive organizati- 
ons‟ business, and believe that tricks may cut spending and promote organizations‟ pr- 
ofits, whistleblowers perhaps hamper employers‟ intent to take actions thanks to altru- 
ism. Whistleblowers do not appreciate employers to pursue short-term profits and ign- 
ore long-term business goals; though, they wish employers to look further and take ef- 
forts to preserve organizations‟ values and benefit. Whistleblowers realize that even if 
immoral actions may survive business, these actions still bring harm to organizations 
and society in the end. This consequence is unable to meet the public‟s expectation on 
honest commerce, and probably loses the public‟s trust in business activities. Therefo- 
re, whistleblowers deprive employers‟ freedom to go for short-term success, and restr- 
ict employers‟ managerial authority to take diverse, adventurous actions, even though 
those decisions or actions are improper and risky. Davidson & Worrell state this situa- 
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tion as follows:  
“Ethical issues aside, from a shareholder‟s standpoint, illegal acts may be worth- 
while if their expected benefit outweigh their expected costs. In addition, some 
investors may view managerial attempts to test the legal waters as preferable to 
always proceeding in a risk-averse manner. Wealth-maximizing shareholders 
may consider it desirable for manager to occasionally get caught trying to 
cheat.”
236
 
Unlike whistleblowers‟ points of view, stockholders of organizations may rationalize 
employers‟ illegal behaviour if the consequences of immoral actions can create more 
benefit than damage for their investments. Stockholders‟ concerns are rational because 
making a profit is the only thing they care about; which method to make a profit is not 
an important factor for them to consider. Contrarily, organizational whistleblowers do 
not think about the profit, what they care is whether organizations can survive the bu- 
siness and continue their operation no matter how tough the situation they will encou- 
nter. 
       (3) Limitations on Control 
              Whistleblowing may be the cost for organizations because it is ab- 
le to restrict employers‟ authority to control the whole operation of organizations. Due 
to managerial power, employers have the right to make decisions regarding organizat- 
ions‟ policies and business strategies. They enjoy the power that prevents them from 
being intervened in business matters by outsiders. However, whistleblowers are incli- 
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ned to restrict employers‟ authority when they not only recognize that employers‟ ma- 
nagerial power fails to get along well with their expectations, but also are aware that 
this power will bring damage on organizations. Once Miceli and Near stated about a 
whistleblowers, and said “not only does he or she choose not to take part in the activi- 
ties, but he or she attempts to keep others from doing so.”
237
 In short, whistleblowers 
tend to invade the managerial area in which they are not allowed to get involved; also, 
they attempt to hinder employers‟ actions from making business decisions and preclu- 
de them from enjoying their legal authority. 
       (4) Unpredictability of Organization Member Actions 
              The last thing to think about whistleblowing is that nobody knows 
when or how their colleagues will blow the whistle, and whether the consequence will 
threaten the work and professional activities. Unpredictable whistleblowing is a factor 
that makes working environments unstable. In this situation, it not only makes emplo- 
yees fail to concentrate on their work, but also brings employers a potential risk to fa- 
ce diverse complaints. In the end, organizations‟ performance cannot be promoted by 
employers‟ risky, but probably successful, decisions since employers are afraid of co- 
coping with unpredictable whistleblowing; likewise, they have no idea what argumen- 
ts will be made, and how whistleblowers will restrict their power to make decisions or 
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to take business actions.  
     ii. Potential Benefit to the Employing Organization 
       (1) Increased Safety and Well-Being of Organization Members 
              Actions taken by whistleblowers have a great function to alert the 
members of organizations regarding diverse information, like fraudulent financial act- 
ions or hazardous conditions in the workplace. Keeping silence on organizations‟ wro- 
ngdoings makes potential threats worse, and further causes damage on organizations 
and the public. Whistleblowers, who serve in high-risk working fields, such as pharm- 
aceutical factories, toxic materials research centers, and other high pollution-emission 
industries, are able to be an earlier alarm to remind people of dangers, and assure the 
safety and well-being of employees. For innocent employees, whistleblowers can be 
seen as the protectors who stand on the first line to battle against employers‟ mistakes 
that cannot be ignored and permissible. 
       (2) Support for Codes of Ethics 
              Organizations are used to setting up ethical standards for employ- 
ees to follow and encourage them to perform activities that can meet expectations un- 
der these standards. Codes of ethics show what behaviour organizations intend to pro- 
mote, and which action organizations want to discourage. Building internal channels 
for employees to report irregularities is a method for organizations to promote emplo- 
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yees‟ ethics. By making use of in-house channels, whistleblowing can be viewed as a 
communication between employers and employees, and gives the management an op- 
portunity to take notice and to timely rectify errors. Whistleblowers would like to see 
this result because not only can they have a direct contact with the upper management, 
but their actions also can satisfy organizations‟ expectations, and their chances of bei- 
ng retaliated against would decrease. 
       (3) Reduction of Organizational Waste and Mismanagement 
              Whistleblowers can decrease the cost of production and increase 
the profit of business. When wrongdoers‟ actions have not been known by organizati- 
ons, whistleblowers are able to disclose these wrongdoings to the management and to 
avoid organizations from suffering losses. These losses may include tangible expenses 
and intangible attritions. Tangible expenses contain legal fees and organizations‟ exp- 
enditure to offset damage. Intangible attritions include the time used to investigate ill- 
egitimacy; the labor assigned to interview witnesses and suspected wrongdoers; and 
the disruption in working environments. By whistleblowers‟ reports, organizations not 
only can prevent different losses, damage and exhaustion, but they also can make a re- 
sponse on those mistakes and correct them rapidly. 
       (4) Improved Employee Morale 
              The support of whistleblowing is able to enhance employees‟ mo- 
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rale in organizations. Employees are aware that they are encouraged to report irregula- 
rities because organizations are inclined to give them positive responses to rectify mi- 
stakes. Employees may feel honored to take efforts to improve the integrity of organi- 
zations and promote internal corporate governance. A research has described that em- 
ployees encouraged to report wrongdoings are more satisfied with their working envi- 
ronments than those who detect illegal activities, but choose to turn a blind eye.
238
 In 
addition, another study pointed out sustaining a whistleblower-friendly working atmo- 
sphere is consistent with employees‟ satisfaction with their jobs and workplaces.
239
 In 
this way, the positive attitude of employers toward whistleblowing not only improves 
employees‟ morale in organizations, but also develops greater cohesion for employees 
in business affairs and the workplace. 
       (5) Maintenance of Good Will and Avoidance of Damage Claims 
              Effective internal whistleblowing preserves organizations‟ reputa- 
tions and reduces the possibility of losses on their business. As organizational corrupt- 
ion has been known by the public, people start doubting the trustworthiness of organi- 
zations. Distrustful actions taken by the public probably include the boycott of organi- 
zations‟ products, the rejection of provided services, and the refusal to purchase orga- 
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nizations‟ shares in the public stock market. However, internal whistleblowing can su- 
rvive organizations and keep organizational mistake from being known by outsiders. 
In this way, organizations not only have sufficient time to resolve those problems, but 
also can preserve good-will of organizations and avoid future damage.  
Contrarily, external whistleblowing cannot benefit organizations in this way. Wh- 
en employees‟ reports do not get positive responses from organizations, employees te- 
nd to ask for help from outsiders since they pay more attention to employees‟ disclos- 
ures and give more assistance than organizations. Though, external whistleblowing br- 
ings harmful results to organizational operation and reputations. Those consequences 
not only may cause the shutdown of business, but also would have a great impact on 
the financial market. Besides, these results probably bring other social problems to the 
society, such as massive layoffs or the rise of criminal rates. 
       (6) Avoidance of Legal Regulation 
              In order to make a response to citizens‟ expectations of discoura- 
ging organizational fraud from happening again, Congress is forced to make up ordin- 
ances to regulate varied business activities. Regulations require organizations to make 
more disclosures regarding their operation, and try to sustain the integrity and transpa- 
rency of the financial market. However, it is not surprising that more disclosures will 
cause more expenses for organizations. Organizations are required to follow securities 
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laws to make a quarter or annual report about their financial conditions; also, it is req- 
uired for them to hire more professionals to do these work. If organizations do not ob- 
ey regulations, they will be punished or fined due to their disobedience, and these cos- 
ts are other financial losses for organizations.  
Yet, whistleblowers can give organizations a warning in advance as detecting mi- 
sconduct, and make organizations have enough time to rectify those mistakes without 
being known by outsiders. Thus, for organizations, whistleblowers not only have a fu- 
nction to prevent organizations from being fined by authorized agencies, but they also 
can preclude the legislators‟ attempts from enacting more ordinances to deter organiz- 
ations‟ misbehavior. 
     iii. Potential Costs to Society At Large 
            The public is easily influenced by the behaviour of whistleblowers. 
When whistleblowers disclose organizations‟ wrongdoings that the public truly cares 
about, many social resources will be used to investigate those illegal actions. Not only 
will organizational fraud bring serious damage on society, but the exhaustion of social 
resources will also indirectly influence people‟s ordinary lives. 
Take significant organizational irregularity for instance. Large-scale organizatio- 
ns‟ business influences the national economy; when organizational corruption is kno- 
wn by citizens, in order to restore the public‟s confidence and rebuild the order of the 
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financial market, the government will try any method to fix these catastrophes. Law 
enforcement agencies get involved in investigating corruption; also, other governmen- 
tal agencies are pushed to find resolution to preclude organizational fraud from happe- 
ning. Judicial resources will be occupied, and this will hinder courts from solving oth- 
er critical issues. The media reports organizations‟ scandals all day long, and this dist- 
racts citizens‟ attention to their daily lives. In addition, in the worse situation, the pub- 
lic will lose trust in business activities, and this consequence will has an impact on co- 
hesive forces in society and influence the operation of the whole financial market. 
     iv. Potential Benefit to Society At Large 
       (1) Increased Safety and Well-Being of Societal Members 
              Similar to the function that whistleblowers bring to the employing 
organization, whistleblowing can protect the safety and health of citizens; likewise, it 
is able to be an alarm and raise the public‟s attention on organizations‟ dangerous acti- 
ons. The public will benefit from whistleblowing because disclosers not only share in- 
formation that it cannot access, but those disclosures prevent social members from be- 
ing fooled by organizations‟ tricks.  
       (2) Reduction of Taxes, Increases in Services 
              It is hard to understand why whistleblowers benefit social memb- 
ers by reducing taxes. However, if thinking of this way, it is not quite tough to realize 
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why Miceli and Near said thus.  
When whistleblowers unveil organizations‟ illegal activities to upper manageme- 
nts, managers have a chance to put misconduct back on the right track. Once these mi- 
stakes are righted, organizations might be survived, and business keeps operating like 
before. Continued large-scale organizations are stable sources to provide sufficient ta- 
xes for the government, and these indirectly reduces the government‟s demand on oth- 
er taxes that mostly come from ordinary people. For this reason, it may be inferred th- 
at whistleblowers not only help poorly-performed organizations‟ business going on, 
but they also relieve other citizens‟ onerous burdens of taxes. In addition, organizatio- 
ns that continue to operate provide various products and complete services for the pu- 
blic, and these advantages cannot be replaced by the individual commercial unit or a 
single person. 
       (3) Less Regulation 
              If whistleblowers can be viewed as an effective mechanism to st- 
op organizations‟ wrongdoings, it is not required for legislators to enact ordinances or 
ask regulatory agencies to make detailed rules to deter organizational fraud. Thus, or- 
ganizations do not have to spend extra money to obey statutes or regulations. By cont- 
rast, they can use those expenses to promote the efficiency of organizational operation. 
For example, organizations can purchase more requisite facilities to increase their pro- 
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ductivities, recruit more professionals to create new products, or establish more effici- 
ent systems to decrease the cost of production.  
Organizations can save their money on expensive legal counseling fees and other 
auditing services because it is not required for them to re-win the trust from the gover- 
nment and the public. Hence, whistleblowing not only cuts down organizations‟ expe- 
nses on complying with the requirements of related statutes and regulations, but also 
makes organizations become “self-policing and self-correcting, [and] social resources 
need not be directed toward controlling organizations.”
240
  
       (4) Support for Codes of Ethics 
              The specific standard for organizations to show support on whistl- 
eblowers might be demonstrated in organizations‟ codes of ethics. Codes of ethics ex- 
press organizations‟ intent to encourage whistleblowing and make whistleblowing em- 
ployees be aware that their actions are going along well with the expectation of organ- 
izations. Because of this promise, whistleblowers will not be afraid of being retaliated 
against by employers or being ostracized from colleagues since their actions are prote- 
cted and acceptable. Also, organizations benefit from whistleblowing since it not only 
promotes corporate governance and strengthens organizations‟ internal control, but it 
also reduces the chance that organizations may suffer financial losses and lose busine- 
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ss reputations.  
In addition, the society enjoys these results as well. Without employees who are 
willing to disclose wrongdoings, citizens are exposed to potential hazards, which may 
threaten the health and safety of the public. In this way, it can be said that not only are 
organizations‟ whistleblowers seen as the protectors of public good, but positive attit- 
ude toward whistleblowing also can be viewed as a symbol of progressive society. 
C. Various Perspectives on Whistleblowing 
In this section, an individual and professional perspectives will be studied. The 
purpose of this section is to understand the attitudes of people who are placed in diffe- 
rent positions or serving in different professional areas toward whistleblowing. 
   1. Individual Perspective 
     a. Employee‟s View 
           Whistleblowing, by definition, involves a tension between an employe- 
e‟s duties to an employer and the employee‟s desire to promote the greater interests of 
society. In the employment relationship, employees have some implicit duties owed to 
employers. One of primary duties is the duty of obedience. The duty of obedience req- 
uires employees to follow reasonable instructions of employers.
241
 In this way, empl- 
oyees do not have to obey employers‟ unreasonable instructions that may be illegal or 
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violate normal business ethics.
242
 Unreasonable instructions made by employers not 
only probably constitute a crime, but also may put employees or others in a dangerous 
place.
243
 Nevertheless, it should be noticed that although employees are able to refuse 
employers‟ unreasonable instructions, employees are not obligated to complain or dis- 
close those instructions to the public.
244
 
Another duty employees owe to employers and organizations is the duty of loyal- 
ty, and it is the principal duty in the employment relationship. The standard to decide 
the duty of loyalty is flexible since it is perhaps changed by the specific circumstance 
in each employment relationship.
245
 The duty of loyalty requires employees 
“to act solely for the benefit of the principal in matters entrusted to him [the em- 
ployee], … to take no unfair advantage of his [the employee‟s] position in the 
use of information or things acquired by him [the employee] because of his [the 
employee‟s] position, … also … not to act or speak disloyally in matters which 
are connected with his [the employee‟s] employment except in the protection of 
his [the employee‟s] own interests or those of others.”
246
  
Also, employees cannot sabotage employers and distribute any information that has a 
high possibility to harm the disparagement of employers‟ products and services.
247
 In 
addition, Westman says: 
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“The duty of loyalty is … a qualified duty, in that employees are not prevented 
from acting outside their employment in a manner which injures their employ- 
ers‟ businesses. Thus, the duty of loyalty would not necessarily prevent employ- 
ees from campaigning for legislation which might require expensive complian- 
ce efforts by their employers.”
248
  
Thus, when actions taken by employees do not conflict with their employment relatio- 
nship with employers, but they are consistent with the employment business, it is allo- 
wable for employees to go against their employers. 
The duty of confidentiality is the third duty that employees owe to employers. It 
is a duty that can be implied from the duty of loyalty.
249
 The duty of loyalty precludes 
employees from doing any business that conflicts with employers‟ interests;
250
 it req- 
uires employees not to be business competitors by using information, knowledge, or 
skills that they learn from their positions of employment. Similarly, the duty of confi- 
dentiality requests employees “not to use or to communicate information confidential- 
ly given him by the principal … [and] to the injury of the principal … unless the info- 
rmation is a matter of general knowledge.”
251
 Confidential information includes diff- 
erent “unique business methods, trade secrets, customer lists, or other strategic infor- 
mation.”
252
 In the employment relationship, employers are inclined to disclose confi- 
dential business information to employees, so they can have abilities to perform duties 
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properly and make missions be achieved successfully.  
Not only is it unavoidable for employers to share confidential information and let 
employees operate their work efficiently, but employers have to take a risk that empl- 
oyees may abuse this knowledge to compete against their business.
253
 Westman says, 
“The duty of confidentiality recognizes that the flow of necessary information betwe- 
en employers and employees would be hampered if employees made unauthorized di- 
sclosures of confidential information.”
254
 If an employee employs confidential infor- 
mation against his/her employer‟s business without having any permission or authori- 
zation, “under appropriate circumstances a court might find that an employee who ab- 
uses a special position of trust and confidence is liable to his employer for tortious br- 
each of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in his employment contra- 
ct.”
255
  
Yet, the duty of confidentiality does not apply to employees when employers ha- 
ve committed or are about to commit a crime.
256
 Even if employees have right to rep- 
ort employers‟ criminal acts without being restricted by duty of confidentiality, empl- 
oyees are still unable to unveil employers‟ unethical conduct under this duty.
257
 There 
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is an obscure difference between employers‟ criminal behaviour and unethical condu- 
ct. The dissimilarity strongly depends on employees‟ knowledge or experiences in the 
specific area. As Ramirez says, “[t]here is a fine line between criminal acts and uneth- 
ical conduct, a line that may not be recognizable by the employee who does not posse- 
ss expert knowledge of the law.”
258
 In this way, whether employers‟ actions are crimi- 
nal or unethical, those not only will be determined by employees‟ specific knowledge 
and experiences of long-term employment, but also the extent of legal knowledge that 
employees hold will be considered. 
    Employees serving in organizations may be placed in the positions that make th- 
em detect fraudulent activities easier and earlier than any outsiders do. Employees ha- 
ve the best way to access information unknown by others and can be more efficient 
monitors than the national inspection system.
259
 The nature of duty of confidentiality, 
obedience and loyalty have implicitly indicated that employees can disclose employe- 
rs‟ criminal activities, and this implication originated from ancient common law that 
encouraged citizens to report criminal conduct to law enforcement agencies.
260
 Obse- 
rving the doctrine of misprision of felony, it constitutes a crime when a citizen knew 
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or witnessed felonies but fails to report them to the authorities.
261
 In this way, apply- 
ing the concept of misprision of felony to employees‟ duties, it might be inferred that 
not only are employees allowed to disclose employers‟ criminal conduct constituting a 
felony, but they will also commit a crime if they are unable to report those employers‟ 
misconduct to outside authorized agencies in time.
262
 However, where did the doctri- 
ne of misprision originate? One time, Westman made a detailed description in his bo- 
ok, and stated this concept as follows:  
“The doctrine of misprision originated in medieval England … Citizens of medi- 
eval England were required to raise a „hue and cry‟ if they witnessed the comm- 
ission of a felony, or came across a dead body. All males … were required to 
join the hue and cry, to pursue the criminal, and to follow the instructions of the 
local constable…. Under English law, the doctrine of misprision did not require 
reporting of all offenses, but only of crimes serious enough to be classified as 
felonies.”
263
  
Though, because the U.S. common law originated from England common law system, 
the question is whether the doctrine of misprision of felony in England still has an inf- 
luence on the U.S. common law. 
The answer to this question tends to be negative because of some reference sour- 
ces. First, Chief Justice John Marshall in Supreme Court noted, “It may be the duty of 
a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offence which comes to his 
knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this 
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duty is too harsh for man.”
264
 Justice Marshall thought that even if the society has put 
expectations on a citizen to disclose illegal activities that he/she has known, the law 
still should not punish a citizen for the reason that is merely a social duty, not an obli- 
gated responsibility.  
Second, many jurisdictions in the U.S. are inclined to make similar negative dec- 
isions. Take the Florida Court of Appeal for instance. The court stated that “[w]hile it 
may be desirable, even essential, that we encourage citizens to „get involved‟ to help 
reduce crime, they ought not to be adjudicated criminals themselves if they don‟t.… 
We cherish the right to mind our own business when our own best interests dictate.”
265
 
The Florida Court of Appeal also agreed that it is improper to punish a citizen for not 
reporting criminal conduct. Even though a citizen discloses illegal activities can bene- 
fit the safety of society, this action still should not be promoted via harsh laws or sev- 
ere punishment. 
Third, the doctrine of misprision of felony is criticized by some commentators si- 
nce it may abuse the “orderly administration of the criminal justice system,”
266
 and is 
inclined to encourage vigilantism.
267
 Besides, the doctrine of misprision of felony can 
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be used to abuse the political purposes.
268
 Westman takes Communist for example:  
“[T]he two Communist scares of this century, of the 1920s and 1950s, prompted 
many prosecutions for disloyalty to the United States.… the doctrine of mispris- 
ion … contains the potential for persecution in times of political turmoil when 
various forms of political conduct are made illegal.”
269
 
Therefore, the doctrine of misprision is no longer viewed as an offense in the U.S. co- 
mmon law and in some jurisdictions, but the misprision of felonies that violates feder- 
al laws still can constitute federal offenses.
270
 As Westman describes:  
“The federal misprision statute modifies the original common-law offense in the 
same way as the state courts have, by expressly requiring the additional element 
of some affirmative act of concealment. Despite the outmoded nature of the cri- 
minal offense of misprision, the underlying principle that citizens should be en- 
couraged to report serious crimes is accepted throughout the United States.”
271
  
Then, even though federal misprisions were modified from the offenses in the comm- 
on law, they are typical and serious crimes that the public tends to present many conc- 
erns. As offenses are regulated by federal statutes, a citizen will be punished when he/ 
she has known or witnessed those offenses, but chooses not to report them. Therefore, 
it could be concluded that employees do not have an obligation to disclose employers‟ 
wrongdoings;
272
 yet, this standard will be excluded when employers commit felonies 
that have been regulated under federal laws,
273
 or when states recognize that the doct- 
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rine of misprision still exists in their common laws.
274
 In those situations, employees 
are obligated to disclose what they have witnessed or known to law enforcement age- 
ncies. 
    Whistleblowing is a high-risk action for employees to take. Employees are afraid 
of being whistleblowers because whistleblowing does not correspond to the expectati- 
ons of organizations in general. The observation made by Miceli & Near can explain 
this point.  
“[E]xpectancy theory provides a framework linking individuals‟ beliefs about or- 
ganizational conditions with their motivation to act. Whistleblowers‟ beliefs ab- 
out the legitimacy and importance of whistle-blowing may differ from others‟ 
beliefs because they may have responded to different organizational conditions, 
or because their values may differ from others‟ because of prior experiences.… 
direct experience strengthens the consistency between self-reported attitudes 
and behavior; because whistle-blowers have acted in support of whistleblowing 
by definition, they should be more supportive of it in their self-report.”
275
 
According to this research, the primary factor for employees to consider whether they 
should blow the whistle is decided by employees‟ beliefs in organizations‟ attitudes to 
whistleblowing. Those beliefs are not only established by the experiences of former 
employees, but are also reinforced by employees‟ self-experiences. The stronger beli- 
ef employees hold that organizations will encourage them to blow the whistle, the mo- 
re frequently organizations will receive arguments from different levels of employees 
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in the workplace. 
However, what kind of features can be found on employees who push themselves 
to be whistleblowers? Since whistleblowers are inclined to place themselves into a da- 
ngerous position, some personal characteristics might be unique on whistleblowers as 
comparing to other people. Once a research said: 
“[R]esearchers can draw from research on behavior that seems similar in some 
ways to whistle-blowing to identify predictors. One stream of research in social 
psychology focuses on pro-social behavior, defined as positive social behavior 
that is intended to benefit other persons, even though pro-social actors can also 
intend to gain rewards for themselves…. Previous authors have presented evid- 
ence that whistle-blowing can be considered a type of pro-social behavior that 
occurs in organizations. Whistle-blowers call attention to questionable practices 
in order to help the present and potential victims or to benefit the organization 
because they believe the activity is not consistent with the organization‟s stated 
values. This suggests that predictors of pro-social behavior may also predict 
whistle-blowing among persons who have observed perceived organizational 
wrongdoing. The literature on pro-social behavior suggests that observers of 
wrongdoing consider whether they are responsible for correcting it.”
276
 
According to this research, employees being whistleblowers can be regarded as a kind 
of pro-social behaviour. Their intentions tend to help organizations or other individua- 
ls to get away from activities that probably cause harmful damage upon them. Emplo- 
yees choose to stop this situation by being whistleblowers because of their higher eth- 
ical belief and moral.
277
 Westman says this point as follows:  
“From an ethical perspective, employees may feel that the act of whistleblowing 
is required rather than voluntary. However, it should be recognized that the co- 
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mpulsion employees may feel does not necessarily arise from legal sources, but 
instead from individually held moral or ethical beliefs. In some cases, an empl- 
oyee‟s decision to blow the whistle is tantamount to a decision that his or her 
individual ethical views are superior to those of his or her organization.”
278
 
Most of the time, employees who choose to be the whistleblower have held long-term 
careers in organizations.
279
 They are used to being placed in pretty high positions and 
deeply believe that they have a stronger sense of loyalty to organizations than other fr- 
esh employees.
280
 This point is upheld by some scholars. As Miceli & Near describe, 
“[T]he nature of the position one holds in the organization may influence the assessm- 
ent of responsibility.”
281
 Likewise, once Moberly mentioned the similar point of view 
and stated: 
“Studies demonstrate that designating a uniform recipient of whistleblower com- 
plaints in an organization and directing employees to that recipient results in in- 
creased amounts of whistleblowing. Perhaps one reason for the increase is that 
employees become whistleblowers out of a sense of loyalty to their organizati- 
on. Contrary to popular belief regarding the traitorous nature of such „snitches,‟ 
social science research demonstrates that whistleblowers often are employees 
with long tenure who believe they will serve the organization‟s best interests by 
providing information about organizational wrongdoing.”
282
  
Because employees who have kept long-term employments in organizations care mo- 
re about business operation and organizations‟ reputations than others, these employe- 
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es are convinced that whistleblowing not only can assist organizations that have com- 
mitted misconduct in going back on the right track, but also can sustain organizations 
to continue their business. 
    Employees who intend to be the whistleblower have to think over two factors be- 
fore stepping forward.
283
 The reason is that being a whistleblower to report organizat- 
ional fraud has to bear several costs and risks.
284
 First, these employees have to think 
about whether the information they provided may change the status quo and will corr- 
ect problems. Second, they must ascertain that if there is any protection in organizati- 
ons, which can avoid them from bearing adverse actions,
285
 financial losses,
286
 or pe- 
rhaps other mental effects or physical harm.
287
 Most of the time, the primary factor to 
preclude employees from stepping forward is retaliation taken by employers and org- 
anizations. Organizations make use of varied adverse actions as their protective casin- 
gs because managements are unwilling to disclose poor performance. Adverse action 
can be appeared in many forms, such as “termination, suspension, non-promotion, re- 
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assignment, transfer, denial of training, withholding wages or other benefit, closer su- 
pervision, or greater scrutiny.”
288
 Miceli & Near say this related issue as follows: 
“If an organization is dependent on a questionable practice, it may provide cues 
that whistle-blowing will be met with retaliation to the whistleblowers and resi- 
stance to changing the questioned practice. Retaliation may be a powerful disin- 
centive to whistle-blowing. Observers of wrongdoing may perceive that a retali- 
atory climate exists and decline to act – or they may rationalize inaction by attr- 
ibuting it to an unfavorable climate…. Similarly, if management appears unwil- 
ling or unable to change its questionable practices, individuals may expect that 
whistle-blowing will be ineffective.”
289
  
In addition, Westman points out that  
“[f]ew experiences are as frustrating as witnessing a wrong but feeling unable to 
correct it. Employees may feel as if they are in such a position when their com- 
panies act improperly, and if they fear loss of their jobs if they protest. Simi- 
larly, employees who participate in the decision-making processes which lead 
to their organizations‟ decisions to take improper actions, but who opposed taki- 
ng such actions, may feel powerless because their voices have gone unheeded. 
The only reason they do not become whistleblowers may be concern about reta- 
liation.”
290
  
Hence, retaliation can be seen as the biggest obstacle for employees to blow the whis- 
tle. Employees trying to be whistleblowers worry about egregious mistakes made by 
organizations; also, they care more about their self-interest and self-safety. Because it 
is difficult for employees to balance the tension, some of them choose to keep silent 
on organizations‟ irregularities in order to survive jobs, and let organizations‟ improp- 
er behaviour abuse their own business. In this situation, it is unsympathetic and unfair 
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to say that these employees‟ choices come from their cowardice; however, the nature 
of human beings pushes them to make such decisions. 
    Besides the fear of retaliation from employers and organizations, the pressure fr- 
om colleagues is another concerning factor for whistleblowers. Most of the time, whi- 
stleblowers are ostracized by fellow workers and isolated by social groups. Colleagu- 
es think that whistleblowers get involved in too many trivial matters to which they sh- 
ould not pay attention or care about. Whistleblowers‟ disclosures on fraudulent activi- 
ties not only bring catastrophes to organizations, and may make the collapse of busin- 
ess, but these reports also cause uncertain results to coworkers‟ occupations and liveli- 
hoods. One time, Culp described this situation as follows:  
“[R]ather than being viewed with admiration by their peers, whistleblowers are 
treated with scorn and disdain and are often rewarded with labels such as „snit- 
ch,‟ „rat,‟ and „tattle-tale.‟ This is not to say that all whistleblowers should be vi- 
ewed as heroes or knights in shining armor. Some may be ill-informed, meddle- 
some, troublemakers or ill-motivated and vindictive.”
291
 
Therefore, those colleagues do not give much appreciation on whistleblowers‟ actions. 
On the contrary, they show no respect for whistleblowers‟ behaviour on the disclosur- 
es of organizations‟ fraudulent activities, and are inclined to nickname them by some 
awful characters. 
     b. Employer‟s View 
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           Compared to employees‟ views on becoming a whistleblower, the attitu- 
de of employers toward whistleblowing is much different. Some employers may cons- 
ider whistleblowing vitalizes organizations‟ bureaucratic systems and brings a power 
to promote rigid operation.
292
 These employers believe that whistleblowing helps to 
supervise other employees, who may potentially commit illegal actions, and to overs- 
ee those who are difficult to be kept tabs on.
293
 Though, it is a little far away from the 
reality if using the minority of employers‟ points of view to study this section.
294
 Act- 
ually, the majority of employers are unwilling to let whistleblowers appear in the wor- 
kplace because they are afraid of the consequences that whistleblowers probably bring 
about. Employers are convinced that the consequences caused by whistleblowing not 
only have negative influences on organizations‟ operation, but also pose potential thr- 
eats to their positions.
295
 In addition to worrying about personal disasters, employers 
are also inclined to see whistleblowing as the behaviour, which challenges their mana- 
gerial power on business affairs
296
 and affects the atmosphere of workplaces.
297
 Dw- 
orkin & Callahan note this point as follows: 
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“In terms of organizational implications, whistleblowing in any form represents 
an obvious challenge to the employing organization‟s legitimate interest in ma- 
nagerial decision-making and maximizing control and efficiency.… Further, fo- 
rmal recognition of a role for whistleblowers may result in a less cooperative 
workplace atmosphere”
298
  
For most employers, they dislike whistleblowing because it brings about the trend of 
second-guessing employers‟ managerial authority and causes distrust in the workplace. 
Not only will potential whistleblowers doubt employers‟ power of decision-making, 
but whistleblowing will also confine employers‟ authority to discharge unsatisfactory 
employees.
299
 As Hubbell says:  
“[T]he right to manage and discharge employees serves important and legitimate 
business purposes for an employer. Any exception to the employer‟s right to di- 
scharge at will tends to increase costs and diminish the employer‟s control and 
management of the business.”
300
  
Further, employees probably take advantage of whistleblowing to disguise their actual 
intent of non-hardworking.
301
 As Carlson notes this point below: 
“Critics of retaliation laws have also argued that citizen employee laws impose 
costs in the day-to-day management of the business wholly aside from litigation 
expenses. According to this argument, citizen employee laws undermine mana- 
gerial authority by empowering employees to question orders, delay work, miss 
work, or show disrespect to supervisors under the guise of acting for the public 
interest. Any law that protects employee traits or conduct is subject to these obj- 
ections, but critics find the problem potentially more severe in the case of laws 
protecting the conduct of citizen employees.”
302
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In this way, whistleblowing is not used by employees to disclose organizational misc- 
onduct or corruption, but it is employed as a private instrument against their employe- 
rs and organizations. Under this situation, because the intention of employees to blow 
the whistle probably is based on self-interest instead of public benefit, whistleblowing 
fails to be seen as altruism, but it is a kind of egoism. 
Another reason for employers to discourage and to devalue whistleblowing is si- 
nce when employees realize they are allowed to second-guess their employers, compl- 
aints will increase in the workplace, and employers have to spend more time addressi- 
ng arguments and defending themselves than before.
303
 Carlson mentions this issue in 
his article and notes:  
“In the modern, highly regulated workplace, a putative citizen employee has a 
myriad of opportunities to rationalize or mischaracterize insubordinate or disre- 
spectful conduct. Moreover, the argument continues, employees who feel empo- 
wered to question instructions or business practices may do so with such feque- 
ncy and persistence that managers are forced to devote an increasing part of th- 
eir time to defending themselves from unfounded charges.”
304
  
Importantly, whistleblowing probably accompanies exposing confidential information 
of organizations when whistleblowers decide to disclose employers‟ frauds externally. 
Confidential information is related to the persistence and the competitiveness of orga- 
nizations, and employers are obligated to protect organizations‟ information from bei- 
ng abused by others. Whistleblowers tend to divulge business information because it 
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is the required step to disclose organizations‟ unlawful actions; however, this behavio- 
ur is detested by employers.
305
 As Carlson says:  
“Another set of concerns sometimes raised by critics of citizen employee laws 
relates to the effects of such laws on communication within a firm or agency. 
First, critics worry whistleblowers in particular might disclose confidential bus- 
iness information in support of their whistleblowing claims, and employers will 
be pressed to respond by inhibiting information transfer within the corporati- 
on.”
306
  
In addition, whistleblowing is able to be regarded as the behaviour of accusation as 
well. It not only may directly suspect the untrustworthiness of organizations, but it pr- 
obably indirectly accuses the disloyalty of other individuals in the workplace. Westm- 
an presents this idea as follows: 
“Whistleblowing by its nature is a form of accusation against an employee‟s org- 
anization, and either directly or indirectly, against another individual in the org- 
anization…. Partly for this reason, the Code of Ethics and Implementation Gui- 
delines issued by the American Society for Public Administration provides that 
„[a]s a last resort, public employees have a right to make public their criticism 
but it is the personal and professional responsibility of the critic to advance only 
well funded criticism.‟ Therefore, employees‟ responsibilities to their organizat- 
ions and co-workers suggest that reports of wrongdoing be carefully researched 
for accuracy before institutional and individual reputations are called into quest- 
ion.”
307
  
Based on this phenomenon, it can be inferred that negligent whistleblowing is another 
factor for employers to have negative perception of whistleblowers. The reason is that 
ill-informed whistleblowing means employees do not carefully think over the truthful- 
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ness of allegations in regard to fraudulent activities; also, those employees are not co- 
ncerned with the damage that perhaps brings to organizations and society at large.  
    Because of negative perception of whistleblowing, it is highly probable for empl- 
oyers to believe that no matter which retaliation they impose upon whistleblowers are 
acceptable and reasonable. Employers do not treat whistleblowing employees as a part 
of organizations‟ assets, but think that they are worthless and expendable. Therefore, 
in employers‟ views, retaliating against employees who decide to be whistleblowers is 
less harmful to organizations and themselves. Compared with adverse actions borne 
by employees, a few employers assume that organizations and society bear more dam- 
age than an employee does.
308
 The damage includes the loss of business reputations, 
an unemployment disaster, the untrustworthiness of the financial market, and an unst- 
able social atmosphere. Employers have duties to go for satisfying profits for organiz- 
ations and stockholders, and it is admirable for employers to devote themselves to pr- 
omoting business performance. Thus, whistleblowing employees‟ livelihoods are not 
the primary concern for employers to think about when they are administering organi- 
zations. On the contrary, the success of business and the persistence of organizations 
are more significant than an individual‟s future.
309
 
Even though organizations‟ interests may be more important than an individual‟s, 
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employees still should not be retaliated against or sacrificed when they simply distract 
employers‟ attention from business to organizations‟ irregularities.
310
 On the contrary, 
employers ought to open their minds and admire what whistleblowing employees do 
to point out organizations‟ mistakes
311
 since they are the firsthand witnesses of illegit- 
imacy. 
312
 Although employers dislike whistleblowing, they still fail to deny the adv- 
antages that whistleblowers bring to organizations. Employers cannot, on the one ha- 
nd, enjoy the benefit brought from whistleblowing; but on the other hand, they intend 
to employ adverse actions to avoid all deficiencies that whistleblowing may cause to 
organizations and themselves. 
In order to resolve this deadlock, employers should change their thoughts and pr- 
ovide whistleblowers an in-house channel to present their concerns. It is an ideal met- 
hod to balance conflicts and reach a win-win result. In this way, the costs of whistlebl- 
owing will be internalized, not externalized.
313
 Employers like whistleblowers to dis- 
close frauds by an internal channel rather than external one since they can rectify tho- 
se wrongdoings without being known by society. If organizational corruption known 
by the public, it not only causes the loss of business reputation, but also makes organi- 
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zations spend more money on investigations.
314
 However, internal whistleblowing re- 
duces those tangible and intangible losses; likewise, it enhances employees‟ fiduciary 
duties to organizations and employers with no leaking of confidential knowledge and 
materials.
315
 As Dworkin & Callahan state this point below: 
“In terms of the employer‟s interests, benefit from whistleblowing may be maxi- 
mized, and disadvantages diminished, when the whistle is blown internally. Uti- 
lization of in-house channels often gives the concerned employee access to mo- 
re complete information, resolving the situation in its entirety. If problems exist, 
the employer has the opportunity privately to take corrective action and thereby 
reduce the likelihood of lost business, adverse publicity, litigation, fines or other 
criminal sanctions, and other adverse consequences.”
316
 
Hence, organizations‟ in-house channels not only help employers promote their inside 
control and internal corporate governance, but assist employees in establishing a good 
communication with the upper management. An internal disclosure reduces the confli- 
cts that regularly happen in the employment relationship, and decreases the costs bro- 
ught by hostile environment in the workplace. 
Employers are the managers of organizations. Their duties not only have to resp- 
ond to changes occurring outside organizations, but also have to assure internal opera- 
tion is under their control. Managerial authority gives them the power to make a deci- 
sion, to cope with complaints from employees, and to protect organizations‟ assets or 
resources. While employees are making more complaints regarding business, this can 
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be implied that employers‟ managerial authority is being doubted. However, for some 
employers‟ points of view, employees‟ complaints are not the challenges for their aut- 
hority, but can be positively seen as a part of managerial control. Since employees re- 
port anything wrong occurring in organizations, employers have a chance to right the- 
se mistakes in time, and put organizational misconduct back on the right track. After 
all, employers hold a duty to avoid organizations from suffering damage or losses, and 
are obligated to promote organizations‟ performance as well. Once Summers & Nowi- 
cki stated this similar idea as below:  
“Managers are hired to execute the goals that derive from the organization‟s mis- 
sion, vision, and values. At the same time, managers have an obligation to prot- 
ect the organization. When employees point out abuses, they are functioning as 
part of … [employers‟] management information system. They are letting [em- 
ployers] know that the goals [that employers] are charged to execute are not be- 
ing met. They are part of a control system. However, when the information bec- 
omes public, the control system has gone out of control.”
317
 
In this way, whistleblowers can be viewed as the reminder for employers to know wh- 
ether everything in organizations is under their control or not. Whistleblowing emplo- 
yees enhance employers‟ abilities to administer business operation; also, they promote 
employers‟ managerial power to control organizations‟ matters. 
As discussed above, employers like employees‟ complaints to remain confidenti- 
al, instead of going to the public. For employers, employees who resort to any outsid- 
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ers represent a kind of disloyalty for them and organizations. Once Summers & Nowi- 
cki studied employers‟ views and found: 
“Managers … are supposed to support the mission, vision, and values of the org- 
anization. At the same time, [managers] value loyalty, which typically includes 
keeping the dirty linen out of sight. Exposing organizational abuse, whether or 
not that abuse was intentional, normally suggests organizational disloyalty. No 
doubt, managers would prefer that abuses brought to their attention remain con- 
fidential while they resolve the problem. Such problem-solving might involve 
working out a satisfactory settlement with the appropriate party, without public 
scrutiny. In those cases, employees may see no need for whistle-blowing to the 
news media or regulatory agencies. They view managers as living up to the org- 
anization‟s mission, vision, and values.”
318
  
Thus, what efforts made by employers can encourage employees to make a disclosure 
via in-house channels? My advice is that employers not only have to show their inten- 
tions to support internal whistleblowing in the workplace, but also should set up a so- 
und internal channel for employees to make their complaints. In addition, employers 
ought to create a whistleblower-friendly working atmosphere, which makes employe- 
es feel comfortable to report and believe organizations uphold their actions. Once Su- 
mmers & Nowicki provided some ideas for employers to encourage internal whistleb- 
lowing, and said this as follows:  
“In an organizational environment where employees believe management really 
upholds the mission, vision, and values of health care, the employees will info- 
rm management about abuses. Tell employees [that management] want[s] to kn- 
ow about these problems. Provide training programs that address employees‟ ri- 
ghts in whistle-blowing, management‟s preference to avoid whistle-blowing sit- 
uations, and what [management] will do to take a whistle-blower‟s concerns in- 
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to account. In reality, [management] cannot possible correct all of the problems 
[it] learn[s] about. Nonetheless, to avoid being perceived as indifferent, [mana- 
gement] can involve employees in discussions about solutions. If employees re- 
alize that the most appropriate solution will avoid causing other adverse effects, 
they may be satisfied…. Ignoring or discouraging employee complaints height- 
ens the risk. Getting employees on the problem-solving team will reduce the ri- 
sk of whistle-blowing more than doing nothing.”
319
 
To sum up, in order to encourage employees to blow the whistle internally, employers 
not only should make employees truly convince that whistleblowing is supported by 
organizations, but they also have to provide each chance for employees to participate 
in the processes of discussion, and let employees know how their concerns will be ha- 
ndled, and how employers will positively respond to those reported problems. 
   2. Professional Perspective 
         Most of the time, professional employees have more conflicts of interest 
than ordinary employees do. Not only do they have to conform to codes of ethics ma- 
de by the professional group, but they also have to abide by organizations‟ charters or 
bylaws and to follow supervisors‟ instructions. Ethical codes require these profession- 
als to disclose illegal activities for the benefit of society; however, their supervisors 
want them to keep irregularities confidential, and request them to be loyal to organiza- 
tions they serve. As Westman says:  
“Professional employees who are sworn to follow ethical codes may experience 
acute conflicts between their duty to obey those codes, and their duty to their 
employers…. professionals may be required to follow the codes of ethics of th- 
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eir professions, many of which require or strongly encourage disclosure of imp- 
roper conduct by co-workers or by clients in order to protect the public welfare. 
For example … the Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Amer- 
ican Bar Association absolutely require attorneys to report ethical violations by 
other attorneys, including co-workers, to the appropriate disciplinary authorities. 
Thus, professional employees may often be placed in positions where their res- 
ponsibilities as employees and their responsibilities under ethical codes are in 
direct conflict. Such professional employees may feel ethically compelled to 
become whistleblowers, and may feel that they run the risk of professional disc- 
ipline if they do not make disclosures of misconduct which affects the public 
safety or welfare.”
320
  
In this way, professional employees encounter more obstacles and tough choices when 
facing the issue of whistleblowing. On the one hand, they are required to protect orga- 
nizations‟ and other employees‟ interests. On the other hand, they have to think about 
public good because the nature of their work is to serve society, and to assure the wel- 
fare of citizens will not be influenced and damaged. Below I am going to analyze two 
types of professionals who regularly face the conflict of interest when being a whistle- 
blower. 
     a. Lawyer‟s View 
       i. Joseph Rose and AMPI
321
 
            Joseph Rose was a lawyer in Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (AMPI). 
His responsibilities covered auditing, payment of legal expenses, and the coordination 
of outside legal counsel in matters other than antitrust. After his disclosure on AMPI‟s 
                                                     
320
 Westman, supra note 159, at 28-29. 
321
 This case refers to Westin, supra note 292, at 31-38. 
                                                           
 
 
115 
criminal activity, a Wall Street Journal article characterized him as “a young attorney 
well on the way to corporate success.” Despite this admiration, it is hard to imagine 
what Rose had borne as he reported AMPI‟s misconduct to his employers and AMPI‟s 
board of directors. Also, being a professional, Rose had encountered conflict of intere- 
st and faced a difficult choice between a professional lawyer and a loyal employee. At 
last, he chose to obey professional ethical codes and unveil AMPI‟s irregularity. How- 
ever, what he lost was intolerable, and those sufferings are typical for whistleblowers. 
As Rose was asked to testify against AMPI‟s illegal actions for the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor‟s Office and the Senate Select Committee, he said:  
“The ironic element in that statement is that because of my role in exposing 
AMPI‟s illegal actions in the „milk deal,‟ I have been labeled a whistle blower. I 
never set out to be a whistle blower; I merely tried to alert the appropriate offic- 
ials at AMPI to the misconduct I became aware of – I felt that was my duty as 
AMPI‟s in-house counsel. Even though AMPI fired me abruptly for attempting 
to discharge my duty, and despite their campaign to discredit me after I was fir- 
ed, my personal set of ethics dictated that I attempt to shield the company beca- 
use of the unsettled question of our attorney-client relationship. If I was a whist- 
leblower, I became one reluctantly.  
Even though I was a reluctant whistle blower, I paid a heavy price for it. 
AMPI‟s campaign against me had its effect: my finances dwindled away; I had 
to give up my house and move my family into a small and inadequate apartment; 
and my wife had to go back to work to help support us, even though her health 
was still delicate. Our family meals consisted of cheap basics like salads, corn 
bread, and pinto beans. We received anonymous, threatening phone calls, and 
even my father, who was dying of emphysema, received derogatory calls about 
me. My father passed away during this period, going to his grave believing that 
my career had been irreversibly destroyed.  
The only break I had after months of job hunting was an offer to practice 
law with a small firm in west Texas. I went there alone to take the job -- at a 
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much reduced salary from what I had been earning -- but after a short time the 
firm dissolved and I was thrown back into the job market. Through the subsequ- 
ent months of unemployment, I remember praying daily for the help of the Lord, 
which I believe was the only thing that could salvage my shattered career and 
help get my family on its feet again. It wasn‟t until August 1975 – nearly two 
years after I was fired by AMPI – that I obtained a decent job, with the National 
Treasury Employees Union in Washington, D.C.”
322
  
Observing Rose‟s situation, not only do professional employees confront the position- 
recognized conflict, but both professional and ordinary employees may also suffer ta- 
ngible pressures and intangible threats to their livelihoods when they determine to be 
a whistleblower. 
       ii. Two Conflicting Roles as a Lawyer 
             In principle, there are two perspectives to examine the role of lawyer 
in organizations. These are the hired gun model (or total commitment model) and the 
gatekeeper model
323
 (or independent lawyer model).
324
 In the hired gun model, lawy- 
ers follow their clients‟ decisions and instructions and fully help them achieve busine- 
ss goals allowed by law, no matter whether the process or outcome will cause damage 
to other people or bring harmful consequences to society. As Fisch & Rosen say, “The 
hired gun model is based on a strong version of client primacy. The attorney is affirm- 
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atively required to assist his or her client to the fullest extent permitted by law.”
325
 
Likewise, Haskell notes this point in his book: 
“The uneasiness within the profession has been evident throughout our history. It 
is reflected in the professional literature by the portrayals of two models of la- 
wyering. One is the lawyer who unquestioningly accepts the client‟s objective 
and in its pursuit zealously employs the arsenal of tactics within the law and the 
professional rules, regardless of the harm inflicted upon specific others or the 
social consequences.”
326
 
In this way, the hired gun model requires a lawyer to put emphasis on the interests of 
clients, whether the consequence that will harm other people or concern the safety and 
health of society is not a critical factor for a lawyer to think about. 
Another vision to decide the role of lawyer is the gatekeeper model. The gatekee- 
per model requires a lawyer to take social duties into account when he/she follows cli- 
ents‟ instructions to perform his/her work. Besides, a lawyer is asked to make an inde- 
pendent judgment for his/her clients when being counseled, and can refuse to practice 
any legal action if he/she thinks that this act may violate his/her professional ethics. 
As Fish & Rosen notes this idea as follows: 
“The gatekeeper model incorporates public policy limitations on attorney condu- 
ct that may constrain an attorney from following some client instructions even 
if those instructions are legal. In addition, the model may require the attorney to 
take affirmative steps to prevent or limit client wrongdoing.”
327
  
Also, Haskell says: 
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“The other model is the lawyer who in his counseling and representation exercis- 
es independent judgment in his relationship to the client. This lawyer, in his ad- 
vice, provides the client the benefit of his judgment of the prudence, long-term 
consequences, morality, and social responsibility of the client‟s objective and of 
the tactics and strategies for its accomplishment. If the lawyer‟s judgment is th- 
at they, or any of them, are unworthy, and if the client is unconvinced that he 
should refrain, the lawyer may decline or terminate the representation.”
328
  
The gatekeeper model does not request a lawyer to put his/her client‟s benefit in the 
first place as he/she performs his/her duties. Though, it asks a lawyer to put more foc- 
us on deterring a client‟s illegal action or wrongful instruction, on abiding by public 
policy, and further on avoiding potential risks imposed upon the public as practicing 
his/her work with professional ethics. 
    Recently, the debate between the hired gun model and the gatekeeper model on a 
lawyer‟s role still continues. Legal scholars try their best to find the balance between 
these two visions, and are vexed at deciding which kind of organizations‟ misconduct 
should be disclosed by a lawyer. Once settling the extent of disclosure, not only can a 
lawyer satisfy his/her social duty, but he/she may not breach his/her loyalty to clients 
and organizations he/she serves. Supporters of the hired gun model argue that a lawy- 
er should not disclose his/her clients‟ unlawful actions because the obligation of discl- 
osure does not correlate with a lawyer‟s duty, and it undermines a lawyer‟s role if he/ 
she puts public interest in the first place. Advocates of the gatekeeper model use the 
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view of public interest to make a counter-argument. They think that even though a la- 
wyer‟s capacity is to serve the best interest of clients, the client primacy still cannot 
be superior to the interest of society.
329
 
    Although the debate has not been resolved until today, the hired gun model is pr- 
edominant over the gatekeeper model in the lawyer-client relationship in the practici- 
ng area.
330
 Haskell finds this phenomenon and describes this as follows:  
“It is generally accepted that … the hired gun model has become predominant. 
There are no statistics on the subject, but there seems to be a consensus in the 
profession that there are more lawyers who practice in that style today … and 
that the style has become more aggressive than in the past. When lawyers speak 
of the decline of professionalism today, it is this shift in professional behavior 
together with a breakdown in civility among lawyers; the introduction of adver- 
tising, marketing, and solicitation of legal business; and the emphasis upon the 
financial „bottom line‟ that are typically referred to. The practice of law has be- 
come more competitive and commercialized.”
331
  
In Haskell‟s point of view, he said that the reason for the dominant hired gun model 
among lawyers is the decline of professionalism. However, which factor causes a law- 
yer‟s professionalism to fall down and gradually get away from protecting the socie- 
ty‟s interests, concerning this issue, Glazer & Glazer studied some phenomena in org- 
anizations that might result in the failure of professionalism. They demonstrate this fi- 
nding as follows:  
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“From the professionals‟ perspective, the demand for compliance was in direct 
contradiction with their beliefs in their independent judgment based on their sp- 
ecial expertise and training. Whenever they found themselves in situations whe- 
re the management of large organizations made decisions that resulted in unsafe 
products or fraudulent acts by putting bureaucratic imperatives ahead of expert 
judgment and values, some professionals felt they had the obligation to resist…. 
Unfortunately for these professionals, their respective professional associations 
were not willing to step forward and support their positions. Ethical resisters 
have not found spirited support from the local branch of … the association … 
Some ethical resisters never even considered approaching a professional organi- 
zation for fear of becoming enmeshed in yet another bureaucracy. Others gave 
some consideration to seeking such assistance, but decided against it when they 
noted that some ethics committee members were employed by large corporatio- 
ns that had skirted the law. Others did seek active intervention of their local so- 
cieties, only to find that their appeal was „put on the back burner‟. They began 
to suspect that the very groups presumably committed to maintaining professio- 
nal ethics had an even larger interest in assuring good relationships with gover- 
nment or corporate officials whose actions the ethical resisters were calling into 
question.”
332
  
Professional employees in different areas often face diverse pressures from employers, 
colleagues, professional associations, and organizations that they serve. Employers try 
to subordinate professional employees to follow their instructions because they are the 
group that is the most difficult to control.
333
 Colleagues dislike associating with the 
professionals due to their arrogance, which results from expertise, and since they are 
opinionated. At times, professional employees do not feel comfortable with their prof- 
essional associations as these professionals find their association members tend to ad- 
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here to a trend that they do not want to follow.
334
 Because of these factors, the profes- 
sionals are tired to be an isolated group in society and gradually turn to go with the st- 
andard that their employers favor, their colleagues habitually practice, and their profe- 
ssional associations are inclined to compliment. These phenomena probably can expl- 
ain the failure of professionalism and correspond with the situation that a lawyer enc- 
ounters in organizations.  
Besides, not only does the actual situation push a lawyer to choose the hired gun 
model, but Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) also have a great influence to promote this trend. For example, Model Rule 4.1 
bars a lawyer from making false statements or material omissions to third parties,
335
 
but this prohibition is restricted when referring to another section. In Model Rule 1.6, 
a lawyer is asked to obey the duty of confidentiality and cannot leak confidential info- 
rmation to the public;
336
 however, because the definition of confidentiality is ambigu- 
ous and has not been defined by Model Rules, a lawyer is inclined to keep silent when 
he/she observes a client‟s illegal actions since he/she is afraid of breaching his/her du- 
ty of confidentiality to the client. 
    Even though the professional rules allow a lawyer to choose the hired gun model 
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or the gatekeeper model on their own, there are still some regulations that request a la- 
wyer to fulfill his/her social responsibility as the gatekeeper. Model Rule 1.2 describes 
that a lawyer not only shall not provide clients with advice for engaging in illegal acti- 
ons, but also cannot assist them in committing criminal or fraudulent conduct.
337
 Rule 
1.13 asks a lawyer to realize his/her obligation is to serve the organization, not to the 
individual or specific group, like corporate managers or executives.
338
 Besides, Mod- 
el Rules also establish a specific procedure for a lawyer when he/she finds that his/her 
warning has no function to persuade clients to stop committing illegal actions. As Fis- 
ch & Rosen describe:  
“The Rule permits but does not require the lawyer to ask for reconsideration of 
the matter, to ask for a separate legal opinion or to refer the matter to higher au- 
thority in the organization. If despite the lawyer‟s efforts, the organization pers- 
ists in violation of the law, the lawyer is permitted to resign.”
339
 
Historically, some mechanisms have been made to require a lawyer to perform his/her 
obligation in a gatekeeper position.
340
 First, some cases allow a malpractice claim ag- 
ainst a lawyer as he/she is found to have negligently assisted clients in misconduct or 
is unable to deter clients‟ wrongdoings. However, relief by means of a malpractice cl- 
aim is restricted because only the trustee or receiver, such as the Federal Deposit Insu- 
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rance Corporation, is eligible to bring such lawsuit.
341
 Clients are forbidden to claim 
the malpractice of a lawyer in order to recover their losses. 
Second, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requests a lawyer to perfo- 
rm his/her duties of gatekeeper. The SEC has had the authority to discipline the profe- 
ssionals for a long time, especially for securities lawyers. Formerly, whether this pow- 
er was allowed, and if the SEC could be another regulatory agency to punish a lawyer 
was doubtful. Though, this uncertain authority held by the SEC is made clear in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).
342
 PSLRA affirms that 
the SEC can bring an action against the professionals on aiding or abetting federal se- 
curities frauds. Because of this authority given by PSLRA, PSLRA finally clarifies the 
suspicion on whether the SEC can be another regulatory agency against securities fra- 
uds that are aided or abetted by the professionals. 
Third, a private litigation can be used to against a lawyer as he/she has aided or 
abetted clients in committing securities fraud. However, in the Central Bank case,
343
 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the private action cannot be used against aiding and 
abetting in securities frauds
344
 thanks to the SEC‟s Rule 10b-5 in Securities Exchange 
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Act of 1934.
345
 Further, PSLRA establishes more limitations upon private litigations 
because Congress intended to “discourage and weed out meritless securities fraud sui- 
ts.”
346
 PSLRA strictly regulates the pleading standard and makes it more stringent for 
private litigations. It describes:  
“[I]n any private action arising under this [chapter] in which the plaintiff may 
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular 
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged 
to violate this [chapter], state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infe- 
rence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”
347
  
Because of the ambiguous definitions of “strong inference” and “required state of mi- 
nd,”
348
 it is quite difficult for the private party to find a standard to claim their actions 
and satisfy the requirements of PSLRA. 
    After the eruption of Enron‟s scandal, the law started to reconsider whether it sti- 
ll had to leave an option for a lawyer to choose which model of professional ethics he/ 
she wants to follow. In order to re-establish a lawyer‟s professionalism, Congress ena- 
cted Section 307 under SOX and required a lawyer to bear a certain obligation to rep- 
ort when he/she finds the public company violates securities laws or other accounting 
frauds. SOX Section 307 provides that: 
“Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the [Securities 
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and Exchange] Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional condu- 
ct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in 
the representation of issuers, including a rule – (1) requiring an attorney to rep- 
ort evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty 
or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal cou- 
nsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof); 
and (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence 
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respe- 
ct to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit co- 
mmittee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the 
board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indire- 
ctly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.”
349
 
Caher analyzed the design of Section 307, and said Section 307 “requires, for the first 
time, that counsel inform senior officers of corporate misdeeds. And, if action is not 
taken at the management level, it requires counsel to bring their concerns up the corp- 
orate ladder.”
350
 Also, The Wall Street Journal describes:  
“The … bill … steps up pressure on lawyers to report evidence of fraud and oth- 
er misconduct by corporate managers – even their bosses. Under the provision, 
lawyers will for the first time be obligated to alert senior officers, such as the 
chief legal counsel or chief executive officer, of evidence of corporate miscond- 
uct in the companies they represent. If those officials fail to address problems, 
the lawyers are then required to report the misconduct to the board.”
351
  
In Section 307, SOX requires the SEC to make a rule that regulates a lawyer to do the 
mandatory report when he/she detects corporate fraudulent activities. SOX wants a la- 
wyer to be a risk-controller in the corporation, and let a lawyer realize his/her respon- 
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sibility is for the corporation and shareholders, not merely for an individual or a speci- 
fic group. At times, a lawyer has a close relationship with managements since he/she 
is often counseled with legal issues. These issues not only include ordinary business 
matters, but probably concern other unlawful tricks that may be used for avoiding the 
punishment from law enforcement agencies. Due to this close connection with corpor- 
ate managements, a lawyer may become an advocate of managements and help them 
commit misconduct. In order to prevent a lawyer from becoming a collaborator in wr- 
ongdoings, SOX poses a strict duty upon a lawyer, and requires him/her to report with 
the evidence of material violations of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty to up- 
per managements. Then, a lawyer not only has an obligation to report the company‟s 
violations of securities laws, but he/she has to ensure the report has been received by 
someone in the company who truly cares about the violation, starts making an investi- 
gation, and seeks to correct this corruption. As for the concern of duty of confidential- 
ity, the lawyer will not breach this duty to his/her employer or the company he/she se- 
rves because, in SOX Section 307, the lawyer is required to make an internal disclosu- 
re in the corporation, not externally disclose the company‟s irregularity. 
     b. Accountant‟s/Auditor‟s View 
       i. Accountant-Client Privilege 
             The attorney-client privilege allows a lawyer not to make any compe- 
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lled disclosure to the public based on the duty of confidentiality with his/her clients. 
This privilege applies “where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional 
legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, ma- 
de in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclos- 
ure by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.”
352
 However, 
unlike a lawyer, an accountant does not have such a privilege that allows him/her to 
not disclose those communications to society. Originally, whether an accountant can 
depend on a privileged communication was an uncertain issue in state and federal co- 
urts because some state courts tended to establish the accountant-client privilege, but 
federal courts did not. When cases that applied to state laws were litigated in federal 
courts, these courts would be bound by state statutes that adopt the concept of the acc- 
ountant-client privilege.
353
 Yet, after enacting Article V of the Federal Rules of Evid- 
ence,
354
 this issue has been resolved. The Federal Rules explicitly express an accoun- 
tant cannot rely on the accountant-client privilege in the federal court as he/she is ask- 
ed to disclose material information about his/her clients‟ illegal activities. As Graham 
notes as follows:  
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“The subject of privileged communications between an accountant and his client 
has assumed new significance due to … the … adoption of … Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Lack of a uniform approach towards the subject is evidenced by the 
wide variance in statutory scope that characterizes the attempts by a minority of 
states to create an accountant-client privilege, and by the wide diversity of opin- 
ions held by jurists, interested legal and professional organizations, and membe- 
rs of the accounting profession itself as to the appropriateness of such a privile- 
ge. The most recent authoritative statement on the subject is that contained in 
Article V of the new Federal Rules of Evidence. Contrary to recent statutory ex- 
pansion of the privileged communication concept on the state level, the Federal 
Rules offer a conservative approach to the privilege doctrine and are a retreat fr- 
om the recognition of privileged communications in numerous professional rel- 
ationships other than that of the attorney and his client.”
355
  
Once Wigmore thought that the exemption to testify should be narrowed, and present- 
ed a caution that it might cause damage to public interest as extensive privileged com- 
munications are allowed. He says: 
“When … come to examine the various claims of exemption … the primary ass- 
umption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of gi- 
ving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being 
so many derogations from a positive general rule.… The investigation of truth 
and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansi- 
on, of these privileges. They should be recognized only within the narrowest li- 
mits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, wit- 
hout any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.”
356
  
Even if Wigmore disagreed with broadening the scope of privileged communications 
unlimitedly, he still showed four situations under which an accountant is able to enjoy 
this privilege against compelled disclosures. As he notes:  
“First, the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed. Second, this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full 
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and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. Third, the rela- 
tion must be one which in the opinion of the community must be sedulously fo- 
stered. Forth, the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.”
357
 
The first time the U.S. Supreme Court held that an accountant cannot have the privile- 
ge of accountant-client communication under federal courts was in the Couch case.
358
 
In Couch, the Court states: 
“… the case of a restaurant owner who, after a number of years of giving her bu- 
siness records to her accountant for tax return preparation, faced an Internal Re- 
venue Service (IRS) investigation of her returns. Upon finding evidence sugge- 
sting that the restaurant owner‟s tax returns substantially understated gross inc- 
ome, the IRS issued a summons to the accountant for the production of any of 
the restaurant owner‟s business records in the accountant‟s possession. The acc- 
ountant refused to comply and transferred the records to the restaurant owner‟s 
attorney.… the restaurant owner claimed that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
to the Constitution barred production of the records due to „the confidential nat- 
ure of the accountant-client relationship and her resulting expectation of priva- 
cy.‟ Writing for the majority, Justice … dismissed the restaurant owner‟s priva- 
cy claim, finding that a taxpayer has no reasonable expectation of privacy when 
she transfers information to her accountant for ultimate disclosure in a tax retu- 
rn.… although not controlling in the instant case, federal courts do not recogni- 
ze an accountant-client privilege.”
359
  
The Couch court‟s decision noted that the accountant in this case could not enjoy the 
privileged communication against compelled disclosures, and held that the lack of ac- 
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countant-client privilege in federal courts did not control its decision.
360
 However, ot- 
her critics argued that the U.S. Supreme Court still did not make a decision on wheth- 
er an accountant can enjoy the accountant-client privilege in federal courts or not. Jak- 
ob said that Couch‟s decision did not address the accountant-client privilege problem, 
but it resolved the issue regarding Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
361
 Roloff described 
the Couch‟s court only “summarily” stated the accountant-client privilege did not exi- 
st under federal laws.
362
  
Even if the Couch‟s holding was so ambiguous, commentators still saw Couch‟s 
decision as the authority for denying the accountant-client privilege in federal laws.
363
 
Lower courts applied Couch‟s decision to similar cases, and perpetuated the unpersua- 
sive reasons that sustained there is no accountant-client privilege under federal laws. 
364
 Molony describes when lower courts addressed the issues in regard to an account- 
ant‟s privileged communication, “[r]ather than applying sound legal reasoning, these 
courts contribute to the phenomenon of „snowballing dicta‟.”
365
 However, because of 
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the enactment of Article V of Federal Rules of Evidence, this dispute was finally clari- 
fied and the argument had been resolved. Following the Federal Rules, they explicitly 
refuse an accountant to have a privileged communication in federal laws, and an acco- 
untant is obligated to divulge his/her client‟s confidential information to society when 
he/she is asked to disclose by federal courts.
366
 
    The absence of accountant-client privilege implicitly makes an accountant/audit- 
or realize that his/her obligation is to serve public good, not just to employers and spe- 
cific organizations. Once a justice made a statement concerning the responsibility of 
the auditor and the accountant: 
“The auditor does not have the same relationship to his client that a private attor- 
ney who has a role as … a confidential advisor and advocate, a loyal represent- 
ative whose duty it is to present the client‟s case in the most favorable possible 
light. … By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation‟s 
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transce- 
nding any employment relationship with the client. The independent public acc- 
ountant performing his special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corpora- 
tion‟s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This „public 
watchdog‟ function demands that the accountant maintain total independence 
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.”
367
 
Though, when scholars presented the issue of conflict of interest, this concern confus- 
es employers/clients about their relationships with accountants/auditors. Baker & Ha- 
yes criticized requiring accountants/auditors to put public interest in the first place is 
inappropriate since this “unusual arrangement poses an ethical dilemma for public ac- 
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countants.”
368
 Also, Duska says the similar matter of concern as follows: 
“[C]lients usually expect their accountants to perform their professional services 
in a matter that benefit the client.… such an expectation is misguided since … 
the accountant‟s responsibilities are to the legitimate users of the statements, not 
necessarily the client.… This creates a difficulty for while the auditors‟ clients 
are the ones who pay the fees for the auditor‟s services, the auditor‟s primary 
responsibility is not to look out for the interests of the auditor‟s employer, the 
client, but to look out for the interest of a third party, the public.… In sum, acc- 
ountants are professionals and consequently should behave as professionals, but 
unlike other professionals, while offering services to their clients, they must ev- 
aluate their client‟s work and make that evaluation pubic.”
369
  
Even if this worry is not hard to understand and is quite rational, I still think this 
concern is meaningless. Considering the reason of presenting financial statements, the 
federal government expects to utilize the disclosure of corporate financial materials to 
sustain the transparency of the public market. Companies not only eager to show good 
business performance, but tend to use these materials to promote investors‟ motives to 
purchase their stocks in the public market. Similarly, the disclosure can give an alarm 
for companies to notice their operations at each stage. Well-structured firms make bu- 
siness prosper, promote the development of the national economy, and reduce social 
problems caused by collapsed or poorly-operated companies. Besides, the sound fina- 
ncial market strengthens investors‟ confidence in purchasing stocks in the public mar- 
ket and builds a good environment for investment. The final purpose of disclosing fin- 
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ancial information is to protect public good and assure citizens‟ welfare. Employers/ 
Clients will not feel confused as they comprehend that the benefit of financial statem- 
ents is flowing to the public, not merely to corporate interests. Hence, it may be infer- 
red that the duty of accountants/auditors is not only to help corporations make accura- 
te financial materials, but also to preserve the integrity of the public stock market and 
to protect the public‟s interest. 
       ii. Internal Control and Accounting Standards 
             The accuracy of corporate financial statements is maintained and aud- 
ited by accountants and auditors. Generally speaking, financial materials are checked 
by three different professionals before publishing to the public. Vinten describes this 
concept as follows: 
“Management accountants are responsible for maintaining an adequate system of 
internal accounting controls to ensure fair presentation of financial statements 
and accurate internal reporting. Internal auditors serve to assure that managem- 
ent accountants (among others) perform their duties in accordance with manag- 
ement‟s goals, evaluating both the technical accuracy of the recorded amounts 
and the operational effectiveness of the organization. Finally, external auditors 
are required to attest to the fair presentation of the financial statements.”
370
  
Accountants performing their jobs to maintain internal control are important because 
they make financial reports more reliable to the public. Based on the pamphlet issued 
by the Committee on Auditing Procedures of the American Institute of Accountants, it 
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describes:  
“Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coordinate me- 
thods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, check the 
accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, 
and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies…. a „system‟ of int- 
ernal control extends beyond those matters which relate directly to the functions 
of the accounting and financial departments. Such a system might include budg- 
etary control, standard costs, periodic operating reports, statistical analyses and 
the dissemination thereof, a training program designed to aid personnel in meet- 
ing their responsibilities, and an internal audit staff to provide additional assura- 
nce to management as to the adequacy of its outlined procedures and the extent 
to which they are being effectively carried out.”
371
  
In addition, the pamphlet mentions that “[t]he primary responsibility for safeguarding 
the assets of concerns and preventing and detecting errors of and fraud rests on mana- 
gement. Maintenance of an adequate system of internal control is indispensable to a 
proper discharge of that responsibility.”
372
 Hence, corporate management has to esta- 
blish different mechanisms to detect, to prevent, and to correct problems that may res- 
ult in the loss of corporate assets. Accountants are able to be placed in one of internal 
control mechanisms and play a role in assuring fair and trustworthy presentations ma- 
de by managements. As for internal auditors, they can be regarded as “eyes of manag- 
ement.”
373
 Internal auditors evaluate those financial reports and find out incorrect nu- 
mbers or data to which accountants did not pay attention. Their jobs are to “see whet- 
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her the company‟s estimates are based on formulas that seem reasonable in the light of 
whatever evidence is available and that choice formulas are applied consistently from 
year to year.”
374
 At last, the role of external auditors is like that of witness. They pro- 
ve the authenticity of financial information and enhance the public‟s confidence in co- 
rporate operation and presented materials. In short, external auditors are accountants 
“who review the firm‟s financial statements and its procedures for producing them. 
Their job is to attest to the fairness of the statements and that they materially represent 
the condition of the firm.”
375
  
Thinking of the theory of the efficient market,
376
 the responsibility and the func- 
tion of independent accountants/auditors are not only to ensure or examine the authen- 
ticity of corporate financial statements, but also to provide assistance in building the 
healthy invested market for the public. The classic statement about this issue was ma- 
de in the Arthur Young case.
377
 As the Justice says:  
“Corporate financial statements are one of the primary sources of information 
available to guide the decisions of the investing public…. Commission [SEC] 
regulations stipulate that these financial reports must be audited by an indepen- 
dent certified public accountant [CPA] in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. By examining the corporation‟s books and records, the inde- 
pendent auditor determines whether the financial reports of the corporation ha- 
ve been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
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[GAAP]. The auditor then issues an opinion as to whether the financial stateme- 
nts, taken as a whole, fairly present the financial position and operation of the 
corporation for the relevant period.”
378
 
Besides the Judge focused on the independent position of accountants/auditors when 
they are making corporate financial statements, Bogle also describes the same point as 
follows:  
“The integrity of financial markets – markets that are active, liquid, and honest, 
with participants who are fully and fairly informed – is absolutely central to the 
sound functioning of any system of democratic capitalism worth its salt…. Sou- 
nd securities markets require sound financial information…. Independent overs- 
ight of financial figures is central to that disclosure system. Indeed independen- 
ce is at integrity‟s very core. And … the responsibility for the independent over- 
sight of corporate financial statements has fallen to America‟s public accounting 
profession. It is the auditor‟s stamp on a financial statement that gives it its vali- 
dity, its respect, and its acceptability by investors. And only if the auditor‟s wo- 
rk is comprehensive, skeptical, inquisitive, and rigorous, can we have confiden- 
ce that financial statements speak the truth.”
379
 
However, unlike the majority that sees the function of financial statements as the gui- 
de for investors to make a decision and as the means to sustain the transparency of the 
financial market, once Macey turned to use the concept of share price to analyze the 
purpose of financial materials. As he says:  
“Accounting is, … not particularly important to investors, except to the extent 
that accounting information is useful in the formation of share prices and in the 
allocation of economic resources that share prices facilitate. For public compan- 
ies … have well-developed capital markets, share prices provide the best lens 
with which to evaluate corporate performance. Share prices are less biased and 
they are more credible than other information about corporate performance … 
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Unlike accounting information, share prices reflect people‟s actual willingness 
to buy and sell stakes in the companies whose shares are traded. And … stock 
prices … provide an objective measure of corporate performance.... While share 
prices are important, the financial information contained in accounting reports 
constitutes an important element in the mix of data that market participants util- 
ize when they engage in the buying and selling of shares that determines share 
prices.… If the accounting data that market participants use to calculate share 
prices is not reliable, then share price will not be reliable either.”
380
  
Based on these observations, the importance of accountants/auditors‟ role is twofold. 
First, fair financial statements presented by accountants/auditors ensure the reliability 
of the securities market. Second, these materials also may be good references for inv- 
estors to decide their preferences. Since the stock price is primarily reflected by finan- 
cial information, the authenticity of financial statement is a necessary basis for invest- 
ors to evaluate corporate performance, and these materials manipulate the willingness 
of investors to trade corporations‟ stocks in the public market. 
Hence, what principles and codes regulate the responsibility of accountants/audi- 
tors and instruct them to make fair, trustworthy financial materials? As studying this 
issue, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the Code of Profes- 
sional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA Co- 
de) have to be referred to in this portion. GAAP is “the common set of accounting pri- 
nciples, standards and procedures that companies use to compile their financial state- 
ment. It is a combination of authoritative standards … and simply the commonly acc- 
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epted ways of recording and reporting accounting information.”
381
 The principles of 
AICPA Code “express the profession‟s recognition of its responsibilities to the public, 
to clients, and to colleagues. They guide members in the performance of their profess- 
ional responsibilities and express the basic tenets of ethical and professional conduct. 
The principles call for an unswerving commitment to honorable behavior, even at the 
sacrifice of personal advantage.”
382
 The AICPA Code has set up six principles for ac- 
countants/auditors to perform their jobs:
383
 
 First, in carrying out their responsibilities as professionals, members should 
exercise sensitive professional and moral judgments in all their activities.  
 Second, members should accept the obligation to act in a way that will serve 
the public interest, honor the public trust, and demonstrate commitment to 
professionalism.  
 Third, to maintain and broaden public confidence, members should perform 
all professional responsibilities with the highest sense of integrity.  
 Fourth, a member should maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts of int- 
erest in discharging professional responsibilities. A member in public practi- 
ce should be independent in fact and appearance when providing auditing 
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and other attestation services.  
 Fifth, a member should observe the profession‟s technical and ethical stand- 
ards, strive continually to improve competence and the quality of services, 
and discharge professional responsibility to the best of the member‟s ability.  
 Sixth, a member in public practice should observe the Principles of the Co- 
de of Professional Conduct in determining the scope and nature of services 
to be provided. 
In these principles, the AICPA Code regulates accountants/auditors about their duties, 
serving the public interest, integrity, objectivity and independence, due care and scope, 
and nature of services.
384
 Before corporations file financial statements to the SEC and 
the public, accountants/auditors have to follow GAAP to audit or to examine financial 
documents. Financial materials that have adopted GAAP can generally be regarded as 
being presented fairly.  
However, the argument had been raised from the Committee of the AICPA duri- 
ng 1960s.
385
 The Committee pointed out that even though corporate financial statem- 
ents are made by GAAP, it is still doubtful if these materials can be seen as being fair- 
ly presented. The Committee described this point as follows:  
“In the standard report of the auditor, he generally says that financial statements 
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„present fairly‟ in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles – 
and so on. What does the auditor mean by the quoted words? Is he saying: (1) 
that the statements are fair and in accordance with GAAP; or (2) that they are 
fair because they are in accordance with GAAP; or (3) that they are fair only to 
the extent that GAAP are fair; or (4) that whatever GAPP may be, the presentat- 
ion of them is fair?”
386
  
This issue was observed by McGinn, and he described that a forensic accountant who 
found companies can employ “aggressive accounting moves that might camouflage a 
sagging business.”
387
 Besides, these “aggressive accounting policies may distort the 
true financial condition of the company,”
388
 even though these policies can be regard- 
ed as a legal accounting method in GAAP. Once Schroeder noted this concept by a sp- 
ecific case when publishing his observation in Business Week:  
“Schilit‟s speciality is flagging the frequent – and perfectly legal – gambit of 
„window dressing,‟ which puffs up profits and revenues. He is not alleging fra- 
ud; indeed, the accounting techniques he highlights are allowed under generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). But GAAP rules are subject to wide 
interpretation – and companies have great leeway in choosing how conservativ- 
ely or aggressively they account for financial transactions.”
389
  
Therefore, it may be concluded that accountants/auditors fail to defend their positions 
when claiming those financial materials are fairly presented because GAAP is applied. 
Likewise, accountants/auditors cannot faithfully fulfill their duties when presenting fi- 
nancial statements by merely obeying the standard of GAPP. Thus, in addition to co- 
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mplying with GAPP, what is the extra requirement that accountants/auditors have to 
follow? This issue appeared in the Herzfeld case,
390
 and the court stated:  
“Compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is not necessarily su- 
fficient for an accountant to discharge his public obligation. Fair presentation is 
the touchstone for determining the adequacy of disclosure in financial statemen- 
ts. While adherence to generally accepted accounting principles is a tool to help 
achieve that end, it is not necessarily a guarantee of fairness.”
391
  
Also, Briloff describes the same issue, and he says:  
“More disturbingly to the accounting profession … was the language in which … 
Federal Judge … scrapped the affirmance. He said in effect that the first law for 
accountants was not compliance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
but rather full and fair disclosure, fair presentation, and if the principles did not 
produce this brand of disclosure, accountants could not hide behind the princip- 
les but had to go beyond them and make whatever additional disclosures were 
necessary for full disclosure. In a word, „present fairly‟ was a concept separate 
from „generally accepted accounting principles,‟ and the latter did not necessari- 
ly result in the former.”
392
 
Consequently, following these views, I conclude that the way for accountants/auditors 
to satisfy their professional and ethical duties, not only do they have to fairly present 
financial statements that ought to comply with the standard of GAAP, but they are ob- 
ligated to disclose correct, complete, explicit information to those who truly care abo- 
ut or can be influenced by these presentations. As Duska & Duska say, “Whatever the 
meaning of fairness, it seems to require that the picture presented be such that it gives 
as accurate a picture as possible to third parties that have a market interest in the fina- 
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ncial statements.”
393
  
    Since accountants/auditors cannot depend on the accountant-client privilege und- 
er federal laws, not only do they have to make compelled disclosures based on the pr- 
otection of public interest, but they are also asked to faithfully examine and fairly pre- 
sent corporate financial statements in order to shield the third parties from being dam- 
aged by these documents. Due to this obligation, it might be inferred that accountants/ 
auditors accept to be the whistleblower when finding that corporate irregularities cou- 
ld be harmful to society. However, in reality, the actual situation is totally contrary to 
this ideal expectation. Once Vinten pointed out this phenomenon as follows: 
“Despite … expressed concern for the public interest, accountants have long op- 
posed whistleblowing. Generally accepted auditing standards have historically 
required a sequential process of reporting problems such as discovered fraud … 
The recent enactment of Statements on Auditing Standards … require the audit- 
or to communicate „reportable conditions‟ in the internal control structure, disa- 
greements with management, and difficulties in performing the audit (e.g. lack 
of client co-operation) directly to the audit committee.… Though auditors are 
not whistleblowing, their responsibility to the public interest is being recogniz- 
ed in the standards.”
394
  
Thus, this can be concluded that the reason why accountants/auditors do not recognize 
themselves as the whistleblower is that the nature of their responsibilities is consistent 
with the protection of public interest. Because of similar process or model to respond 
to organizations‟ irregularities, it makes accountants/auditors think that reporting wro- 
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ngful financial statements is a part of their jobs and unrelated to whistleblowing. After 
all, the public‟s negative perception on a whistleblower is quite difficult to change in a 
short time, and no one is willing to be viewed as a snitch, or a tattletale in his/her soci- 
al relationship and network. 
In order to avoid the accounting firm‟s conflict of interest as auditing companies‟ 
financial materials, Congress enacted SOX to restrict its consulting services. The incr- 
ease of consulting services began in the 1990s due to the commodification of auditi- 
ng.
395
 Since auditing services had become commodified, and profits were not as good 
as the accounting firm originally expected, so it tended to provide more consulting se- 
rvices to its clients because those services had not been commodified, and “profit ma- 
rgins were very high.”
396
 However, more consulting services meant more conflicts of 
interest in the accounting firm. When the firm wanted to make profits and keep a stea- 
dy business relationship with clients, who wanted to show financial conditions in imp- 
roper ways, these brought the tension between the accounting firm‟s duties as auditors 
and interests in retaining their lucrative consulting contracts. For the sake of threateni- 
ng the accounting firm to take their requests, clients used to put the pressure on the fi- 
rm to fire accountants or to force the reassignment of lead auditors, who are “the me- 
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mbers of the firm who led the auditing teams.”
397
 Not only does the reassignment of 
lead auditors affect the relationship between the client and the accounting firm, but al- 
so the reassigned lead auditor may take a risk of losing his/her position, suffer financ- 
ially, and endure setbacks in other ways.
398
  
Because clients could punish the accounting firm when displeasing auditing serv- 
ices by “not renewing existing contracts or by withholding new contracts”
399
 with the 
firm, in order to pursue profits, the accounting firm gradually yielded to clients‟ requ- 
ests, and those increased accounting fraud. As a result of this trend, as Eisenberg says, 
“In the 1990s the economics of the accounting profession had developed in a way that 
made it extremely attractive for accounting firms to abdicate their gatekeeper function 
by bending to their clients their client‟s financial improprieties.”
400
 This consequence 
not only brought the disasters of Enron and WorldCom, but also was the background 
for Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Under SOX, in order to “reinstate the integrity of the accounting process and im- 
prove the efficacy of financial reporting,”
401
 Congress chiefly emphasized on four pa- 
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rts in regulating auditing and the operation of accounting firms.
402
 First, in Section 
101 and 102, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the 
Board) to oversee accounting firms. Likewise, it required accounting firms to be regi- 
stered public accounting firms when they prepare, issue, or to participate in the prepa- 
ration or issuance of any audit report for public companies. 
Second, Congress regulated non-audit services in Section 201 and 202. These pa- 
rts not only forbid accounting firms to provide certain of non-audit services to their cl- 
ients, but also require the accountant to get a pre-approval from the company‟s audit 
committee, and disclose to the stockholders in the company‟s periodic reports, even if 
those non-audit services are permitted.  
Third, the function of corporate audit committee has been strengthened. Not only 
is the public company required to have the audit committee, but the committee has to 
be composed of all independent directors. Besides, there should be at least one financ- 
ial expert sitting on the audit committee; otherwise, the public company has to disclo- 
se this information to the public and explains why it did not hire any expert to serve 
on its audit committee. Further, SOX requires the audit committee to be responsible 
for all tasks of hiring, compensating, and supervising of outside independent auditors. 
It is a policy that not only can avoid auditors‟ conflicts of interest with senior executi- 
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ves, who are the persons to achieve results, and these results have to be audited by au- 
ditors, but also can assure the accuracy of the company‟s financial statements. 
Fourth, in Section 302, Congress required chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
chief financial offers (CFOs), or persons performing similar functions to certify annu- 
al or quarterly reports. CEOs and CFOs have to confirm that they have reviewed these 
reports. In addition, they have to certify that the reviews were based on their knowled- 
ge, and these reports “[do] not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state a material fact,” and “fairly present in all materials respects the financial con- 
dition and results of operation of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the 
report.”
403
 
Because Congress made several provisions to regulate auditing and the accounti- 
ng firm, it is hard to use limited pages to go through the whole details, and this may 
be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, by observing SOX, it is easy to find that 
Congress intended to reinstate the role of accountants/auditors to be the gatekeeper, 
instead of being the accomplice of making false financial statements with companies 
they serve. The purpose is not only to retrieve the public‟s confidence in accounting 
fields, but also to sustain and ensure the authenticity of information disclosed by publ- 
ic companies in the public market. 
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     c. Perspective of Public Interest 
     i. Grace Pierce and Ortho
404
 
             Once Dr. Pierce was an associate director of medical research of Ort- 
ho Pharmaceutical Corporation (Ortho) in 1971. The story began from Dr. Pierce‟s st- 
rong conscience of professional ethics that caused the conflict of interest with her sup- 
ervisor. She and her fellow researchers were asked to proceed with drug test on huma- 
ns, but this drug was considered to have an excessively high level of saccharin – a ch- 
emical sweetener that scientists found might cause cancer. Due to this knowledge, Pi- 
erce turned down Ortho‟s order and refused the drug test on humans. As Dr. Pierce sa- 
id, “I couldn‟t in good science take the high saccharin formulation out and give it to 
infants and old people when I knew there was a controversy over whether this could 
or could not be carcinogenic.” Yet, her strong sense of professional ethics did not bri- 
ng her big praise from Ortho. Pierce was dismissed from the research program, being 
demoted, and told by the supervisor that she was irresponsible and unpromotable. Be- 
cause of this unbearable humiliation, she decided to quit and prepared to argue these 
issues in court in order to fight for her professional ethics.  
    The story started from Dr. Pierce‟s first year in Ortho. Raritan, a company focus- 
ed on making contraceptives and reproductive drugs and also got much reputation on 
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this area, wanted to transfer its track to the broader field of therapeutic. As a result of 
this shift, Dr. Pierce was assigned to projects concerning the testing of therapeutic dr- 
ugs and was later promoted to the associate director of medical research/therapeutics. 
The project team in which she participated was trying to research a new prescription 
drug, called loperamide, which can be used in the treatment of acute and chronic diar- 
rhea. Loperamide is made as a liquid form to help infants, children, and adults, especi- 
ally for the elderly, who felt uncomfortable taking a solid form of medicine. (Lopera- 
mide also has a trade name called Imodium and “Janssen‟s formula”) The first challe- 
nge for the project team was to reduce the bitter taste of loperamide and make it more 
palatable to take. In order to resolve this problem, the project team decided to add a 
kind of sweetener, called saccharin, to eliminate this unfavorable taste. However, the 
dispute still existed in the scientific field since no one knew whether saccharin or oth- 
er kinds of artificial sweeteners might cause any potential hazard to humans‟ health. 
This worry came from an animal-fed testing, and the result revealed that large dosages 
of saccharin developed the formation of cancer.  
The news about saccharin that probably causes cancer came out from laboratori- 
es and was broadcasted fervently by the mass media while Dr. Pierce and her colleag- 
ues were working on the test of loperamide. What Dr. Pierce concerned was that the 
extremely high level of saccharin in Ortho formula for making loperamide. Dr. Pierce 
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had observed that Ortho‟s formula of loperamide contained more than forty times of 
saccharin, which was compared to the amount of saccharin in a 12-ounce can of diet 
soda permitted by FDA. Other project colleagues agreed with Dr. Pierce‟s worries, 
and Dr. King, a toxicologist in the project, also concluded the amount of saccharin “in 
the Janssen preparation was too high and questioned using saccharin sodium at any le- 
vel in the product.” Concerned about the excessive usage of saccharin in loperamide, 
the project team reached an unanimous agreement to reject the possibility to market 
loperamide, and said Janssen formula “was not suitable for use in the United States” 
even if it has been marketed in Europe. Though, this decision was not paid attention 
to by Ortho. After the project team presented their opinions on loperamide, the repres- 
entative of Janssen Company came to visit Ortho for the purpose of discussing the pr- 
oject of loperamide. After the meeting, Dr. Pasquale, the executive director of Ortho‟s 
medical research department and other company executives, made a decision to conti- 
nue the process of testing project and decided to sell loperamide in the U.S. market. 
The whole plan of action was outlined on Ortho and Janssen‟s memo when discussing 
this schedule. 
    When hearing the information that Ortho was going to start the marketed plan, 
Dr. Pierce and colleagues were unsatisfied with this decision and presented their dem- 
ur. Besides, they found the memo made in the meeting misdescribed their conclusion 
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as being in agreement with the marketing of loperamide. The memo said, “The prese- 
nce in the drop formulation of 17.5 mg. of saccharin sodium per milliliter represents a 
potential problem, as FDA may not permit the use of a product with saccharin present 
at this level. By comparison, FDA permits 15.8 mg. per fluid ounce as a sweetener 
(approximately 3% of the level currently being employed in Imodium drops).” Due to 
these differences and other problems, the project team expressed their “reluctance to 
„lock into‟ the Janssen formulation of pediatric drops as the dosage form of choice.” 
Because of this false expression, the project team strongly disputed the memo, and Dr. 
Pierce also requested some sentences should be noted in the record. She added the fol- 
lowing sentence: “It would be difficult to justify medically and legally our position of 
hastening into clinical trials with a questionable formulation when preliminary work 
in Pharmaceutical Development indicates a more acceptable formulation will be avail- 
able very soon.” The action of Pierce was supported by Dr. King, a toxicologist on the 
team, and he described “any intentional exposure of any segment of the human popul- 
ation to a potential carcinogen is not to the best interest of public health or the Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corporation. We do not have to market a formulation with high levels 
of saccharin; we do have an alternative approach.” 
However, despite the negative feedback from the project team, Ortho still turned 
its back on them. Ortho not only stuck to loperamide formula, but also proceeded to 
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the schedule of marketing. Dr. Pierce supposed the reason why Ortho did not care ab- 
out any objection was that Ortho had already made up a schedule to sell loperamide to 
the market and did not expect any action to delay its plan. When Dr. Pierce told to the 
newspaper report, she said “[t]he marketing people can go-off half-cocked sometimes, 
they think millions of dollars are waiting to fall in their laps, promotions are to be had, 
careers to be made.” As regards Ortho, it still insisted that loperamide formula it pres- 
ented might not cause any possible hazard to humans‟ health. Ortho conceded a bottle 
of loperamide had a high amount of saccharin, but it strongly argued that the amount 
of saccharin in the dosage prescribed for a 24-hour period was less than the amount of 
saccharin in a 12-ounce can of diet soda, and which is acceptable and is permitted by 
FDA.  
Under the increasing pressure from Ortho, the team members started changing 
their minds and were inclined to support Ortho‟s view on loperamide formula. Contra- 
rily, Dr. Pierce still reaffirmed her position and refused to attest to the safety of lopera- 
mide. She said, “I did not and do not now agree with the majority decision in this mat- 
ter,” “in spite of the existing controversial evidence as to the ultimate safety of sacch- 
arin for human consumption, it is my strong opinion that justification for contemplati- 
ng use or for requesting FDA permission to use the Janssen drop formulation is not 
evident. I respectfully request, in the interest of proceeding reasonably with this very 
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worthy project, that an alternate formulation with no saccharin, or as low in saccharin 
as possible, be used.” In Dr. Pierce‟s mind, being the only physician on the project te- 
am, she sincerely believed that she had a stronger responsibility than other profession- 
als. She thought it was her job to monitor and to analyze the result of the drug on hu- 
man tests. She was obligated to understand what function the drug served, what side- 
effects it caused, and how safe and effective it was. Her role was not only to explain 
the drug‟s properties for other physicians, but she also had to supervise them when th- 
ey used the drug for testing other subjects. Because of this burden, she gave herself a 
bigger obligation to insist on her opinion and position.  
At last, Dr. Pierce was informed that she was going to be demoted due to her irr- 
esponsible behaviour, and was taken off all her jobs on therapeutic drug projects. As a 
result of this untruthful accusation, Dr. Pierce presented her resignation and decided to 
take legal actions against Ortho. She filed a suit against the company and claimed the 
damage caused by the termination of employment relationship. The damage she clai- 
med included the loss of her professional reputation, the disruption of her career, the 
loss of salary, seniority, and retirement benefit, and physical and mental distresses she 
had suffered.  
Under the proceeding of the lawsuit, Ortho defended the claim by using the con- 
cept of employment-at-will and disputed that there was no employment contract betw- 
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een Ortho and Dr. Pierce. Hence, “the employment is at will of either party and may 
be terminated at any time, with or without justification…. It made no difference whet- 
her [Dr. Pierce] resignation was voluntary or induced.” In the lower court, the judge‟s 
holding in favor of Ortho and stated the court ought to follow the common law princi- 
ple that employees with no contract can be discharged at will. However, when the suit 
was appealed, the superior court reversed this decision, and “sent the case back for a 
trial on all of the issue raised by the pleadings.” At last, Dr. Pierce won the final victo- 
ry in the case and successfully fought against Ortho. 
     ii. Whistleblowing and Public Interest 
Our society has advocated justice and honesty, and “has an interest in 
encouraging lawful behavior and ensuring that those responsible for wrongdoing are 
held accountable for their actions.”
405
 Whistleblowing can promote this expectation 
when the disclosers of illegal activities “identify unsafe products or practices, wastef- 
ul or fraudulent actions, and other harmful or criminal behavior”
406
 to the public and 
the people who truly care about the misconduct. Whistleblowers have a great function 
to save the federal government billions of dollars,
407
 to prevent environment from be- 
ing polluted, and to protect the safety and health of society from being harmed by oth- 
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ers.
408
 From the public‟s point of view, whistleblowing decreases potential hazards 
that probably impose upon citizens without being cautioned in advance. At the same 
time, the public benefits from the outcomes that whistleblowing brings about because 
it deters organizations from being involved in illegitimate conduct. Solomon & Garcia 
discuss this point as follows:  
“From the perspective of the wider society, the most obvious benefit of whistleb- 
lowing is its potential for reporting and subsequently deterring organizational 
misconduct. The enormous economic costs that are ultimately passed on to the 
public for such offenses as employee theft, corporate tax fraud, misappropriati- 
on of funds, consumer fraud, and other types of occupational and organizational 
crime may be greatly reduced by the threat of detection provided by employees 
as potential whistleblowers.”
409
  
Take Dr. Pierce‟s case for instance. Because Dr. Pierce disclosed unsafe composition 
of loperamide, not only did the public get a warning or attention from her information, 
but she also prevented lethal misconduct that Ortho made from which citizens might 
suffer. Sometimes, whistleblowers are also able to save an individual from bearing ph- 
ysical and mental distress and to protect organizations from collapsing. However, mo- 
st of the time, whistleblowers can rescue the public from enduring the loss of life, the 
loss of investment, and the loss of stable social environment. 
Even if the public gets so many advantages from whistleblowing, citizens still re- 
quire whistleblowers to weigh their actions before stepping forward. Whistleblowers 
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not only are asked to consider if potential hazards are actually concerned with public 
interest or may place society into a dangerous situation,
410
 but they also should ascer- 
tain whether these illegal activities are important to ordinary people or not. In add- 
ition, whistleblowers have to think over whether whistleblowing is the necessary and 
inevitable step to deter misconduct, to correct egregious errors, and to put accused or- 
ganizations‟ illegitimacy back on the right track.
411
 As Westman says:  
“All of these ethical considerations must be weighed in determining whether wh- 
istleblowing is the proper course of action. First, the responsibility to the publ- 
ic interest suggests that potential whistleblowers must consider whether the sub- 
ject of the potential report is truly a matter of public interest, distinguishing bet- 
ween matters in which the public may be interested, and matters which actually 
affect the public safety or welfare.… If it is determined that the subject of the 
potential report directly affects the public interest, employees must determine 
whether the public interest is either substantial or insignificant…. Potential whi- 
stleblowers must consider whether it is possible that whistleblowing will lead to 
correction of the imminent danger.”
412
  
Further, the public requests whistleblowers to be motivated by good faith before taki- 
ng actions to report, and requires them to make accurate disclosures. The requirement 
of good-faith disclosure ensures that whistleblowers‟ intentions are for the protection 
of public good, not for whistleblowers‟ self-interest or other political concerns. One ti- 
me, Westman stated a similar issue as follows: 
    “From the public‟s point of view … it would be better to encourage disclosures 
made in good faith, which after investigation prove to be unfounded, than to di- 
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scourage all disclosures which cannot be absolutely verified.… the public has 
an interest in encouraging well-researched disclosures made in good faith, even 
if the ultimate conclusion of the investigation into the disclosure reveals that the 
perceived danger did not actually exist.”
413
 
The requirement of accuracy is to ensure that the public will not waste social resourc- 
es on investigating untruthful accusations. False reports may cause tremendous finan- 
cial damage and bring the loss of reputations for an individual and organizations. As 
Westman describes this below: 
“In cases where the subject of the disclosure is less serious, however, the public 
has an interest in encouraging only accurate disclosures, regardless of the whist- 
leblower‟s good faith, so that public resources are not unnecessarily wasted in 
investigating the disclosures. As a matter of policy, therefore, well-researched 
whistleblower disclosures regarding serious threats to the public safety, made in 
good faith, should be legally protected.”
414
  
Hence, the public requests whistleblowing employees to bear good faith and to verify 
the authenticity of misconduct beforehand when disclosing those serious wrongdoings. 
In disclosing significant frauds, the public puts emphasis on the honesty of disclosers 
no matter whether the result turns out to be true or not. Contrarily, when the matter of 
concern is less significant and serious, the accuracy of disclosures will be paid more 
attention to by the public because good faith but negligent disclosures might bring ha- 
rm to organizations and society. 
Untruthful disclosures injure the society‟s harmony and imperil social relationsh- 
ips. Inaccurate and excessive whistleblowing can be viewed as a source of slander and 
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organizational sabotage. Even more, whistleblowing may raise much surveillance and 
reduce the autonomy of workers in the workplace.
415
 Nefarious employees probably 
use whistleblowing as an instrument to take revenge on their employers or colleagues. 
Also, malicious whistleblowers can damage organizations by making wild accusations 
against employers‟ conduct and managements‟ policies. Those actions will harm busi- 
ness good-will that mostly organizations cherish, and bring disastrous financial losses 
to these bodies. The primary factor that supports organizations to continue business is 
the public‟s confidence in their appreciated performance and honest operation. The lo- 
ss of the public‟s trust probably withers organizations‟ performance, and reduces inve- 
stors‟ passion for the securities market from which organizations gather necessary fu- 
nds and capital.  
In addition, excessive whistleblowing perhaps makes employees feel uncomfort- 
able in the workplace. The surveillance technologies watch employees to perform the- 
ir jobs, and coworkers are afraid of being complained about or being reported because 
of their trivial mistakes. This situation not only results in the loss of workers‟ autono- 
my in their jobs, but also makes the quality of working atmosphere worse and affects 
employees‟ performance. The deficiency of excessive whistleblowing is twofold. One 
time, Miethe noted this point as follows: 
                                                     
415
 Miethe, supra note 192, at 86. 
                                                           
 
 
158 
“First, employees will become more alienated and disenchanted because their 
sense of autonomy at work and friendship ties with co-workers will be severely 
threatened by the greater surveillance. Second, both productivity and innovation 
in these work environments are likely to diminish because employees will be 
overly cautious in production activities and not willing to take chances and try 
alternatives, owing to fear of reprisals.”
416
  
These results may not go along well with public interest. From the public‟s point of 
view, it is damaging to the harmony of society as social relationships are filled with 
mistrust. Mistrust not only makes people feel no sympathy on everything in their daily 
life, but it also destroys appreciated values that maintain the operation of society and a 
variety of economic or social activities. Besides, the progressive society needs to be 
promoted by innovative organizations and creative citizens. New ideas and ingenious 
thoughts have to be tested and be tried before gaining the fruit of success. However, if 
false whistleblowing increases, an individual probably are frightened away by malev- 
olent whistleblowers when he/she is convinced that whistleblowing will twist his/her 
initial intent to promote social welfare.  
For organizations, the management may lose chances to promote companies‟ fut- 
ure performance and to create a big fortune for the public since thinking about a poss- 
ible risk to be reported by malicious whistleblowing employees. At the same time, the 
public will be exposed to potential threats that can damage the health and safety of so- 
ciety thanks to no trust in whistleblowing. Hence, both bad-faith whistleblowers and 
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false whistleblowing bring an individual, organizations, and the society at large a neg- 
ative consequence when whistleblowers‟ actions are not motivated to put others‟ bene- 
fit in the first place, but contrarily, their intent is only for private interests and inclined 
to abuse appreciated social values. 
 
Chapter III. How do Common Law, State Law and Federal Statutes Protect the 
Employee Blowing the Whistle in the Workplace – Study the Balance Between 
the Doctrine of Employment-At-Will and the Public Policy Exception 
A. Introduction  
       The tie between whistleblowing and employment-at-will is significant becau- 
se hiring at-will makes employees fear of being discharged without any reasonable ca- 
use or sufficient explanation thanks to their disclosures on employers‟ misconduct. Al- 
so, this doctrine may indirectly encourage employers to commit unlawful conduct ba- 
sed on their superior managerial power to terminate employees at will, and will not be 
imposed upon any liability for their adverse employment actions.
417
 
1. What Is the Employment-At-Will Doctrine? 
         Before start discussing the whistleblower protection, it is quite important 
to get familiar with the employment relationship. Traditionally, the employment-at- 
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will doctrine governs the employment relationship between employers and employees, 
and it briefly means that each party can terminate the employment relationship at any 
time and for any reason.
418
 Either a good cause or the lack of good faith needs not to 
be proved when this doctrine applies.
419
 As for the complete description, Cramton st- 
ates that the employment-at-will doctrine means “employers and employees are free 
to end their economic relationship at any time, absent express agreement to the contr- 
ary. Either party may terminate the relationship for any reason, for no reason at all.”
420
 
Likewise, Cavico describes that this doctrine exists “where an employment relation is 
of indefinite duration, the employer may discharge an employee or an employee may 
leave at any time, for any reason, without being liable thereby for any legal wrong…. 
moreover, [it] permits an employer to discharge an employee even for a cause which 
is morally wrong.”
421
  
To employers, the doctrine of employment-at-will consents them to “dismiss the- 
ir employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for ca- 
use morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”
422
 Further, a strict 
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application of this doctrine allows employers not to be liable, although their intentions 
to discharge employees are resulting from any retaliatory purpose.
423
 To employees, 
this doctrine permits them to express their unwillingness to work and stop the emplo- 
yment relationship at any time. However, this action will be barred if employees have 
made an express agreement with employers, and promised they will not close the em- 
ployment relationship at will.
424
  
   2. Source of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
         Before the doctrine of employment-at-will became prevalent, in the early 
of nineteenth century, the United States followed the English common law that presu- 
mes the employment relationship is for one year if there is no specific agreement bet- 
ween employers and employees.
425
 Even if the employment relationship lasts one day 
longer over a year, the employment contract is regarded to be renewed for another one 
continue year.
426
 In addition, the English common law imposes a liability upon empl- 
oyers as they breach an employment contract by discharging employees with no reas- 
onable cause.
427
 The English common law makes up this presumption is because an 
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employment contract was rare before the eighteenth century, and it is necessary to est- 
ablish a rule to regulate the relationship of master-servant.
428
 Morrison describes this 
point as follows: 
“The first sort of servants, … acknowledged by the laws of England, are menial 
servants; so called from being intra moeina, or domestics. The contract between 
them and their masters arises upon the hiring. If the hiring be general without 
any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a 
principal of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain 
him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons; as well when there 
is work to be done, as when there is not: but the contract may be made for any 
larger or smaller term.”
429
  
Also, the English common law requires employers to give a notice to employees when 
employers decide to terminate employees‟ jobs, but the employment duration has been 
unstated. Generally speaking, the period for giving a notice varied thanks to different 
types of employees‟ positions. However, employees are basically given three months 
earlier notice when employers want to close the employment relationship;
430
 this rule 
resulted from England‟s Statute of Labourers.
431
 Although this statute had been repe- 
aled in 1863, the principle contained in this statute still influences England courts to 
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make related decisions.
432
  
Until the late nineteenth century, the American law gradually departed from the 
England common law and established its own rules to govern the employment relatio- 
nship. The American law abandoned one-year presumption for the employment contr- 
act and turned to favor indefinite employment relationship because of America‟s soci- 
al and economic changes. Hence, it could be concluded that the employment-at-will 
doctrine was the product under diverse social phenomena. This concept first appeared 
in H.G. Wood‟s 1877 treatise, who was a New York lawyer and treatise writer.
433
 His 
treatise regarding master and servant law not only provided a new solution for resolvi- 
ng the obstacle of one-year employment presumption in U.S. practical usage, but had 
a good start for American jurisprudence to foster this new doctrine.
434
 Wood had exp- 
ressed his thought about employment-at-will and said: 
“With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a 
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden 
is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or 
year, no time begin specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attach- 
es that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the par- 
ty may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the mutual understa- 
nding of the parties was in reference to the matter; but unless their understandi- 
ng was mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite per- 
iod, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and 
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in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants.”
435
  
Wood described that whenever the employment relationship has not been specified, 
employers and employees will not be confined by each other and can discharge or quit 
at any time. They do not have to bear the burden to prove whether their intent results 
from bad faith or lacks of reasonable causes because these are not considerable factors 
under the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Besides Wood‟s treatise created this concept for resolving the problem of one- 
year presumption in employment relationship; likewise, Industrial Revolution provid- 
ed potential assistance for the prevalence of new doctrine in America. In the period of 
Industrial Revolution, because demand for merchandise in the market varied in differ- 
ent periods, employers had to be flexible in adjusting labor distribution to respond to a 
variety of changes. Maintaining the one-year presumption for the employment relatio- 
nship not only wasted organizations‟ expenses on hiring practices, but caused an ineff- 
icient way on the usage of labor in society. Hence, the principle allowing employers to 
discharge employees at will puts more focus on the flexibility of organizational adjus- 
tment than employers‟ freedom to terminate employees.
436
 In addition, employers are 
in favor of this doctrine because the traditional paternalistic view that requires maste- 
rs to take care of servants no longer exists under this doctrine. Employers might not 
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be confined by the presumed employment relationship as they want to discharge unsu- 
itable employees in the workplace.
437
 
Not only did the industrialized society promote the prevalence of the doctrine of 
employment-at-will, but American jurisdictions tended to support and make favorable 
decisions when resolving similar issues. For example, the New York Court of Appeal 
adopted this doctrine in the Martin case in 1895.
438
 The court held that the ordinary 
employment relationship could not be viewed as one-year presumption, but “a hiring 
at will, and therefore the defendant was at liberty to terminate [employees] ... at any 
time.”
439
 Until 1913, most jurisdictions gave up the English common law and agreed 
with Wood‟s presumption.
440
 Further, the freedom of contract enhanced the doctrine 
of employment-at-will, and this view first appeared in the Adair case in the U. S. Sup- 
reme Court.
441
 The Court states this concept as follows: 
“In the absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties controlling their 
conduct towards each other and fixing a period of service, it cannot be, we repe- 
at, that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his will … to remain 
in the personal service of another… [The employee] was at liberty to quit the 
service without assigning any reason for his leaving. And [the employer] was at 
liberty, in his discretion, to discharge [the employee] from service without givi- 
ng any reason for so doing.”
442
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In Adair, the Court held that the law was unconstitutional since it imposed a criminal 
liability upon a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce when it discharged 
an employee participating in a labor organization.
443
 Then, the law violated the indiv- 
idual‟s freedom of contract regulated by the Fifth Amendment that protects the indivi- 
dual from being deprived of his/her property or liberty without due process.
444
 
Also, courts used to act as the advocates of the employment-at-will doctrine and 
were inclined to satisfy the expectation of dominant business entities.
445
 Once Cavico 
described this phenomenon in his article, as he presents: 
“The employment at will doctrine emerged because it was well-suited to the fav- 
orable business-oriented social, economic, and political climate that maturated 
its development. During that period, the judiciary, bolstered by the prevailing 
attitudes of laissez-faire economics and freedom of contract, encouraged indust- 
rial growth by actively supporting the right of an employer to control its own 
business, including approving the right to an employer to discharge at will.… 
The emerging capitalist employer required wide latitude in employment practic- 
es, especially the license to regulate the size of its labor force, in order to confr- 
ont growing competition and to meet changing market conditions. The employ- 
ment at will doctrine promoted and protected the capitalist employer by empo- 
wering its rule over the labor force. The employer now had great flexibility to 
upgrade its labor force or to dismiss employees during times of reduced demand 
for production … The courts, in response to the economic changes sweeping 
the United States, performed a role as developers of the common law, and ushe- 
red in a doctrine which reflected the requirements, expectations, and beliefs of 
the then dominant business class.”
446
 
Hence, observing a series of social and economic changes, courts gradually stated that 
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the concept of hiring at-will has great function on the usage of labor in markets. For 
employers and organizations, hiring at-will lets them rapidly respond to the market‟s 
supply and demand, and dispatch to adjust organizational operation. In addition, it can 
improve organizational efficiency because employers have the right to fire unsuitable 
employees at will, and recruit new constituents who can enhance the performance of 
organizations. Similarly, it is allowable for employees to quit from organizations they 
serve at any time since they also have the right to choose employers and organizations 
they want to serve and whom they like to associate with. 
Further, the principle of mutuality is another concept that promoted the doctrine 
of employment-at-will. Its rationale is that not only can employers not be compelled 
to retain employees who they try to discharge, but employees also cannot be forced to 
serve unpleasant employers or organizations.
447
 A court states:  
“Our disinclination to expand [this case] serves to protect employees as well as 
employers … In the absence of an employment contract, the counterpart part of 
the employer‟s privilege to terminate at will is the privilege of the employee to 
do the same … employees have a strong interest in maintaining that privilege 
free from threat of suit, lest employers be supplied with a new weapon with 
which to harass key employees wishing to change jobs. Thus, the rights of emp- 
loyer and employee to decline to create conditions for termination benefit 
both.”
448
  
Therefore, the privilege of termination belongs to both employers and employees, and 
it is not an exclusive right for any particular party. When employers have a freedom to 
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discharge employees whom they dislike or abominate, employees hold the same right 
to get rid of supervisors whom they do not respect or are unwilling to serve or comply 
with as well. 
The doctrine of employment-at-will has been in the Constitution from the Copp- 
age case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
449
 The Court held that it is the constitu- 
tional right for an individual to decide whether he/she wants to enter into a contract or 
not. Freedom of contract or freedom of not making up a contract is a convergence for 
an individual to balance self-interest and other factors. The Court overthrew the state 
statute that imposed a misdemeanor upon employers who required employees to sign 
a contract, which precluded employees from becoming a member of labor union when 
they were in the employment relationship. The Court notes: 
“Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property – parta- 
king of the nature of each – is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of 
property.… If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a 
substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional sense. 
The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the ri- 
ch; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acqui- 
re property, save by working for money.”
450
 
Thus, since the doctrine has been certified by the U.S. Supreme Court, inferior courts 
or other agencies will not suspect the status of the employment-at-will doctrine when 
addressing related employment disputes. Not only has hiring at-will doctrine grown to 
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be the standard that governs U.S. employment relationship in the workplace, but also 
has become the prevalent concept to decide the duties and obligations held by emplo- 
yees and employers. 
   3. Influence of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in American Society  
         Followed by the analysis, it may be interesting to know how the employm- 
ent relationship in America has been influenced by the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Werhane points out this phenomenon in his book: 
“Legally speaking, 55 percent of all employees in the private sector are at-will 
employees. What this means is that these employees are working with no assur- 
ances regarding the conditions or term of their employment, which can be unil- 
aterally altered or terminated at any time, for good reasons, no reason, or even 
immoral reasons.… At-will employees range from part-time contract workers to 
CEOs. This category includes all those workers, managers, and executives in 
the private and public sectors of the economy not covered by agreements, statu- 
tes, or contracts.… these employees have no rights to due process or to appeal 
employment decisions, and the employer does not have any obligation to give 
reasons for demotions, transfers, or dismissals.… The reality is that most empl- 
oyees, particularly those who perform at least adequately, are generally unaffec- 
ted by their at-will status. It is often not until something out-of-the ordinary oc- 
curs, such as an unforeseen altercation, corporate restructuring, layoffs, econo- 
mic downturns, or a corporate merger, that people become aware of their status. 
While changes are taking place with regard to how employment is regulated, th- 
ese changes do not significantly alter the fact that our default legal framework 
and mindset about employment is rooted firmly in the employment-at-will.”
451
 
As the observation of Werhane, the employment relationship following the doctrine of 
employment-at-will is not be protected by due process as employees are fired. Emplo- 
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yers have no responsibility to make a good cause or hold good faith when they decide 
to discharge employees. This situation causes several problems because of the imbala- 
nced power between employers and employees. Even if employees have the right to 
quit at any time, whether they can practice this privilege is still in doubt. Do they have 
comparable resources, like employers, to find another job to replace the original one? 
Several unequal phenomena arise as a result of the application of employment-at-will 
doctrine. In later sections, these issues will be discussed, and other policies will be ap- 
plied to against this employer-orientation doctrine. 
   4. Criticisms of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine  
       In the doctrine of employment-at-will, there is no outlet for discharged em- 
ployees to claim their arguments because they have no right to be protected in the leg- 
al process and to appeal those unjust treatment made by their employers. Also, emplo- 
yers have no obligation to explain their adverse actions imposed upon employees. Th- 
is issue generally gives rise to other legal scholars‟ attention and makes them turn to 
think about whether this inherent unfairness should be maintained or not.
452
 Because 
of potential imbalanced power in the employment relationship, the principle of mutua- 
lity, in reality, appears to have less function to reach practical fairness between emplo- 
yees and employers. In fact, employees rarely have a chance to choose work that they 
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really like, and to decide whether these jobs are suitable for their professional majors. 
The reason to find a career is that employees have to sustain their livelihoods, families, 
and bear necessities of life. Considering the nature of employment, employees have to 
evaluate geographical restriction, time, the knowledge that they have to invest in purs- 
ued careers, the possibility of promotion, and if the payment is worth for them going 
for because it is difficult for them to change jobs arbitrarily.
453
 Then, employees seld- 
om quit voluntarily and fear to be terminated with no reasonable cause; also, employ- 
ees worry their positions will not be protected by the legal process after bearing empl- 
oyers‟ adverse actions.
454
  
On the contrary, employers do not have such concerns to worry since they hold 
managerial power in the workplace. Employers have superior authority to choose whi- 
ch person they want to recruit, and have the power to make employment contracts and 
to amend the terms of contract.
455
 Besides, employers may not make their livelihoods 
or business into trouble only because of employees‟ resignations. If employers intend 
to retain employees whose performance is admirable but think about quitting, employ- 
ers can simply raise those employees‟ payments or increase other benefit to keep them 
in original positions. Otherwise, employers are able to provide more attractive terms 
                                                     
453
 Moskowitz, supra note 427, at 34. 
454
 Massingale, supra note 418, at 200-01. 
455
 Id. 
                                                           
 
 
172 
in the employment contract to attract other suitable or competent applicants to partici- 
pate in their organizations.  
Compared with the situations encountered by employers and employees, employ- 
ees involuntarily discharged suffer more hardships in daily life than employers do be- 
cause employers probably can easily change those temporary inconveniences by man- 
agerial power.
456
 In this way, it may be inferred that the employment relationship can- 
not be considered as an equal, mutual, or symmetrical model. As a court notes:  
“While the doctrine is cast in mutuality, affording to employee as well as emplo- 
yer the right of at-will termination, it cannot be seriously contended that, in rea- 
lity, it impacts with equal force.… it assures equality to the employee as does 
the law which forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges.”
457
  
Because of the differences in economic and bargaining power between employers and 
employees, employers‟ abilities to make the terms of employment contracts or control 
other matters related to employment will have a great influence on employees‟ activit- 
ies in the workplace. Following this disparate position, it increasingly raises the conc- 
ern about the abuse of employers‟ managerial power on the treatment of employees.
458
 
In view of this unfair situation, courts are required to establish a rule or other excepti- 
ons to prevent employees from being punished by employers‟ unjust practices. Ironic- 
ally, however, before starting to adopt the employment-at-will doctrine, courts had be- 
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en criticized by not following the public‟s expectations as result of social and econo- 
mic changes.
459
 Likewise, coping with current disputes, courts are forced to make a 
new policy to respond to diverse values of society, and find some solutions to satisfy 
new expectations coming from employees, employers, and the public.
460
 A court not- 
es a similar concept below:  
“Absolute employment at will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up vi- 
sions of the sweat shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. 
The doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our law. As it was a judicially promu- 
lgated doctrine, this court has the burden and duty of amending it to reflect soc- 
ial and economic changes.”
461
  
Courts have been criticized for being the advocates of discouraging legal and moral 
behaviour since former decisions support the employment-at-will doctrine.
462
 Though, 
when this doctrine has been misused and has become a tool for employers to retaliate 
against employees, courts have to intervene in before legislatures begin to take actions 
to statutorily forbid those retaliatory actions. 
Protecting employees from being abused by employers‟ authority in the workpla- 
ce is extremely important because, nowadays, the operation of society not only depen- 
ds on the connection of each social constituent, but also relies on the interaction of va- 
rious human activities. As Tannenbaum says: 
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“We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our 
means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely depende- 
nt upon wages. If they lose their jobs, they lose every resource, except for the 
relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the 
mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something new in the 
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man‟s hands.”
463
  
Since the disparity of bargaining power and economical position in the employment 
relationship, courts gradually transferred their focus from promoting successful busin- 
ess to think about the individual‟s protection and public interest. The employment-at- 
-will doctrine was strictly pursued until the 1960s.
464
 During the 1960s, the issues ab- 
out the quality of life and the protection of personal interest got the federal governme- 
nt‟s attention.
465
 Federal government found that even if the hiring at-will doctrine had 
a considerable influence to promote organizational performance and improve the usa- 
ge of labor in the market, this doctrine still brought potential harm on employees‟ rig- 
hts and public good. Diverse social values will be violated “when the employer termi- 
nates the employee for a reason that contravenes or jeopardizes a clear and fundamen- 
tal, substantial, or well established „public policy‟ of the jurisdiction.”
466
 Although th- 
ere is managerial power owned by employers, when this power arises from employe- 
rs‟ bad intent and starts harming employees, it should be restricted and examined by 
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authorized agencies. One time, a court stated, “Firing for bad cause – one against pub- 
lic policy articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law – is not a right inhe- 
rent in the at-will contract …”
467
 In addition, usually, employees are wrongfully disc- 
harged for the reason that they are conscious of their social duties to protect the publ- 
ic‟s safety and promote the public policy of jurisdiction.
468
 One court notes this idea 
as follows: 
“An employer should not have an absolute and unfettered right to terminate an 
employee for an act done for the good of the public. Therefore … an at-will em- 
ployee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in viola- 
tion of a well-established public policy of the state.”
469
  
Hence, in order to protect employees from suffering unjust treatment, courts ten- 
ded to reconsider whether they should shrink the scope of the employment-at-will do- 
ctrine and brought other exceptions to restrict this principle.
470
 Because of these con- 
cerns, the jurisdictions and the legislatures made up some exceptions and limitations 
as they address issues associated with the problem of the doctrine of employment-at- 
will.
471
 Right now, the public policy exception is the most widely-accepted concept to 
modify the defects of the hiring at-will doctrine. Once a court stated, “The potentially 
harsh effects of the at-will doctrine have been tempered … by the adoption of the pu- 
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blic policy exception.”
472
 Then, how to operate the public policy exception in order to 
balance the conflict of interest in the employment-at-will doctrine is the next lesson to 
study, and is going to be discussed in the later section. 
   5. The Public Policy Exception and Its Function 
       The prevalent method to limit the employment-at-will doctrine is the publ- 
ic policy exception.
473
 The public policy exception means employees can bring a cau- 
se of action against employers when they suffer wrongful or retaliatory discharge, and 
the discharge violates significant public policies. In essence, as Jones says, “The emp- 
loyer and employee stand on opposite sides of the issue of whether an employer shou- 
ld terminate employment if it is contrary to public policy.”
474
 According to the public 
policy exception, some elements have to be satisfied when employees are filing a cla- 
im against the doctrine of employment-at-will. These elements include: (1) an act or 
refusal to act by the employee (2) an act or refusal was supported by public policy (3) 
an act or refusal bears a causal relationship … to (4) the employee‟s discharge.
475
 It is 
hard for employees to bring the public policy exception against employers when they 
are fired only for a good or no reason, even for a bad reason. If the discharge is not in 
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retaliation for the employee having engaged in conduct supported by a strong public 
policy.
476
 As the discharge is with “the absence of just cause … or [there is] the pres- 
ent of an unfair ulterior motive [of employers],” these kinds of discharge are insuffici- 
ent in the absence of a strong public policy that protects the employee‟s conduct moti- 
vating the discharge.
477
 
The public policy exception is a compromise after courts struck the balance amo- 
ng employers‟ managerial authority, employees‟ personal security, and significant pu- 
blic policies.
478
 However, some people stand for the employment-at-will doctrine be- 
cause they think employers not only can efficiently make use of their managerial po- 
wer to bring maximum interests, but can control workplaces and reduce unnecessary 
risks.
479
 Providing a legal recourse for discharged employees may increase the chance 
of false allegations to occur and influence the harmony of workplaces.
480
 The opposi- 
tion contends that even though the hiring at-will doctrine strengthens employers‟ pow- 
er on management, this power still cannot be superior to the public‟s expectations on 
protecting the individual‟s rights, promoting public policies, and ensuring public inte- 
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rest.
481
 Atkins states this point as follows: 
“Modernly, courts strike a balance between the competing interests of employer 
discretion, employee security and public policy. Proponents of the at-will empl- 
oyment doctrine argue that the employer‟s interest in controlling the working 
environment must be maintained. Proponents for enforcement of the at-will em- 
ployment doctrine argue that, except in the most egregious instances, allowing 
recourse for unjust dismissal is unwarranted. These proponents contend unjust 
dismissal protection encourages false claims, and is an inappropriate means of 
enforcing public policy. Opponents contend that protection of the employee and 
society is of paramount importance. If employees have no recourse, employers 
will coerce them into committing illegal acts to the detriment of society and, 
potentially, the environment.”
482
 
Organizations‟ private interests cannot be superior to public welfare when the reason 
that employers take retaliatory actions against employees correlates with the issue of 
public policy or probably harms the safety and health of citizens. In these situations, 
courts have to restrict the employment-at-will doctrine because their actions will satis- 
fy the expectation of social constituents and avoid the losses to the public. 
   6. Evolution of the Public Policy Exception 
a. History
483
 
         Because unfair circumstances caused by the hiring at-will doctrine, legal 
scholars and courts intended to make up a rule or other exceptions to restrict employe- 
rs‟ managerial power that can discharge employees at will; the public policy exception 
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was the product under this consideration. The public policy exception not only resolv- 
es the problem of conflicts of interest among employers, employees, and the public in 
the employment-at-will doctrine, but finds an outlet to address imbalanced power in 
the employment relationship.  
The public policy exception is the concept that came from state common law. It 
initially appeared in the Kouff case
484
 and the Petermann case
485
 under the California 
Court of Appeal. In Kouff, the court held that the doctrine of employment-at-will is re- 
stricted and has to be subject to statutory limitations. Employers‟ allegations will be of 
no merit if they claim the hiring at-will doctrine trumps statutory prohibitions. Thus, 
the court held that the application of the employment-at-will doctrine has to follow st- 
atutory limitations and cannot be abused by employers. In Petermann, the court set up 
a concept of “public policy” to restrict the application of the employment-at-will doct- 
rine. The court held that the doctrine of hiring at-will is limited by statutes and has to 
be restricted under the concerns of diverse public policies. The court states this point 
as follows: 
“The public policy of this state … would be seriously impaired if it were to be 
held that one could be discharged by reason of his refusal to commit perjury. To 
hold that one‟s continued employment could be made contingent upon his com- 
mission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage 
criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and serve to 
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contaminate the honest administration of public affairs. This is patently contrary 
to the public welfare.”
486
 
In Petermann, the court noted that when employees are discharged since they are un- 
willing to assist employers in committing perjury, in this situation, employers are rest- 
ricted to terminate employees at will because of the consideration of public policy. In 
this way, employers will bear more restrictions to apply the employment-at-will doctr- 
ine in the workplace since the scope of limitation extends from narrow statutes to the 
broader concept of public policy. 
Besides, the concept of wrongful discharge appearing in the public policy excep- 
tion arose from the Frampton case decided by Indiana‟s Supreme Court.
487
 In Framp- 
ton, the Court held that the plaintiff should not be wrongfully terminated only because 
she filed a worker‟s compensation claim. As the Court notes: 
“If employers are permitted to penalized employees for filing workmen‟s compe- 
nsation claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of 
being discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory 
right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation – opting, 
instead, to continue their employment without incident. The end result ... is that 
the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation.… Since the Act embraces 
such a fundamental … policy, strict employer adherence is required.”
488
 
Thus, the Court restricted employers‟ right to discharge employees wrongfully merely 
since employees intend to exercise their statutory rights. Employers are not allowed to 
interfere in employees‟ privileges when employees‟ actions involve fundamental liber- 
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ty that are protected by statutes or regulations, which are serving the significant public 
policy. 
Because of the Petermann case, many jurisdictions have recognized that in order 
to bring a cause of action against the employment-at-will doctrine, employees have to 
file their claims based on some factors. These factors include employees‟ “(1) refusal 
to commit an unlawful act, (2) performance of an important public obligation, or (3) 
exercise of a statutory right or privilege.”
489
 These discussions are going to be prese- 
nted in later sections. 
b. The Public Policy Exception As a Tort 
         Observing from the origination of the public policy exception, employe- 
rs‟ tortious actions under the employment-at-will doctrine can be a factor for employ- 
ees to have a cause of action against employers. Many jurisdictions have provided tor- 
ts as a legal remedy for employees who have suffered wrongful discharge from empl- 
oyers whose actions contravene significant public policies.
490
 Werhane says this point 
as follows:  
“Exceptions to EAW [employment-at-will] are also derived from tort theory. Th- 
ese exceptions fall into a number of broad categories. Most of these situations 
target either the right of the employer to discharge the employee or the manner 
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in which an employee is discharged. Wrongful discharge based on public policy 
is clearly the most successful argument in many jurisdictions … Such actions 
contend that the employer is preempted from discharging the employee, genera- 
lly on the basis of a contrary federal or state regulation. Similarly, arguments for 
outrage, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interf- 
erence with contract, while less successful, are also based on claims of improp- 
er motivation for discharge.”
491
  
Therefore, the wrongful discharge can be the most persuasive claim for employees to 
allege their terminations are worth being protected under the consideration of public 
policy. Though, the public policy is an unclear concept and can be shown by a variety 
of forms. Thus, it is important for employees to find an exact public policy, which can 
shield their rights from being damaged by employers before filing a claim in the legal 
jurisdiction. 
In addition, courts find that it is not difficult for them to recognize torts because 
the wrongful discharge is the violation, which neither results from the agreement bet- 
ween employers and employees nor from the expectation in the employment relation- 
ship. Also, this violation does not satisfy the public‟s expectation since ordinary peop- 
le not only think the discharge should result from employers‟ good faith, not coming 
from retaliatory intent, but they also believe that the wrongful discharge is unaccepta- 
ble in our society.
492
 Since employees bearing the wrongful discharge can bring a ca- 
use of action by torts against employers, physical or emotional harm will be consider- 
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ed when courts decide to relieve employees‟ losses. As a court notes:  
“We believe that public policy also requires us to allow a wrongfully discharged 
employee a remedy for his or her complete injury … In addition to his monetary 
loss of wages, the employee may suffer mentally. „Humiliation, wounded pride, 
and the like may cause very acute mental anguish…‟ We know of no logical reas- 
on why a wrongfully discharged employee‟s damages should be limited to out-of- 
-pocket loss of income, when the employee also suffers casually connected emoti- 
onal harm.”
493
 
Likewise, courts may impose the punitive damage in torts
494
 upon employers for their 
wrongful terminations when employees‟ conditions can satisfy required elements and 
standards.
495
  
Even if employees can bring a cause of action by torts against employers‟ wrong- 
ful discharge and relieve their losses, there are some defects when applying torts agai- 
nst employers‟ retaliatory actions. The most difficult problem comes from the vaguen- 
ess of the word “public policy”.
496
 As a result of the ambiguity of this term, courts fi- 
nd it difficult to trace back the precise source when applying the public policy except- 
ion to restrict the employment-at-will doctrine.
497
 Employees, employers and their at- 
torneys fail to easily predict the result of the case because the unspecific public policy 
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of torts not only had a negative history on being rejected by some courts,
498
 but diffe- 
rent jurisdictions also have made divergent decisions on related issues. Thus, it is co- 
mplicated to identify courts‟ positions as applying the public policy of torts. A vague 
definition of public policy and an imprecise standard to decide public policy preclude 
employees from filing a claim against employers‟ adverse employment actions. Also, 
these defects hinder employers from preparing for a strong defense to rebut employe- 
es‟ claims if their allegations are false. Then, these deficiencies cause the public poli- 
cy exception to become “an amorphous source of just cause litigation”;
499
 also, they 
are inclined to “transform at-will employment into life tenure regardless of work perf- 
ormance.”
500
 The application of public policy on resolving the issues of hiring at-will 
doctrine is not as specific and uncomplicated as courts or legal scholars originally cre- 
ated this concept. 
c. Sources of the Public Policy Exception 
For the sake of realizing which situation will be protected under the pu- 
blic policy exception, it is important to get the whole comprehension regarding the so- 
urces of public policy. Frankly speaking, the sources of public policy “typically enco- 
mpass Constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative rules, regulations 
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or decisions.”
501
 Even if the sources of public policy have been dominated by legisla- 
tive enactments, administrative regulations, or judicial decisions; sometimes, professi- 
onal codes of ethics also can be regarded as a kind of public policy and be used to ag- 
ainst employers‟ wrongful terminations.
502
 In later sections, these sources are categor- 
ized and be discussed. 
       i. Constitutional Sources 
             The Constitution is the foundation of law. Any legislative statutes or 
administrative regulations cannot conflict with it when related issues get involved in 
the spirit of the Constitution. Even though the Constitution prevents the individual fr- 
om being damaged by state actions and not purely by private conduct,
503
 when a spe- 
cified condition interferes with the individual‟s right protected by the Bill of Rights, 
the Constitution still can be viewed as a source of public policy to keep a person from 
being harmed. Therefore, as employees suffer wrongful discharge and find their cons- 
titutional rights have been infringed, they can claim violations of rights and have a ca- 
use of action against private employers under legal jurisdiction.
504
 
     When starting to discuss the public policy under the Constitution, the right of 
pri- vacy, the right of free speech, and the right of association come to mind. First, 
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the rig- ht of privacy is not only cherished by an individual, but is put on the primary 
place in the constitutional doctrine.
505
 Hence, if employees are discharged by 
employers who- se actions invade their privacy, the Constitution can be the source of 
public policy that employees may depend on to bring a cause of action against 
employers.
506
 However, employees‟ right of privacy may not be superior to other 
interests when these conflict with each other. Likewise, the right of privacy has to be 
balanced between employers‟ business discretion in the workplace and other social 
interests in order to decide whi- ch one will prevail.
507
 As the public‟s interests are 
more critical than employees‟ priv- acy, individual rights should yield and keep out 
of the way. A court states this concept as follows: 
“Where the public policy supporting [employees‟] privacy in off-duty activities 
conflicts with the public policy supporting the protection of the health and safety 
of other workers, and even [employees] themselves, the health and safety concer- 
ns are paramount.”
508
  
Thus, it is highly possible that courts would hold that employees‟ allegations are of no 
merit even though their claims are based on the privacy clause under the Constitution. 
Because other interests still have to be protected and considered, courts have to decide 
which interest has more advantages than others do when those different interests conf- 
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lict with each other. 
Second, the right of free speech is another public policy that is protected under 
the Constitution. This concept was coming from the Novosel case,
509
 and the court st- 
ated this point as follows:  
“The definition of a „clearly mandated public policy‟ as one that „strikes at the 
heart of a citizen‟s social right, duties, and responsibilities‟ … appears to provi- 
de a workable standard for the tort action.… the protection of an employee‟s fr- 
eedom of political expression would appear to involve no less compelling a soc- 
ial interest than the fulfillment of jury service or the filing of a worker‟s compe- 
nsation claim.”
510
 
However, like the right of privacy, even if a person can rely on the right of free speech 
in the Constitution to fight against any infringements, courts still tend to balance and 
take other factors into account in order to decide whether this right has to protected in 
the workplace or not. Once the Novosel court made up some inquiries for considerati- 
on before a decision came out: 
 “Whether, because of the speech, the employer is prevented from efficie- 
ntly carrying out its responsibilities; 
 Whether the speech impairs the employee‟s ability to carry out his own 
responsibilities; 
 Whether the speech interferes with essential and close working relations- 
hip;  
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 Whether the manner, time, and place in which the speech occurs interfere 
with business operation.”
511
  
Therefore, as observed above, courts tend to think about employers‟ managerial power, 
employees‟ protected rights, and organization‟s interests before making the conclusion 
on the issue of freedom of speech. Not only will employers‟ discretion on business be 
considered, but employees‟ abilities to perform their duties, the working environment, 
and organizational operation or performance will be thought over at the same time. 
Third, other courts further extend the public policy to the freedom of association, 
512
 the freedom from discrimination,
513
 and the freedom from defamation in the priv- 
ate workplace.
514
 Moreover, Perritt even claimed that due process could be regarded 
as one public policy when employees are discharged due to the insufficient process or 
an unreasonable cause. As he says:  
“Due process is also constitutionally recognized. Part of substantive due process 
is the rationality idea: the idea that injury must be justified by some good cause. 
It is a relatively short logical step … to transform the public policy tort into a 
legally imposed just cause standard.”
515
  
Nonetheless, when adopting due process as a type of public policy, it may completely 
abolish the employment-at-will doctrine. Thus, the application of this concept should 
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be more careful and restrictive. 
       ii. Statutory and Administrative Sources 
             Not only can the public policy be found in the Constitution, but courts 
also find other sources to mitigate the doctrine of employment-at-will in federal and 
state statutes,
516
 and administrative regulations.
517
 It is required for employees to po- 
int out a violation of specific statutes or regulations that employers breach because th- 
ese sources give them a strong claim of public policy against employers‟ wrongful di- 
scharge.
518
 Although statutes and administrative regulations can be viewed as the so- 
urces of public policy, some courts still tend to apply this exception conservatively.
519
 
The reason is that courts are unwilling to ruin the hiring at-will doctrine since it is the 
basis of the employment relationship within U.S. society.
520
 A court noted this conce- 
rn and stated that “[v]irtually every statute reflects a public policy judgment … To ex- 
tract a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine from each statute 
would effectively eviscerate that doctrine.”
521
 Even if courts worried the ground of 
employment relationships might be destroyed due to a broad definition of public poli- 
                                                     
516
 Wagenseller, supra note 445, at 380. 
517
 Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1344 (3d Cir. 1990). 
518
 Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129, 
133 (1987). 
519
 Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., supra note 461. 
520
 Redick v. Kraft, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 296, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
521
 Id. 
                                                           
 
 
190 
cy, they still set up some rules to restrict the hiring at-will doctrine when finding emp- 
loyers abuse managerial power to discharge employees; these standards will be listed 
below. 
First, under certain situations, when statutes expressly restrict employers‟ rights 
of discharge on employees, employers cannot claim their rights and are shielded und- 
er the employment-at-will doctrine.
522
 Take Florida Statutes Section 440.205 for exa- 
mple, it states, “No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coe- 
rce any employee by reason of such employee‟s valid claim for compensation or atte- 
mpt to claim compensation under the Workers‟ Compensation Law.”
523
 These statutes 
adjust employers‟ managerial power and confine their discretion to discharge employ- 
ees.
524
 If employers still fire employees at will in prohibited circumstances, not only 
do their actions violate the public policy, but they also may be imposed upon the liabi- 
lities for their adverse employment actions.
525
  
Second, if the reason that employees suffer terminations is since they refuse em- 
ployers‟ requests to breach statutes
526
 or regulations,
527
 discharged employees can be 
shielded by claiming the public policy protection. Like the Sides court notes:  
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“[W]hile there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for 
an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contr- 
act for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different 
interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very 
nature is designed to discharge and prevent.”
528
 
Because statutes or regulations embody the public‟s expectations, which require social 
constituents not to diverge from social values and breach laws, those who push others 
to commit illegal conduct should be condemned by society.
529
 Thus, when employees 
discharged is because their refusals to violate statutes or regulations, courts tend to su- 
pport employees‟ actions and compensate their losses from employers‟ adverse actio- 
ns. Once a court showed its position and stated: 
“… the public policy exception is invoked when an employer requires an at-will 
employee, as a condition of retaining employment, to violate the law. To hold 
otherwise would sanction defiance of the legal process legislated … In a nation 
of laws the mere encouragement that one violate the law is unsavory; the threat 
of retaliation for refusing to do so is intolerable and impermissible.”
530
  
Thus, with no shield for employees who are unwilling to yield to employers‟ unlawful 
requests and refuse to violate laws, these employees may be conflicted with balancing 
job security and statutory compliance.
531
  
As for the allegation under the protection of public policy, employees have to po- 
int out the specific violation that is equal to or more than the general statement of pub- 
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lic policy.
532
 Besides, the requirement of causation is another factor for courts to deci- 
de if discharged employees have a legal right against employers‟ terminations. A court 
states this point as follows:  
“[A] plaintiff must allege and prove more than that she was fired; she must allege 
and prove that her firing was caused by a prohibited retaliatory motive.… With- 
out the requisite causation there might be a discharge, but not an actionable dis- 
charge.… There must be facts for a „casual connection‟ between [a plaintiff‟s] 
refusal to act and the discharge, facts other than the refusal and the discharge th- 
emselves.”
533
 
Sometimes, the retaliatory motive can be proved by “rapidity and proximity in time” 
between employees‟ refusals to violate statutes or regulations and their discharge.
534
 
Yet, some courts adopted a stricter standard that requires employees to prove the disc- 
harge results from the only one cause, that is, the denial of breaching statutes or regul- 
ations.
535
 Likewise, some courts even held that the public policy exception merely pr- 
otects discharged employees from refusing to take criminal actions and will not be ap- 
plied to civil violations.
536
 These diverse decisions make the public policy exception 
complicate to apply. Nonetheless, no matter which standard or limitation courts impo- 
se upon this principle, the violation of law is not acceptable and can be a factor to give 
rise to the protection of public policy. 
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Third, discharged employees can claim the public policy exception when they 
are terminated by pursuing the statutory right.
537
 However, as employees bring this ri- 
ght against employers, employees must prove that employers‟ decisions of discharge 
exactly arise from employees‟ actions of pursuing statutory rights. It is not sufficient 
for employees to contend that the discharge violates statutory rights.
538
 Filing a work- 
er‟s compensation claim is the most prevalent allegation for employees to fight for a 
statutory right when being terminated by employers. In the Frampton case, the emplo- 
yee filed a claim for his compensation and received a settlement; nevertheless, he still 
suffered retaliatory discharge subsequently.
539
 The court stated that the discharge bec- 
ause of the worker‟s compensation claim is a wrongful, unconscionable action, which 
is unallowable under the law, and held that this claim of retaliatory discharge is grant- 
ed in related Indiana statutes.
540
 The court notes this decision as follows: 
“… a [retaliatorily] discharge would constitute an intentional, wrongful act on 
the part of the employer for which the injured employee is entitled to be fully 
compensated in damages…. [U]nder ordinary circumstances, an employee at 
will may be discharged without cause. However, when an employee is discharg- 
ed solely for exercising statutorily conferred right, an exception to the general 
rule must be recognized.”
541
  
Yet, like the policy of the refusal to violate statutes or regulations, employees are req- 
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uired to assert that the discharge has “a causal link” with the filing of the worker‟s co- 
mpensation.
542
 With no connection or related evidence that is able to prove the casual 
link, it is difficult for discharged employees to get relief for the damage from employ- 
ers‟ adverse actions.  
Fourth, even though there is no specific statutory protection and enumerated rig- 
hts, employees who suffer retaliatory discharge still can be shielded as these terminat- 
ions are inconsistent with social concerns or state public policies.
543
 This standard ex- 
tends the scope of the public policy exception, and protects other conditions that have 
not been specified in statutes or regulations.
544
 In addition, this standard reduces the 
possibility of unequal situations that cannot go along with the public‟s expectations to 
happen. However, this concept lacks the specific standard for courts to vindicate the 
reasonableness of discharge, so several courts have refused to adopt this principle wh- 
en trying to find public policies.
545
 By contrast, these courts tend to construe statutory 
language more broadly as resolving the issues of retaliatory discharge.
546
 
iii. Judicially Made Sources 
Many jurisdictions have agreed that judicial decisions can be a source 
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of public policy.
547
 As a court notes:  
“Limiting the scope of public policy to legislative enactments would necessarily 
eliminate aspects of the public interest which deserve protection but have limit- 
ed access to the political process. Judicial decisions can also enunciate substant- 
ial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not treated.”
548
 
Similarly, Leonard describes that “… neat separation of functions between executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches has become blurred over two centuries of practice. 
From the very beginning, … state courts played an important role in identifying publ- 
ic policy wholly apart from legislative or executive actions.”
549
 Even though judicial 
decisions can be regarded as the source of public policy, courts still have to recognize 
the rule or standard that directs them to make a suitable judicially-created public poli- 
cy. In general, courts are used to referring to prior judicial decisions, which do not si- 
mply resolve retaliatory discharge claims but may be related to other issues, as the so- 
urce of public policy when addressing wrongful dismissals.
550
 However, judicial dec- 
isions acting as the source of public policy have been criticized by commentators bec- 
ause they found these decisions were made subjectively and vaguely.
551
 Judicial deci- 
sions not only make it harder for later courts to decide the scope of the sources,
552
 but 
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let future parties anticipate the results of cases more difficultly.
553
 Then, forming a pr- 
ecise rule is the urgent concern for courts when they are going to apply this concept as 
a source of public policy. 
    Courts have established some standards of conduct for discharged employees as 
they bring a cause of action against employers under public policy. First, courts set up 
a standard for discharged employees when they refuse to commit illegal actions requ- 
ested by employers.
554
 Once the Hinson court noted, “This public policy exception 
has been recognized in a number of cases where at-will employees have claimed they 
were discharged in reprisal for opposition to their employers‟ illegal or unethical acti- 
vities.”
555
 
Second, employees can claim under the public policy exception when they are fi- 
red because of performing an important public obligation.
556
 Employers‟ power shou- 
ld be restricted and has to be re-balanced when they impose retaliatory discharge upon 
employees since they operate social duties. Mostly, employees suffer the discharge as 
testifying organizations‟ illegal activities or employers‟ misconduct in courts or before 
investigative agencies.
557
 The action of testifying against employers not only can be 
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regarded as altruism to protect public interest, but it also presents an individual‟s soci- 
al responsibilities, which require each societal constituent to have the duty to sustain 
the order of society.  
Third, codes of ethics can be viewed as a source of public policy.
558
 Even if the 
term “public” is vague and is difficult for courts to determine whether employees‟ act- 
ions are for public interest or not, when the professionals practice their duties, there is 
no dispute that their jobs serve social welfare. Thus, when the professionals are disch- 
arged because of the refusal to violate their codes of ethics, they are able to claim und- 
der the public policy exception against employers‟ wrongful terminations.
559
 Mosko- 
witz describes the consequences of breaching codes of ethics and the significance for 
those professionals: 
“[E]ach profession is based on distinctive knowledge and service to the commu- 
nity…. Law, medicine, and other professions play a direct role in the formation 
of public policy and its implementation…. They must be given the leeway to 
address … problems in a manner consistent with ethical standards. In addition, 
the at-will professional employee motivated by ethical concerns attempts to cor- 
rect a problem at the risk of the substantial financial investment in his education, 
his long-term financial security, and his career standing and reputation…. The 
professional employee may encounter more subtle retaliatory actions, such as 
less desirable work assignments, loss of prestige, and decrease in promotional 
and pay opportunities. Moreover, … [a] professional license may be revoked 
because of the violation of statutes that allow discipline because of „unprofessi- 
onal‟ or „unethical‟ conduct.”
560
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In addition, codes of ethics have to clearly express that the professionals‟ duties are to 
serve public interest, not to the specific entity or person.
561
 They also should establish 
an explicit standard or rule that regulates the professionals‟ conduct to satisfy the pub- 
lic‟s expectations.
562
 Further, codes of ethics have to demonstrate that the profession- 
als‟ rights and obligations are going for public good, not solely for self-interest and pr- 
ivate benefit. 
Fourth, a few courts have formed a public policy when employees are discharged 
because employers have specific intent to harm employees without employees having 
engaged in the conduct protected by separate specific public policies.
563
 A court notes 
this point below: 
“[T]he novel theory of recovery … must surely involve specific intent … to ha- 
rm [the employee] or achieve … other proscribed goal. If a general intent, in the 
sense that an employer knew or should have known the probable consequences 
of his act, were all that a disgruntled employee need show in order to make out 
a cause of action, the privilege of discharge would be effectively eradicated, for 
some degree of harm is normally foreseeable whenever an employee is dismiss- 
ed…. we made it clear that a bare recitation that defendant had act „intentionally, 
wrongfully, maliciously, fraudulently, deceitfully and without justification „did 
not satisfy the specific intent requirement.‟”
564
 
Liabilities will be imposed upon employers for the conduct specifically directed agai- 
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nst employees. Although this judicial decision provides employees with another grou- 
nd against retaliatory discharge taken by employers, few courts adopted this concept 
as a kind of public policy.
565
 There are two explanations for this outcome. First, it is 
because of the inaccurate application of the authority. Courts have stated that malicio- 
us discharge entails one‟s “disinterested malevolence”
566
 or “ulterior purpose.”
567
 Yet, 
when the defendant‟s conduct is viewed as malicious, courts tend to impose upon him/ 
her the liability of punitive damage, not ordinary tort liability.
568
 Second, courts have 
rarely adopted tort liability as the public policy exception when employees are termin- 
ated by employers‟ immoral or unethical manner.
569
 Consequently, whether employe- 
rs‟ specific intent to damage employees is able to be treated as a kind of public policy 
still needs further discussion. 
Fifth, courts have set up a public policy to modify the employment-at-will doctri- 
ne when employees‟ terminations result from the disclosure of employers‟ misconduct 
or organizations‟ wrongdoings. This action taken by employees is called whistleblow- 
ing and is going to be discussed in the next section. 
     d. Whistleblower Protection Is a Source of Public Policy 
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           It may be a common phenomenon for employees to suffer retaliatory di- 
scharge when they disclose employers‟ misconduct or organizations‟ frauds. In order 
to protect the health and safety of society, many courts tend to shield the whistleblow- 
ing employee and treat his/her action as one protected public policy.
570
 The behaviour 
of whistleblowers-employees may be regarded as altruism when they act in good faith. 
Courts defined this action as “the good faith reporting of a serious infraction of … rul- 
es, regulations, or the law [affecting public health, safety or general welfare] by a co- 
worker or an employer to either company management or law enforcement officials.” 
571
 Courts show their support for whistleblowers-employees who file a tort-based ca- 
use of action against employers when employees are terminated by a wrongful or reta- 
liatory means.
572
 Whistleblower protection can be seen as one founded public policy 
because it not only prevents employers from encroaching on employees‟ faith and loy- 
alty to organizations, but it also safeguards public interest and social welfare from bei- 
ng harmed.
573
 
Typically, whistleblower protection is applied in three situations. First, it is appli- 
ed when employees are discharged because they refused to practice illegal activities 
                                                     
570
 Callahan, supra note 417, at 460-61. 
571
 White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669, 671 (10
th
 Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 
572
 Id. 
573
 Collier v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App.3d 1117, 1121 (1991). 
                                                           
 
 
201 
for which their employers demand.
574
 The reasons are that not only employees‟ beha- 
viour is moral, but also actions that sustain the law and satisfy the public‟s expectatio- 
ns should not be punished.
575
 Also, discharged employees are protected because their 
motives are for social welfare, not for employers‟ illegal profits or self-interest. Once 
a court noted that the legislative purpose has to be achieved by those who are willing 
to assist in exercising the law.
576
 Since whistleblowers can be viewed as internal mo- 
nitors and can make sure employers‟ actions are under the law, with no protection for 
these people, nobody wants to bear a heavy social obligation and to take a risk on los- 
ing jobs or livelihoods. However, some jurisdictions restrict this application
577
 becau- 
se they hold that the time for these employees to file a claim is when they are “unacc- 
eptably forced to choose between risking criminal liability or being discharged from ... 
livelihood.”
578
 Because it is difficult to decide the term of “unacceptable force,” emp- 
loyees may encounter an obstacle when filing a lawsuit in these jurisdictions. 
Second, the public policy exception is implicated as employees disclose employ- 
ers‟ misconduct and are subsequently discharged in retaliation for disclosures. Protect- 
ing employees who are terminated because of disclosing employers‟ unlawful actions 
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can fulfill legislative purposes
579
 and prevent the public from being threatened by po- 
tential risks or damage.
580
 In addition, it may make the underlying law unenforceable 
if employers are allowed to discharge good-faith whistleblowers at will without provi- 
ding them remedies.
581
 As a court stated, “The law is feeble indeed if it permits [the 
defendant] to take matters into [the defendant‟s] own hands by retaliating against [his/ 
her] employees who cooperate in enforcing the law.”
582
 Yet, since some jurisdictions 
have limited application for employees unwilling to take illegal actions,
583
 those who 
merely report employers‟ misconduct and then are discharged probably will not have 
a cause of action in these jurisdictions.
584
 
Third, the public policy is applied as employees‟ terminations arise from arguing 
employers‟ behaviour that is legal, but may be harmful to public good. However, this 
situation is more difficult for employees who are retaliated against to claim because it 
lacks the public policy expressed in statutes. Also, in reality, many courts were unwill- 
ing to address this issue since they found it difficult to define the term “public policy.” 
585
 In the Geary case,
586
 the court refused to apply public policy to shield the salespe- 
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rson because he was discharged by reporting the product that he thought was unsafe to 
the public.
587
 The court noted that the salesman had no duty to evaluate the safety of 
products, and his action had been beyond the scope of his work.
588
 Besides, the court 
held that the salesman‟s discharge resulted from the employer‟s managerial power, 
and it did not want to intervene in the employer‟s authority.
589
 Hence, the court decli- 
ned to create a public policy for the terminated salesman when no statutory statement 
of public policy exists on which he/she can rely. 
B. Common Law Protection 
1. Three Forms to Modify the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
         In addition to applying the public policy exception to modify the doctrine 
of employment-at-will, case law has employed an implied in fact contract theory and 
an implied in law contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing to restrict the hi- 
ring at-will doctrine. I will describe these theories and discuss how they are applied to 
the employment-at-will doctrine below. 
     a. Implied Contract Theory 
           Courts will impose a liability upon employers when discharged employ- 
ees have relied upon an implied in fact contract from oral assurances, representations, 
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employee handbooks, or personnel manuals distributed in the workplace.
590
 Under th- 
is theory, courts may find an implied contract as employers promise permanent empl- 
oyment or are willing to modify the at-will employment doctrine, and choose to termi- 
nate employees for a good cause unless employees perform unsatisfactory duties or 
are in unsuitable occupations.
591
 The rationale of implied contract theory is “based on 
the premise that statements or acts indicating that an employee will be terminated on- 
ly for good cause or otherwise giving assurances of job security, create in the employ- 
ee the expectation of permanent employment.”
592
 Other courts also mentioned this 
point and held that “[o]ral or written statements of personnel policy which result in an 
employee‟s legitimate expectation of benefit are legally enforceable even though the 
employment contract is for an indefinite term.”
593
 In some circumstances, courts tend 
to use the promissory estoppel theory to force employers to abide by their oral assura- 
nces. In the Martin case, the court stated that “… when an employee gives up another 
offer in exchange for and in reliance upon the employer‟s promise of permanent empl- 
                                                     
590
 Andrew D. Hill, “Wrongful Discharge” and the Derogation of the At-Will Employment Doctrine 19 
(1987). 
591
 Brian Heshizer, The New Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of Employment At 
Will, 36 Lab. L. J. 95, 104-06 (1985). 
592
 Massingale, supra note 418, at 196. 
593
 William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho 
L. Rev. 201, 214 (1985). 
                                                           
 
 
205 
oyment, that contract, if proven, is enforceable.”
594
 Accordingly, the implied assuran- 
ce made by employers cannot be repudiated once reliance has been placed in employ- 
ees‟ minds. 
    Yet, employers will not be bound by the implied contract as they have expressed 
their intentions by a clear and direct statement or disclaimer.
595
 Employers can expli- 
citly notify employees that the provision in handbooks or manuals reserves their rights 
to close employees‟ position at will,
596
 and there is no guarantee for job security und- 
er the employment relationship.
597
 
     b. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Theory 
           Besides making use of the implied contract theory to restrict the hiring 
at-will doctrine, some jurisdictions also found that there is an implied in law contract- 
ual covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship. Thus, em- 
ployers have implied duties on the performance of contracts.
598
 Once a court stated, 
“The covenant encompasses an obligation to refrain from interfering with the one par- 
ty‟s right to receive the benefit of the contract.”
599
 As employees bear wrongful disc- 
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harge since employers violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, co- 
urts may impose the liability upon employers and then provide discharged employees 
remedies to compensate their losses.
600
 
In the Cleary case, the California Court of Appeals stated that the implied coven- 
ant of good faith and fair dealing is present in all employment contracts.
601
 The court 
held that the defendant-employer breached the implied duty because of the long-term 
employment and the existence of an internal grievance procedure.
602
 The court noted 
this point as follows: 
“Two factors are of paramount importance in reaching our result that the plaintiff 
has pleaded a viable cause of action. One is the longevity of service by plaintiff 
-- 18 years of apparently satisfactory performance. Termination of employment 
without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law cove- 
nant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts…. The second fact- 
or of considerable significance is the expressed policy of the employer (probab- 
ly in response to the demands of employees who were union members), set for- 
th in Regulation 135-4. This policy involves the adoption of specific procedures 
for adjudicating employee disputes such as this one. While the contents of the 
regulation … compels the conclusion that this employer had recognized its res- 
ponsibility to engage in good faith and fair dealing rather than in arbitrary cond- 
uct with respect to all of its employees.”
603
 
Therefore, the court stated that the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing has 
been assured by the employee‟s long-term employment relationship with the employer 
and by in-house channels set up for employees to present their concerns. In this way, 
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the employer is not allowed to breach this implied contract arbitrarily and to harm the 
employee‟s interest.  
     c. Theory of Public Policy Exception 
           The public policy exception may be viewed as the most widely-accepted 
theory to restrict the employment-at-will doctrine. Employees who are wrongfully di- 
scharged are able to file a tort
604
 or contract
605
 claim to recover their losses. Case law 
has established this exception in order to stop employers‟ actions that probably contra- 
vene public policies and cause harmful consequences on social interests by abusing 
employees.
606
 At present, courts have applied the public policy exception in three cat- 
egories of cases.
607
 
       i. Refusing to Commit an Unlawful Act – This situation usually occurs when 
employees are unwilling to make a fraudulent testimony for their employers‟ illegal 
behaviour.
608
 In this way, as employees are discharged because of the refusal to com- 
mit unlawful conduct, they are able to file a claim against employers‟ unreasonable re- 
quests. 
       ii. Performing an Important Public Obligation – When employees are fired 
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because they serve on jury duty,
609
 disclose employers‟ misconduct or organizational 
corruption,
610
 and refuse to violate professional codes of ethics,
611
 they can depend 
on this standard to file a cause of action against employers or organizations to relieve 
their losses. 
       iii. Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege – This circumstance occurs most 
often as employees are terminated because of filing a worker‟s compensation claim.
612
 
Sometimes, it is also applied to the situation in which employees refuse to take polyg- 
raph tests.
613
 When employees are terminated because of pursuing statutory rights or 
privileges, their losses will be compensated, and employers have to bear the liability 
for their retaliatory actions. 
2. The Precedent Case of SOX Section 806 – Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares 
Corp.
614
 
         The Welch case plays a significant role when discussing SOX Section 806. 
The reasons are that not only is it the precedent case that the employee filed his claim 
against the employer for losses because of the disclosure under SOX, but it also is the 
first time for the whistleblower-employee to prevail employment protection under this 
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newly-enacted statute.
615
 Because the Welch case happened in Virginia, in this part, 
the differences of employment protection in Virginia common law and SOX are going 
to be compared and discussed. 
a. Facts
616
 
           David Welch was the CFO and the Transfer Agent of Cardinal Banksha- 
res (Cardinal). Initially, Cardinal was a bank holding company owned by Bank of Flo- 
yd, but it purchased all of Bank of Floyd‟s stock later. As the CFO, Welch‟s responsib- 
ility was monitoring and reviewing journal entries of Cardinal. As the Transfer Agent, 
not only did he have a duty of reviewing stock trades; canceling old stock certificates 
and issuing new ones, but he also had to keep records concerning who held Cardinal‟s 
shares; which way these stocks were held and how many Cardinal‟s stocks each inve- 
stor owned. Welch was discharged and sued in SOX since he found out incorrect jour- 
nal entries, noticed untied and loose business control in the company, and uncovered 
his employer‟s sequent improper inside trading. 
The story began from when Welch wrote a memorandum to R. Leon Moore, who 
was the CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Cardinal, concerning his im- 
proper insider stock trading. From Welch‟s observation, Moore‟s trading not only alw- 
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ays happened at or near the end of the financial reporting quarter, but also made use of 
information that was not widely distributed or disclosed to the public market. Welch 
noticed Moore‟s behavior had already closely satisfied the definition of insider trading 
made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave Moore a warning. 
However, Moore responded to Welch that he had consulted about this issue with corp- 
orate accountants and lawyers, and they found no problem with regard to his trading. 
Even if Moore guaranteed his trading was in no question, Welch still worried about 
the information that Moore was given because of Welch‟s understanding of the SEC 
rules and of recent eruptions of corporate scandals on insider trading. Even with these 
considerations, however, Welch still had no plan to present his concerns to any memb 
er of the board of directors and audit committee, except for Moore. 
    But Welch‟s concerns were reasonable as he found that Moore instructed Wanda 
Gardner, Cardinal‟s Vice President and Internal Auditor, to make two improper journ- 
al entries. Welch was quite surprised at Gardner‟s actions because he had a sufficient 
knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and wondered why 
Gardner took a risk of getting involved in these improper entries. In addition, Welch 
also suspected various credit entries made by Moore‟s personal secretary and worried 
that she was controlled by Moore, too. Those fraudulent credit entries might increase 
corporate revenues and make a better look on current financial reports. However, the- 
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se reports‟ ugly side would show up in the following year. In Welch‟s point of view, 
he thought that these improper journal entries and credit entries represented a terrible 
financial control and might bring irreparable damage to the corporation and investors. 
He suggested that each stage of the financial reports should be fairly presented and be 
provided to shareholders with sufficient information, and let shareholders realize the 
company‟s profits and losses and understand their potential risks for investment. Even 
though Welch knew these reports were fraudulent and inaccurate, he still signed the 
consolidated financial statements and reports of condition filed with the Federal Rese- 
rve. Still, he did not report those wrongdoings to the SEC since he realized not only 
would he have been discharged before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but it 
also might be difficult for him to find another new occupation to replace his old career 
in other companies at his age. 
Waiting for SOX to become effective in July of 2002, Welch examined SOX and 
concluded that Cardinal‟s conduct was fraudulent. Upon understanding SOX‟s regula- 
tions, Welch made up his mind and insisted that Cardinal should go back on the right 
track and establish a stronger financial control. Under the regulations of SOX, it requ- 
ires: 
“public traded companies to file two certification forms, an initial certification 
and a recurring quarterly certification, with their financial statements or Form 
10-QSB. Both certification forms must be signed by the CEO and CFO. By sig- 
ning, the CEO and CFO certify that, based on their knowledge and belief, the 
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financial reports accompanying the forms „fully comply with the requirements‟ 
of §13(a) or §15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the inform- 
ation contained therein „fairly presents, in all material respects‟ the financial co- 
ndition and results of the company. The signatures also certify that the signator- 
ies are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and pro- 
cedures and have made use of those controls and procedures. The initial certifi- 
cation is required only for the first Form 10-QSB submitted after passage of the 
Act.”
617
  
    Because of the requirements of SOX, Moore, as the CEO of Cardinal, signed ini- 
tial certifications to prove the authenticity of financial reports. Even if these certificat- 
ions had been approved by Cardinal‟s external auditor who guaranteed that there were 
“no violations or potential violations of laws or regulations, or irregularities involving 
management and employees,”
618
 Welch, as the CFO of Cardinal, still refused to sign 
these initial materials because he thought that the accuracy of these documents was 
questionable. Later, Welch wrote a memo to Moore and told him why he did not sign 
these statements. He explained that his concerns on improper journal entries and on 
sundry credit entries made him reconsider approving these documents. He was unwill- 
ing to bear the liability of committing misconduct that he was not involved in. He also 
cited penalties and pointed out which material items should be presented under SOX. 
In addition, he argued that he did not participate in, and was not consulted about the 
design of internal control procedures, nor did he evaluate the effectiveness of those 
procedures as required by SOX. Further, he complained about his inability to access 
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the audit committee because Moore was the medium to control how information got 
to the members of the committee and the board of directors. In response to Welch‟s ar- 
guements, Moore replied to Welch and stated that Welch had to provide more persuas- 
ive evidence to strengthen his position. Also, Moore emphasized those certifications 
that Welch questioned and refused to sign would still be certified. 
    After Moore and Welch exchanged their memos, Cardinal‟s board of directors set 
up a meeting and started to investigate Welch‟s allegations. Moore not only restated 
that there was no fraud on these certifications, but he also presented other negative st- 
atements to belittle Welch‟s personality and working performance. These statements 
included “errors made by him in past call reports, his failure to train other employees 
as his backup and to implement new software, and his „excessive reliance‟ on internal 
and external auditors for help in accomplishing his work.”
619
 Douglas Densmore, a 
Cardinal‟s counsel, suggested the board to address Welch‟s complaints and to decide 
whether Welch should be terminated. Also, Densmore advised the audit committee to 
meet with Welch and to find out whether his concerns could be viewed as reasonable. 
Later, Welch requested a meeting for the purpose of preventing Cardinal from being 
punished by SOX. When Moore and Cardner (Vice President of Cardinal) heard that 
the meeting would be tape-recorded by Welch, they instantly left as did Moore‟s pers- 
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onal secretary. Despite their absence, this meeting still continued, and Welch explain- 
ed his allegations with regard to Cardinal‟s recent financial fraud and tried to find the 
solution to fix it. 
    Following Welch‟s meeting, Densmore held another meeting for Moore and Wel- 
ch. The participants of this meeting comprised of Moore and Michael Larrowe, who 
was Cardinal‟s external auditor and Welch‟s former employer. Before the meeting sta- 
rted, Densmore and Larrowe had been instructed by Vernon Bolt, the vice chairperson 
and chair of the audit committee of Cardinal, to ask about Welch‟s intentions for mak- 
ing his allegations. Yet, Welch did not participate in this meeting because not only was 
his attorney not present, but he thought Larrowe was one of the participants in corpor- 
ate financial corruption. Later that same day, a joint meeting of Cardinal‟s and the Ba- 
nk‟s audit committee was held to discuss Welch‟s allegations again. Larrowe restated 
that the journal entries were correct, and there was no fraudulent information to misle- 
ad investors. Likewise, Moore repeated his observation regarding Welch‟s bad perfor- 
mance on working and his inability in the CFO position. Besides, Densmore not only 
concluded that Welch “had surfaced issues, but not in the proper way or in a timely fa- 
shion,”
620
 but he also suggested Welch should be “suspended indefinitely pending fu- 
                                                     
620
 Id. 
                                                           
 
 
215 
rther action by the board.”
621
 Finally, the meeting‟s participants unanimously agreed 
to suspend Welch‟s position, and Welch received a letter from Bolt who notified Wel- 
ch that this suspension resulted from “refusing to meet with Cardinal‟s legal counsel 
and external auditor.”
622
 
    As a result of the suspension, Welch filed the complaint to the Occupational Saf- 
ety and Health Administration (OSHA) under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Welch thought 
his situation was in the protected activity regulated by SOX and presented evidence to 
support his position that his suspension resulted from uncovering Moore‟s miscon- 
duct. However, unfortunately, his claim was denied by OSHA, and he turned to file an 
appeal to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On appeal, the ALJ made a decision in 
favor of Welch. First, the judge found that Welch‟s actions were under the protected 
activity because he “reasonably believed” illegal conduct was being committed. In ad- 
dition to finding two improper journal entries, Welch stated that he was isolated. For 
example, Larrowe chose to discuss financial matters with Moore, instead of going to 
Welch; both Densmore and Larrowe were not suspicious of Moore‟s representations 
and completely believed the authenticity of materials. Further, these people tried to set 
up a barrier to keep Welch away from investigating financial wrongdoings. Hence, 
based on these facts, the judge held that it was reasonable for Welch to believe Cardi- 
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nal‟s internal control was breaking down, and he was an innocent person in this finan- 
cial corruption. Second, the judge also found “the proximity in time between Welch‟s 
protected activities and the adverse employment action was „itself sufficient to create 
an inference of unlawful discrimination.‟”
623
 Third, Cardinal could not provide clear 
and convincing evidence to rebut Welch‟s prima facie case and did not prove Cardinal 
would have taken the same adverse employment action even though Welch‟s actions 
were not under the protected activity.  
In this way, the judge not only found the ground to favor Welch‟s claim, but also 
relieved his losses completely from Cardinal‟s adverse action. 
b. Application of Virginia Common Law 
           Even if Welch‟s claim had been resolved in SOX, the result might be di- 
fferent if Welch had filed a claim against Cardinal‟s adverse action in his homestate – 
Virginia. Like other jurisdictions, Virginia provides employees protection when they 
suffer retaliatory actions taken by employers.
624
 However, Virginia common law esta- 
blished narrow exceptions to modify the at-will employment doctrine and did not use 
those exceptions in the broad way.
625
 Typically, Virginia has set up three categories of 
exception when addressing the restriction of hiring at-will doctrine. First, the public 
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policy exception is applied when employees are terminated because of pursuing their 
statutory rights.
626
 Second, employees are able to be protected when statutes regulate 
discharge that may violate the law and social interest.
627
 Third, as discharge results fr- 
om employees‟ refusals to commit criminal actions, the exception will restrict emplo- 
yers‟ authority to discharge employees at will.
628
 Observing those exceptions, Virgin- 
ia laws provide no cause of action for Welch to file a claim because not only does Vir- 
ginia have no statute to protect the whistleblower, but its common law also has not fo- 
rmed the whistleblower protection as one of its public policies to restrict the doctrine 
of employment-at-will. Below, I am going to apply the Welch case in Virginia jurisdic- 
tion and try to anticipate different consequences. 
       i. Statutory Laws and the Public Policy Exception 
             When applying statutes and the public policy exception to terminated 
employees‟ claims, Virginia courts required employees to show their claims are based 
on state statutes,
629
 and asked them to point out specific public policies on which they 
rely.
630
 Then, it is not possible for employees to file a claim based on the violation of 
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federal laws against employers‟ adverse actions in Virginia.
631
 Besides, Virginia com- 
mon law has not set up the whistleblower protection as its public policy to protect dis- 
charged employees who report employers‟ misconduct. In the Dray case, the court no- 
tes this point as follow: 
“In the present case, the plaintiff seeks to mount a generalized, common-law 
„whistleblower‟ retaliatory discharge claim. Such a claim has not been recogni- 
zed as an exception to Virginia‟s employment-at-will doctrine, and we refuse to 
recognize it today.”
632
  
Similarly, in the Storey case, the plaintiff argued his wrongful termination because of 
reporting a legal concern violated the public policy of Virginia and sought remedies to 
compensate his losses.
633
 However, the court stated that there is no statute or public 
policy that “create[s] a right with which Storey‟s termination interfered.”
634
 Consequ- 
ently, the court found that there was no cause of action for the plaintiff‟s claim based 
on the exception of whistleblower protection.
635
 In addition, Virginia courts stated th- 
at the termination must violate public policies
636
 and excluded the violation of private 
interest.
637
 Thus, employees have no reasonable cause of action to file a claim against 
employers when adverse actions do not impair public policies of Virginia. 
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In this way, based on these observations, Welch has no cause of action to argue 
his suspension in Virginia. No matter whether statutory law or the public policy exce- 
ption, there is no good ground for Welch to bring a suit against Cardinal until Virginia 
enacts whistleblower protection statutes or adopts the exception of whistleblower pro- 
tection as a matter of its public policy. 
       ii. Burden of Proof 
             Compared with SOX that provides discharged employees with a low- 
er standard of burden of proof, Virginia gives employers a loose evidentiary burden to 
rebut employees‟ allegations in their claims.
638
 Virginia allows a defendant-employer 
to prove his/her allegation by the preponderance of evidence, and this advantage can 
make him/her easily to refute a plaintiff-employee‟s argument. In addition to a lower 
burden imposed upon an employer, in Virginia, a discharged employee has to take the 
disadvantage of proving causation, and this makes it harder for a plaintiff-employee to 
receive a prevailing decision from the court.
639
 
    In SOX, the statute merely requires employees to prove their situations fall under 
the protected activity, and those are the contributing factor for employers‟ adverse act- 
ions.
640
 As employees can satisfy the burden of proof and have the prima facie case, 
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employers have to take the shifting burden by clear and convincing evidence to rebut 
that they would have taken the same adverse employment action even though there is 
no protected activity.
641
 However, neither does Virginia employ the burden-shifting 
test in wrongful discharge case,
642
 nor does it request employers to bear a stricter sta- 
ndard of burden of proof to rebut employees‟ allegations. Instead, Virginia imposes a 
lower preponderance standard on employers‟ evidentiary burden.
643
 Thus, in the Wel- 
ch case, Cardinal might have got different consequences in SOX and in Virginia com- 
mon law. In SOX, Cardinal will have a hard time rebutting Welch‟s claim because it 
has to present clear and convincing evidence to meet its evidentiary duty. By contrast, 
Virginia common law makes it easier for Cardinal to defend Welch‟s arguments since 
Virginia uses a lower standard of the preponderance of evidence. 
Besides different standard of burden of proof, Virginia common law uses proxi- 
mate causation for employees‟ claims on wrongful discharge.
644
 Proximate causation 
requires employees to prove their actions are the substantial cause related to the disch- 
arge.
645
 Employees fail to satisfy this burden by proving the proximity of time betwe- 
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en the protected activity and the termination;
646
 this is very different from SOX.
647
 In 
the Welch case, Welch will lose his claim in Virginia because he cannot prove his rep- 
ort was the substantial cause for suspension. Yet, Cardinal may have a successful alle- 
gation to rebut Welch‟s claim since the evidence about Welch‟s bad performance pro- 
bably is another cause to suspend him. In other way, Welch‟s allegation is valid under 
SOX because SOX simply requires Welch to prove his report is a contributing factor 
for the suspension.
648
 SOX does not adopt proximate causation because its strictness 
may cause an unjust resolution of employment dispute. 
       iii. Exception of the Refusal to Commit Criminal Acts 
              Virginia common law establishes this exception since the court held 
that the employment-at-will doctrine should not “serve as a shield for employers who 
seek to force their employees, under the threat of discharge, to engage in criminal act- 
ivity.”
649
 In Welch, if Welch files his claim based on this exception, he has to prove 
that Cardinal‟s officers have committed illegal activities, and those would be charged 
by criminal liabilities.
650
 In addition, Welch has to show that his suspension is motiv- 
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ated by his refusal to accept fraudulent journal entries.
651
 As for regulating fraudulent 
activities, Virginia statutes are “designed to protect the property rights, personal freed- 
oms, health, safety, or welfare” of the general public policy.
652
 These statutes impose 
a legal right or duty upon Welch or other people placed in the same position.
653
  
Concerning statutes regulating similar financial fraud in Welch, Virginia has two 
statutes that prohibit bank officers‟ fraudulent conduct.
654
 The first statute is Virginia 
Code § 6.1-122, which proscribes “false entry in any book, report or statement of such 
bank … with intent” to cheat organizations or their officers.
655
 The second one is Vir- 
ginia Code § 18.2-113, and it restricts “fraudulent entries … in accounts by officers or 
clerks of financial institutions.”
656
 Fraudulent entries have to be made “with the inte- 
nt, in so doing, to conceal the true state of such account.”
657
  
    Turn to consider the Welch case, Welch probably can find both Virginia statutes 
on which he can depend to file a claim against Cardinal. However, he may suffer so- 
me obstacles when he tries to prove journal entries are false;
658
 likewise, he may find 
it difficult to point out not only whether Moore forced him to make fraudulent entries, 
                                                     
651
 Id. at 252-53. 
652
 Storey, supra note 633, at 453. 
653
 Id. at 451. 
654
 Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-122, § 18.2-113 (2010). 
655
 Id. § 6.1-122. 
656
 Id. § 18.2-113. 
657
 Id. 
658
 Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 578, 582 (Va. 2003). 
                                                           
 
 
223 
but also if he refused to commit such illegal act.
659
 It is not easy for Welch to prove 
two journal entries are false since accounting statements can be certified by different 
methods.
660
 Accountants and auditors believe their opinions and auditing results will 
be correct if they have employed GAPP or other certified accounting standards to aud- 
it.
661
 In addition, Welch cannot make a persuasive statement to prove that Moore req- 
uested him to make, to omit, to change journal entries, and to show his refusal to com- 
mit fraudulent actions that resulted in the suspension. Actually, Moore did not instruct 
Welch to do anything wrong, let alone Welch refused to engage in any wrongful activ- 
ity. For these reasons, Welch probably will lose his claim because those requirements 
are going to be scrutinized in Virginia‟s courts before making a decision to restrict the 
doctrine of employment-at-will. 
Similarly, the defendant‟s intent is another difficult issue to prove.
662
 Welch has 
to provide sufficient evidence, which demonstrates that Moore‟s explicit intention was 
to make fraudulent financial materials, to cheat the corporation, and to mislead invest- 
ors. Not only is Welch‟s reasonable belief of misconduct not sufficient and is not sati- 
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sfying the burden of proof,
663
 but also the evidence has to show that Moore knowing- 
ly engaged in alleged fraudulent activities and intentionally committed them.
664
 Con- 
sequently, Welch may find it difficult to file a claim against Cardinal in Virginia juris- 
diction. Without the protection of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, employees in Virginia enc- 
ountering the same situation fail to seek a sufficient remedy and relieve their losses si- 
nce Virginia courts tend to impose a strict evidentiary burden upon employees in emp- 
loyment cases. Virginia‟s judicial decisions on employment disputes make it harder to 
restrict the employment-at-will doctrine. 
C. State Law Protection 
       No matter whether state statutes or state common law, nearly fifty jurisdictio- 
ns have their own legislative or judicial policies and remedy to protect whistleblowers. 
However, the whistleblower protection varies considerably from state to state
665
 since 
each state has a different historical background, and the evolution of protection on the 
whistleblower has been piecemeal.
666
  
    Because each state‟s common law construes the public policy exception differen- 
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tly, the requirements in state‟s whistleblower protection are diverse.
667
 These diverge- 
nces include what kind of whistleblowers should be protected;
668
 what illegal activiti- 
es should be reported;
669
 what motive whistleblowers should hold; what evidence can 
be used to prove employers‟ misconduct;
670
 what relief should be provided;
671
 and 
who is able to be the recipient of whistleblowers‟ reports.
672
 Among these divergenc- 
es, however, the recipient of employees‟ arguments is the most widely-varied from st- 
ate to state.
673
 As Sinzdak talks about this point as follows: 
“Several states require employees to report wrongdoing externally to a public bo- 
dy. Of these, some provide protection only if the employee reports wrongdoing 
to a government entity that is capable of taking appropriate action. Still others 
limit the appropriate external public recipient to one or two specific governme- 
nt entities. Some states take the opposite approach, requiring employee to report 
internally (at least initially) in order to receive protection. Many of these states, 
however, do provide an exception to the internal reporting requirement if the 
employee reasonably believes that supervisors are involved in the wrongdoing 
or that correction of the violation by the employer is otherwise unlikely. Only a 
handful of states take the broader federal approach – providing protection to 
employees who choose to make either an internal report to a superior or an ext- 
ernal report to a public body. Almost all states reject or discourage reporting to 
third parties such as the media.”
674
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Hence, when each state legislature considered the recipient of the disclosure, it tended 
to take many factors into account before deciding which outlet should be provided. 
Those factors consisted of the employer‟s managerial power, the employee‟s occupati- 
onal security or rights, the organizations‟ benefit, and the public‟s interest or welfare. 
In addition, each state made use of different standard of evidentiary burden to pa- 
rties who are in litigation when discharged employees file a claim against employers. 
As Cherry says: 
“Plaintiffs bringing actions for retaliatory discharge in various states must also 
meet varying burdens of proof. Depending on the language of the specific state 
statute, the whistleblower may have to prove that the reported wrongdoing actu- 
ally occurred. Other jurisdictions use a less strict „reasonable belief standard,‟ 
requiring the whistleblower to prove that he or she had a good reason to belie- 
ve the wrongdoing had occurred and thus made the report in good faith. Several 
courts have said that „bad faith‟ reports should not receive protection.”
675
  
The different standard for the burden of proof means varied results for the prima facie 
cases. As a lower standard of evidentiary burden is imposed upon employees in empl- 
oyment suits against employers‟ adverse actions, employees probably find it easier to 
file a claim against employers and to compensate their losses in the administrative pr- 
ocedure and courts. 
Further, few states set up a policy to protect “embryonic whistleblowers,” which 
means “persons who have not disclosed irregularities but who might have been close 
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to doing so at the time of and adverse employment action.”
676
 Thus, because of these 
divergences, in order to get more understanding on state whistleblower protection, it 
would be helpful to compare each state whistleblower statutes and to find out their di- 
fferences if the Welch case were filed in diverse jurisdictions. 
1. California 
         California is the state that treats the whistleblower more kindly and provid- 
es more protection or remedies than other states. Before modifying its Whistleblower 
Protection Statute (WPS) to conform with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), not 
only did California restrict employers‟ right from discharging employees who disclose 
organizations‟ violations on federal or state laws,
677
 but it prohibited employers from 
retaliating against employees who reported employers‟ misconduct.
678
 In addition, the 
statute applied to all employees, no matter whether they served in private or public 
entities.
679
 Until the passage of SOX Section 806, California followed Congress‟s st- 
ep to strengthen its protection on whistleblowers.
680
 California‟s legislature found th- 
at whistleblowing for securities frauds is related to public interest since “unlawful act- 
ivities of private corporations may result in damage not only to the corporation and its 
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shareholders and investors, but also to employee of the corporation and the public at 
large.”
681
 Moreover, California‟s legislature stated that public interest will be protect- 
ed if corporate employees can be treated as the monitor to control internal risks and to 
prevent companies‟ illegal activities if possible.
682
 Because of this policy, California‟s 
new WPS extends the coverage to those employees who report corporate securities fr- 
aud. Therefore, public interest will be assured when a sound protective system is pro- 
vided for those vigilant, but aggrieved employees. 
    The modified California WPS has made several changes to protect employees, 
and these changes are  
    “First, it expands the WPS to protect employees who report suspected violations 
of state and federal rules, not just statutes and regulations. Second, [it] broadens 
the WPS‟s authority to prohibit from retaliation in three way: (1) [it] prohibits 
employers from discriminating against employees who refuse to participate in 
any activity that would result in a violation of a state or federal statute, regulati- 
on or rule; (2) it prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for 
having exercised his or her whistleblower rights in any former employment; 
and (3) it establishes that a government employee‟s report against his or her em- 
ployer is sufficient to secure WPS protections.”
683
  
The definition of employee under the new statute not only includes present employees, 
but also contains former employees.
684
 In addition, the new WPS increases penalties 
imposed upon employers who deter or retaliate against employees who report organi- 
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zations‟ fraudulent conduct. Further, the new statute requires employers to establish a 
hotline for employees to present their concerns and asks employers to keep reporters‟ 
identities in confident. The anonymous reporting can “help foster the early detection 
of financial misdoings” and provide “a safer haven of protection” for employees who 
find our organizational fraud.”
685
 Also, by referring to the standard of burden of proof 
in SOX, California‟s new WPS merely asks employees to “reasonably believe” the vi- 
olation of law has or is about to occur
686
 and requests them to prove the protected act- 
ivity is “a contributing factor” that causes employers to make adverse employment ac- 
tion against them.
687
  
Compared with a lower evidentiary burden for employees, the new statute impo- 
ses a strict standard of burden of proof upon employers. That is, in order to rebut emp- 
loyees‟ allegations, employers have to provide “clear and convincing evidence,” whi- 
ch verifies that they would have taken the same action against employees, even if no 
protected activity exists.
688
 Because of these modifications in the new California Wh- 
istleblower Protection Statute, it is much easier for Welch to file a claim against Card- 
inal and compensate his losses in California. 
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   2. Louisiana
689
 
         Louisiana is the state that has a loose standard of burden and limited public 
policies to provide protection or remedy for whistleblowers. Different from California 
and Virginia, Louisiana‟s common law has not formed any public policy exception to 
modify the employment-at-will doctrine.
690
 Though, Louisiana has a statute to addre- 
ss whistleblowing disputes when employees are retaliated against by employers beca- 
use of disclosing, testifying or providing information of wrongdoings, or showing the- 
ir refusals to commit any violation of law.
691
 Under Louisiana‟s whistleblower prote- 
ction statute, it provides that  
“an employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and 
after advising the employer of the violation of law: (1) discloses or threatens to 
disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law; (2) provides 
information to or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, 
hearing, or inquiring into any violation of law; (3) objects to or refuses to parti- 
cipate in an employment act or practice that is in violation of law.”
692
  
In addition, the violation of law that employees disclose, testify, provide knowledge in 
regard to misconduct, or refuse to commit wrongdoings has to be related to Louisiana 
state laws
693
 or its environmental laws.
694
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Even though there is general protection for whistleblowers in Louisiana, it does 
not have a statute similar to SOX Section 806. Considering the Welch case, however, 
Louisiana does have a statute regulating bank officers, such as Virginia.
695
 For the sa- 
ke of getting a prevailing decision in wrongful discharge claims, Louisiana‟s court he- 
ld that discharged employees not only have to hold more than good faith belief on the 
violation of law,
696
 but they have to prove that the violation is related to Louisiana‟s 
state laws.
697
 Merely holding reasonable belief in the violations of state law, such as 
the standard set up by SOX, is not sufficient for a plaintiff-employee to claim wrongf- 
ul discharge in Louisiana, nor is claiming that these violations are regulated under fe- 
deral laws. 
    Therefore, like in Virginia, Welch will encounter the same situation when he files 
a claim against Cardinal‟s adverse employment action in Louisiana. Because Louisia- 
na has not established a similar standard of burden of proof and causation, like SOX, 
in its whistleblower statute and case law, Welch fails to relieve his losses in Louisiana 
as he initially expects under SOX Section 806. 
   3. Delaware 
         Delaware is a corporation-friendly state. It means that in both corporate st- 
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atutes and judicial decisions, Delaware has set up beneficial standards and policies for 
the corporation‟s formation and its management. As for the whistleblower protection, 
the same as other states, Delaware has its own common law and statutory protection 
to modify the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Under Delaware common law, Delaware courts have formed the covenant of go- 
od faith and fair dealing
698
 and the public policy exception
699
 to restrict employers‟ 
power to discharge employees at will. However, for the sake of avoiding its common 
law from “swallow[ing] the rule and effectively end[ing] at-will employment,”
700
 De- 
laware courts tended to construe these judicial decisions narrowly and stand on the si- 
de of employers.
701
 Not only did courts give employers wide latitude in power to fire 
employees at will,
702
 but they also decreased the chance for employees to file a prev- 
ailing claim against employers‟ wrongful discharge. Though, Delaware courts intend- 
ed to restrict employers‟ power to terminate employees as the decision of discharge is 
made by employers‟ reprisal and ill-will against employees,
703
 and when employers‟ 
motives to take adverse actions lack reasonable causes.
704
 In this way, discharged em- 
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ployees have a cause of action against employers when the decision of discharge resu- 
lts from employers‟ bad faith or an unpersuasive reason. In the Delaware courts‟ poin- 
ts of view, employers‟ bad faith probably includes “an aspect of fraud, deceit or misre- 
presentation” in terms of employment,
705
 and the violation of public policies that has 
been expressed in the law.
706
 Moreover, the promissory estoppel will be applied when 
employees suffer wrongful discharge because of employers‟ bad faith.
707
 
As for the public policy exception, Delaware courts have set up a two-prong test 
to decide whether discharged employees have a legal right to claim the protection un- 
der the public policy or not. As a court notes:  
“First, the employee must assert a public interest recognized by some legislative, 
administrative or judicial authority and second, the employee must occupy a po- 
sition with responsibility for advancing or sustaining that particular interest.”
708
 
In the Lord case, the court held that “[w]hile Lord‟s allegation that Souder misapprop- 
riated the property of deceased residents arguably implicates a legislatively sanctioned 
public interest, there is no support for the conclusion that Lord, as an administrative 
secretary, occupied a position with responsibility for advancing that interest. Because 
Lord is unable to assert a responsibility for implementing a recognized public interest, 
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her public policy must fail.”
709
 Hence, Delaware courts require employees to find out 
the source of public policy that can support their allegations; also, the courts request 
employees to hold a responsible position to pursue this particular interest before filing 
a claim against employers‟ adverse employment actions. 
For the statutory protection, Delaware‟s Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA)
710
 
provides the protection for a private sector employee who “refuses to commit or assist 
in the commission of a violation”
711
 or “reports verbally or in writing to the employer 
or to the employee‟s superior a violation, which the employee knows or reasonably 
believes has occurred or is about to occur ... .”
712
 The violation defined by this statute 
includes “an act or omission by an employer,” which is “materially inconsistent with, 
and a serious deviation from, financial management or accounting standards impleme- 
nted pursuant to a rule or regulation promulgated … under … the laws of this State … 
or the United States … to protect any person from fraud, deceit, or misappropriation 
of … private funds or assets under the control of the employer.”
713
 
     When analyzing the Welch case in Delaware, first, there is no implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing for Welch to argue his suspension because Cardinal did 
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not cheat Welch in term of employment, and the suspension resulted from Welch‟s di- 
sclosure of Cardinal‟s wrongdoings, not from the violation of the implied in law cont- 
ract of good faith and fair dealing. Second, Welch cannot be shielded in the public po- 
licy exception set up by Delaware‟s judicial decisions. Considering the two-prong test 
formed by Delaware courts, Welch may be unable to satisfy the first prong if he fails 
to prove that Moore‟s conduct actually violated public interest. Also, the public policy 
exception in Delaware does not support employees who disclose questionable, but sti- 
ll legal, on financial or business practices in the organization.
714
 Then, if Welch cann- 
ot show which public interest Cardinal impaired, Welch will have a weak ground to fi- 
le a claim based on the public policy exception in Delaware. Third, whether Cardinal 
violated Delaware‟s WPA is dependent on the divergence of accounting standards. If 
journal or sundry account entries met the requirement of General Accepted Accounti- 
ng Principle (GAAP)
715
 or satisfied the “fairly presented” standard under SOX,
716
 th- 
is issue is still controversial among accountants, auditors, and lawyers. Since account- 
ing is quite subjective in some aspects, it is difficult for Welch to contend that two jo- 
urnal and sundry account entries were fraudulent.
717
 For those reasons, Welch perha- 
ps will not receive the whistleblower protection within Delaware jurisdiction because 
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there are many obstacles for him to address. 
D. Federal Law Protection  
1. Legislative Model 
         Federal statutes also provide whistleblower protection for employees who 
serve in various areas because Congress was gradually concerned that employers‟ po- 
wer to terminate employees at will poses a potential threat upon public interest. From 
social constituents‟ points of view, it is hard to prevent the safety or health of the publ- 
ic from being damaged unless employees are willing to report misconduct and can be 
shielded from employers‟ threats or retaliation after the disclosure. Thus, Congress re- 
cognized that whistleblower protection probably is a good measure to promote the pu- 
blic‟s welfare and to avoid potential damage on society.  
Typically, federal whistleblower statutes can be categorized by two types. The 
first type is related to the protection of occupational health and safety. The second one 
is associated with different environmental protections.
718
 Federal statutes that regula- 
te the health and safety of the public include the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA),
719
 the Mine Safety and Health Act,
720
 and the Energy Reorganization Act. 
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721
 As for other statutes enacted for environmental protection, they can be represented 
by the Clean Air Act,
722
 the Toxic Substances Control Act,
723
 and the Surface Mining 
and Reclamation Act.
724
 
    Yet, no matter whether the purpose of federal statutes is to protect occupational 
health and safety or the environment, these statutes intend to use employees to make 
an earlier observation on organizations‟ misbehavior, which may bring damage on the 
public‟s health and safety. The whistleblower protection can be viewed as a tool to en- 
courage employees to unveil organizations‟ wrongdoings earlier, and thus can achieve 
the statutes purposes and secure public interest from being harmed. Although the whi- 
stleblower protection has been recognized in both federal and state laws, their functi- 
ons and goals are widely different. Briefly speaking, the state protection puts more fo- 
cus on shielding employees‟ rights; it provides the procedure and remedy for dischar- 
ged employees when their terminations arise from employers‟ retaliation. By contrast, 
the federal protection does not merely ensure the individual‟s rights, but it emphasizes 
more on the protection of public good by enforcing statutory purposes.
725
 Because fe- 
deral whistleblower statutes rely more on employees‟ disclosures to achieve statutory 
                                                     
721
 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2010). 
722
 Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2010). 
723
 Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2010). 
724
 Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2010). 
725
 Trystan Phifer O‟Leary, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and State 
Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 Iowa l. Rev. 663, 666-67 (2000). 
                                                           
 
 
238 
purposes,
726
 Congress noticed that decreasing employees‟ injury or losses caused by 
employers‟ retaliation encourages employees to disclose irregularities in the organiza- 
tion.
727
 Consequently, in order to make it easier for employees to relieve their losses, 
some federal courts are inclined to construe federal whistleblower provisions in a bro- 
ader way when protecting whistleblowing employees from bearing employers‟ adver- 
se actions.
728
 
Likewise, as to the recipient of whistleblowers‟ reports, federal courts tend to gi- 
ve a wide range of interpretation. Courts not only permit employees to disclose to go- 
vernmental institutions or other legal authorities, but also allow employees to make an 
internal report to the management or to other departments in charge.
729
 In the Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Commissioners case,
730
 the court applied the Clean Water Act to ad- 
dress the dispute and noted this point as follows:  
“[W]histle-blower provisions are intended … to encourage employees to aid in 
the enforcement of … statutes by raising substantiated claims through protected 
procedural channels.… If the regulatory scheme [of the Clean Water Act] is to 
effectuate its substantive goals, employees must be free from threats to their job 
security in retaliation for their good faith assertions of corporate violations of 
the statute. [The Clean Water Act‟s] protection would be largely hollow if it we- 
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re restricted to the point of filing a formal complaint with the appropriate exter- 
nal law enforcement agency. Employees should not be discouraged from the no- 
rmal route of pursuing internal remedies before going public with their good fa- 
ith allegations.”
731
  
The court stated that in order to achieve the statutory purpose, it is better to increase 
the recipient of disclosure for employees to present their concerns. If those outlets are 
confined, employees may find it difficult to seek a suitable recipient, and this situation 
not only decreases the willingness of employees to unveil organizations‟ violations of 
law, but the society also suffers disadvantages resulting from this consequence. 
In addition, some courts took a positive position on agreeing with employees to 
use the media as one of external recipients.
732
 The reasons are that courts recognized 
employees‟ disclosures are significant to the function of federal statutes;
733
 also, emp- 
loyees can balance their situations and seek an appropriate way to present their conce- 
rns. If the outlet of disclosure is restricted, this will affect employees‟ actions to report 
and decrease the efficacy of federal statutes to regulate matters of concern. Thus, fed- 
eral courts reached a common consensus that it is not mandatory for employees to ma- 
ke a disclosure in specific ways.
734
 No matter which recipient employees select, diff- 
erent recipients will not affect the effectiveness of the disclosure, and employees still 
can have a justified action to file a claim against employers. 
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Federal statutes equipped with the whistleblower provision have some features in 
common. First, the coverage of federal statutes is quite narrow.
735
 Since federal statu- 
tes tend to be topic-specific, employees are unable to be shielded by the statute if their 
disclosures are beyond the area that the statute regulates. Hence, before filing a claim 
under federal statues, it is better for employees to know if their disclosures are in the 
covered area of statutes, and to notice whether they are the protected subject or not. 
Even if the regulated area and the covered employee in federal statutes are narrow, fe- 
deral statutes are inclined to employ broad types of whistleblowing activities to prote- 
ct employees.
736
 These statutes shield the covered employee who is going to comme- 
nce, is commencing, or has commenced the protected whistleblowing activity.
737
 As 
to the protected activity, employees will be shielded when they disclose wrongdoings, 
assist the investigation, or testify organizations‟ misbehavior prohibited in federal stat- 
utes, but then being retaliated against by employers.
738
 
Second, nearly every federal whistleblower statute makes use of the administrati- 
ve agency to resolve whistleblower disputes and establish a procedure to address adv- 
erse actions.
739
 Most statutes require employees to file claims in the limited period;
740
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the common period is thirty days after employers‟ adverse actions occur.
741
 Employe- 
es must file a claim to the Secretary of Labor, which is an agency under the Departm- 
ent of Labor (DOL) to investigate and decide whether employees‟ allegations are mer- 
ited or not.
742
 When violations are found, the Secretary will make a preliminary order 
for employees; otherwise, it will dismiss employees‟ claims.
743
 As the party does not 
comply with the preliminary order, the Secretary has a right to file a suit in federal di- 
strict court to enforce its order.
744
 In addition, each statute requires a claim to be settl- 
ed within the limited period under the administrative proceeding.
745
 When any party 
does not agree with the order made by the Secretary, the party is able to appeal the cl- 
aim to federal court for a de novo review.
746
  
Third, federal statutes provide a remedy for employees when suffering losses due 
to employers‟ adverse actions.
747
 Typically, the remedy includes the relief, such as re- 
instatement, recovery of lost wages and benefits, and recovery of costs. Besides, some 
statutes give employees a right to claim compensatory or exemplary damage.
748
 Furt- 
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her, a few statutes set up a “catch-all” provision that gives courts wide latitude of dis- 
cretion to decide other forms of relief, which can compensate employees‟ losses total- 
ly.
749
 In this way, because of diverse regulations in federal statutes, unless being fa- 
miliar with statutes and courts‟ decisions, not only do employees bearing adverse acti- 
ons find it difficult to know what relief they will be granted, but it is hard for employ- 
ers to anticipate the liability that courts will impose upon them, and what damage they 
will be charged to indemnify for employees‟ losses. 
   2. Whistleblower Protection in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
     a. Introduction 
           The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is the product after the explosi- 
on of a series of corporate scandals, like Enron,
750
 WorldCom,
751
 Global Crossing,
752
 
Adelphia
753
 and Toyco.
754
 Observing from corporate corruption, once Kohn referred 
to the Judiciary Committee‟s corporate reform proposal and stated: 
“[I]nvestors and pensioners were being robbed by highly educated professionals 
who had spun an intricate spider‟s web of deceit. These corporations valued pr- 
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ofit over honesty and had cook[ed] the books and trick[ed] the public and fede- 
ral regulators. The auditors hired by the companies were no better and deceived 
the investing public and reaped millions for select few insiders.”
755
  
In addition, the Judiciary Committee also recognized that a series of corporate scanda- 
ls were the consequence that resulted from business greed and broken regulatory syst- 
ems. As it described:  
“Many people and institutions contributed to the Enron debacle, including the 
corporate officers and directors whose actions led to Enron‟s failure, the well- 
paid professionals who helped create, carry out, and cover up the complicated 
corporate ruse when they should have been raising concerns, the regulators who 
did not protect the public or our public markets, and the Congress and the cour- 
ts, which have thrown obstacles in the way of securities fraud victims.… Witho- 
ut discipline, professionalism, and effective legal structure, and the accountabil- 
ity, greed can run rampant with devastating results.”
756
  
Moreover, not only do those corporations impose retaliatory actions upon whistleblo- 
wing employees who disclose employers‟ misconduct,
757
 but corporate cultures hind- 
er employees from acting honestly in business affairs and from reporting companies‟ 
unlawful activities in time.
758
 Kohn refers to the Judiciary Committee‟s proposal and 
describes this concept below: 
“[The] corporate code of silence not only hampers investigations, but also creates 
a climate where ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity. The con- 
sequences of this corporate code of silence for investigators in publicly traded 
companies in particular, and for the stock market in general, are serious and ad- 
verse, and they must be remedied.… Unfortunately, … efforts to quiet whistleb- 
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lowers and retaliate against them for being disloyal to litigation risks transcend 
state lines. This corporate culture must change, and the law can lead the way.” 
759
 
Congress found that whistleblower protection is critical since whistleblowers can pro- 
vide confidential information, which the public is unable to access. In addition, being 
the firsthand witness of corporate wrongdoing, companies‟ whistleblowers may have 
the chance to slow down employers‟ intentions to commit fraudulent actions, and dec- 
rease the possibility of corporate deceit to happen. For that reason, the whistleblower 
protection can be viewed as a significant means to not only benefit companies‟ intern- 
al control and corporate governance, but also promote business performance and safe- 
guard society‟s welfare. As a result, in order to deter business fraud, the whistleblower 
protection is the centerpiece of SOX because this provision is able to achieve one of 
statutory purposes and to protect public interest. 
Further, economic and political pressure arising from astonishing corporate scan- 
dals and the eroding financial market were other two factors to push Congress to enact 
SOX.
760
 Corporate corruption made investors realize the recent U.S. financial market 
was not suitable and safe for investment;
761
 multinational funds were withdrawn from 
the investing market since investors thought that terrible corporate governance in U.S. 
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public companies was a potential risk to lose money.
762
 Even though official hearings 
were held and the U.S. President was severely rebuked for corporate illegitimacy, the- 
se still could not change the situation and restore the public‟s confidence in the financ- 
ial market.
763
 
Because of these phenomena, the intent of Congress to enact SOX was not only 
to “restore public trust in the markets,”
764
 but also to “combat fraudulent accounting 
practices and other conduct defrauding shareholders.”
765
 In addition, the purpose of 
SOX is “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate di- 
sclosure made pursuant to the securities laws and for other purposes,”
766
 and “to incr- 
ease transparency in financial markets, which allows investors to rely on the accuracy 
of financial information.”
767
 Baynes states that SOX is “designed to promote investor 
confidence by ensuring that the public receives more information about possible corp- 
orate fraud. Such disclosures would ensure that the markets have perfect information 
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so that investors could make informed investment choices.”
768
 Also, securities laws 
ensure the accuracy of information distributed by public corporations, and have a fun- 
ction to equalize the asymmetrical information between investors and companies. As 
Seligman states, “The primacy policy of the federal securities laws involves the reme- 
diation of information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the information available 
to outside investors and insiders.”
769
 Hence, SOX can be regarded as the most efficie- 
nt statute to fight against corporate corruption by strengthening corporations‟ respons- 
ibilities, by requiring sufficient public disclosures, by reforming the method of accou- 
nting and financial reports, and by making sure the security of whistleblowing emplo- 
yees.
770
 
    Sarbanes-Oxley has some designs to achieve statutory purposes. First, SOX has 
an anti-retaliation provision to protect employees from suffering adverse actions after 
disclosing employers‟ misbehavior.
771
 Second, SOX imposes a criminal penalty upon 
employers when they maliciously retaliate against employees who report the violation 
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of securities laws or related frauds.
772
 Third, it requires public companies to set up an 
in-house channel for employees to anonymously present their concerns on corporate 
irregularities to the board of directors.
773
 Fourth, SOX imposes a duty upon the lawy- 
er to report material evidence regarding corporate violations of securities laws or the 
breach of fiduciary duties to companies‟ officers or the board of directors.
774
 Among 
these provisions, however, Congress recognized that the anti-retaliation protection is 
quite critical to whistleblowing employees because there was no statute, neither feder- 
al nor state, to protect whistleblowers who disclose corporate wrongdoing at the time 
of enactment. Even if state statutes and common laws have established the protection 
for whistleblowers, state statutes cover the limited protected activity and strictly regu- 
late certain requirements; likewise, state common laws narrowly construe public poli- 
cy and set up an unequal standard of burden to restrict the employment-at-will doctri- 
ne.
775
 In addition, federal whistleblower statutes are topic-specific, and only protect 
employees who disclose wrongdoing in specific areas or industries.
776
 
Therefore, state and federal statutes or state common laws cannot provide whistl- 
eblowing employees with complete protection when they are retaliated against by em- 
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ployers. This consequence, on the one hand, makes employees wonder if the law prot- 
ects bad people and discourages ethical behaviour; on the other hand, it frightens em- 
ployees away from unveiling confidential information that is probably material to aff- 
ect the health or safety of the public. In this way, the anti-retaliation provision in SOX 
plays a significant role in stopping corporate corruption and promoting internal corpo- 
rate governance by shielding loyal employees. 
     b. Extensive Protection under SOX Section 806 
       i. Overview 
             The design of anti-retaliation provision in SOX Section 806 received 
several compliments from academic and practical areas.
777
 This provision was called 
the “gold standard” of whistleblower protection,
778
 and indicated as “the most impor- 
tant whistleblower protection in the world.”
779
 It brought the patchwork of state laws 
and state common laws to an end, and gave employees national protection as serving 
in public companies. Hence, the whistleblower protection will not be restricted by di- 
verse standards, and be used as a general rule to shield employees employed in public 
firms. Initially, the intent of Congress to enact Section 806 was to affect corporate cul- 
ture, which treated whistleblowers unfriendly. Because of this reason, Congress assist- 
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ed employees who show their courage to make a disclosure in getting rid of the punis- 
hment made by the management, and encouraged them to unveil organizations‟ frauds 
and misconduct with no fear. Besides, the Judiciary Committee said: 
“[Section 806 of the Act] would provide whistleblower protection to employees 
of publicly traded companies who report acts of fraud to federal officials with 
the authority to remedy the wrongdoing or to supervisors or appropriate indivi- 
duals within their company. Although current law protects many government 
employees who act in the public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no 
similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies who blow the 
whistle on fraud and protect investors. With an unprecedented portion of the 
American public investing in these companies and depending upon their hones- 
ty, this distinction does not serve the public good.”
780
 
Thus, SOX Section 806 was a compromise after balancing corporate interest and pub- 
lic welfare. Due to the lack of protection on shareholders, corporate misconduct may 
damage investors‟ interests and affect the public‟s financial safety if there is no regul- 
ation to stop corporate securities violation. In this way, the Committee concluded that 
the investor‟s interests and the public‟s benefit should not be superseded by the mana- 
gement‟s misbehavior, and thought corporate whistleblowers will be an efficient mea- 
ns to reach this goal. That is, those whistleblowers not only can deter employers‟ ille- 
gal actions in time, but also can assure shareholders‟ investments and preserve public 
good at the same time. 
       ii. Process of Protection under SOX Section 806 
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             Congress made a reference to the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investme- 
nt and Reform Act to establish the procedure of SOX Section 806, and authorized the 
Department of Labor (DOL) to adjudicate whether whistleblowers‟ claims are merited 
or not in Section 806.
781
 Even though the DOL has the right to address whistleblowe- 
rs‟ arguments, the DOL has delegated its authority to the Secretary of the Occupation- 
al Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to make the investigation.
782
 Therefore, 
when employees have suffered adverse actions because of the disclosure, they have to 
file a claim to OSHA in ninety days after the violation occurs. If employees fail to fol- 
low this requirement, their claims will be dismissed even if their allegations are the 
prima facie case.
783
 Sometimes, this filing limitation may be extended when the doct- 
rine of fairness is found.
784
 Yet, this situation rarely happens, and the doctrine of fair- 
ness is hard to apply as well.
785
 In addition, the ninety-day period begins when empl- 
oyees are informed of the final adverse action, not at the time as employees feel the 
impact of those actions.
786
 The Administrative Review Board (ARB) noted:  
“In whistleblower cases, statutes of limitation … run from the date an employee 
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receives final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of an adverse employment de- 
cision. Final and definitive notice denotes communication that is decisive or co- 
nclusive, i.e. leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change. Uneq- 
uivocal notice means communication that is not ambiguous, i.e. free of mislead- 
ing possibilities…. The date that an employer communicates to the employee its 
intent to implement an adverse employment decision marks the occurrence of a 
violation, rather than the date the employee experience the consequences.”
787
 
Thus, the legal right for whistleblowing employees to claim the allegation in the adm- 
inistrative procedure is at the time as the adverse employment action is specific and is 
ready to be taken. Employees should not wait to file a claim when feeling the negative 
consequence caused by retaliatory actions or even wait the limited period that has pas- 
sed to argue unequal treatment. 
When a claim is filed to OSHA, OSHA has sixty days to make an investigation 
and to decide if employees‟ allegations are merited.
788
 It will assign an investigator to 
review the claim and related materials to see if employees have alleged a prima facie 
case. If the OSHA investigator cannot find employees‟ allegations are merited, OSHA 
will dismiss the case and terminate the investigation.
789
 However, before closing the 
case, the OSHA investigator will contact employees and ask them to provide more ev- 
idence to prove their allegations are really the prima facie case. Once determining that 
employees‟ claims are the prima facie case, OSHA will give a notice for employers to 
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rebut employees‟ allegations by sufficient evidence in the limited period. As the regul- 
ation describes:  
“Within 20 days of receipt of the notice of the filing of the complaint, the named 
person may submit to the Assistant Secretary a written statement and any affid- 
avits or documents substantiating its position. Within the same 20 days, the na- 
med person may request a meeting with the Assistant Secretary to present its 
position.”
790
  
If employers‟ presented files or documents can be demonstrated by the “clear and con- 
vincing evidence that it [employers] would have taken the same unfavorable personn- 
el action in the absence of the complainant‟s [employees‟] protected behavior or cond- 
uct,” OSHA will dismiss employees‟ claims and terminate the investigation.
791
 When 
employees‟ allegations can be recognized as the prima facie case, and employers are 
unable to provide sufficient evidence to hold their positions, OSHA will start a formal 
investigation for employees‟ complaints.
792
 The investigation will be made by intervi- 
ewing the witness identified by each party, and it is not required to keep the witness‟s 
identity confidential. Nonetheless, when some specific circumstances are met, it is all- 
owable for OSHA to conceal the witness‟s identity, and make him/her testify anonym- 
ously.
793
 
After the sixty-day period for the investigation, OSHA has to decide whether em- 
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ployees‟ allegations are true or not.
794
 By means of reviewing related materials or int- 
erviewing the witness, when OSHA finds that there is sufficient evidence to prove that 
employers‟ actions have violated securities law or related fraud, OSHA will file a pre- 
liminary order for employees who have been retaliated against and further to compen- 
sate their losses.
795
 On the contrary, when suspected illegal activities cannot be prov- 
ed or found, OSHA will dismiss the claim and stop the investigation. Yet, no matter 
which party is granted to the order, the DOL has to give each party a notification that 
it still has a right to appeal,
796
 and the appeal has to be filed in thirty days after recei- 
ving OSHA‟s preliminary order.
797
 As the preliminary order is appealed, everything 
will be overturned except for the decision of reinstatement; other OSHA findings may 
“… carry no weight either before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or the Board 
(Administrative Review Board).”
798
 At last, when complaints still cannot be settled in 
180 days in the administrative procedure, employees are allowed to file their claims to 
federal district court and ask for a de novo review.
799
  
Typically, SOX Section 806 provides the party with a two-tier review on the app- 
eal, and Kohn makes a summary for the process of appeal below: 
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“The Sarbanes-Oxley corporate whistleblower law (SOX) has two stages of app- 
ellate review. The first is within the Department of Labor (DOL) and the second 
is within the federal courts. The basic steps for appeal are these: 
 A DOL administrative law judge‟s (ALJ) Recommended Decision and Ord- 
er (RDO) on the merits of a case will become the final decision of the DOL 
unless a petition for review of that decision is filed with the DOL Administ- 
rative Review Board (ARB) within 10 days of the decision‟s issuance. 
 If appealed, the ARB is vested with jurisdiction to issue the final decision of 
the DOL. In order to seek judicial view of a DOL order, a party must exhau- 
st his or her administrative remedies by filing a petition for review with the 
ARB. 
 Within 60 days of a final decision by the ARB, any party may seek judicial 
review of the final DOL order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in 
which the violation of SOX allegedly occurred. Decisions of the appeals co- 
urt are subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 A decision by either OSHA or an ALJ to reinstate an employee is immediat- 
ely enforceable in U.S. District Court. Other relief ordered by the DOL, inc- 
luding back pay and attorney fees, are subject to judicial enforcement only 
after either the ALJ or ARB issues a final order. 
 The ARB has „inherent authority‟ to hear motions for reconsideration filed 
by a party within a „reasonable time after the first decision‟ is rendered.”
800
 
Thus, observing the proceeding, it can be concluded that even if the procedure in SOX 
Section 806 is quite complicated, it still can be regarded as a sound system of remedy 
since it ensures due process for employees who blow the whistle. 
       iii. Requirements of Filing a Claim 
              Before OSHA starts a formal investigation, employees have to prov- 
ide materials and evidence to make the OSHA investigator believe that their allegatio- 
ns are the prima facie case. Employees are imposed upon the burden of proof as follo- 
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ws:
801
 
          (1) They Are Employees Covered under SOX 
                 In order to plead for the claim, plaintiffs have to be covered em- 
ployees in SOX Section 806. For the sake of making discharged employees relieve th- 
eir losses easier because of the disclosure, the DOL tends to broadly define the term 
of employee when applying SOX to address whistleblower issues. One time, the DOL 
described this point in an environmental whistleblower case and reasoned that 
“The term „employee‟ as used in this Act must be given a most liberal interpretat- 
ion, particularly in view of the evils the Act was designed to prevent. It is obvi- 
ous the Act is intended to prevent employers from engaging in acts of discrimi- 
nation, whether it takes the form of termination of employment or simple intim- 
idation. In light of these statutory objectives, the overriding policy considerati- 
ons involved would compel that the term employee be as inclusive as is rationa- 
lly possible.”
802
  
The covered employee in SOX includes “… an individual presently or formerly work- 
ing for a company or company representative, an individual applying to work for a 
company or company representative, or an individual whose employment could be af- 
fected by a company or company representative.”
803
 A company representative means 
“any officer, employee, contractor or subcontractor, or agent of a company.”
804
 In ad- 
dition, based on administrative decisions and orders, and judicial decisions, the cover- 
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ed employee contains former employees, contract workers, and probationary or temp- 
orary employees,
805
 independent contractors,
806
 applicants for employment and pros- 
pective employees,
807
 and contract job shoppers.
808
 One time, a court noted the reas- 
on for this broad definition of employee, and it stated: 
“A broad interpretation of „employee‟ is necessary in order to carry out the statu- 
tory purpose…. Protecting the reporting employee against retaliation only while 
that employee is in the employ of the violator has a „chilling effect‟ and discour- 
ages, rather than encourages, the reporting of … violation.”
809
  
Thus, by means of giving a broad definition of employee, employees who suffer adve- 
rse employment actions can be easily covered in the statute, and will not be isolated 
by SOX. 
          (2) They Engaged in Activities Protected under SOX 
             (a) What Violations Are Reportable for Employees? 
                    SOX regulates two categories of violations and activities that 
employees are allowed to report. First, employees can be protected when they 
“provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an 
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonable believes 
constitute a violation of Section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulati- 
on of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law 
                                                     
805
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relating to fraud against shareholders.”
810
  
According to expansive regulations above, Kohn summarizes those violations as foll- 
ows: 
 “Employee allegations regarding violations of the federal criminal fraud 
laws, such as sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348 of Title 18. 
 Employee allegations of possible violations of the numerous federal civil 
laws related to fraud against shareholders, including the Securities Act of 
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Com- 
pany Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1940, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002.  
 Employee allegations regarding any employer violation or noncompliance 
with the numerous and detailed requirements set forth in the rules and regul- 
ations of the SEC, including those rules published at Title 17 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations and the numerous laws administered by the SEC. Many 
of the laws, rules, and regulations incorporated into this provision of SOX 
are published by the SEC on its Internet site located at http:// www.sec.gov. 
 All laws related to fraud against shareholders. This provision potentially en- 
compasses all of the laws, rules and regulations just referenced, and any ot- 
her law, rule, or regulation that could be reasonably argued protect investors 
from fraud. This would clearly include those portions of the Securities Act 
of 1933 that permit shareholders to file civil actions concerning corporate 
deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities. The bro- 
ad scope of this provision is reflected in the numerous class action lawsuits 
filed by investors related to fraud against shareholders or other violations of 
SEC rules and regulations.”
811
 
In addition, SOX requires the covered employees to reasonably believe that those vio- 
lations occur. Reasonable belief means employees do not have to prove the accuracy 
of their concerns, but they ought to perceive in a reasonable way and show the violati- 
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on happens.
812
 Although employees‟ allegations cannot show employers actually co- 
mmit securities violation or related fraud later, the fact that employees reasonably bel- 
ieve employers have breached SOX is enough for them to file a claim. It does not ma- 
tter whether the after-the-fact findings cannot prove the correctness of employees‟ bel- 
ief.
813
 Likewise, even if those claims bring potential harm to employers‟ reputations, 
when employees exercise the protected right in SOX Section 806, these claims are sti- 
ll effective and irrespective of the correctness or the consequence of employees‟ alleg- 
ations for employers‟ misconduct.
814
  
Second, SOX sets up a “participation clause” to protect employees.
815
 Employe- 
es‟ rights can be protected, and their losses will be compensated under the participati- 
on clause when they 
“file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding 
filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an 
alleged violation of Section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of 
the Security and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relati- 
ng to fraud against shareholders.”
816
 
The proceeding in the regulation not only includes participation in civil or criminal la- 
wsuits, but extends to the participation in SEC procedures and other securities-related 
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proceedings.
817
 
(b) What Are Protected Activities for Employees? 
Whistleblowing employees are protected in SOX Sec 806 as 
they provide or disclose information associated with employers‟ securities violations 
or regulated frauds to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any member or 
any committee of Congress; or a person with supervisory authority in public firms.
818
 
About the disclosure to the federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, employees 
can be protected when they directly contact government agencies, federal courts, and 
Congress.
819
 Similarly, this regulation may extend when employees “who make prot- 
ected disclosure to the SEC, a U.S. Attorney‟s office, the U.S. Department of Justice, 
and other government agencies involved in any manner in regulating publicly traded 
companies, such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.”
820
 Even thou- 
gh the federal regulatory or law enforcement agency‟s duties do not address the issue 
of securities violation, employees are still shielded when “the contents of the disclosu- 
re related to fraud against shareholders or violations of the laws or rules referenced in 
SOX.”
821
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As to internal disclosure of violation, SOX not only protects employees disclosi- 
ng securities violations or related frauds to management officials who exercise super- 
visory authority, but it also shields employees uncovering to “any person working for 
the employer who has authority to investigate, discover or terminate misconduct.”
822
 
In this way, besides the disclosure of securities violation to supervisors, it is allowable 
to show employees‟ concerns to the audit committee and auditors, the general counsel, 
the chief executive office of the company, and company-instituted employee concerns 
programs.
823
 In this way, as observed above, it is concluded that employees are unab- 
le to be protected when “conferring with a peer, or discussing an accounting impropri- 
ety with a subordinate internally.”
824
 
          (3) Employers Were Aware of Protected Activities 
             (a) Covered Employers under SOX 
                    The definition of employer is fairly broad in SOX; it not only 
includes publicly-held companies, but also covers “any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent” of public companies.
825
 Yet, “non-publicly traded companies, 
which serve as contractors, subcontractors, or agents of Wall Street traded firms wou- 
ld also be covered under SOX. In addition, individual „officers,‟ „employees,‟ and oth- 
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er „persons‟ who work for or control the conduct of publicly-traded companies may 
also be liable under the Act.”
826
 
In addition, the joint employer doctrine is also applied in SOX when deciding the 
definition of covered employer.
827
 Joint employers mean that “separate business entit- 
ies have been found liable as employers where the interrelation between the company 
actually employing the worker and the independent corporation was sufficient to qual- 
ify the parent company as joint employer.”
828
 Accordingly, employees, who serve in 
subsidiary companies but non-publicly traded, can file anti-retaliation claims against 
publicly-held parent companies for which they do not directly work. So, employers or 
companies named by employees‟ complaints may be “prohibited from engaging in di- 
scriminatory conduct against any employee, prospective employee, former employee 
or an employee seeking employment or working for another employer.”
829
 
             (b) Requirement of “Awareness” 
                    For the sake of establishing sufficient grounds for allegations, 
employees have to prove that they engage in protected activities. Also, they have to 
show that employers‟ awareness of protected activities makes employers take adverse 
employment actions upon employees. It is causation because if there is no negative in- 
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formation in employers‟ minds, they probably will not have any motive to take retalia- 
tory actions against employees.
830
 In essence, the requirement of awareness can be 
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
831
 However, “although knowledge of the 
protected activity can be shown by circumstantial evidence, that evidence must show 
[that] … Respondent [the employer] with authority to take the complained of action, 
or … [the employer] with substantial input in that decision, had knowledge of the 
protected activity.”
832
 It does not matter whether the makers of final decisions know 
protected activities or not. As Kohn says: 
“If an employer with knowledge of the protected activity contributed heavily to 
the decision to take an adverse action against an employee, knowledge on the 
part of the employer will be inferred, even if the actual decision maker had no 
knowledge. An employer cannot defend this element of a case by alleging that 
its managers did not know that a concern implicated a potential violation of law, 
if the employee‟s allegations reasonably should have been perceived as commu- 
nicating such a violation.”
833
 
Thus, it is not necessary to see whether decision-makers know protected activities or 
not. As actions of decision-makers are influenced by employers‟ information, opinions, 
or advices with regard to the knowledge of securities violation or related fraud, which 
shows employers‟ awareness of protected activities, this influence will transfer to the 
actions taken by actual decision-makers. In this way, employers are unable to isolate 
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themselves from the liability by claiming that they are not the actual person to make 
retaliatory decisions. 
          (4) Protected Activity Was a “Contributing Factor” to Adverse Actions 
Taken by Employers. 
             (a) Contributing Factor 
                    Employees are required to prove that the protected activity is 
a contributing factor for employers to take adverse actions. Hence, it is not necessary 
for employees to bear a strict standard of burden of proof to show the motivating fact- 
or. Frankly speaking, the definition of contributing factor means 
“any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in 
any way the outcome of the decision. This test is specifically intended to overr- 
ule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that his protected 
conduct was a „significant,‟ „motivating,‟ „substantial,‟ or „predominant‟ factor 
in a personnel action …”
834
  
Employees do not have the obligation to show the protected activity is the primary re- 
ason for employers to take retaliatory actions, but they have a duty to prove that the 
protected activity is one of the factors that motivates employers to make adverse deci- 
sions.
835
 Besides, an ALJ held that if retaliatory actions closely follow employees‟ re- 
ports or disclosures, this “sequence of events” can be inferred as this causation.
836
 Fu- 
rther, the DOL stated “temporal proximity between the protected activities and the ad- 
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verse action may be sufficient to establish the inference that the protected activity was 
a motivation for the adverse action.”
837
 In practical cases, the temporal proximity has 
been interpreted as a period that is as long as a year between the protected activity and 
the adverse action taken by employers.
838
 
             (b) Adverse Action 
                    SOX Section 806 prohibits employers from taking retaliatory 
actions that may “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment” under 
protected activities regulated by SOX.
839
 Likewise, the DOL stated that SOX forbids 
employers to “intimidate, threaten, restrain” or “blacklist” employees who blow the 
whistle with regard to employers‟ misconduct.
840
 Case law not only construes adverse 
employment action broadly such as SOX, but its interpretation also extends to the dis- 
ciplinary action “even if no loss of salary is involved.”
841
 The DOL even indicated th- 
at any adverse action would meet the element of employees‟ claims “if it is reasonably 
likely to deter employees from making protected disclosures.”
842
 However, it has to 
be noticed that not everything that makes employees feel uncomfortable would consti- 
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tute adverse actions.
843
 Employees still have to prove that employers‟ actions have an 
impact on “employment status” or permanently changed the employment relationship 
between employers and employees.
844
 
          (5) When Employees Demonstrate a “Contributing Factor,” the Burden of 
Proof Shifts to Employers to Establish by the “Clear and Convincing Evidence” that 
They would Have Taken the Same Adverse Action Even If Employees Never Engaged 
in the Protected Activity 
The standard of the clear and convincing evidence imposed upon 
employers is much stricter than employees‟ burden of proof by the preponderance of 
evidence. Congress adopted this standard to make employers “face a difficult time de- 
fending themselves” when being challenged by whistleblower cases.
845
 One time, a 
court explained this severe standard of burden and stated, “Clear and convincing evid- 
ence has been described as evidence which produces in the mind of the trier of fact an 
abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contention is „highly possible.‟”
846
 Be- 
sides, another court set up three factors to evaluate whether employers can satisfy the- 
ir burden of proof to rebut employees‟ claims by clear and convincing evidence. The- 
se factors are “the strength of the agency‟s evidence in support of its personnel action; 
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the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials 
who were involved in the decision; and any evidence that the agency takes similar act- 
ions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly 
situated.”
847
 
    If employers meet their burden of proof and show they would have taken the sa- 
me action even though the protected activity does not exist, employees still can preva- 
il their claims by proving employers‟ legitimate reasons are pretexts for their adverse 
actions with the preponderance of evidence.
848
 Employees can show pretexts by the 
lack of employers‟ credibility
849
 or by providing more evidence to prove protected ac- 
tivities really result in hostile employment actions.
850
 Hence, it may be said that emp- 
loyees have to bear ultimate burden of proof to show that the protected activity streng- 
thens employers‟ motives to take retaliatory actions.
851
 
       iv. “Make-Whole” Remedy under SOX Section 806 
              SOX Section 806 provides a make-whole remedy for employees wh- 
en they suffer adverse actions because of the disclosure or participation in the investi- 
gation on corporate securities violation or related fraud. SOX states the relief as follo- 
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ws: 
    “(c) REMEDIES-(1) IN GENERAL – An employee prevailing in any action un- 
der subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the emplo- 
yee whole. 
     (2) COMPENSATORY DMAGES- Relief for any action under paragraph (1) 
shall include- (A) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employ- 
ee would have had, but for the discrimination;  
     (B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and  
     (C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimi- 
nation, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney 
fees.”
852
 
SOX gives the DOL and courts the power to consider employees‟ situations and offer 
them the relief necessary to make their losses whole. To ascertain the relief that can 
completely make up for employees‟ losses, courts and the DOL probably think about 
several factors. Some of these factors include the kind of retaliatory action that emplo- 
yees suffer, or the type of position that employees held in the organization. In short, as 
the authorized agency and courts consider the relief, the type of relief will not be rest- 
ricted. Courts and the DOL have wide latitude discretion on damage, and employees‟ 
losses can be relieved in non-monetary or monetary way. The form of relief can be ca- 
tegorized as follows:
 853
 
(1) Reinstatement 
                 Reinstatement is the first remedy mentioned by SOX since it is 
the most practical relief for employees retaliated against by employers. Observing that 
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it is difficult for employees to find a comparable employment after blowing the whist- 
le, reinstatement is the most urgent need for whistleblowing employees. Reinstateme- 
nt is viewed as the “presumed” relief because it is “normally an integral part of the re- 
medy.”
854
 As a court notes this point below: 
    “When a person loses his job … money damages can suffice to make that person 
whole. The psychological benefits of work are intangible, yet they are real and 
cannot be ignored…. Unless we are willing to withhold full relief … we cannot 
allow actual or expected ill-feeling alone to justify non-reinstatement. We also 
note that reinstatement is an effective deterrent in preventing employer retaliat- 
ion against employees who exercise their constitutional rights. If an employer‟s 
best efforts to remove an employee for unconstitutional reasons are presumptiv- 
ely unlikely to succeed, there is, of course, less incentive to use employment de- 
cisions to chill the exercise of constitutional rights.”
855
 
Reinstatement is a remedy that restores terminated employees to ordinary lives 
as if adverse employment actions would not have occurred. A court states, “Unlawful- 
ly discharged workers should ordinarily be returned to their original jobs.”
856
 Howev- 
er, when reinstatement cannot be available in some circumstances, such as corporate 
reorganization, employees discharged still have to be placed in “substantially equival- 
ent” positions compared to their original careers when their companies have been me- 
rged into other organizations.
857
 In addition, based on the evidence or related materia- 
ls, if the information can show that terminated employees are capable of being promo- 
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ted before blowing the whistle, these employees should be reinstated to higher positi- 
ons or occupations that may satisfy their expectations on promotion before being disc- 
harged.
858
 
          (2) Front Pay 
                Actually, front pay is not the relief described in SOX. Though, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that front pay is an indispensable part of the make-whole 
remedy when reinstatement is not available to relieve employees‟ losses.
859
 Hence, fr- 
ont pay is able to be regarded as “a substitute for reinstatement” for aggrieved emplo- 
yees.
860
 Typically, front pay would be given as the employment relationship is “irrep- 
arable animosity”
861
 or where “a productive and amicable working relationship wou- 
ld be impossible.”
862
 The DOL allowed front pay to be a form of relief because once 
it said:  
“Where the record reflects a sufficient level of hostility between an employer and 
employee that would cause irreparable damage to the employment relationship, 
it may be appropriate, at the request of the complainant, to order front pay in 
lieu of reinstatement.”
863
  
For this reason, before determining the remedy of front pay for aggrieved employees, 
courts and the DOL will consider whether the employment relationship is suitable to 
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be continued and steadily sustained. As they conclude that the working environment is 
not harmonious but hostile, courts and the DOL are inclined to end employment relat- 
ionship and to compensate employees‟ losses by the relief of front pay. 
          (3) Back Pay 
                 Once a Judge described, “The legitimacy of back pay as a reme- 
dy for unlawful discharge or unlawful failure to reinstate is beyond dispute.”
864
 Thus, 
the remedy of back pay plays an irreplaceable role in relieving discharged employees‟ 
losses under whistleblower statutes. As for how to calculate the amount of back pay, 
another judge notes: 
    “The purpose of a back pay award is to make Complainant whole, which is to re- 
store him to the same position he would have been in but for discrimination … 
Complainant has the burden of establishing the amount of back pay … Howev- 
er, because back pay promotes the remedial statutory purpose of making whole 
the victims of discrimination, „unrealistic exactitude is not required‟ in calculat- 
ing back pay, and „uncertainties in determining what an employee would have 
earned but for the discrimination should be resolved against the discriminating 
[party].‟ The courts permit the construction of a hypothetical employment histo- 
ry for Complainant to determine the appropriate amount of back pay Complain- 
ant is entitled to all promotions and salary increases which he would have obta- 
ined, but for the illegal discharge.”
865
 
For the sake of estimating back pay, employees suffering adverse actions bear the bur- 
den of proof to show the amount, which they would have received if those hostile act- 
ions had not been imposed upon them. The certainty of claimed amounts is not neces- 
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sary, but employees have to “recreate the employment history” and “hypothesize the 
time and place of … advancement absent the unlawful practice” to show estimated lo- 
sses.
866
 Hence, back pay cannot be awarded in exact sums like those that employees 
might have gotten before being affected by employers‟ retaliatory actions. Back pay is 
a roughly calculated amount, not the complete exact relief. 
          (4) Other “Make Whole” Remedies and Interest 
                 In addition to the relief of reinstatement, front pay, and back pay, 
courts and the DOL will consider other remedies that can completely relieve employe- 
es‟ losses. In practical cases, the forms of relief may include “reimbursement for lost 
overtime; interest on the back pay award; restoration of all pension contributions; rest- 
oration of health and welfare benefit; restoration of seniority; the provision of neutral 
employment references; restoration of parking privileges; the provision of necessary 
certifications for the employee; applicable promotions; vacation pay; salary increases; 
training; cease and desist orders; compensation for forced sale of assets; job search 
expenses; expungement of personnel file; benefit; stock option and employee saving 
plan; forbiddance on future employers of derogatory communications that may influe- 
nce future employment relationship and prohibition on laying off or terminating empl- 
oyees except for good causes; and an order provides good recommendations for com- 
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plainant”
867
 
    As mentioned above, other make whole remedies will not be banned since relief 
can be decided or awarded based on different situations of cases, such as the positions 
of aggrieved employees or their expectations of future corporate business performan- 
ce. Due to assorted types of adverse employment actions, courts and the DOL are inc- 
lined to employ a broad way to award the relief for employees, so they can totally ma- 
ke up for losses resulting from employers‟ reprisal. 
          (5) Special and Compensatory Damage 
                 Special damage is one kind of employees‟ losses listed on SOX 
Section 806. It contains compensatory damage, such as “damages for emotional distr- 
ess caused by an employer‟s retaliatory conduct.”
868
 Under SOX, special damage inc- 
ludes litigation costs, expert witness fess, and reasonable attorney fees.
869
 One time, a 
judge explained what damage is special, and stated, “Whether a particular kind of inj- 
ury gives rise to „special‟ damages thus depends on the tort committed. The usual con- 
sequences of a wrong are „general‟ damages, and the unusual consequences of a wro- 
ng are „special.‟”
870
 In addition to emotional distress, other courts and the administra- 
tive agency have extended compensatory damage to “mental anguish, lost future earn- 
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ing, harassment, humiliation, loss of reputation, ostracism, depression, fear caused by 
threat, panic, frustration resulting from discriminatory experience and martial or fami- 
ly problems caused by retaliation.”
871
 
    In order to claim compensatory damage, employees must bear the burden of pro- 
of by competent evidence to show that they have suffered inconveniences and troubl- 
es.
872
 Compensatory damage will be relieved in monetary way to make up for mental 
effects. However, no matter whether the relief is non-monetary or monetary, awarding 
a make-whole remedy for aggrieved employees retaliated against by employers beca- 
use of their disclosures is the rationale for courts and the administrative agency to fol- 
low under SOX Section 806. 
 
Chapter IV. Practical Events of Whistleblowing and Insufficient Protection in 
SOX Section 806 
A. Corporate Scandal 
1. Sherron Watkins and Enron
873
 
         Former Enron‟s Vice-President, Sherron Watkins has said, “I am incredibly 
nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.” Because of this con- 
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cern, Watkins changed her role from an annoying corporate whistleblower to one of 
Time Magazine‟s Persons of the Year. Before being employed by Enron, Watkins ear- 
ned her master‟s degree of professional accounting from the University of Texas at 
Austin. She started working life as an auditor in the accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, 
in 1982 and spent eight years in its Houston and New York offices. Watkins became a 
certified public accountant in 1983 and was hired by Enron Vice-President Andrew 
Fastow to manage Enron‟s partnership with the California Public Employee Retirem- 
ent System. From June to August of 2001, she worked directly for Fastow and was as- 
signed to various capacities. During 2001 and 2002, Watkins became the Vice Presid- 
ent of Enron and was taking charge of examining Enron‟s assets and inventories to de- 
cide whether they could be sold in response to Enron‟s weak performance in the stock 
market.  
While Watkins was checking out these materials, she found some “mystery asse- 
ts” and “fuzzy off-the-books arrangements that seemed to be backed by nothing more 
than … deflated Enron stock.” She learned that Enron made use of affiliated entities 
to engage in accounting improprieties and believed Enron controlled gains and losses 
in income statements by using its own stocks. As Watkins requested someone to clari- 
fy her confusion, no one was willing to give her a response and tried to explain these 
arrangements. When testifying before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Inv- 
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estigations, Watkins said that she had not received any satisfactory explanation from 
Enron‟s executives about those accounting transactions. The more information she le- 
arned, the more she became “highly alarmed” because her “understanding as an acco- 
untant was that a company could never use its own stock to generate a gain or avoid a 
loss on its income statement.” Even if Watkins observed the financial misconduct, she 
was still afraid of reporting accounting frauds to either Fastow or to Jeffrey Skilling, 
Enron‟s then-chief executive officer, since she thought there “would have been a job 
terminating move” subsequently. 
    Because Watkins could not agree with Enron‟s executives‟ behaviour, she started 
job-hunting outside Enron. While she was in the process of finding a job, Skilling un- 
expectedly resigned. His abrupt and puzzling departure for “personal reasons” not on- 
ly directed Wall Street to make negative reactions, but also made Enron‟s shares fall 
more than six percent in the stock market. When various rumors about Skilling‟s resi- 
gnation flew between Enron‟s employees and the Wall Street analysts, Kenneth Lay, 
the chairman of the board, invited Enron‟s employees to drop their concerns and sugg- 
estions in a comment box. Making use of this opportunity, Watkins submitted an ano- 
nymous seven-page letter that presented her concerns in relation to Enron‟s account- 
ing improprieties. In this letter, Watkins asked, “Has Enron become a risky place to 
work?” She referred to a document that directly pointed out one of Enron‟s questiona- 
                                                           
 
 
276 
ble business practices and wrote, “There it is! This is the smoking gun. You cannot do 
this!” Also, she made a detailed description concerning Enron‟s accounting frauds and 
stated, “[T]o the layman on the street it will look like we are hiding losses in a related 
company and will compensate that company with Enron stock in the future.” Also, 
Watkins showed her prescient fears on Enron‟s violations of accounting standard and 
worried Enron‟s actions might cause the implosion in a wave of accounting scandals. 
At the same time, Watkins wondered that whether Skilling knew Enron‟s financial pr- 
oblems and believed accounting frauds could not be fixed, so he “would rather aband- 
on ship now than resign in shame in two years.”  
Shortly after submitting the letter, Watkins arranged a meeting with Lay and exp- 
ressed her worries on Enron‟s financial misconduct. In the meeting, Watkins pointed 
out problems on Enron‟s off-book partnerships and special purpose entities. She also 
suggested that Enron should not conceal these accounting frauds from the public. On 
the contrary, she advised Enron had to present its financial conditions fairly and stren- 
gthen investors‟ confidence on its performance. In addition, Watkins told Lay to hire 
an independent law firm to investigate these problems, and Vinson & Elkins, Enron‟s 
attorneys, should not be retained because they seemed to help Enron make up questi- 
onable deals. Following Watkins‟s requests, Lay promised an investigation would be 
started, and he would find out whether her observations were true or not. 
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However, when Lay passed Watkins‟s letter to Enron‟s general counsel, James V. 
Derrick, he still hired Vinson & Elkins to do the investigation. Derrick said hiring Vi- 
nson & Elkins was permissible because this investigation was a “preliminary one.” In 
the investigation, Vinson & Elkins adopted brief and limited discovery on Watkins‟s 
allegations. This method made the result “largely predetermined by the scope and nat- 
ure of the investigation and the process employed.” In addition, Vinson & Elkins did 
not let independent accountants participate in the investigated proceeding. Therefore, 
the investigated result was frustrating, and Vinson & Elkins concluded that special pu- 
rpose entity transactions were not questionable. Until the eruption of Enron‟s scandal, 
these wrongdoings were not disclosed nor did Watkins report her concerns to the SEC, 
the Department of Treasury, or any other governmental official. 
When Watkins prepared testimonies before the House Subcommittee on Oversig- 
ht and Investigations, she reviewed an e-mail, titled “Confidential Employee Matter,” 
from Vinson & Elkins to Enron‟s executives. Its content talked about the state of Tex- 
as whistleblowing law, and part of this message was noted:  
“Per your request the following are some bullet thoughts on how to manage the 
case with the employee who made the sensitive report … You … asked that I 
include in this communication a summary of the possible risks associated with 
discharging (or constructively discharging) employees who report allegations of 
improper accounting practices: First, Texas law does not currently protect corp- 
orate whistle-blowers. The Supreme Court has twice declined to create a cause 
of action for whistle-blowers who discharged…. Fourth, in addition to the risk 
of a wrongful discharge claim, there is the risk that the discharged employee 
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will seek to convince some government oversight agency (e.g., IRS, SEC, etc.) 
that the corporation has engaged in materially misleading reporting or is other- 
wise non-complaint. As with wrongful discharge claims, this can create proble- 
ms even tho [sic] the allegations have no merit whatsoever.” 
Watkins noticed this e-mail was in reference to her because the created date of e-mail 
could be traced back to two days after she talked to Lay. It was clear that Watkins had 
become a target as a result of her disclosure on accounting improprieties. This person 
at the high level of Enron might be Andrew Fastow, the chief financial officer of Enr- 
on, since knowing Watkins had talked to Lay about Enron‟s accounting misbehavior, 
he was unhappy and told to Watkins‟s direct supervisor about he wanted Watkins “out 
of here tonight.” Also, Watkins added, “I found out … that Ken Lay‟s first action was 
not to look at my concerns about fraudulent accounting but to see if they could dump 
me on the street.” Watkins felt frustrated and said, “I can‟t believe they looked into fi- 
ring me.... It was a horrible response. There‟s nothing in there to remind them to rem- 
ember the code of conduct, the vision and values.”  
Like Vinson & Elkins‟ email described, Texas laws did not provide protection for 
corporate whistleblowers when they disclosed employers‟ wrongdoings. In the Austin 
case, the Supreme Court of Texas dismissed a cause of action that asked to protect the 
employee who suffered retaliatory discharge because he reported illegal activities of 
the private company.
874
 Because of the lack of protection for whistleblowers in Texas 
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at that time, Enron‟s executives would not be imposed upon any liability and had a le- 
gal consequence to discharge Watkins. 
However, Enron did not get to fire Watkins, Enron‟s fraudulent conduct came to 
light and were scrutinized by Congress, the public, and its shareholders. On October 
16, 2001, Enron announced a $618 million loss in the third quarter and admitted it had 
overstated earnings by $586 million. On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankrupt- 
cy, and Lay also resigned as the CEO of Enron on January 23, 2002. As for Watkins, 
her whistleblowing was getting positive reactions from her colleagues and the public 
in the initiation. But when Enron started laying off employees and lots of coworkers 
lost their livelihoods immediately, the negative criticism sprung out and blamed Watk- 
ins for not reporting those illegal activities to the SEC in time. This response is not su- 
rprising since corporate whistleblowers rarely bring a satisfying consequence in the 
end and are unable to meet each party‟s expectation at the same time as they decide to 
blow the whistle outside companies. 
   2. Cynthia Cooper and WorldCom875 
         WorldCom‟s scandal occurred in March of 2002 when Cynthia Cooper fo- 
und financial cheating by WorldCom‟s executives and their affiliated accounting firm. 
Cooper was the president of internal auditing of WorldCom; she received a report fr- 
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om an executive of wireless division who asserted that WorldCom employed reserves 
to make its revenues look better. When she mentioned this question to the outside au- 
ditor, Arthur Andersen, Cooper was told that these accounting matters were not a pro- 
blem and did not have an influence on WorldCom‟s financial condition. While Cooper 
was presenting these accountings to Scott Sullivan, the CFO of WorldCom, he felt un- 
comfortable with Cooper‟s query and angrily told her to back off. Getting a negative 
response from Sullivan, Cooper was afraid that her action would bring her in the dan- 
ger of termination; hence, in this awareness, Cooper started cleaning out her personal 
items from the office. However, because of her curiosity, she still did not want to back 
off since she thought “when someone is hostile, my [Cooper‟s] instinct is to find out 
why.” Arising from the worry on WorldCom‟s financial frauds, Cooper and her audit- 
ors decided to go through WorldCom‟s computer system and tried to find the truth of 
questionable accounting. 
    The findings were astonishing. In May of 2002, Cooper and her auditors found 
that WorldCom had treated operating costs as capital expenditures. These mixtures 
made WorldCom‟s financial reports better than they actually were. The fraudulent ac- 
counting showed WorldCom had concealed a $622 million loss as a $2.4 billion profit. 
When Sullivan was conscious that Cooper and her team had known these frauds, he 
asked Cooper to stop and prohibited Cooper and her teams from reviewing these fina- 
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ncial materials. However, Cooper did not follow his request and refused to yield under 
his authority. 
    Cooper passed the fraudulent accounting to the board‟s audit committee in June 
of 2002 when she had found over $2 billon false accounting entries. The audit commi- 
ttee notified Sullivan about this matter and gave him the limited time to explain finan- 
cial treatment. A meeting was took place in little more than a week; the committee fo- 
und Sullivan‟s explanations on unorthodox accounting practices were unsatisfactory 
and unpersuasive, and they could not adopt his explanations as justifiable reasons to 
maintain his position. Thus, the Committee asked Sullivan to resign; if he did not, the 
committee would fire him the next day. When these financial frauds were disclosed, 
WorldCom was forced to admit its financial corruption, and this information was im- 
mediately spread out on newspapers and the public media. Besides, SEC filings and 
congressional hearings had showed more details not only on how these illegal actions 
were committed, but on how WorldCom‟s executives directed accountants to make fr- 
audulent financial reports. Once two external investigations pointed out:  
“… WorldCom kept two sets of books and that there were numerous failures in 
the company‟s corporate governance structure. In addition to the switches surr- 
ounding capital expenses and operating costs, the company also manipulated re- 
venues, depreciation reserves, and … taxes. Sullivan and four other WorldCom 
executives and employees face criminal charges for orchestrating the $3.8 billi- 
on fraud.”
876
  
                                                     
876
 Cherry, supra note 92, at 1041. 
                                                           
 
 
282 
Also, WorldCom‟s corruption could trace back to its CEO who carelessly treated these 
financial irregularities. “The Oklahoma Attorney General has indicted former Chief 
Executive Officer Bernard Ebbers, who was in charge of the company when the mass- 
ive fraud took place and knew about the exaggerated numbers at the end of each quar- 
ter.”
877
 
    WorldCom‟s financial corruption not only made itself suffer a huge loss on busi- 
ness, but also caused many negative impacts on society. Whistleblowing is not an easy 
action for employees because they are used to thinking it over before taking a step. As 
the Wall Street Journal notes, “one of the reports said while dozens of people knew 
about the fraud, it remained hidden from public view because employees were afraid 
to speak out.” Even though Cooper knew her report might result in the loss of her job, 
she was convinced that the disclosure of corporate fraud was more important than her 
self-interest. After reporting financial frauds of WorldCom, Cooper still stayed in the 
company even though she realized it was highly possible that WorldCom would file 
bankruptcy at last. However, she believed that there would be some changes in the bu- 
siness and thought “[t]here really is a corporate-governance revolution across the cou- 
ntry. Internal-audit departments are going to be taken more seriously.” Cooper suppo- 
sed that her whistleblowing might cause a revolution that could affect corporate man- 
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agement to pay more attention to improve corporate governance and make business be 
run in legal and ethical processes. 
Like Watkins in Enron, the initial responses that Cooper received from strangers 
were positive and filled with admiration. Yet, WorldCom‟s employees blamed Cooper 
that if she did not blow the whistle, they would not be laid off, and WorldCom should 
not be in this terrible situation. Cooper was isolated by colleagues since they stopped 
associating with her. Being the whistleblower, Cooper was neither given a promotion, 
nor did she receive respect from coworkers. She seemed like a trouble- maker in the 
company, and did not qualify for any rewards. At last, WorldCom could not avoid the 
destiny of bankruptcy, and this resulted in a massive layoff. 
Unlike Watkins, who would not receive whistleblower protection in Texas after 
reporting Enron‟s financial frauds; however, Cooper was protected under Mississippi 
state law because Mississippi courts adopted a broad public policy to modify the doct- 
rine of employment-at-will. In the McArn case, the Mississippi Supreme Court establ- 
ished a public policy that allowed the whistleblower to bring a cause of action against 
the employer‟s wrongful termination.
878
 Therefore, if Cooper had been retaliated aga- 
inst because of her disclosure, she could have filed a claim and relieved her losses in 
Mississippi jurisdiction. 
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3. Experiences and Obstacles Whistleblowers Have When Disclosing Corporate 
Wrongdoing 
   a. Whistleblower Is a Trouble-Maker 
         Not only does the law show no sympathy for whistleblowing,
879
 but co- 
mpanies and colleagues also regard it as a threat for business and careers. The manag- 
ement thinks that the whistleblower‟s behaviour is disloyal to corporations, and he/she 
is “a type of scoundrel”
880
 and a “disgruntled employee with an axe to grind with his 
or her former employer.”
881
 Whistleblowers are troublemakers for companies and are 
viewed as “dissatisfied and ineffective employees who are unable to work within the 
system.”
882
 As for corporate cultures, “these people are perceived as turncoats, as not 
being team players, as people not to be trusted.”
883
 For coworkers, whistleblowers are 
employees who are “treated as outcasts by fellow employees.”
884
 Once Sherron Wat- 
kins said that whistleblowing at Enron was “not any easy road to take” because Enron 
tried to “just stick [her] in a corner and treat [her] like a pariah and sort of force [her] 
out.”
885
 Watkins even complained that she felt like an outcast among her colleagues 
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after disclosing Enron‟s financial fraud.
886
 These phenomena not only reveal that iso- 
lation is common treatment for whistleblowers because no one wants to create the ill- 
usion that shows he/she stands with the whistleblower, but also prove that whistleblo- 
wing conflicts with social values and corporate cultures cherished by American‟s soci- 
ety and companies. 
In this way, no matter whether the disclosure is external or internal, whistleblow- 
ers might not receive appreciation from companies and colleagues. On the one hand, 
external whistleblowing breaches implied employment contract that requires employ- 
ees to bear the duty of loyalty for employers and corporations;
887
 on the other hand, 
internal whistleblowing is perceived as a kind of insubordination, especially as whistl- 
eblowers do not follow customary corporate in-house channel to present concerns and 
to disclose employers‟ misconduct.
888
  
   b. Mental Effects and Monetary Consequences 
One time, Elliston in his research gave a caution for those employees 
who want to be whistleblowers. As he says: 
“The decision to blow the whistle is not one to be taken lightly. Professionally, it 
can cost an employee not only his or her job but also a career. Personally, it can 
cost much grief – disrupted sleep, strained friendships, and diminished fortunes. 
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Those who decide to dissent publicly should recognize that they are gambling, 
and the odds are against them.”
889
  
Not only are whistleblowers isolated and relegated to dead-end positions,
890
 but they 
also suffer stresses coming from the workplace, which bring them serious mental illn- 
esses and cause other problems, such as alcohol or drug abuse.
891
 In addition, expens- 
ive legal fee is another pressure for whistleblowers when they are discharged and lose 
financial sources at the same time. As Culp says:  
“In fighting the retaliatory acts of their employers, they [whistleblowers] have 
incurred tremendous legal expenses which, when coupled with the loss of earni- 
ngs resulting from termination, have resulted in disastrous financial consequen- 
ces. Many whistleblowers have lost their homes and marriages as a direct result 
of their concern for the public health and welfare.”
892
  
Other psychological burdens resulting from whistleblowing, like “the effects of public 
criticism and a lengthy stay in litigation‟s limelight,” would torment whistleblowers‟ 
minds and have a great influence on their daily lives.
893
  
Filing a claim against employers probably fails to satisfy employees‟ expectatio- 
ns to get rid of these terrible consequences since employees may still have a hard time 
proving their allegations in some state jurisdictions. Some courts impose a stricter sta- 
ndard of burden upon whistleblowing employees, but adopt a lower evidentiary burd- 
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en for employers to rebut employees‟ arguments. Employers can easily reverse emplo- 
yees‟ claims and prove their decisions of termination result from employees‟ unsatisf- 
actory performance or terrible working attitudes, not from retaliation because of empl- 
oyees‟ disclosures.
894
 Even if employees prove their allegations are merited and gran- 
ted the relief, employees still cannot restore damaged working atmosphere because 
the employment relationship has been ruined.
895
 In addition, the remedy is unable to 
completely relieve employees‟ losses when they have been blacklisted in tight-knit in- 
dustries and branded as a troublemaker by previous employers because of former dis- 
closures.
896
 
Consequently, employees blowing a whistle not only have to bear mental effects 
and financial stresses, but they also may get a cold shoulder from courts when courts‟ 
decisions tend to impose a stricter standard of burden upon whistleblowing employees. 
In this way, the consequence of whistleblowing will frustrate employees because they 
have to face mental and physical problems alone; similarly, other factors that they ca- 
nnot anticipate and control may make their situations worse. 
     c. What Is Retaliation? 
       i. Definition of Retaliation 
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             Once Rehg described retaliation in the employment relationship as fo- 
llows: 
“Retaliation against whistleblowers represents an outcome of a conflict between 
an organization and its employee, in which members of the organization attem- 
pt to control the employee by threatening to take, or actually taking, an action 
that is detrimental to the well-being of the employee, in response to the employ- 
ee‟s reporting, through internal or external channels, a perceived wrongful acti- 
on.”
897
 
Retaliation is a phenomenon that can show the imbalanced power in the employment 
relationship. Because employers hold managerial power to control the operation of or- 
ganizations and can decide the positions of employees, this authority makes it harder 
for employees to fight against employers when employees are treated in unequal ways 
or suffer retaliation. 
Retaliation on whistleblowing employees can be shown in various manners. Mic- 
eli defines retaliation as an “undesirable action taken against a whistleblower and in 
direct response to the whistleblowing.”
898
 Also, Keenan states that retaliation is “taki- 
ng an undesirable action against an employee or not taking a desirable action because 
that employee disclosed information about a serious problem.”
899
 The undesirable ac- 
tion includes “both adverse actions taken against the whistleblower (e.g., demotion) 
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and positive actions that were not taken, but otherwise would have been taken had the 
employee not blown the whistle (e.g., promotion).”
900
 In addition, Cortina & Magley 
even make a detailed classification, and divide retaliation into two categories. One is 
the work-related retaliation, and can be “tangible, formal and documented in employ- 
ment records.”
901
 It includes “discharge, involuntary transfer, demotion, poor perfor- 
mance appraisal, and deprivation of perquisites or overtime opportunity.”
902
 Another 
is the social retaliation, and comprises “antisocial behaviors, both verbal and nonverb- 
al, that often go undocumented.”
903
 Anti-social behaviour can be exemplified by “ha- 
rassment, name-calling, ostracism, blame, threats, or the silent treatment.”
904
 Yet, no 
matter what kind of retaliation is imposed upon employees, it can be concluded that 
adverse employment actions not only make employees suffer diverse mental effects, 
but also decrease the working performance and affect employees‟ willingness to enha- 
nce organizations‟ values. 
       ii. Types of Retaliation 
             In SOX Section 806, the statute forbids regulated employers to disch- 
arge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner that discriminates aga- 
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inst employees who make the disclosure of securities violation or related fraud. Besid- 
es, in practical cases, many actions still can be seen as adverse employment. Mavrom- 
mati describes the consequence of whistleblowing, and says: 
“Traditionally, a worker, who blows the whistle on an employer, can expect to fe- 
el the force institutional rage; criticism; ostracism from colleagues; poor perfor- 
mance evaluations; punitive transfers; loss of job; black listing and even dama- 
ge to health from the strain of battling against a power organization.”
905
  
Once a report filed by the National Whistleblower Center in 2002 stated that nearly 
half of whistleblowers would be fired after employers‟ wrongdoings are disclosed,
906
 
and other complainants would be subjected to a variety of retaliatory actions or threats 
from employers and colleagues.
907
 In practice, some retaliatory actions have been vi- 
ewed as discrimination, and prohibited by the administrative agency and courts. These 
actions are exemplified below: 
 “elimination of position/reduction in force 
 transfers, and demotions 
 constructive discharge (or making working conditions so difficult as to for- 
ce a resignation) 
 blacklisting 
 reassignment to a less desirable position 
 negative comments in evaluation that impact employment opportunities 
 a retaliatory order to undergo a psychological fitness for duty examination 
 denial of unescorted access to a work site 
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 suspension of test certifications 
 denial of promotion 
 threats 
 retaliatory harassment or acts constituting intimidation and coercion 
 transfer to position where employee could not perform supervisory duties 
 circulation of negative references and other forms of bad mouthing 
 moving an office and denying parking and access privileges 
 negative references provided to a reference-checking company 
 transfer to a position in which there was less opportunity to earn overtime 
pay 
 refusal to rehire or denial of employment 
 layoffs 
 failure to recall an employee back to work 
 denial of overtime or refusing to let an employee take time off 
 refusal to refer an employee for work with another employer 
 refusal to provide proper references and job referrals 
 denial of parking privileges 
 hostile work environment 
 offering an employee a hush money settlement 
 improperly coercive questioning concerning protected activities 
 harassment which reasonably could create a chilling effect on employee sp- 
eech 
 enforcement of policies that directly impact or prohibit protected activity” 
908
 
Thus, as observed above, no matter which retaliatory behaviour that employers impo- 
se upon whistleblowers, it can be found that employers‟ main intent is to make whistl- 
eblowers feel lonely in the workplace, and try to kick them out.  
In addition, Glazer & Glazer stated that retaliation is in relation to the conflict of 
interest and imbalanced power in the employment relationship. They describe this po- 
int as follows: 
                                                     
908
 Kohn et al., supra note 220, at 98-99 (emphases omitted). 
                                                           
 
 
292 
“The retaliation against ethical resisters reveals the dark underside of American 
bureaucratic life. Just as the resisters personify the continuing presence of cons- 
cience and individual responsibility, so do the reprisals mounted against them 
expose the lengths to which management will go to crush dissent. By their acti- 
ons, ethical resisters become disturbers of power, challengers of the status quo 
that all too often benefit a few corporate managers and government bureaucrats. 
While the resisters often evoke sympathy, they have no shield adequate to prot- 
ect them.… The resisters usually find that they either have to accept defeat or 
undertake a lengthy and expensive fight.”
909
 
Traditional employment relationship means the communication between employers 
and employees is vertical, not horizontal. Employers have managerial authority to co- 
ntrol everything, but employees only can passively receive and practice the order. Em- 
ployees are unable to change the position, promote the working atmosphere, and affe- 
ct the management‟s decision-making. By contrast, employers can decide who will be 
promoted or demoted, and determine whether to accept different voices from the wor- 
kplace or only to treat these concerns as meaningless complaints. Employers have the 
power that subordinates cannot compare with and enjoy. Because of this imbalanced 
position, when retaliation comes along and imposes upon employees, they cannot ind- 
ependently fight against employers and have to take adversities by themselves. 
   4. Consequences of Whistleblowing 
         Whistleblowers can select several outlets to present their concerns after ba- 
lancing different factors and actual situations. They are able to disclose organizations‟ 
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wrongdoings to complaint recipients, upper or middle-level management, governmen- 
tal agencies, or other public parties.
910
 Because there are diverse channels that whistl- 
eblowers can choose, the consequences of whistleblowing made by these recipients 
will be different because of various responses.
911
 As complaints are brought by empl- 
oyees, some recipients probably choose to ignore or respond to these arguments by re- 
taliation.
912
 Hence, whistleblowing employees can adjust their steps when these resp- 
onses do not meet their expectations. As retaliation is taken by respondents, whistlebl- 
owers still can find other recipients whom they think are capable of resolving the pro- 
blem. If there is no recipient that whistleblowers prefer to make a disclosure, they are 
allowed to file a claim in a court against the recipients who have taken adverse actions 
upon them.
913
 As Miceli & Near state, “Our contention is that not every case of whis- 
tleblowing plays out in the same fashion.”
914
 Therefore, when making anticipation on 
the consequence of whistleblowing in each given case, some variables should be con- 
sidered before the result comes out. 
Observing the outcome of whistleblowing, employees may have an equal chance 
to be retaliated against or to be rewarded for their actions. For corporations, it is a hi- 
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gh likelihood that they will give whistleblowing employees responses with reprisal if 
corporate cultures devalue these actions. However, when employers have shown inte- 
ntions to uphold whistleblowing in the workplace or have educated employees whistl- 
eblowing is correspondent to companies‟ policies and interests, in those circumstances, 
the response to whistleblowing will be positive. The whistleblower-friendly atmosph- 
ere established by organizations not only reduces the obstacle for employees to prese- 
nt concerns, but it also lessens their fears to be retaliated against by employers or isol- 
ated by colleagues. At this time, the actions taken by whistleblowers are admirable for 
the management because these actions help finding mistakes in the workplace, and pr- 
event the collapse of organization. Typically, the consequence of whistleblowing can 
be divided into a short-term and a long-term result. Miceli & Near make this distincti- 
on as follows: 
“In the short term, the organization can decide either to terminate the alleged wr- 
ongdoing or to continue it. The response to the whistleblower – independent of 
the decision concerning the termination or continuation of the wrongdoing – is 
to reward, to treat as before, or to retaliate. In the long term, the whistleblower 
may respond to the organization‟s decision, perhaps by deciding to blow the 
whistle again or by deciding not to do so, under any circumstances; in addition, 
the whistleblower‟s attitudes and behavior in the organization may be affected. 
The long-term consequences for the organization are equally varied, and may 
be a mixture of good and bad results, ranging from increased costs of litigation 
with the whistle-blower to improved performance if the wrongdoing is termina- 
ted.”
915
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A short-term consequence of whistleblowing is probably easy for whistleblowing em- 
ployees and organizations to anticipate. For whistleblowers, the purpose of blowing 
the whistle is to unveil organizations‟ wrongdoings and to correct them by internal or 
external help. Whistleblowers want errors to be rectified and alert wrongdoers about 
their unlawful actions. For organizations, they are the recipients of whistleblowers‟ di- 
sclosures. As organizations know misconduct, they have to decide whether to ignore 
the disclosure and retaliate against informants, or to take a positive action to deter mi- 
stakes from getting worse and reward whistleblowers for their loyalty to organizations. 
As to a long-term result, based on the responses of organizations, whistleblowers may 
be influenced by the management‟s actions or colleagues‟ attitudes toward their discl- 
osures, and decide whether to make a similar report again or not. Likewise, organizat- 
ions will consider the benefit and the cost of response to determine if they should treat 
later complaints positively or negatively. Thus, it can be said that a short-term conseq- 
uence is seen as a test for employees to make a subsequent report, and a long-term co- 
nsequence influences organizations to develop corporate culture upon whistleblowing. 
For the sake of making a systematic description, a short-term and a long-term conseq- 
uence of whistleblowing can be diagramed by Figure 4-1:
916
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In this way, for whistleblowers, they hope reported wrongdoing can be rectified 
immediately since this result is their original purpose to make a disclosure. As for the 
reward from supervisors or admiration from coworkers, these are viewed as extra enc- 
ouragements to affirm their actions. For organizations, they probably take other facto- 
rs into account before deciding whether to reward or to retaliate against these employ- 
ees. For instance, the cost of response on whistleblowing is one of factors they will th- 
ink about. If employers act positively on whistleblowing, they must bear a risk on the 
increase of the dissent from employees afterward, and this trend is detrimental to ma- 
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nagerial power of controlling organizations‟ affairs. Contrarily, when employers‟ resp- 
onses are negative, it may be predictable for them to face the collapse of business, and 
to be investigated or intervened by the public or governmental agencies after the corr- 
uption breaks out. 
As described above, different variables have to be taken into account before the 
consequence of whistleblowing comes out. In Miceli & Near‟s research, they have es- 
tablished a diagram to analyze the influence of each variable on the result of whistleb- 
lowing. This diagram is illustrated by Figure 4-2:
917
 
 
                              Figure 4-2 
Social Actors, Predictor Variables and Consequence of Whistleblowing 
 
 
Predictor 
Variables 
 
Social Actors 
Complaint Recipient Co-workers Management 
Effect- 
iveness 
Retaliation 
Effect- 
iveness 
Retaliation 
Effect- 
iveness 
Retaliation 
 
Individual 
 
      
 
Situational 
 
      
 
Organizational 
 
      
 
Dependence 
 
      
                                                     
917
 Id. at 183. 
                                                           
 
 
298 
In this diagram, Miceli & Near made use of the complaint recipient, the cowork- 
er, and the management as the respondents for whistleblowers‟ disclosures. Three res- 
pondents have a feature in common; that is, they are able to play different roles at the 
same time.
918
 As Miceli & Near described the complaint recipient, they thought that 
the complaint recipient “must be someone who has the power to change the situation, 
whether internal or external to the organization…. the complaint recipient could be 
one‟s immediate supervisor, a coworker, a member of top management or an individu- 
al external to the organization.”
919
 Likewise, the coworker has two different roles. On 
the one hand, he/she is a colleague, “which implied some task interdependence and 
sense of norms for appropriate or even ethical behavior with regard to one‟s peer.”
920
 
On the other hand, he/she is seen as an organizations‟ member, “which implied some 
senses of loyalty to the organization member.”
921
 As to the management, it also plays 
two characters; it can be the supervisor for the business matter or be the whistleblower 
to organizations‟ illegal activities. Yet, Miceli & Near thought that this situation has to 
depend on “their [the management] own level in the hierarchy and that of the whistle- 
blower.”
922
 In short, these three actors are typical outlets for whistleblowing employ- 
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ees to present concerns, and these respondents are almost the first channel for whistle- 
blowers to think about. 
As to the leftward column of the diagram, Miceli & Near used individual, situati- 
onal, organizational, and dependence as four factors for predictor variables. First of all, 
in the individual predictor, Miceli & Near stated that “… characteristics of the whistl- 
eblower … would influence the organization‟s response to him or her as a credible so- 
urce for reporting wrongdoing.”
923
 Concerning the credibility of sources, it is built by 
whistleblowers‟ power in organizations. As Miceli & Near described, “… credibility 
is often confounded with power, because many of the status or position variables that 
confer power on an organization member also make that person a respected or credib- 
le source of information.”
924
 Hence, the power of whistleblowers is a crucial factor to 
affect organizations‟ responses to whistleblowing.  
Second, the situational predictor can be categorized into two portions, these are 
“characteristics of the wrongdoing relating to its content” and “characteristics of the 
wrongdoing relating to the process by which it occurs and is interpreted.”
925
 The first 
category means the type or the seriousness of wrongdoing affects organizations to res- 
pond to whistleblowing, and it relates to organizations‟ dependence on its continuati- 
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on. The second category describes the procedure that organizations use to make a res- 
ponse on wrongdoing because different processes correlate with the ways that organi- 
zations treat whistleblowers. Diverse types of misconduct or the seriousness of wron- 
gdoing, and the procedure that reacts to illegal activities affect employers‟ attitudes to 
correct organizational fraud. It is a high possibility that when severe wrongdoings tan- 
gle with ordinary business operation, the management is unwilling to rectify them sin- 
ce the correction probably speeds up the collapse of organization. However, what type 
of wrongdoing significantly affects employers‟ responses to whistleblowing, this is st- 
ill uncertain in recent empirical research.
926
 
Third, the organizational predictor includes “both characteristics of the subunit 
and characteristics of the organization” to anticipate organizations‟ responses to whist- 
leblowers.
927
 This variable takes organizations‟ cultures on whistleblowing into acco- 
unt and considers organizations‟ sizes, structures, and ethical cultures.
928
 Besides, Mi- 
celi & Near said that organizations‟ environments also play a role in the response, and 
these include “norms associated with its [organizations] task domain, and social nor- 
ms that may affect the organization‟s ethical culture.”
929
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Fourth, the dependence predictor is the most complicated category of variable,
930
 
and is able to be divided into four elements as follows: 
 Dependence on the Wrongdoing 
            This concept correlates with the situational predictor. It means that wh- 
en wrongdoings are important for organizations, and they cannot continue business or 
survive without depending on misconduct, organizations probably make more negati- 
ve responses to whistleblowing.
931
 
 Dependence on the Wrongdoer 
            This element is similar to organizations‟ dependence on illegal actions. 
When organizations‟ performance is highly dependent on wrongdoers, whistleblowers 
are hardly able to receive satisfying responses from supervisors or organizations to pr- 
otect and to support their actions.
932
 
 Dependence on the Complaint Recipient  
            The power of the recipient can be used to determine the density of whi- 
stleblowers. However, the result may be different because whether the recipient supp- 
orts whistleblowing is a significant factor to consider. As the powerful complaint reci- 
pient is willing to stand with whistleblowing employees, those employees probably 
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have a higher possibility to receive positive responses for their disclosures. Contrarily, 
when the recipient dislikes the actions taken by whistleblowers, it is probable that tho- 
se employees‟ disclosures will be ignored, and adverse actions are predictable and wi- 
ll be imposed upon them subsequently.
933
 
 Dependence on the Whistleblower 
            This element is associated with the individual predictor above. As whi- 
stleblowers are more powerful and credible in organizations, not only will their discl- 
osures receive more attention from organizations, but also few colleagues will suspect 
the authenticity of their reports. Miceli & Near described that organizations may view 
whistleblowers‟ actions as credible when they “(a) have support from others; (b) have 
credibility within the organization because of position or idiosyncrasy credits or how 
they have handled the whistleblowing; (c) have competent legal advice; (d) have sho- 
wn that their case will benefit other members of the organization or at least not harm 
them; and (e) are considered high performers or powerful individuals for other reaso- 
ns.”
934
 Yet, this element would be influenced by other elements, like organizations‟ 
dependence on the wrongdoing, the wrongdoer, or the complaint recipient. Hence, as 
observing this element to anticipate the consequence of whistleblowing, other elemen- 
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ts still have to be thought about.
935
 
    In the analysis, Miceli & Near concluded that the individual variable appears to 
not playing a critical role in the effectiveness of whistleblowing
936
 because different 
whistleblowers act for various reasons or motives. As for the situational variable, Mic- 
eli & Near described the type of wrongdoing affects the effectiveness of whistleblowi- 
ng; the reason is that when specific misconduct is important to the operation of some 
industries, it is crucial to affect the result of whistleblowing.
937
 The organizational va- 
riable, which involves organizations‟ sizes, structures, cultures, and competitive press- 
ure, causes a negative result on whistleblowers‟ disclosures. As the size of organizati- 
ons is huge; the structure of organizations is rigid; the culture of organization is cons- 
ervative; and competitive pressure is intense, retaliation imposed upon whistleblowers 
is predictable, and affects those employees to bring effective reports on misconduct.
938
 
Likewise, the dependence variable has a function to affect organizations‟ responses; 
however, Miceli & Near stated that it still has to observe the credibility of whistleblo- 
wers in organizations, and then decide the outcome of disclosure.
939
 
In addition, when there is less restriction on employees to make a report in speci- 
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fic industries, there is a higher possibility that they will receive a positive response fr- 
om organizations than those restricted to blow the whistle.
940
 Miceli & Near assumed 
that employees not role-prescribed can make more effective disclosures than those re- 
stricted to report because they “were trusted to report wrongdoings … when the circu- 
mstances were so egregious that the wrongdoing could not be ignored.”
941
 In this sit- 
uation, it is inferred that the credibility of employees allowed to report is much higher 
than that of role-prescribed employees for employers to make a disclosure on organiz- 
ations‟ misbehavior. 
    Besides making use of variables to discuss the effectiveness of whistleblowing, 
in employers‟ points of view, they observe that the role of whistleblowers in the discl- 
osure may affect their decisions to make the response. Miceli & Near state this point 
as follows: 
“How the organization‟s top managers view the alleged wrongdoing and the 
whistle-blowing incident will depend to a large extent on whether they see the 
whistle-blower as a dissident or a reformer, whether they view the whistleblow- 
ing as an attempt at overall organizational change, and whether this change is 
believed to be desirable. If executives see only the specifics of the particular 
whistle-blowing incident, they are likely to act to contain the damage and main- 
tain organizational stability. If, on the other hand, they view it as an opportunity 
for positive reform, they may be more open to change.”
942
 
Hence, the intent of whistleblowers is another factor for employers to consider if they 
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ought to make a positive or negative response to the disclosure. The effectiveness of 
whistleblowing will depend on whether employees‟ reports can be seen as useful sug- 
gestions or important concerns for organizations‟ future performance, and not merely 
arising from employees‟ meaningless complaints or personal reprisal on employers or 
organizations. 
   5. Can Whistleblowers be Secured Completely under SOX Section 806? 
         Considering the Enron and WorldCom cases, could Watkins or Cooper ha- 
ve been shielded if SOX had been in force at the time of the scandals? Cooper did not 
suffer retaliation after reporting WorldCom‟s accounting irregularities, but she was bl- 
amed by her colleagues and got negative treatment in the workplace. As for Watkins, 
she probably would have been fired if Enron‟s financial frauds had not been disclosed 
to the public. Enron‟s top management might still have gone to the outside counsel to 
seek suggestions by which they could legally discharge Watkins with no penalty. Enr- 
on‟s management would have been more confident in firing Watkins when it knew th- 
at Texas common law had not adopted the whistleblower protection as its public poli- 
cy. The retaliatory action imposed upon Watkins for reporting Enron‟s financial frauds 
would come to light, and Watkins could not have any channel to claim her allegations 
and compensate the losses she had suffered. Yet, this situation might have been differ- 
ent in SOX. SOX Section 806 precludes employers from discharging employees when 
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the protected activity occurs. Enron could not have fired Watkins as her disclosure 
was regulated under SOX.
943
 Thus, the result of Watkins‟s action would be no longer 
dependent upon Texas‟s public policy, and corporate whistleblowing would have been 
protected in SOX Section 806. 
    Applying SOX, Enron might have been accused for retaliatory discharge in Sect- 
ion 806 if it had terminated Watkins or had imposed any adverse action upon her bec- 
ause of her disclosure.
944
 Since a make-whole remedy is guaranteed by SOX, Watkins 
can relieve losses, no matter whether mental or physical harm, from Enron‟s retaliati- 
on.
945
 Concerning the relief, SOX gives the administrative agency and courts a broad 
horizon to decide the type of remedy that can completely make up for Watkins‟ losses. 
In addition, SOX imposes criminal liability upon Enron when it violated the regulati- 
on banned by the statute. SOX Section 1107(e) provides “[w]hoever knowingly, with 
the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person … for providing to a law 
enforcement officer … relating to the commission or possible commission of any Fed- 
eral offence, shall be … imprisoned not more than 10 years … .”
946
 Therefore, Enro- 
n‟s management participating in discharging Watkins might have borne criminal char- 
ges under Section 1107(e) of SOX. 
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    SOX modifies the employment-at-will doctrine in American employment relatio- 
nship, and resolves the imbalanced power between employers and employees. Though, 
SOX still has some deficiencies because it merely applies to those violations that rela- 
te to limited frauds and securities laws.
947
 Besides, incorrect recognition, narrow inte- 
rpretation, and unclear standard made by the administrative agency decrease the effec- 
tiveness of SOX. Owing to these factors, the function of SOX Section 806 is restricted 
and cannot meet the statutory purpose as it was originally enacted.  
SOX shields whistleblowers disclosing employers‟ misconduct about one or mo- 
re of six types of securities laws, regulations, and SEC‟s rules. Not only does the viol- 
ation have to be associated with these specific categories, but whistleblowing employ- 
ees also have to reasonably believe that employers or companies have committed the 
prohibited violation. The regulated violations include: 
 Mail fraud;948 
 Wire fraud;949 
 Banking fraud;950 
 Securities fraud;951 
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 Any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission;952 or 
 Any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders953 
Once Moberly did research and found that few percentages of whistleblowers can win 
a prevailing order from the administrative procedure when claiming their allegations 
in SOX.
954
 OSHA and ALJs dismissed their claims because whistleblowers could not 
prove employers‟ violations were concerning specific types of frauds or breaching sp- 
ecific rules, regulations, and laws.
955
 The research described that OSHA and ALJs st- 
ated most whistleblowers‟ claims were in regarding to general fraud, accounting fraud, 
or other types of conduct, and those could not satisfy specific categories regulated by 
SOX.
956
 Hence, because whistleblowers did not meet the requirement of the statute, 
their claims were not merited in the administrative procedure, and could not engage in 
the protected activity in SOX Section 806. 
    Considering the low winning rate of a preliminary order for employees in the ad- 
ministrative procedure, Moberly assumed that some factors probably cause this phen- 
omenon. The first factor is in regard to the attitudes of OSHA and ALJs when address- 
ing whistleblowers‟ claims. As he says: 
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“This outcome [low rating of winning a preliminary order for employees] could 
reflect OSHA‟s and ALJs‟ reluctance to define broadly the categories of whistl- 
eblower disclosures that Sarbanes-Oxley will protect. These two categories of 
„fraud‟ and „other‟ misconduct could be characterized as the most amorphous 
and least bound by the specific statutory language of the Act.”
957
 
The second factor is about the narrow interpretation of protected activities made by 
ALJs. Once Moberly took the Grant case
958
 and the Allen case
959
 for examples and 
stated: 
“Examining specific ALJ cases qualitatively demonstrates that many ALJs inter- 
preted the Act‟s „protected activity‟ requirement narrowly. ALJs required that 
whistleblowing employees draw a direct line between their disclosures of misc- 
onduct and the misconduct‟s relationship to shareholder fraud. For example, in 
Grant v. Dominion East Ohio Gas, an ALJ found that an employee properly rep- 
orted accounting irregularities and errors, but found that the employee did not 
engage in „protected activity‟ because the employee was unable to tie these irre- 
gularities directly to active fraud on the shareholders. Similarly, the employees 
in Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., reported to their supervisors several instan- 
ces of faulty interest calculations, inconsistent and untimely refunds, and impr- 
oper accounting involving cost recognition. The ALJ refused to find a „protect- 
ed activity‟ because the employees could not demonstrate that these errors and 
omissions in financial accounting and reporting were related to a broader sche- 
me of intentional corporate fraud.”
960
 
Last, Moberly pointed out that ALJs requested whistleblowers to prove which specific 
violation regulated by SOX that employers have committed. This requirement not on- 
ly imposes extra burden that is not required under SOX upon employees, but also inc- 
reases the difficulty for whistleblowing employees to win a prevailing order in the ad- 
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ministrative procedure. As Moberly describes: 
“ALJs also demanded that employee whistleblowers specifically inform the reci- 
pient of a whistleblower disclosure that the illegal activity being reported viola- 
tes one of Sarbanes-Oxley‟s identified federal laws. Under this interpretation, 
rather than merely reporting activity that an employee reasonably views as ille- 
gal, the employee must have enough legal knowledge to tie that activity to a sp- 
ecific illegality identified by the Act.”
961
 
Thus, as a result of extra requirement that ALJs impose upon employees, and the narr- 
ow interpretation made by OSHA and ALJs, whistleblowers cannot truly receive com- 
plete protection as Congress‟s original expectation to enact this statute. The statutory 
language gives whistleblowing employees a hope to relieve losses from reporting cor- 
porate misbehavior, but the administrative agency reduces their passion to disclose the 
wrongdoing when they find a prevailing order is difficult to be granted, and the result 
is not as satisfactory as they expect. 
    In addition, whether private subsidiaries of public companies can be in the cover- 
age of SOX Section 806 is still a dispute in the administrative procedure. This argum- 
ent is observed by different decisions made by OSHA and ALJs on meritorious cases. 
Moberly shows this point as follows: 
“… the statutory language does not clearly set forth whether the Act applies to 
privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. The ALJs focused on 
this ambiguity much more intensely than OSHA. In 41.7% of ALJ cases using 
the „not a covered employer‟ rationale, ALJs found that an employer was not 
covered by the Act because it was a subsidiary of either a publicly traded comp- 
any or a foreign company. By contrast, OSHA made this same determination at 
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about one-fourth the rate, 10%. Thus, the difference in usage of the „covered 
employer‟ rationale between OSHA and the ALJs seems best explained by the 
difference in how these administrative decision makers evaluated private subsi- 
diaries of public companies.”
962
 
Soon after the passage of SOX, originally, ALJs adopted a broader application on Sec- 
tion 806. They agreed that the employees of privately-held companies can file a claim 
when they have named public parent companies as respondents.
963
 Also, by virtue of 
the concept that tortfeasor is always liable to others‟ injury, some ALJs held that when 
employees specifically allege public companies also participated in adverse employm- 
ent actions with privately-owned entities, these public firms are liable for retaliation. 
964
 Further, making use of the idea of “corporation‟s veil piercing,” a few ALJs even 
held that when private companies are “mere instrumentality” of public firms,
965
 emp- 
loyees bearing retaliation are allowed to bring a cause of action against those public- 
companies as well.  
    However, these broad interpretations did not continue for a long time. Beginning 
in late 2004, ALJs started to apply a stricter application of covered employers regulat- 
ed under SOX. Some ALJs dismissed employees‟ claims because they did not specifi- 
cally name public companies as respondents and added them beyond the regulated pe- 
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riod.
966
 Besides, some ALJs directly restrained the employees of private companies to 
file claims against employers, and declared that those claims were of no merit.
967
 Mo- 
st ALJs stated that if employees serving in private entities want to have a cause of act- 
ion against employers, they will have no ground to support their claims
968
 since SOX 
whistleblower protection only regulates public companies, not including private entiti- 
es.
969
 
    Therefore, as a result of ambiguous statutory language in SOX and the uncertain 
standard in the administrative agency, these defects affect the effectiveness of the stat- 
ute to protect employees retaliated against because of the disclosure or participation in 
the investigation on corporate securities violation. These obstacles have to be resolved, 
and it is urgent to restore employees‟ confidence in SOX Section 806. The reasons are 
that these employees not only show their ethical courage to make disclosures, but also 
devote themselves as whistleblowers against corporate corruption, and are sincere fol- 
lowers of the statute. 
B. Empirical Critiques on the Whistleblower Protection under SOX Section 806 
   1. Insufficient Protection in Practice 
     a. Low Rate of Winning in SOX Section 806 
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           Before going to federal district court to file a suit against employers in 
SOX, whistleblowers have to make use of the administrative procedure to settle clai- 
ms beforehand. The administrative procedure of Section 806 is modeled on other fed- 
eral whistleblower laws,
970
 and it is the result after balancing the protection of whistl- 
eblowers‟ rights with due process and an expedited administrative proceeding.
971
 Yet, 
those procedures do not have a direct correlation with a high rate of granting a prevai- 
ling order to whistleblowers. On the contrary, they rarely succeed in getting a satisfac- 
tory decision after filing a claim in OSHA and ALJs.
972
 Because most claims will be 
dismissed in the administrative procedure, this situation not only affects the number 
of merited allegations, but also destroys employees‟ belief that they will be complete- 
ly relieved for losses after the disclosure. As Dworkin states, “Despite the intended pr- 
omotion and use of whistleblowing to help enforce Sarbanes-Oxley and deter wrongd- 
oing in the securities market, the statutory scheme gives the illusion of protection wit- 
hout truly meaningful opportunities or remedies for achieving it.”
973
 
    In addition, once Moberly stated the low rate of winning a whistleblower‟s claim 
in SOX Section 806 as follows: 
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“According to OSHA, of the 784 cases resolved at the initial investigative 
level … OSHA investigators found only 17 to have merit, while another 106 ca- 
ses settled. The percentage of meritorious and settled cases for Sarbanes-Oxley 
is slightly lower than the percentage of successful claimants for other whistlebl- 
ower statutes administered by OSHA … Moreover, of the 119 OSHA-level dec- 
isions that were appealed … the Department of Labor‟s Administrative Law Ju- 
dges (ALJs) decided in favor of employees only 4 times, while another 19 settl- 
ed.”
974
 
Thus, whistleblowers probably have a hard time claiming allegations when they find 
OSHA or ALJs show no sympathy to their positions, and few resources can be granted 
for losses. Likewise, whistleblowing employees may feel hopeless when they lack of 
legal knowledge to file the claim, and have to face financial difficulties or other ment- 
al effects after being terminated. 
     b. Situations that Cause the Weakness of SOX Section 806 
           Concerning defects of Section 806, Moberly states some typical proble- 
ms after observing the actual practice of SOX. He says: 
    “Yet Sarbanes-Oxley‟s anti-retaliation provision suffers from significant limitati- 
ons. The Act only protects employees of public corporations and only if such 
employees report violations of federal securities laws. Its statute of limitations 
period of ninety days is unreasonably short because it does not give employees 
enough time to deal with the after-effects of retaliation, consider their options, 
hire an attorney, and have the attorney investigate the merits of the case before 
filing a complaint. The remedies do not include any sort of punitive or liquidat- 
ed damages to provide extra encouragement for whistleblowers. Finally, requir- 
ing employees to jump through OSHA‟s administrative hoops before bringing a 
claim in federal district court can be cumbersome rather than expeditious, bias- 
ed rather than expert, [and] ineffective rather than efficient.”
975
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In addition to the problems of covered employees and limited securities violations to 
disclose, some scholars also mentioned other defects, and these will be studied in the 
later section. Here, however, I want to put emphasis on two points that I have not dis- 
cussed before. These are inappropriate usage of OSHA as the dispute-resolver and the 
lack of incentive for employees to blow the whistle under SOX Section 806. 
    First, OSHA is not an expert to investigate the issue regarding securities violati- 
on. As Solomon notes: 
“Little noticed, though, was that the new law [SOX] didn‟t assign the job of prot- 
ecting whistle-blowers to experts on financial malfeasance, such as the Securiti- 
es and Exchange Commission. Instead, the task went to the Labor Department‟s 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration…. But OSHA investigators are 
trained in health and safety issues, such as claims of retaliation for reporting 
faulty equipment or illegal dumping of chemicals. Now they were asked to und- 
erstand sophisticated financial stratagems – a task whose difficulty is clear from 
the failure of regulators and investors to spot fraud at Enron, WorldCom and el- 
sewhere for many years. How OSHA handles the whistle-blower assignment is 
crucial to efforts to improve corporate governance, because unless workers feel 
protected, many will keep quiet about improprieties they see.”
976
 
Because the investigatory authority is delegated to OSHA, which is unsophisticated in 
financial frauds, not authorizing securities regulators to make an investigation,
977
 it is 
an obstacle for the OSHA investigator to decide whether respondents violate securiti- 
es laws or related frauds. As the investigator has no related legal knowledge and is un- 
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able to take the right step to start an investigation, it is highly possible that employees‟ 
claims will be alleged of no merit. In addition, the investigator‟s unfamiliarity of laws 
puts the health and safety of society in a risk when employers‟ violations get involved 
in public interest. 
    Second, SOX cannot give a reward to whistleblowing employees before they rel- 
ieve losses in the administrative procedure when their disclosures are proved to be tr- 
ue afterward. As Kobayashi & Ribstein describe this point below: 
    “[W]histleblowers may lack adequate incentives to disclose the fraud. Someone 
must determine the amount of compensation the whistleblower should receive. 
This has been a problem under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where provisions agai- 
nst whistleblowing have been administered with little success by the oddly cho- 
sen Occupational Safety and Health Administration…. The whistleblower faces 
not only an uncertain recovery, but also the possibility of retaliation from which 
the law may not adequately protect. Moreover, the whistleblower may incur dir- 
ect costs in uncovering wrongdoing for which she may not be reimbursed.”
978
 
The lack of incentive for employees to blow the whistle is one of the deficiencies of 
anti-retaliation model under SOX Section 806. SOX encourages employees to report 
corporate misconduct and promises to compensate their losses completely; however, it 
cannot create a monetary stimulus for employees to become the active monitor of cor- 
porate corruption.
979
 As employers‟ wrongdoings are detected, employees tend to bal- 
ance self-interest and situations before blowing the whistle. In this circumstance, em- 
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ployees‟ positions to disclose are passive, not active. This condition not only has a gr- 
eat influence on employees‟ abilities to make a spontaneous report, but also decreases 
the chance to unveil employers‟ misbehavior. 
In addition, several surveys have demonstrated that most employees have no idea 
whether they will be rewarded or not after reporting employers‟ wrongdoings.
980
 This 
uncertainty not only influences employees‟ willingness to disclose corporate financial 
fraud, but ruins SOX‟s statutory purpose to strengthen employees‟ positions as intern- 
al monitors to deter the management‟s securities violation. Even if employees are aw- 
are that SOX protects their actions, they still worry if the outcome will meet their exp- 
ectations of blowing the whistle; unclear protection pushes employees back off. Simil- 
arly, courts‟ inconsistent recognition on whistleblower statutes makes employees fear 
that their positions are not strong enough against employers.
981
  
    Because of these concerns, the monetary encouragement probably re-wins empl- 
oyees‟ passion for disclosing the management‟s misconduct. In this way, employees 
do not have to worry about uncertain compensation in the administrative procedure, 
but they are guaranteed to receive a reward as their reports are proved to be true after 
the disclosure. 
   2. What Are Pros and Cons of SOX Section 806? 
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     a. Pros of Section 806 
           In comparison to other federal whistleblower laws, the whistleblower 
provision in SOX has some breakthroughs on deterring corporate wrongdoing. First of 
all, SOX Section 806 broadens its protection to the employees who disclose corporati- 
ons‟ violations on securities laws or related frauds. Before the passage of SOX, feder- 
al and state whistleblower laws simply allowed private sector employees to report or- 
ganizational illegitimacy concerning the danger of the health and safety of the public. 
982
 These statutes did not shield employees to report securities violations that may ru- 
in the public market. At that time, the scope of the health and safety of the public was 
limited because corporate illegal activities in the financial market could not be percei- 
ved as a threat on public interest. SOX is the first statute that puts emphasis on the sa- 
fety of the securities market. It provides remedies for employees who show their con- 
cerns on employers‟ misconduct that implicates the violation of federal securities laws 
or related frauds,
983
 but suffer adverse employment actions taken by employers or pu- 
blic companies. Then, after the passage of SOX Section 806, the coverage of whistle- 
blower laws does not merely protect the health and safety of the public; yet, it broade- 
ns the scope and reaches out to the safety of the financial market, which probably aff- 
ects public interest as well. 
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    Second, SOX Section 806 gives protection to corporate employees who disclose 
or participate in the investigation on companies‟ financial frauds. Before the enactme- 
nt of SOX, the operation of public firms is mostly supervised by the SEC and overse- 
en by other gatekeepers, such as public accounting firms or law firms. Though, follo- 
wed by the eruption of corporate scandals, like Enron or WorldCom, many people sta- 
rted wondering whether those outsiders can really have a function to deter corporate 
securities fraud. Since before corporate corruption broke out, external monitors depe- 
nded too much on financial materials supplied by executives or subordinate managers, 
and the information was used to turning out to be false. Because of realizing this situ- 
ation, Congress transferred its attention from external gatekeepers to corporate inside- 
rs to oversee securities violations. Congress found that corporate insiders are capable 
of accessing the information that the public hardly gets to know. Besides, insiders are 
much more familiar with corporate operation than others are, and are able to be the fi- 
rsthand witness of corporate misbehavior. Therefore, SOX is the first statute that prac- 
tices this policy, and provides protection for those companies‟ insiders who show their 
courage and bravely disclose corporate securities violation. 
    Third, SOX Section 806 extends the coverage by broadening the definition of 
employer, and provides a complete remedy for whistleblowing employees who suffer 
retaliatory actions after the disclosure. SOX restricts adverse actions taken by officers, 
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employees or agents of public companies, not just limits its application on employers. 
984
 As regards the relief, not only can reinstatement, front pay, back pay, or other spe- 
cial damages be compensated for employees, but SOX also awards aggrieved emplo- 
yees the make-whole relief to make up for other losses. Take reinstatement for exam- 
ple. SOX gives an expedited reinstatement of employment after the OSHA investigat- 
or finds that the employee‟s allegation is merited. In addition to rapid recovery of car- 
eer, the reinstatement in the preliminary order will be kept even if the respondent app- 
eals to ALJ with the DOL.
985
 Also, the reinstatement will not be stayed when the em- 
ployee‟s claim is transferred to federal district court for a de novo review.
986
 The rea- 
son for this immediate relief is that reinstating the whistleblower‟s position can stren- 
gthen employees‟ confidence in SOX; similarly, it can give a potential warning to cor- 
porate management that the influence of retaliatory action has decreased because em- 
ployees can be relieved losses quickly in the administrative procedure. Hence, a com- 
plete remedy for employees, on the one hand, makes employees not worry about their 
losses after the disclosure; on the other hand, the relief probably dwarfs corporate em- 
ployers‟ intentions to commit illegal activities, and deters these actions from harming 
shareholders‟ investments and the national economy. 
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    Fourth, SOX Section 806 adjusts imbalanced standard of burden of proof impos- 
ed upon whistleblowing employees compared with other whistleblower laws. SOX 
requires employees to show reasonable belief on employers‟ misconduct that breaches 
securities laws, regulations, SEC rules, or related frauds,
987
 and simply needs them to 
prove allegations by a preponderance of evidence. Contrarily, in order to rebut emplo- 
yees‟ allegations, employers have to present clear and convincing evidence, the evide- 
nce producing “a firm belief or conviction,”
988
 to verify that their actions did not co- 
me from retaliatory intent, but were the decisions after considering other factors to ta- 
ke adverse actions on whistleblowing employees. These factors probably include em- 
ployees‟ unsatisfactory performance or employees‟ lack of qualification on their care- 
ers in the workplace.
989
 
    Fifth, by observing SOX Section 806, it seems that the statute only regulates pu- 
blic companies; however, this is not true. SOX covers its protection to contractors, su- 
bcontractors, and agents of publicly-held companies, and it is highly probable that th- 
ese bodies are private entities.
990
 Because a sequence of corporate scandals broke out 
in the beginning of this century, this regulation may infer that Congress was inclined 
to protect those employees who disclose corporate financial fraud, but are employed 
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by private companies, such as the accounting firm, the law firm, or the investment ba- 
nk. In addition, as mentioned above, some decisions made by ALJs approved private 
subsidiaries of public firms are in the coverage of SOX.
991
 Thus, it can be concluded 
that no matter whether companies that take adverse actions on whistleblowers are pri- 
vate or public, when employees name those companies as respondents together, these 
firms are subject to SOX whistleblower provision. 
     b. Cons of Section 806 
       i. Problem of Limited Period of Filing 
             Federal whistleblower statutes have diverse requirements for employ- 
ees to file a claim against employers. These diversities not only can be found in filing 
limitation,
992
 but also can be shown by different period of investigation.
993
 The role 
of limited period for filing and investigation, on the one hand, helps the administrati- 
ve agency to determine whether employees‟ claims have been beyond the filing peri- 
od and are still in a merit, and meets the requirement of expedited administrative pro- 
cedure. On the other hand, it assists employees in knowing whether their rights are st- 
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ill legally protected under SOX or not. Hence, it might be said that the limited period 
benefits both the administrative agency and the employee because of its function of 
reviewing and reminding.
994
 
    The purpose of the limited period concerns the issue of balanced interest betwe- 
en employers and employees. As Ramirez describes: 
    “In selecting an appropriate statute of limitations for an omnibus statute, tension 
exists between the interests of the employee and the employer. An employer 
may prefer a shorter time period, such as the ninety-day period, because it prot- 
ects the general „at-will‟ nature of the employer-employee relationship and per- 
mits a claim to be investigated while the actions prompting the claims are still 
fresh in the minds of the witness. Yet, for the employee, ninety days may not be 
enough time to realize that an adverse employment action is based upon the 
whistleblowing activity of the employee.”
995
 
Employers and colleagues prefer whistleblowing employees‟ claims to be resolved as 
soon as possible because these complaints affect the harmonious working atmosphere, 
and damage the trust that has been built among employers, employees, and coworke- 
rs.
996
 The disrupted trust is difficult to restore and can indirectly influence future bus- 
iness performance.
997
 By contrast, employees prefer a longer period to file a claim si- 
nce they need more time to access confidential information and potential witnesses, to 
investigate suspected activities, and to sustain a stable financial source to support the 
litigation. The purpose of employees‟ preparation is to establish sufficient ground ag- 
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ainst employers‟ retaliation because of their disclosures or participation in the investi- 
gation on corporate securities violation. 
    Observing the limitations in SOX Section 806, these designs have been criticiz- 
ed by legal scholars and employees who had filed their claims under SOX. Ordinarily 
speaking, there are two complaints about the limited period. The first one is regarding 
the limited period on filing employees‟ claims to OSHA. SOX requires employees to 
“file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 90 days after the date on which 
the violation occurs.”
998
 The day to start calculating regulated period is after the reta- 
liation occurs, not after the retaliation is discovered or felt.
999
 This regulation has se- 
veral defects because it is difficult for employees to find out when the first day of the 
retaliation happens if they are not the decision-maker of adverse actions. In addition, 
even if the specific day has been known, and the retaliation is discovered in three mo- 
nths, this short filing period still cannot give employees enough time to decide wheth- 
er to become the whistleblower of corporate misconduct, and to file a claim against 
employers.
1000
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The second criticism is that these fixed timelines are unable to be totally follow- 
ed by the DOL. The regulation requests employers to meet with OSHA and to present 
sufficient evidence to rebut employees‟ allegations in twenty days after receiving the 
complaint. 
1001
 As the OSHA investigator finds that employees‟ allegations are meri- 
ted and awards them a preliminary order,
1002
 employers still have ten days to strengt- 
hen their positions after receiving a notification of the order from OSHA. In order to 
overturn the order, employers can present more persuasive evidence
1003
 against OSH- 
A‟s preliminary order granting the relief for employees.
1004
 However, in reality, these 
timelines are not entirely enforced by the DOL.
1005
 The DOL‟s noncompliance with 
regulated timeline not only affects an expedited administrative procedure, but also de- 
stroys balanced interests that have been set up by the administrative agency for empl- 
oyers and employees. If extra time is allowable in the administrative procedure, the 
beneficial consequence probably go to employers, not employees. These extensions 
will cause potential harm to employees because they are likely to be discharged at th- 
at time, and hope the immediate remedy can support their unemployed lives and relie- 
ve other hefty expenses that arise from later litigation. 
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       ii. Issue of Burden of Proof 
             Employees and employers bear the burden of proof to verify their all- 
egations and to rebut opponents‟ complaints in SOX. For employees, originally, they 
have to prove their claims are justifiable by the preponderance of evidence.
1006
 When 
the OSHA investigator finds their claims are merited, the burden-shifting is occurring 
and turning to employers to stand their positions.
1007
 For employers, in order to rebut 
employees‟ allegations, they have to use clear and convincing evidence to show that 
they would have taken the same action even though there is no protected activity.
1008
 
If employers succeed to defend employees‟ arguments, employees have to ultimately 
bear the burden of proof by the preponderance of evidence, and to show that employ- 
ers‟ reasons are pretexts and should not be relied on.
1009
 
    Although employees bear a lower standard of burden to claim their allegations, 
some statistics still showed that employees have a frustrating rate of winning a preli- 
minary order from OSHA. As Moberly describes this point as follows: 
    “… despite having every advantage regarding the burden of proof for causation, 
employees still lost at an extremely high rate at the OSHA Level, … OSHA fo- 
und that an employee satisfied the „contributing factor‟ standard only 30.6% of 
the time. When the employee met this level of proof, placing a „clear and conv- 
incing‟ burden of proof on the employer still resulted in a relatively low emplo- 
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yee win rate of 35.1%. Overall in these „causation‟ cases, employees won only 
10.7% of the time at the OSHA Level ….”
1010
 
Though, if the intent of Congress to enact SOX was to encourage employees to brave- 
ly disclose employers‟ misconduct, and to establish a friendly framework for them to 
report, why do employees still have a hard time claiming their allegations and cannot 
be relieved for their losses in the administrative procedure? In order to clarify this co- 
nfusion, two issues have to be scrutinized. 
    The first issue is with regard to the possibility that there is no precedent case for 
employees to follow.
1011
 Before filing a claim against employers, employees may ref- 
er to others‟ cases in which those people also suffered similar adverse actions by emp- 
loyers. These cases not only can help employees to know what evidence may be help- 
ful for preparing their claims, but can provide them simulated situations to think abo- 
ut strategies of defense when similar conditions come to them. Precedent cases have a 
function of giving whistleblowing employees illustrations for reference. Even if past 
cases are not exactly the same as present cases, employees still can make use of simil- 
ar factors or situations to persuade the dispute-resolver that their allegations are meri- 
ted, and what they suffered is worth being relieved and protected.
1012
 As regards the 
method of proof, courts are inclined to use direct evidence or circumstantial evidence 
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to decide which party has a meritorious claim. Direct evidence is the evidence that “if 
believed, proves the existence of a dispute without inference or presumption.”
1013
 As 
for circumstantial evidence, it can be made by various presumptions to indirectly pro- 
ve the reality of claims. These inferences are exemplified by disparate treatment,
1014
 
work performance,
1015
 or antagonism to protected activities.
1016
 However, above ad- 
vantages will be useless if precedent cases are not available for employees at the time 
as they decide to file a claim against employers in SOX Section 806. In this way, not 
only do employees have no reference to make a persuasive allegation before OSHA, 
but it is difficult for them to rebut employers‟ reasons that are proved by clear and co- 
nvincing evidence to impose legitimate adverse actions upon employees. 
    The second dispute is that it is much easier for employers to present a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason and to conceal their actual intent to make the adverse acti- 
on.
1017
 The reason is that employers have incomparable authority on business matters. 
Employers hold managerial power to make corporate policies, to control potential ris- 
ks, and to evaluate employees‟ working performance. In addition, employers have the 
right to decide whether to continue or end the employment relationship. They can ma- 
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ke a decision to retain or to discharge employees and have more resources to find em- 
ployees‟ faults in their duties.
1018
 By contrast, employees‟ allegations are not easy to 
be proved because of limited resources and inadequate witnesses‟ testimony. Witness- 
es, most of employees‟ colleagues, tend to stand with employers since they fear of irr- 
itating and being retaliated against by employers. Likewise, these coworkers are unw- 
illing to breach the duty of loyalty to organizations they serve, and are afraid of creat- 
ing an illusion that they are also the whistleblower or the assistants of whistleblowing. 
Then, even if whistleblowing employees bear a lower standard of burden to file a cla- 
im in SOX, they still have a hard time rebutting employers‟ reasons for adverse actio- 
ns. Not only may employees lack precedent cases to support their allegations and ha- 
ve inadequate resources to assist them in filing a persuasive claim, but the imbalanced 
power in the employment relationship makes employees more difficult to argue empl- 
oyers‟ actions lack of justification, and contend their excuses are simple pretexts for 
retaliation.
1019
 
       iii. Mandatory Arbitration Agreement1020 
              The attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court toward a mandatory arbitrat- 
ion agreement upon resolving employment disputes has changed from negative to po- 
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sitive. The Court tended to not enforce these contracts before the early 1990s;
1021
 ho- 
wever, nowadays, this insistence is not being kept anymore, and the Court favors tho- 
se mutual agreements to solve a variety of employment arguments that happen in the 
workplace.
1022
 
    In the Alexander case, the Court held that even though the plaintiff participated 
in a collective bargaining agreement before the dispute occurred, he still retained the 
right to request for a hearing about race discrimination under federal courts.
1023
 The 
Court noted that depriving the plaintiff‟s independent statutory right of filing a claim 
to the administrative agency or suing in courts not only will influence the administrat- 
ive agency‟s function to resolve employment disputes, but also may weaken the indi- 
vidual litigant‟s role as a private attorney general for achieving the purpose of statutes. 
1024
 Besides, after comparing with statutory litigation and arbitration, the Court conc- 
luded that exclusive arbitration procedures are inappropriate to resolve statutory clai- 
ms since these procedures may violate statutory purposes.
1025
 Further, the Court stat- 
ed that some defects of private arbitration contracts, such as limited discovery, the in- 
applicability of the rules of evidence, and the informality of arbitration proceedings, 
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will impede the statutory plaintiff to completely relieve his/her losses in the arbitrati- 
on.
1026
 Further, the Court pointed out that the arbitrator in the Alexander case was in- 
eligible to be the dispute-resolver because he lacked “general authority to invoke pub- 
lic laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties,”
1027
 and his limited knowl- 
edge did not allow him to resolve the employment discrimination issue.
1028
 Thus, the 
Court was inclined to show a negative attitude toward exclusive arbitration on the sta- 
tutory employment claim. 
    However, in the Gilmer case, the Court changed its attitude toward the mandato- 
ry arbitration clause, and held that this agreement is enforceable and can be an exclus- 
ive remedy for employment disputes.
1029
 Although Gilmer‟s decision was contrary to 
the Alexander case, the Gilmer Court did not overturn Alexander‟s decision because 
the facts of these two cases were different. The Gilmer Court reasoned that Alexande- 
r‟s decision was sustained because it related to collective bargaining agreements.
1030
 
The Alexander Court addressed the dispute that a union restricted the plaintiff‟s statu- 
tory rights,
1031
 but not involving a contract with an individual employee, such as Gil- 
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mer.
1032
 Thus, the Gilmer Court agreed that private arbitration contracts can resolve 
employment claims and did not hold that these contracts are banned from applying to 
employment disputes. Until the Circuit City Stores case, the Court definitely agreed 
the validity of mandatory arbitration in employment disputes,
1033
 and stated that “ar- 
bitration agreements can be enforced … without contravening the policies of congres- 
sional enactment giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibi- 
ted by federal law … .”
1034
 Hence, the support of mandatory arbitration agreements 
is certified, and no one suspects the role of private arbitration contracts to resolve em- 
ployment issues. 
As observed above, the U.S. Supreme Court‟s attitude toward pre-dispute arbitr- 
ation contracts transferred from suspicion to encouragement, and this transformation 
brings advantages to settle employment disputes. By the assistance of private arbitrat- 
ion agreements, on the one hand, courts reduce their pressure to resolve considerable 
volumes of employment claims;
1035
 on the other hand, arbitration contracts make em- 
ployers and employees have freedom to decide which dispute resolution is best for th- 
eir situations. Arbitration contracts not only promote the efficiency of resolving empl- 
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oyment disputes, but also save costs in future litigation. 
Even if mandatory arbitration contracts put emphasis on the advantages of prom- 
oting efficiency, the freedom of contract, and fairness, other disadvantages still cann- 
ot be ignored when applying private arbitration on employment issues. As Cherry de- 
scribes “… many of the problems associated with mandatory arbitration: perceived 
employer bias; fewer options available to the employee regarding where to bring suit; 
and limitations on discovery.”
1036
 Similarly, Watnick mentions “… applying … man- 
datory arbitration agreements … weakens employee positions because arbitration ge- 
nerally favors employers.”
1037
 These defects affect employees‟ rights to receive a fair 
judgment, and show significant imbalanced power between employees and employers 
on making the contract. Cherry shows the argument upon the efficiency of arbitration 
contracts as follows: 
“… many of the arguments contending that employees … benefit from efficien- 
cy savings are not compelling. If it would really be in an employee‟s „best inte- 
rest‟ to enter into a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration contract, then employees 
would not be contesting these contracts in courts around the country, claiming 
they are unfair and against public policy. Furthermore, if mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration contracts really are in the interests of employees, then employers 
would not have to impose the arbitration clause ex ante, before a dispute arose. 
Rather, if it really were in an employee‟s best interest to use arbitration, the rat- 
ional employee would seek binding arbitration after a dispute arises.”
1038
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Thus, the efficiency of arbitration contracts does not actually take employees‟ interes- 
ts into account; contrarily, it stands on employers‟ side to determine which method is 
best for employees. The rationale of arbitration contracts is based on employers‟ acti- 
ve positions to control all aspects of employment relationship, and is not established 
by an equal, mutual, and non-discriminative foundation. 
In addition, Cherry criticized the concept of freedom of contract on the mandato- 
ry arbitration agreement as well. As she says: 
    “… at present there is very little „freedom‟ of choice involved in most arbitration 
contracts, which in reality are little more than contracts of adhesion. At the time 
of contracting, an employee is relatively powerless to negotiate the terms of 
employment, especially in regard to these arbitration clauses. Employers may 
unilaterally dictate that the arbitration program in their form contracts not be 
subject to modification. Even if an employee is made fully aware of the differe- 
nces between arbitration and a trial by a jury of her peers, it is unlikely that she 
would be able to negotiate different terms.”
1039
 
In this way, if one party has no right to negotiate the terms of contracts, this may viol- 
ate the spirit of freedom of contract, which authorizes both parties to reach a satisfact- 
ory agreement by themselves. When the terms of contracts are controlled by the pow- 
erful side, not only may the weak party suffer unanticipated damage when the dispute 
occurs, but those unequal consequences also cannot be adjusted by courts or other au- 
thorized administrative agencies later. 
    Concerning the issue of fairness, employees who sign mandatory arbitration con- 
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tracts probably suffer discrimination by the gender or ethics of arbitrators.
1040
 The di- 
versity of arbitrators affects the outcome of arbitration, and employees have nothing 
to do with this. After all, employers are inclined to select groups or persons they favor 
as arbitrators, and hope that those bodies will make a prevailing decision on employe- 
rs‟ business or interests as well. Employers will not mandate those jobs to others who 
antagonize capitalism and tend to show sympathy to weak parties, such as employees. 
Besides, employees‟ positions may be easily impaired by limited discovery in manda- 
tory arbitration agreements. As Cherry states this concept below: 
“Limited discovery usually works to disadvantage employment discrimination 
plaintiffs because these plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion while at the sa- 
me time are usually the party with less information. These discovery restraints 
deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to make their own choice of how much ti- 
me and money to spend on the discovery process, within the limits sanctioned 
by the courts.”
1041
 
Unlike a complete, systematic investigation made by authorized administrative agen- 
cies or courts, the procedures of arbitration have limited time, labor, and money to to- 
tally understand the disputed issue. Arbitration having limited resources on the invest- 
igation not only affects employees‟ rights on finding the truth, but also decreases the 
possibility that employees may have sufficient ground to win a prevailing decision fr- 
om an arbitrator. 
    Consider SOX Section 806, even though SOX gives whistleblowing employees 
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the make-whole relief to make up for their losses,
1042
 several whistleblower cases sti- 
ll did not go to the administrative agency and courts, but were sent to arbitration for 
being settled.
1043
 The reason is that SOX does not expressly forbid the usage of arbit- 
ration contracts to resolve whistleblowing disputes.
1044
 This defect indirectly allows 
employers to insert a provision of mandatory arbitration in the prospective employm- 
ent contract and to circumvent SOX‟s regulations. In addition, the attitude of U.S. Su- 
preme Court that supports private arbitration to resolve employment issues increases 
the prevalence of arbitration contracts. Therefore, inferior courts are supposed to foll- 
ow the Court‟s decision and employ this presumption to resolve whistleblowing disp- 
utes.
1045
 This consequence seriously weakens the function of SOX Section 806 that 
not only to protect employees from bearing adverse actions because of the disclosure, 
but also to assist employees in relieving their losses by an impartial, expedited admin- 
istrative procedure. 
       iv. Narrow Recipient of Disclosure 
             In SOX, it is allowable for whistleblowing employees to report to fe- 
deral regulatory or law enforcement agency, to any member or a committee of Congr- 
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ess, or to a person having supervisory authority in the public company.
1046
 As the le- 
gislature considered the recipient of disclosures under SOX Section 806, it had balan- 
ced the conflict of interest among related parties. Dworkin & Callahan state this point 
as follows: 
“Principled policymaking regarding whistleblowing outlets requires the balanc- 
ing of competing interests: the employee‟s interest in reporting wrongdoing wi- 
thout penalty, the organization‟s interest in maximizing control and efficiency, 
and society‟s interest in encouraging lawful behavior and public accountability. 
Decisions regarding the appropriateness of outlets are crucial to the interests of 
the parties involved, because they determine who can act upon the information, 
when and how a remedial or punitive response may be made, and whose intere- 
sts are furthered or impaired.”
1047
 
When the scope of recipient is broad for employees to make a disclosure, it is highly 
probable that employees‟ claims would not be dismissed in the administrative proced- 
ure, and their losses could be compensated easily from the administrative agency or 
courts. Likewise, the broad scope of recipient prevents public good from being dama- 
ged by potential threats of corporate misbehavior since the disclosure will not be blo- 
cked by specific groups or respondents easily. On the contrary, as the recipients of di- 
sclosures are confined, the influence of unveiling corporate wrongdoing is restricted. 
In this time, it can be inferred that employers will take the priority position to control 
the result of retaliation and organizations‟ misbehavior, and employees cannot do any- 
thing about that. 
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    The broad scope of recipient benefits employees to report corporate misconduct. 
However, federal and state whistleblower statutes are inadequate to shield whistleblo- 
wing employees since these statutes put many restrictions on reporting requirements. 
They confine the scope of recipient, and if employees report beyond this scope, their 
claims will be dismissed and be regarded as no merit cases. Because of this limitation, 
when employees observe employers‟ illegal actions and realize their rights of blowing 
the whistle,
1048
 they may feel frustrated as finding that the recipient whom they repo- 
rt is not regulated under the statute.
1049
 The narrow scope of recipient not only hamp- 
ers employees to show concerns on employers‟ misconduct, but it also hinders the pu- 
blic from accessing confidential information about actual corporate operation and fin- 
ancial conditions.
1050
 
    Before making a decision to blow the whistle, employees are inclined to take di- 
fferent issues into account. One of these issues is about the selection of reporting reci- 
pients. As Sinzdak notes: 
    “ … because employees are generally unaware of whistleblower rights, their sel- 
ection of a report recipient is primarily driven by practical considerations. The- 
se considerations include the type and significance of the alleged misconduct, 
the employee‟s status within the organization (both in terms of experience and 
position), the organizational status of the wrongdoers, the organization‟s culture, 
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and the fear of retaliation.”
1051
 
As mentioned above, several variables, such as individual predictors or situational pr- 
edictors, have a significant impact on employees to make an effective disclosure.
1052
 
Therefore, employees have to consider several factors to determine which outlet is pr- 
oper in their situations to report corporate irregularities. These factors are exemplified 
by the seriousness of wrongdoing, the extent of illegal activities that public firms rely 
on to survive, the position of wrongdoer, corporate cultures, and an employee‟s credi- 
bility of being a whistleblower. When the broader scope of recipient can be selected, 
not only is it easier for employees to find a suitable channel to present their concerns, 
but it is highly probable that employees will make a successful disclosure and deter 
employers‟ illegal conduct. 
    Thus, in the premise of good-faith whistleblowing, when reporting to other reci- 
pients fails to receive a satisfying result, extending the scope of recipient to the media 
and Internet as a last resort can promote the statutory purpose of SOX.
1053
 Generally 
speaking, employees thinking that they can rectify wrongdoings may choose internal 
disclosure to show their concerns and right the mistake.
1054
 On the contrary, powerle- 
ss employees, like a newcomer, rarely get support to blow the whistle since they have 
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not had “idiosyncrasy credits” in organizations.
1055
 Hence, their credibility on disclo- 
sures probably is devaluated and will not be recognized by supervisors.
1056
 Besides, 
another deficiency for fresh employees is that they are more unfamiliar with reporting 
channels than others who have served in organizations for a long time.
1057
 In this way, 
it is hard for fresh employees to generate changes and timely put organizations‟ misc- 
onduct back on the right track. Moreover, the status of employees will affect their abi- 
lities to make a credible disclosure.
1058
 Some factors that can weigh the status include 
the pay level, job performance, supervisory or professional status, the importance of 
the career, and role prescription.
1059
 Also, special knowledge and skills held by empl- 
oyees are able to heighten their statuses in organizations. The reasons are that experti- 
se is not only a requisite asset for organizations‟ operation, but it also lets employees‟ 
opinions or advice more persuasive and credible to supervisors when making a discl- 
osure by in-house channels.
1060
 
    Since fresh, low-level, or non-professional employees lack the power to influen- 
ce the change, these employees are likely to be a group that prefers making an extern- 
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al disclosure, such as making a report to the media or by Internet.
1061
 Other employe- 
es‟ motives to disclose to the media are because not only it can rapidly respond to the- 
ir concerns, but it also can increase the credibility of their information and effectively 
rectify corporate irregularity.
1062
 Besides powerless employees regard external discl- 
osure as their priority, sophisticated employees tend to take the same step as well.
1063
 
Because of the experiences of making reports, these employees know no matter whet- 
her the disclosure is to the management or governmental institutions, there are several 
defects that will affect the effectiveness of whistleblowing. Yet, disclosing to the me- 
dia, their concerns will not be ignored; also, they are able to receive meaningful resp- 
onses as their feedbacks, and may not be treated as annoying complainants in the wo- 
rkplace again.
1064
 
    However, when considering the question if SOX allows powerless employees to 
present concerns to the media or Internet, the answer is frustrating and negative. Obs- 
erving other federal whistleblower statutes, only the False Claims Act (FCA) permits 
employees to use the media as one of external outlets to make a disclosure.
1065
 Thus, 
since many factors have set up an obstacle for employees to report, SOX should broa- 
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den its scope of recipient because this decreases any possibility that dwarfs the functi- 
on of SOX Section 806. 
       v. Internal Reporting should be Previous to External Reporting 
             In SOX, whistleblowing employees are able to disclose internally to 
the person who has supervisory authority in the public company, or can report extern- 
ally to federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, or to a member or any committ- 
ee of Congress. Even though SOX Section 806 allows employees to disclose corpora- 
te securities violation either internally or externally, SOX still has to add a provision, 
which expressly requires that internal disclosure should be previous to external one. It 
means that whistleblowing employees are required to exhaust the internal channel for 
presenting their concerns before going to employ the external one. For companies, th- 
is policy is good for them because internal disclosure not only reduces potential dam- 
age to companies, but it also avoids the collapsed employment relationship happened 
among employers, employees, and colleagues. One time, Dworkin described the simi- 
lar concept as follows: 
    “Benefits of internal whistleblowing include facilitating the prompt investigation 
and correction of wrongful conduct and minimizing the organizational costs of 
whistleblowing by permitting employers to rectify misconduct confidentially, 
with little disruption to the employer-employee relationship. Internal whistlebl- 
owing also enables the correction of misunderstanding, which reduces the likel- 
ihood that the organization and its employees will unfairly suffer harm.”
1066
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Hence, it may be concluded that corporate whistleblowers can bring a good conseque- 
nce to companies when they are persuaded to employ internal outlets to make a discl- 
osure.
1067
 Internal disclosure not only gives employers an opportunity to correct wro- 
ngdoing and timely put companies‟ misconduct back on the right track, but it also re- 
duces the possibility that companies would suffer the loss of reputations on business 
as a result of employees‟ external reports. In addition, disclosing to internal recipients 
decreases the pressure of corporations to prepare for future litigation and avoids those 
lawsuits from disseminating confidential business information. As a court notes this 
point below:  
    “The requirement promotes the purpose … by affording the employer the first 
opportunity to correct a violation. This allows the employer to avoid, among ot- 
her things, unnecessary harm to its reputation, the burden of undergoing an inv- 
estigation and preparation for a hearing or trial.”
1068
 
Sometimes, the reason for employees to make a report may result from erroneous jud- 
gment on employers‟ behaviour or from the disagreement on ethical standards, not ac- 
tually from employers‟ violations of law.
1069
 Hence, since there might be no violation, 
internal whistleblowing assists employers in clarifying the misunderstanding and giv- 
es employers more chances to communicate with employees regarding corporate ethi- 
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cal practices.
1070
 
    Further, Dworkin & Near mention another advantage of internal whistleblowing, 
and say: 
    “… internal reporting would prevent the negative publicity, investigations, and 
administrative and legal actions that usually ensue after external whistleblowi- 
ng. It also would give the company an opportunity to prevent the more serious 
consequences of continued wrongdoing, and thus to diminish the likelihood of 
punitive damages for such wrongdoing. Finally, a proper company response to 
the internal whistleblower could also prevent the negative consequences to the 
work environment and the whistleblower that almost inevitably follow external 
whistleblowing.
1071
 
Thus, internal whistleblowing can reduce the chance that companies will be investig- 
ated by outsiders. It prevents confidential information from leaking to the public or to 
business competitors. When employers receive employees‟ arguments about corporate 
illegal activities, they are capable of examining the authenticity of complaints before- 
hand and correct misconduct in time. These early actions avoid the intervention of go- 
vernment, and reduce the likelihood that the public will criticize corporate wrongdoi- 
ng.
1072
 In addition, these actions save the expenditure of companies for future litigati- 
on,
1073
 avoid administrative fines and judicial criminal sanctions, or other adverse co- 
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nsequences.
1074
 As for employees, internal report prevents them from being punished 
by companies due to the breach of duty of loyalty;
1075
 likewise, they may suffer less 
retaliation from the management when deciding to make an internal disclosure, not an 
external one.
1076
 
    Observing SOX Section 806, even though it provides employees a broader recip- 
ient for making a disclosure than other federal whistleblower states, it still fails to bal- 
ance the conflict of interest among related parties. Although Section 806 did not cov- 
er the media as one of the recipients, but other external recipients still might bring ne- 
gative effects on companies and the financial market.
1077
 Under SOX, employees can 
use federal agencies, courts, or any member or committee of Congress as the external 
recipient to present their concerns.
1078
 Unlike the media, who broadcasts the disclos- 
ure publicly, these external recipients probably can keep the investigation confidential. 
However, it is still difficult for these recipients to keep the disclosure from leaking to 
the public completely before the truth comes out.
1079
  
Federal agencies tend to disclose the information based on their discretion beca- 
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use they do not bear the duty of confidentiality to any corporation.
1080
 Also, the me- 
mbers of Congress like to discuss corporate scandal and propose their policies in pub- 
lic. In this way, the disclosure is inevitable to flow to the public and the press, and th- 
ese situations are beyond the legislature‟s expectation on SOX Section 806.
1081
 Initia- 
lly, the drafters of SOX assumed that federal agencies and the constituents of Congre- 
ss know how to balance the conflict of interest before leaking the disclosure; the reas- 
on is that they realize disclosed materials probably bring potential harm to companies, 
and affect the operation of the capital market.
1082
 Even if these bodies think the discl- 
osure benefits public good, they still should consider subsequent social problems bef- 
ore leaking the information, such as massive layoffs. Yet, these regulated external rec- 
ipients do not take those consequences into account and still go their ways. If the whi- 
stleblower‟s report is disclosed to an internal recipient in advance, those concerns will 
be needless. Internal reporting not only preserves corporate interest, but it also preve- 
nts the public from being damaged by incorrect disclosures and sustains the order of 
the financial market. 
    Observing SOX Section 806, it does not consider these defects. It gives employ- 
ees a right to select a recipient without thinking about any consequences. Then, it may 
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be inferred that the purpose of disclosure is not simple to rectify employers‟ miscond- 
uct beforehand as Congress originally designed, but it probably can be seen as a med- 
ium to take revenge on employers or companies, and further to impair the shareholde- 
r‟s investment. As Rubinstein notes this point as follows: 
    “The primary goal of Section 806 should be to encourage the early recognition 
and correction of wrongdoing, rather than to punish the wrongdoers themselves. 
Though the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing should be held 
accountable for their actions, it is important not to punish an entire company, as 
well as its shareholders, where the violation may in fact be the result of a rouge 
employee and not representative of the company at large…. Such public disse- 
mination of information presents the added problem of shareholder harm beca- 
use of the possibility of decreased share value.”
1083
 
Consequently, when the statutory purpose of SOX Section 806 has been twisted, it is 
no longer a satisfactory authority to regulate whistleblower protection. Yet, it may tu- 
rn out to be an instrument employed by careless or malicious employees to affect co- 
mpanies‟ operation and to damage the society‟s welfare. Therefore, SOX has to estab- 
lish a specific procedure that instructs whistleblowers how to present their concerns 
step by step, and should not merely making use of a laissez-faire process that probab- 
ly depreciate the company‟s and the public‟s interests. 
       vi. Narrow Recipients and Covered Employees 
              SOX Section 806 has other deficiencies, and these can be categoriz- 
ed by two types; they are narrow recipients and limited covered employees. Although 
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related defects have been mentioned in previous sections, here I still want to add oth- 
er points worthy to be discussed. 
    The first defect is that the coverage of recipient is narrow in SOX Section 806 si- 
nce it does not shield whistleblowing employees from disclosing to those people who 
have no supervisory authority. Under SOX, the disclosure to the management is restr- 
icted to report to someone in charge to correct wrongdoing, but it does not cover prot- 
ection to report to colleagues or employers who are neither a supervisor nor have aut- 
hority to rectify misconduct.
1084
 However, in some situations, successful disclosures 
may be assisted by these people and then be reported to the person in charge. If SOX 
cannot think about this circumstance and extends its protection for those employees, 
who disclose to a wrong recipient, but still make a successful report by others‟ assist- 
ance, it perhaps hinders employees from being a whistleblower since it appears to test 
employees‟ legal knowledge on SOX‟s provision of whistleblower protection. In short, 
employees have to be familiar with the statute before taking an action to blow the wh- 
istle. Yet, this assumption is unreasonable because most employees do not know their 
rights of being a whistleblower, let alone realize the limitation of recipient regulated 
under SOX.
1085
 
    The second defect is that the covered employee in SOX Section 806 is restricted 
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because it cannot cover those people who are not regulated employees, but probably 
have a function to disclose corporate wrongdoing. Independent professional is a good 
example since he/she cannot be viewed as the covered employee in SOX.
1086
 In addi- 
tion to not being shielded under SOX, at times, this professional is also unwilling to 
disclose his/her clients‟ misconduct because he/she is afraid of alienating clients and 
harming the client-professional‟s relationship. One time, Ramirez mentioned this sim- 
ilar concept as follows: 
    “Public confidence in corporations depends in large part upon the oversight of 
the corporation by others with professional duties and responsibilities, yet these 
professionals may not be protected by SOX. Some categories of „gatekeepers‟ 
may not fall within SOX‟s civil whistleblower protections because independent 
professionals arguably are not „officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, 
or agents of such companies.‟ Thus, whistleblowing by the independent profes- 
sional risks harming the relationship with the client -- or even loss of the client  
-- without any avenue of civil protection.”
1087
 
In some situations, independent professional cannot be regarded as the contractor, su- 
bcontractor or agent of the public company. In the Roulett case, the administrative ag- 
ency found that financial insurance employer providing debt securities for publicly- 
owned companies did not make him/her the contractor, subcontractor, or agent of pu- 
blic firms under SOX.
1088
 In addition, the reason that an independent professional se- 
ldom divulges the client‟s misconduct is not only does he/she fear losing business, but 
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he/she also recognizes that no client wants a tattletale to address his/her business affa- 
irs. Since when a professional‟s bad reputation is spread out, he/she fails to keep a po- 
sition in a specific area; also, he/she is forced to get away from this frustrating enviro- 
nment and to start a new live by finding other occupations. 
Besides, another concern arises when deciding whether an in-house counsel can 
be shielded in SOX Section 806 or not.
1089
 An in-house counsel is a typical corporate 
unit, and his/her function is to timely report companies‟ violations of law to the direc- 
tors‟ audit committee.
1090
 In SOX, an in-house counsel is likely to be protected since 
he/she is in the definition of “employee”; yet, the divergence of courts‟ decisions ma- 
kes this application uncertain. Some courts did not want to shield an in-house counsel 
based on the client-attorney privilege since an attorney owes the duty of confidentiali- 
ty to his/her client. Contrarily, a few courts stated that disclosing confidential inform- 
ation cannot be an exclusive reason to restrain a lawyer from being protected and ma- 
kes him/her bear employers‟ retaliation.
1091
 Thus, even if an in-house counsel disclo- 
ses corporate securities violation, it is still unclear whether courts will award him/her 
a remedy to compensate losses when he/she is retaliated against by his/her employer 
because of the disclosure. 
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    Further, whether SOX Section 806 provides protection for employees who serve 
in U.S. enterprises or their subsidiaries, but stationed outside the U.S. borders, this is- 
sue is still uncertain.
1092
 The purpose of SOX encourages employees to bravely discl- 
ose corporate securities fraud with no fear of retaliation, and gives them a sound rem- 
edy to relieve losses because of the disclosure.
1093
 Yet, these merits will be meaning- 
less when SOX is unable to apply to U.S. public companies or their subsidiaries that 
operate business outside the U.S. territories since the disclosure may also come from 
other countries‟ employees. This deficiency fails the function of SOX because emplo- 
yees serving in these companies can act the same role as Cooper in WorldCom or Wa- 
tkins in Enron. Also, it is highly probable that these pubic parent corporations perhaps 
take advantage of overseas public or private subsidiaries to commit misconduct prohi- 
bited by the U.S. statutes. If SOX cannot take this situation into account and protects 
the employees of U.S. overseas companies and subsidiaries from being retaliated aga- 
inst, it is not difficult to predict corporate corruption will revive and damage the fina- 
ncial market again. In this way, it is better for Congress to reconsider this issue and 
add a new regulation in SOX Section 806. As Ramirez describes this below: 
    “An omnibus provision should provide specific language providing a forum in 
the United States to protect those would-be whistleblowers employed by empl- 
oyers with operation in the United States, whether the employee is stationed in 
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the United States or outside of its borders, whether the employee is working for 
a subsidiary or for the parent company, and whether the employer is a private 
or a government entity.”
1094
 
Since there are still several deficiencies in SOX Section 806, it is hard to totally 
expect SOX can fully achieve its statutory purpose to protect corporate whistleblowe- 
rs from suffering adverse employment actions. Corporate financial fraud will not be 
stopped, and employees fail to be placed in a critical position to deter the manageme- 
nt‟s wrongdoings until all defects are resolved. Therefore, Congress still needs to take 
efforts to make SOX‟s whistleblower provision more complete and satisfying, and fo- 
rms a stronger framework to prevent whistleblowing employees from taking a risk of 
losing jobs and encourage them to preserve the public welfare. 
 
Chapter V. Suggestions and Improvements of the Whistleblower Protection in 
SOX Section 806 
A. Statute Itself 
   1. Broaden the Scope of Protection and Forbid Extra Requirements 
     a. Covered Employer 
           In SOX Section 806, besides publicly-traded corporations, SOX also re- 
stricts the contractors, subcontractors, or agents of public firms from taking any adve- 
rse action against employees who disclose securities violations or related frauds occu- 
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rring in publicly-owned companies.
1095
 However, whether private subsidiaries of pu- 
blic firms can be regarded as the covered employer in SOX, it is still an arguable and 
ambiguous issue. In addition, the administrative agency has had an improper interpre- 
tation in the language of SOX, this misunderstanding reduces the function of the stat- 
ute to prevent whistleblowing employees from being retaliated against, and assist th- 
em in receiving the relief to make up for their losses because of the disclosure or part- 
icipation in the investigation on the violation. In this way, these two disputes are criti- 
cal points in this part and will be discussed in this section. 
       i. SOX‟s Regulated Employers Should Clearly Cover Private Subsidiaries of 
Public Companies 
            The language of SOX Section 806 specifies that SOX forbids publicly- 
traded companies to retaliate against employees who disclose or participate in the in- 
vestigation on corporate securities violation.
1096
 Also, the Judiciary Committee illust- 
rated that the regulated subject under SOX is the public company listed on the financ- 
ial market.
1097
 Hence, following this legislative scheme and statutory language, in the 
administrative procedure of SOX, ALJs and the ARB were inclined to exclude the pr- 
ivate subsidiaries of public companies because they are not the regulated employer in 
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SOX. Yet, whether this exclusion is appropriate and can satisfy initial statutory purpo- 
se, it is still up for discussion. 
    By means of financial perspective to study the relationship between private subs- 
idiaries and public parent companies, subsidiaries are used to being treated as the age- 
nt of parent companies (or should be seen as a part of public firms) and cannot be se- 
parated from parent companies for the reason of accounting.
1098
 One court notes this 
concept as follows: 
    “While it would not seem inappropriate to view subsidiaries as „agents‟ of the 
publicly traded company … the subsidiaries, for Sarbanes-Oxley purposes, are 
more than mere agents like an outside auditor or consultant. Subsidiaries … are 
an integral part of the publicly traded company, inseparable from it for purpos- 
es of evaluating the integrity of its financial information, and they must be trea- 
ted as such.”
1099
 
Thus, it may be concluded that when examining the financial condition of public par- 
ent companies, subsidiaries‟ financial statements still have to be presented and audit- 
ed together with parent corporations. Therefore, the financial performance of subsidi- 
aries and public parent companies should not be treated separately, and must be view- 
ed as a whole, inclusive accounting statement. As the court states: 
    “When its [the publicly-traded entity] value and performance is based, in part, 
on the value and performance of component entities within its organization, the 
statute ensures that those entities are subject to internal controls applicable thr- 
oughout the corporate structure … A publicly traded corporation is, for Sarban- 
es-Oxley purposes, the sum of its constituent units; and Congress insisted upon 
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accuracy and integrity in financial reporting at all levels of the corporate struct- 
ure, including the non-publicly traded subsidiaries.”
1100
 
As a result, the operation of private subsidiaries not only can be seen as a part of pub- 
lic parent companies‟ internal control, but those subsidiaries are also the units for pu- 
blic firms to perform their corporate policies and business. One time, the court stated, 
“[T]he scope of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection tracks the flow of financial 
and accounting information throughout the corporate structure and remains as perme- 
able to the internal „corporate veil‟ as the financial information itself.”
1101
 In this way, 
private subsidiaries and public parent companies ought to be viewed as an undivided 
entity while auditing financial materials. Due to this concept, the exclusion of the pri- 
vate subsidiaries of public firms in Section 806 is not appropriate when thinking abo- 
ut the statutory purpose of SOX. Thus, as the private subsidiaries of public companies 
are argued by their employees, those private entities have to be seen as an integral pa- 
rt of public parent corporations and be regulated under the covered employer in SOX 
Section 806 at the same time. 
    Accordingly, observing the structure, language, and purpose of SOX, Congress 
ought to explicitly cover the private subsidiaries of public companies in the regulation 
of SOX Section 806. Not only does a clear statement reduce conflicting decisions fr- 
om the administrative agency, but the extension of regulated employers also increases 
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the possibility that whistleblowing employees may be granted a preliminary order fr- 
om the authorized agency. 
       ii. The Administrative Agency Improperly Construes SOX Section 806 
             ALJs improperly construe SOX Section 806 only applies to employe- 
es who serve in publicly-traded companies. ALJs held that any officer, employee, co- 
ntractor, subcontractor, or agent of public firms cannot discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass or in any other manner that discriminates against “employees of publ- 
ic corporations”.
1102
 Thus, when these contractors, subcontractors, or agents of public 
corporations are privately-owned entities, their own employees are not the protected 
objects under SOX, and these private entities will not be liable for their adverse actio- 
ns imposed upon whistleblowing employees.
1103
 Due to this misunderstanding on Se- 
ction 806, ALJs declared that several claims were of no merit since the complainants 
were not the covered employees regulated by SOX. As a result, many whistleblowing 
employees bearing retaliation cannot compensate their losses even if they disclose or 
participate in the investigation on securities violations prohibited by the statute. Owi- 
ng to ALJs‟ improper explanation on Section 806, ALJs constrain SOX‟s statutory pu- 
rpose to employ corporate employees to unveil corporate securities fraud, and to shie- 
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ld them from being retaliated against by employers. 
Likewise, ALJs‟ recognition on SOX Section 806 seemed not to be proper beca- 
use of another explanation of SOX. As Vaughn says: 
“At first reading, the structure of the prohibition suggests that a protected person 
must be „an employee‟ of these companies [public companies]…. The structure 
and language of the prohibition, however, allows another interpretation. Clearly, 
the term „employee‟ includes an employee of the relevant company, but an em- 
ployee could also be an employee of the contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
the company.”
1104
 
Vaughn stated that the covered employee in SOX Section 806 does not simply restrict 
to the employees of publicly-traded companies, but it can be interpreted to include the 
employees of contractors, subcontractors, or agents of public corporations as well, no 
matter whether these bodies are private or public entities. In addition, he also said that 
ALJs‟ recognition on Section 806 is contrary to the intent of Congress because SOX 
does not confine its coverage only to the employees of public companies. Vaughn bri- 
ngs his thought as follows: 
    “This interpretation is not foreclosed either by the language or structure of the 
provision. That language and structure is different from the analogous subsecti- 
on of AIR-21, which specifically labels that subsection „discrimination against 
airline employees‟ before using the term „employee‟ in a context similar to its 
use in the whistleblower provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The whistleblo- 
wer provision of Sarbanes-Oxley contains no such express limitation of this te- 
rm.”
1105
 
In other words, “an employee” as used in Section 806(a)‟s prohibition of retaliation is 
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not expressly restricted to the employees of public-traded companies and is able to ju- 
st as easily be read to include the employees of those companies‟ contractors, subcon- 
tractors, or agents. Because Congress tends to clearly define the scope of each statute, 
1106
 if it did not definitely confine the scope of covered employees in SOX, it is not 
proper for ALJs to limit the coverage and affect the application of SOX on regulated 
activities. Likewise, Kohn supports the broad interpretation because he thinks this can 
be truly “consistent with the case law developed under other whistleblower laws.”
1107
 
In addition, the broad interpretation of SOX can meet the goal of the statute to deter 
securities fraud since the contractors, subcontractors, or agents of public firms are pe- 
rhaps used as an instrument by public companies to retaliate against employees blow- 
ing the whistle. Vaughn notes this point as follows: 
    “Important policies support this alternative interpretation … First, the employee 
of a contractor (or subcontractor or agent) may be well placed to discover fraud 
and abuse by the company. If that employee makes a protected disclosure … 
[he/she] should be protected if the company pressures the contractor, subcontra- 
ctor, or agent to retaliate against this employee…. Second … Congress conside- 
red the role contractors, subcontractors, and agents play in enabling or condon- 
ing corruption and fraud. In these circumstances … Congress would seek to pr- 
otect the employees of these entities who could disclose that corruption or fra- 
ud.”
1108
 
In this way, not only can the employees of public companies have a function to discl- 
ose securities fraud, but the employees of contractors, subcontractors, or agents of pu- 
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blic companies enable to play the same role in unveiling the wrongdoing of public fir- 
ms, no matter whether these bodies are public or private. In addition, federal securiti- 
es violation not merely happens in public corporations, other business entities have a 
high possibility to assist or to be controlled by public firms to cheat stockholders and 
the public. Hence, it is required to cover the employees of affiliated entities of public 
companies under the regulation of SOX to guard against those situations. 
    Thus, Congress should amend the content of Section 806 and expressly state that 
it not only applies to the employees of publicly-owned firms, but also covers the emp- 
loyees who serve contractors, subcontractors, or agents of public companies, no matt- 
er whether these bodies are private or public. In my point of view, I suggest that when 
regulating the covered employee in SOX Section 806, maybe it is a good thing to not 
confine the type of employee. The reason is that private firms may also commit or as- 
sist securities violation and retaliate against employees who blow the whistle, and th- 
ese actions are perhaps controlled or manipulated by public companies. If SOX only 
protects the employees of public firms, this regulation seems to imply that SOX allo- 
ws private entities to contribute or commit securities violations or related frauds with 
public companies. This consequence is contrary to the statutory purpose of SOX and 
confuses corporate shareholders. Accordingly, I think that no matter what kind of cor- 
poration in which employees serve, if they are willing to or have an ability to disclose 
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the regulated activity or to participate in the investigation regarding the violations, th- 
ese employees are qualified to be shielded and to compensate their losses due to the 
disclosure or participation. 
     b. Extra Requirements on Burden of Proof and Other Protected Employees 
           In SOX Section 806, it provides broad covered activities to protect em- 
ployees who disclose or participate in the investigation on public companies‟ miscon- 
duct related to the violation of federal securities laws, regulations, SEC‟s rules, or rel- 
ated frauds that may damage shareholders and the public.
1109
 Even though regulated 
activities cover diverse securities violations, the administrative agency imposed other 
requirements upon employees when filing a claim in SOX. These extra requirements 
not only increase the difficulty for employees to be granted a preliminary order in the 
administrative procedure, but they also make wide-range reported actions become a 
meaningless regulation and weaken the function of SOX. 
    There are three practical issues under the administrative procedure.
1110
 First, the 
ARB added an extra burden of proof on employees because it asked employees to ve- 
rify that the disclosure is “definitely and specifically” related to regulated categories 
of securities violations or frauds under SOX.
1111
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Second, the ARB stated that when employees report employers‟ misconduct, wh- 
ich is a “mere possibility that a challenged practice could adversely affect the financi- 
al condition of a corporation, and that the effect on the financial condition could in tu- 
rn be intentionally withheld from investors, is not enough” for employees to argue th- 
ose suspected activities breach SOX‟s regulation.
1112
 Once Moberly said, “The ARB 
also seemed to require, at the time a whistleblower makes a disclosure, that the whist- 
leblower specifically identify the statute violated by the activities the whistleblower 
reports and connect the statute to Sarbanes-Oxley‟s provision.”
1113
 These assumptio- 
ns appear to increase the difficulty for employees to satisfy their burden of proof wh- 
en filing a claim under SOX Section 806 against employers‟ adverse actions. 
Third, the ARB changed the requirement of reasonable belief for employees as 
they claim their disclosures are in protected activities since the ARB interpreted a “re- 
asonable belief” of securities violations means “a high certainty that the law had been 
broken.”
1114
 The ARB seemed to alter the standard of proof from “reasonable belief” 
to “actual violation” of federal securities laws, regulations, SEC‟s rules, or related fra- 
uds. This change not only conflicts with the regulation of SOX, but opposes to the in- 
tent of Congress when it initially enacted the statute.  
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    To resolve these problems, Congress ought to amend the content of SOX Section 
806 and expressly show its intent in the statute. Section 806 should legitimately reject 
the ARB‟s decisions that seriously restrict the statutory purpose to protect whistleblo- 
wing employees. First, Congress should reject the requirement made by the ARB that 
asked employees to prove the disclosure “definitely and specifically” correlates to se- 
curities violations or related frauds.
1115
 Employees‟ burden of proof requests them to 
only show employers‟ activities have breached regulated violations, they are not obli- 
gated to specifically identify violated statutes, regulations, SEC‟s rules, or frauds that 
connect to SOX‟s provision. 
Second, Congress should restate its policy of reasonable belief. Also, it ought to 
amend the statute to emphasize that “an employee‟s reasonable belief regarding the il- 
legality of an activity reported should be compared with an employee of similar educ- 
ation and experience.”
1116
 By means of adopting this flexible regulation, employees 
are able to receive complete protection on claiming their allegations and avoid the ad- 
ministrative agency from making use of the same standard on the element of reasona- 
ble belief in different employment cases. 
Further, because independent professionals cannot be treated as covered employ- 
ees under SOX, Congress also has to make some changes in the language of Section 
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806 and protect these professionals from being retaliated against by clients because of 
the disclosure or participation in the investigation on securities violations. Likewise, 
considering in-house counsels are perhaps restricted to unveil employers‟ misconduct 
because owing the duty of confidentiality to companies, Congress should make an ex- 
ception in the language of Section 806, and describe that when these counsels‟ actions 
are pursuing public good or when specific conditions are satisfied, counsels‟ disclosu- 
res will not breach their duties to employers. In this way, it can avoid any recriminati- 
on from employers because in-house counsels‟ disclosures are probably in the wake 
of the leaking of confidential business information. 
2. Internal Reporting Is better than External Disclosure 
SOX Section 806 does not ask employees to employ internal reporting as 
the first resort for the disclosure. It gives employees an option to select internal or ex- 
ternal outlets, but does not consider involved parties‟ interests. Internal disclosure be- 
nefits public companies since it makes the management have sufficient time to rectify 
the wrongdoing before this information leaks to the public. Likewise, employees ma- 
king internal reports alert supervisors who have not observed mistakes, and give them 
a chance to put unlawful actions back on the right track. As employers or colleagues 
do not commit misconduct on purpose, internal disclosure is capable of raising super- 
visors‟ notices on those mistakes that probably result from others‟ negligence, careles- 
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sness, or oversight in work. Also, supervisors can timely rectify these errors and prev- 
ent damage from harming companies.
1117
 In addition, internal disclosure not only as- 
sists firms in building efficient in-house channels to right wrongdoings, but also helps 
the management to establish a bridge of communication with employees to respond to 
complaints made in the workplace. 
    Internal reporting can be regarded as a trend since it has been advocated by some 
corporations, courts‟ decisions, and state laws. First, corporate sentencing guidelines 
are critical devices that encourage companies to establish a complete, sound in-house 
channel for employees to make a disclosure. The guidelines provide a financial incen- 
tive for companies that perform effective and ethics programs to deter and detect any 
violation of law.
1118
 The guidelines are operated by giving accused corporations “cul- 
pability scores” that may be reduced by estimating whether these firms have sustain- 
ed a useful program to avoid or rectify any illegal activities occurring in companies, 
or by evaluating whether companies have disclosed misconduct to proper authorities 
and are cooperative in the investigation.
1119
 When the defendants-companies provide 
substantial assistances for the investigation, courts will consider these factors to miti- 
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gate firms‟ sentences.
1120
 To decide whether companies‟ in-house channels are effect- 
ive, courts will think about whether codes of ethics have been properly enacted; whet- 
her reporting outlets are workable; or whether firms have provided protection for wh- 
istleblowers and prevent them from being retaliated against by employers.
1121
 These 
guidelines try to employ the incentive of decreased punishment and the avoidance of 
negative reputation to encourage firms to build a friendly, practical, and effective int- 
ernal disclosure system.
1122
 Hence, the more thorough in-house channels that compa- 
nies have established, the fewer penalties or fines will be imposed upon them for their 
illegitimate actions. 
    Second, the U.S. Supreme Court also showed its intention to support an internal 
report, and this intent was obviously presented in sexual discrimination claims in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that employers can take an affirmative defe- 
nse if, first, they claim that they have taken reasonable care to prevent and quickly co- 
rrect sexual harassment as receiving reports from employees.
1123
 Second, employers 
have to prove that “employees unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventi- 
ve or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 
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1124
 As these two elements are certified, employers will not be liable to employees‟ 
sexual harassment claims. In addition, employers can relieve from liability when sho- 
wing they have taken efforts to make policies to deter any likelihood of sexual harass- 
ment from occurring in the workplace.
1125
 If the policy made to preclude sexual hara- 
ssment from happening has found, employers will hold less liability to employees‟ cl- 
aims. In this way, before deciding whether employers are liable to sexual harassment 
claims, the Court puts focus on whether any policy or step has been taken by employ- 
ers to stop sexual harassment from occurring. The Court supports employers to set up 
a system or make a policy to deter sexual harassment in the workplace and hopes to 
promote internal reporting by lessening employers‟ liability once they are accused of 
sexual harassment claims. 
    Third, some states support that internal disclosure should be previous to external 
one. Although these states have a variety of standards to provide protection for empl- 
oyees who disclose employers‟ misconduct, these states still have the same policy that 
encourages employees to make an internal disclosure, and let the person or division in 
charge has a chance to right mistakes in time.
1126
 Even if many states require emplo- 
yees to make an internal report as the first resort, in some circumstances, disclosing to 
                                                     
1124
 Id.  
1125
 Id. 
1126
 Rubinstein, supra note 134, at 654. 
                                                           
 
 
367 
outsiders is permissible as employees reasonably believe that in-house channels have 
been blocked and cannot be viewed as effective outlets to present their concerns.
1127
 
Take Maine‟s whistleblower statute for example. Maine‟s law requires employees to 
present their arguments to someone who has supervisory authority in advance and to 
make this person has enough time to respond and correct mistakes.
1128
 Yet, internal 
disclosure is not needed when employees have a specific reason, and think reporting 
to the supervisor is futile because the management will not instantly rectify presented 
problems.
1129
 In this situation, employees can show their concerns to outsiders in reg- 
ard to employers‟ misconduct. Several states support internal reporting since they co- 
nsider using inner scheme as the first resort is rational in traditional employment rela- 
tionship; also, it balances the interests among employees, employers, and the public. 
Internal disclosure, on the one hand, precludes confidential business information from 
leaking to the public; on the other hand, it lessens the likelihood that false disclosures 
probably disturb the public stock market. 
    Thinking about the advantages of internal disclosure, Congress ought to amend 
the language of SOX Section 806 and adopt internal reporting as the default rule. Ext- 
ernal disclosure will be permitted only when some specific conditions have been sati- 
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sfied. Rubinstein illustrates these specified situations, and says: 
“External reporting should be permitted in the first instance only where the emp- 
loyee (1) has a reasonable belief that the employer will not make a prompt go- 
od faith effort to address the problem, (2) reasonably believes an emergency is 
involved, or (3) reasonably fears reprisal or retaliatory action as a result of disc- 
losure.”
1130
 
Employees have to bear the burden of proof to show external reporting is a necessary 
step to take because they reasonably believe that internal disclosure will be futile, and 
they will not receive a satisfactory, friendly response from the management. Likewise, 
when reported matters are urgent, dangerous, or critical to the public and fail to be re- 
solved by internal disclosure, reporting corporate misconduct to outsiders is allowable 
for employees to present their concerns.  
As for the third factor, I do not quite approve of the author‟s point of view. After 
all, the element of “reasonably fears reprisal or retaliatory action” puts too much foc- 
us on the consideration of employees‟ self-position and self-interest. As external disc- 
losures involve in the conflict of interest between public and private fields, public int- 
erest ought to take the priority for being shielded over private one. Employees‟ dama- 
ge resulting from retaliation is capable of being relieved easily and fully awarded by 
the protection of SOX; however, the public‟s confidence in business activities, the go- 
vernmental agencies, and in the operation of the financial market cannot be restored 
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merely by ordinary statutes and monetary relief. In addition, reasonable fear is an abs- 
tract idea because nobody can establish a justifiable standard to determine whether an 
individual‟s fear is reasonable or not. This ambiguous concept not only increases the 
difficulty for an employee to claim his/her allegation in the administrative procedure, 
but also indirectly wastes legal resources to address and to interpret the unclear langu- 
age in the statute. 
Similarly, in my point of view, in order to rebut employees‟ allegations in regard 
to external disclosure, employers have to prove by clear and convincing evidence and 
show that they have built a sound, complete in-house channel for employees to make 
a disclosure. Employees going to outsiders cannot hold their grounds when employers 
have an effective internal channel to cope with employees‟ concerns, and no argument 
will be ignored in the procedure of internal reporting scheme. By contrast, as there is 
no sufficient internal outlet for employees to show their worries, and they also reason- 
ably believe that arguments will not be paid attention to by the management, it is allo- 
wable for employees to divulge those problems and concerns to outsiders, and relieve 
their losses if they suffer employers‟ retaliation. 
Thus, Congress should adopt internal disclosure as the default rule with excepti- 
ons for external reporting in SOX Section 806. When a public company provides em- 
ployees with a complete, sufficient in-house channel to show their concerns, and em- 
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ployees also reasonably believe that the management is going to make good faith eff- 
ort to address their arguments, in this situation, employees must use internal disclosu- 
re as the first resort. On the contrary, as there is no sound reporting outlet; or a comp- 
any has set up an in-house channel, but employees reasonably believe that their conc- 
erns will not be paid attention to; or they reasonably believe the disclosure is an emer- 
gency, employees are allowed to utilize external disclosure for exceptions. In this way, 
SOX can make use of the most efficient means to resolve securities violations that oc- 
cur in a public corporation and balance the conflict of interest among involved parties 
at the same time. Similarly, internal disclosure can decrease the possibility that malic- 
ious or bad-faith employees capitalize on external reporting as an instrument to threa- 
ten the management‟s actions and decisions, to affect companies‟ operation and busi- 
ness performance, or to take revenge on colleagues, employers, companies and furth- 
er to influence the society. 
 3. Reporting Recipients Should Extend to the Media and the Internet  
       Even though SOX Section 806 has provided corporate employees wide sc- 
ope of recipient to make a disclosure, it is suggested that the coverage ought to broad- 
en to the media and Internet whistleblowing, and makes SOX whistleblower protecti- 
on more complete and sufficient. 
Media whistleblowing has advantages to assist employees in achieving their go- 
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als of disclosures. First, because the media disclosure perhaps brings a negative publ- 
icity to companies and causes a negative impact on their good-will and business perf- 
ormance, those harmful consequences push firms to preclude anything wrong from 
happening in the workplace and compel them to make wrongdoings right.
1131
 Second, 
the media is able to act as a monitor of the public to supervise whether the governme- 
nt has started taking actions to make an investigation after the disclosure. The functi- 
on of the media not only makes the government pay more attention to whistleblowing 
employees‟ reports, but also reduces the likelihood that governmental agencies are al- 
so accomplices in organizations‟ misconduct since they are passive to respond to the 
disclosure.
1132
 Third, the confidential relationship between the media and informants 
prevents the information from being blocked by managements or third parties that int- 
end to conceal organizational corruption. The feature of confidentiality supports info- 
rmants to go forward and protects them from bearing retaliation taken by employers 
or organizations they serve.
1133
 
As regards Internet whistleblowing, it also has benefit as follows. First, Internet 
disclosers can get in touch with wide audiences, which might be broader than the aud- 
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iences of the media. Since the Internet will not be confined by time, areas, or locatio- 
ns, sometimes, Internet disclosers are capable of reaching right audiences, like comp- 
anies‟ stockholders, supervisory bodies, or customers.
1134
 In addition, due to its feat- 
ure of expansive dissemination of information, it probably gives rise to the attention 
of government to make an investigation on the disclosure and further to affect those 
firms‟ behaviour to rectify mistakes.
1135
 Second, owing to Internet, information prov- 
iders can be shielded by the feature of confidentiality and show their concerns anony- 
mously.
1136
 Like the media disclosers, Internet whistleblowers do not have to worry 
about being exposed by third parties or getting reprisals from employers or organizat- 
ions. Third, Internet whistleblowers need not cater to the interest of the media and ha- 
ve freedom to unveil varied corporate misconduct. The reason is that the media tends 
to select and broadcast news that the public is much interested in order to make profi- 
ts and get widen audiences. Yet, newsworthy information reduces the function of whi- 
stleblowing since not every citizen cares about the same issue occurring in society.
1137
 
Fourth, Internet disclosers have the ability to control whether to disseminate the infor- 
mation or not. Their disclosures will not be blocked by the media owing to the press‟s 
social obligations, the conflicts of interest in the media or competitors, or other exter- 
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nal pressures from the government, accused organizations, and interested parties. 
As a result of the advantages brought by the media and Internet whistleblowing, 
SOX Section 806 ought to broaden the scope of recipient and cover the protection to 
those employees who share knowledge to the media or spread information by the Int- 
ernet. Once Sinzdak suggested a three-tiered standard for employees to follow as dis- 
closing to a recipient, as he said: 
    “First, a whistleblower should receive protection for internal reports to supervis- 
ors or external reports to a government body so long as the employee reasonab- 
ly believes that the report recipient can remedy the alleged wrongdoing…. Sec- 
ond, employees who report wrongdoing to the media or third party advocacy 
groups should receive protection if they can show that both an internal and an 
external report would have been ineffective. Third, legislators should protect an 
employee who reports wrongdoing via the Internet if the employee has tried ot- 
her channels to no avail, the employee reasonably believes that his or her posti- 
ng will reach a recipient who can resolve the issue, and the employer is actually 
violating the law.”
1138
 
Concerning the first-tiered requirement, Sinzdak explained “reasonably belief” has to 
be separately observed by objective and subjective belief. When observing objective 
belief, Sinzdak described that some factors have to be thought over. These factors inc- 
lude: 
“the employee‟s relationship with the employer (including the employee‟s tenure, 
seniority, and job responsibilities); the report recipient‟s identity and position 
within or outside the company; the seriousness of the alleged wrongdoing; the 
centrality of the misconduct to the organization‟s mission; the identity of the 
wrongdoers and their role within the organization; the employer‟s responsiven- 
ess to previous complaints; the existence of established internal reporting chan- 
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nels; and, if the report is external, the nature of the work performed by the rele- 
vant government agency.”
1139
  
As for subjective belief, Sinzdak said that the court has to evaluate whether a whistle- 
blowing employee “believed she was reporting the matter to an individual who would 
resolve the problem.”
1140
  
Although Sinzdak has suggested a good structure for the procedure of reporting 
under SOX, observing this scheme, I presume that Sinzdak forgot to balance the conf- 
lict of interest among involved parties when discussing internal and external disclosu- 
re. Consequently, I cannot totally agree with Sinzdak about his three-tiered standard 
of reporting process. 
    In my point of view, the scheme of recipient in SOX Section 806 ought to be the 
four-tiered procedure. Foremost, it is required for corporate employees to employ int- 
ernal disclosure as their first resort before going to outsiders to present their concerns. 
This requirement corresponds to my advocacy that internal disclosure should be the 
default rule in Section 806, and must give employers a chance to right mistakes in the 
first place.  
Second, when employees reasonably believe that internal disclosure will be futi- 
le, and they will not get a positive response from employers; or reported subject matt- 
ers are urgent, dangerous, and critical, and are unable to be resolved by in-house cha- 
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nnels except for seeking help from outsiders, in those situations, employees are perm- 
itted to make an external disclosure and receive a prompt, friendly, and effective resp- 
onse from third parties, such as legal authorities, governmental agencies, or a member 
or the committee of Congress. 
Third, as whistleblowing employees find both internal and external recipients are 
incapable of correcting companies‟ irregularities and ineffective in deterring employe- 
rs‟ wrongdoings from happening or going worse, these employees are allowed to go 
to the media and present their arguments. Yet, the standard that evaluates whether em- 
ployees‟ disclosures to the press are necessary should not be based on the concept of 
“reasonable belief”; however, it has to heighten to the standard of “definite or specific 
belief” and makes employees bear a stricter standard of burden to hold their positions. 
In this policy, employees have to definitely and specifically believe that the media di- 
sclosure is the necessary and the most efficacious measure to rectify corporate securi- 
ties violations or related frauds. When those violations are involved in emergency and 
cannot be waited for a long investigation, and those also concern severe public good, 
employees can go to the media and make disclosures. The reason is that media whistl- 
eblowing is highly probable to bring a more destructive consequence on a corporation 
and the public than the result caused by other methods. For a company, no matter wh- 
ether employees‟ reports are proved to be true or not, not until disputes have been set- 
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tled, continued dissemination of negative information made by the media will affect 
citizen‟s impression on a corporation and cause a great impact on a company‟s busin- 
ess, performance, and good-will. For the public, the media disclosure also disturbs the 
operation of society since the disclosure probably results in social unrest and exhausts 
the energy of social constituents in daily lives. Since the media whistleblowing is lik- 
ely to cause damage and bring harmful results on a corporation and the public, after 
balancing the interest of involved parties, it is reasonable to impose a stringent evide- 
ntiary burden upon employees when they select the media as the first recipient for the 
disclosure. 
Fourth, when whistleblowing employees notice no matter which recipient (inter- 
nal, external, or the media disclosure) is still unable to satisfy their expectations to ri- 
ght corporate irregularity and put misconduct back on the right track, it is allowable 
for employees to use Internet to uncover companies‟ wrongdoings and show their wo- 
rries. In this portion, Internet disclosure means employees use “personnal, individual” 
internet resources to unveil securities violations; these can be exemplified by Facebo- 
ok, Twitter, MSN or personnal blog. Other “organizational, systematic” disclosures 
will not be covered in this part, like the action of WikiLeaks.
1141
 In addition, as regar- 
ds internet news, such as the news that is posted on the media company‟s website, this 
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belongs to the media disclosure in my classification and does not fit into Internet dis- 
closure. As for the standard to decide whether Internet disclosure is an appropriate ac- 
tion for employees to take against corporate wrongdoing, and is a required step to ma- 
ke a disclosure, I hold that if employees “reasonably believe” that other recipients ca- 
nnot be workable to right companies‟ mistakes, employees can use Internet to make a 
report. The reason I made this conclusion is that Internet disclosers are less likely to 
access the right audience.
1142
 This feature perhaps affects employees‟ abilities to ma- 
ke a successful disclosure in regard to employers‟ misconduct. Besides, since Internet 
disclosure is difficult to trace the source and verify the authenticity of information, it 
may have less impact on the public because most people probably think it is a kind of 
private reprisals or business pranks. Therefore, it is not necessary to impose a stricter 
standard of burden upon employees because Internet is not only a restricted method to 
report corporate misbehavior, but the damage it brings to related parties may be lesser 
than other channels will cause. 
Thus, I suggest Congress ought to think about my advice and amend the proced- 
ure of reporting for employees to make a disclosure that can conform to the anticipat- 
ion of involved parties. As for a sound regulation of the reporting process, not only 
should the effectiveness of recipient be considered, but the interests of involved parti- 
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es have to be thought over and be balanced. In this way, Congress has to think more 
and take care as resolving the issues regarding the conflict of interest, and avoids sev- 
ere imbalanced interests among related groups. 
B. Procedure Requirement 
1. Problem of Timelines 
a. Extending the Period of Filing Requirement 
      SOX Section 806 provides whistleblowing employees a ninety-day per- 
iod to file a claim against employers or companies when they receive a notice of adv- 
erse actions. However, the ninety-day limitation is an obstacle for employees to claim 
their allegations since in recent studies, researchers found that most claims were deni- 
ed by OSHA and ALJs because of plaintiffs-employees‟ failures to satisfy the ninety- 
day requirement.
1143
 Designing a longer filing period for employees to bring their cl- 
aims is required because one study concluded that employees tend to recognize their 
rights of Section 806 and to file a cause of action under OSHA between 90 and 180 
days after suffering employers‟ adverse actions.
1144
 Hence, a shorter filing period in 
Section 806 cannot benefit employees because it not only reduces their chances to co- 
mpensate the losses caused by employers‟ retaliation, but also indirectly decreases the 
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effectiveness of SOX to use internal employees to disclose public companies‟ securit- 
ies violations or related frauds. 
    Giving employees a longer filing period to bring a claim under SOX Section 806 
has some advantages. Foremost, extending the filing period reduces the possibility th- 
at OSHA and ALJs may dismiss employees‟ claims because of their failures to satisfy 
the filing requirement. As employees satisfy the regulated timeline, OSHA and ALJs 
are able to take the further step to find other merits in employees‟ allegations, and this 
increases employees‟ chances to be granted a preliminary order in the administrative 
procedure.
1145
 In addition, it is highly probable that employees might have lost caree- 
rs after being retaliated against; a longer filing period gives employees extra time to 
find other positions to replace original jobs and to sustain a stable source of income to 
fight against employers and prepare the litigation.
1146
 Further, a longer period of fili- 
ng, on the one hand, provides employees more time to gather evidence and to contact 
a competent attorney for the sake of making a persuasive claim in the administrative 
procedure; on the other hand, it gives an attorney sufficient time to completely realize 
the facts and to make thorough preparation for employees‟ allegations before filing a 
cause of action under OSHA.
1147
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    Second, providing employees an extended period to file a claim in Section 806 
gives employees enough time to make a response to employers‟ retaliation. Likewise, 
it reduces the shock of employees as finding that they have missed the regulated time- 
line to claim an action against employers. Under SOX, the start of the filing period is 
when employees receive the final notice of retaliation; however, this design arises so- 
me disputes because employees perhaps have no idea when retaliation starts since th- 
ey are not the decision-makers of adverse actions. Also, the interval between the noti- 
ce and actual adverse actions is crucial in a shorter filing period because it may easily 
influence the merit of employees‟ claims in SOX Section 806.
1148
 Due to these defec- 
ts, extending the filing period is necessary since it not only avoids employees from fe- 
eling confused with the start of the filing period, but it also fixes the defect of a short- 
er period that makes it easier for employees to miss the regulated timeline to bring a 
cause of action in Section 806 against employers‟ adverse actions. 
    Third, extending the filing period will not bring a negative consequence for emp- 
loyees to claim an action and will not affect their abilities against employers.
1149
 Ob- 
serving other whistleblower statutes, they give whistleblowing employees a longer fi- 
ling period than that of SOX Section 806. Yet, in these statutes, employees rarely we- 
aken their positions against employers‟ rebuttals since employees have more time to 
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prepare their claims. Thus, it is not required to worry about whether employees‟ capa- 
city of defense will be influenced in the administrative procedure. As employees have 
more time to gather evidence and information, there is a higher possibility for them to 
make a persuasive claim and to be granted a prevailing order in the administrative pr- 
ocedure. 
    Even though most legal scholars advocate extending the filing period in Section 
806, the extent of the filing requirement is still controversial, and the argument cannot 
be settled. Some scholars support making an extension from 90 days to 180 days,
1150
 
but others hold that the filing period should extend to one year and make employees 
have more time to stand their positions.
1151
 However, not being partial to each side, 
in my point of view, I suggest that the extended period has to be separately observed 
by varied situations and then decide which filing requirement is suitable for employe- 
es to bring a cause of action under SOX Section 806.  
First, when employees are discharged, suspended, or cannot endure adverse acti- 
ons and choose to quit, in these situations, SOX should provide employees a one-year 
period to file a claim under Section 806. The reasons for holding that are below. First, 
employees can have more time to find other careers to substitute original jobs in order 
to regain a source of income to sustain their livelihoods. Second, besides finding oth- 
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er occupations, employees may have extra time to gather evidence, to hold their grou- 
nds on allegation, and to prepare future litigation. Third, the one-year filing requirem- 
ent will not affect employees‟ abilities to discover the evidence of accused activities 
and influence the authenticity of information. Also, employees may have more chanc- 
es to access the witness who is willing to help them against employers‟ adverse actio- 
ns and companies‟ misconduct. Fourth, the one-year period provides employees enou- 
gh time to recover from the disaster of physical or psychological effects and gives th- 
em courage to face the coming lawsuit. 
Second, when employees have not been discharged, suspended, and still can put 
up with employers‟ adverse actions even if they resent unjust treatment, these emplo- 
yees should be given a six-month period (180 days) to file their claims in Section 806. 
The reason to give these employees a shorter period of filing than above employees is 
that these employees still keep their careers. This advantage not only gives those em- 
ployees a chance to observe whether employers or companies are willing to put the 
wrongdoing back on the right track or not, but lets them be able to rapidly make a res- 
ponse to retaliation. On the other hand, because these employees still hold their jobs, 
it is easier for them to understand criminal facts, to gather evidence, or to contact the 
witness than those employees who have been discharged, suspended, or have quitted. 
In this way, they only need a shorter period to decide whether to bring a cause of acti- 
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on against employers for the sake of shielding their rights in SOX and bringing corp- 
orate misbehavior to light.  
Consequently, as a result of different situations that employees may encounter, it 
has to take some factors into account to decide whether to give employees a longer or 
shorter filing period to claim their actions. However, no matter which period employ- 
ees is provided, both suggested filing requirements are still longer than given filing li- 
mitation in SOX Section 806. Then, it is required for Congress to adjust the filing pe- 
riod and make SOX achieve original legislative purposes more effectively. These pur- 
poses are to preclude corporate securities violations or related frauds from happening, 
to protect employees from being retaliated against by employers, and to rapidly relie- 
ve their losses due to the disclosure or participation in the investigation on those viol- 
ations. 
   b. OSHA Should Strictly Adhere to the Timelines Regulated in SOX Section 
806 
         Although SOX Section 806 sets up timelines for employees and emplo- 
yers to hold their grounds, the administrative agency does not strictly adhere to those 
regulated limitations when coping with whistleblower disputes.
1152
 Regulated timeli- 
nes not only are the result of balancing both parties‟ interests, but they meet the statut- 
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ory purpose to give employees an expedited administrative procedure to relieve losses 
and to resolve employment issues.
1153
 Under SOX, when the OSHA investigator fin- 
ds the employee‟s claim is a prima facie case, the employer is required to meet OSHA 
and provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut the employee‟s allegations in twe- 
nty days once he/she receives a notice of complaint.
1154
 After the investigation, if the 
OSHA investigator finds that the employee‟s claim is in a merit, and the employer ac- 
tually violated the regulated activity, the investigator will award the employee a preli- 
minary order to compensate his/her losses. When the employer gets a notice of order, 
he/she still has ten days to present more evidence to support his/her position, and arg- 
ues that he/she would have taken the same adverse action even though there is no pro- 
tected activity.
1155
 However, in reality, these regulated timelines are not exactly follo- 
wed by OSHA and most of the time, these timelines are extended to a longer period, 
and this consequence probably causes a beneficial situation for the employer to defe- 
nd his/her ground. 
Requiring OSHA to adhere to the timelines is necessary. First, if OSHA can stri- 
ctly comply with the timelines, employees may have a better chance to file a prevaili- 
ng claim against employers and to be granted a preliminary order. Compared with the 
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power of each party in the administrative procedure, employees may be placed in the 
superior position to allege their claims than employers in the beginning of the procee- 
ding.
1156
 The reason is that when employees file a claim under SOX, they usually ha- 
ve more knowledge about illegal actions and are familiar with the administrative pro- 
cedure than employers.
1157
 Thus, in the initial stage, employees tend to play a leading 
role in litigation since they have the advantage of information. However, when the pe- 
riod of litigation gets longer, this advantage will disappear and transfer to employers 
since they start having more sense and knowledge regarding accused activities.
1158
 In 
addition, employers have more resources to gather information, to seek legal counsel- 
ors, and have authority to persuade the witness to stand with them. By contrast, at this 
time, employees‟ positions weaken because they probably have lost their jobs and su- 
ffered financial or emotional effects at the same time.
1159
 For that reason, employees 
may not have energy to keep on claims and fight against employers owing to this im- 
balanced power.
1160
 
Second, if OSHA adheres to regulated timelines, employees may benefit from an 
expedited administrative procedure since they can receive rapid relief for their losses. 
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1161
 If employees are discharged, they are able to restore the position because the rei- 
nstatement is one of important remedies in SOX. Likewise, they do not have to worry 
about other monetary or non-monetary damage since SOX promises to make up for 
all losses as employees bear employers‟ adverse actions. In this way, if the administr- 
ative agency sticks to the timelines, it can decrease the possibility that whistleblowing 
employees may experience financial disasters or psychological effects due to the end- 
less litigation. 
Third, all employees, corporations, and the public can enjoy the advantages from 
an expedited administrative procedure when OSHA adheres to the regulated timelines. 
For employees, they will benefit from the procedure since not only can their losses be 
relieved immediately, but they also may not be blamed for being a trouble-maker as a 
result of uncertain consequences of accusations. For companies, they can quickly ma- 
ke responses to wrongdoings and reduce the possibility that these illegal actions will 
be known by the public because of long-winded litigation. For the public, an expedit- 
ed administrative procedure avoids trivial matters from wasting legal resources; also, 
it can rapidly settle the disputes that significantly affect the health or the safety of so-  
ciety and avoid social problems from happening, like the potential risk of self-suicide, 
the issue of divorces or broken families. 
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Then, Congress ought to strictly require OSHA to adhere to the regulated timeli- 
nes and ask the DOL to supervise OSHA when proceeding with the investigation. The 
DOL‟s duty not only protects whistleblowing employees‟ rights under SOX, but ensu- 
res that an expedited administrative procedure has been abided by the authorized age- 
ncy. In addition, OSHA should be given more resources and be authorized more pow- 
er to make the investigation; this improvement perhaps enhances the efficiency of the 
administrative procedure, and increases the correctness of awarding a preliminary or- 
der. As Moberly says: 
    “To the extent OSHA is willing but unable to perform this task, Congress should 
provide OSHA with more resources to investigate and to adjudicate Sarbanes 
-Oxley claims adequately…. To provide a fuller investigation-one that is more 
„hearing-like” -Congress should provide OSHA subpoena power in its Sarbanes 
-Oxley investigations, similar to the authority OSHA employs to enforce the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.”
1162
 
Thus, giving more resources and power to OSHA not only can make the investigation 
more complete, but it also can improve the efficiency of the administrative procedure 
and increase the chance that whistleblowers will be granted a preliminary order. After 
all, when the investigation is fully made, more evidence is able to be found, and disp- 
utes are rapidly settled, it is highly probable that whistleblowers can relieve their loss- 
es and quickly get rid of negative effects of litigation. 
2. Issue of the Standard of Evidentiary Burden 
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As regards the evidentiary burden imposed upon employees and employe- 
rs in SOX Section 806, Congress set up a lower standard of burden of proof for whist- 
leblowing employees to verify their claims; by contrast, it established a stricter evide- 
ntiary burden for employers to rebut employees‟ allegations. Even though this can be 
said that an equal standard of burden has been regulated in Section 806, employees st- 
ill find it difficult to be granted a preliminary order from OSHA when they bring a ca- 
use of action against employers under SOX. 
    First, even if employers have to bear a stricter burden of proof to rebut employe- 
es‟ claims by using clear and convincing evidence, and show that their actions result 
from managerial power, in the administrative procedure, employers are probably able 
to satisfy their evidentiary duty because they have more resources and can access mo- 
re potential witnesses than employees.
1163
 
    Second, in order to rebut employees‟ claims, employers have sufficient materials 
or information that can be used to point out employees‟ negative personalities, unsati- 
sfactory working performance, and uncooperative attitudes in the workplace. In this 
way, employers are capable of indirectly suspecting the authenticity of employees‟ al- 
legations and have persuasive evidence to hold their grounds. 
    Third, employees probably have a hard time finding witnesses to assist them ag- 
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ainst employers. The reason is that witnesses, who mostly are employees‟ colleagues, 
do not want to engage in whistleblowing because of negative impression on the whis- 
tleblower. Besides, the fear of retaliation is another factor to influence their willingne- 
ss to stand with whistleblowing employees.
1164
 Further, it is not easy for whistleblo- 
wers to seek help from other employees serving in different companies because those 
employees may not want to damage the business relationship with accused employers 
or companies.
1165
 At times, those employees have a function to assist whistleblowers 
in getting a prevailing order because they perhaps strengthen whistleblowers‟ eviden- 
ce on corporate securities violation or provide other persuasive materials to prove wh- 
istleblowers‟ allegations. However, because of the consideration of business, it is hig- 
hly probable that those outside employees will not go with whistleblowers to fight ag- 
ainst employers‟ illegal actions. Also, the unwillingness of taking a side on whistlebl- 
owing among coworkers is another obstacle for whistleblowers to find extra assistan- 
ce.
1166
 Since no colleague wants to show support on whistleblowing, this makes whi- 
stleblowers feel not only isolated on the disclosure, but also helpless to hold their gro- 
unds and to relieve their losses in the administrative procedure. 
    In order to resolve these problems, Congress ought to take below advice into ac- 
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count when modifying SOX Section 806 in later amendments. About employers‟ bur- 
den of proof, it is highly suggested that a stricter standard should be adopted as exam- 
ining “clear and convincing evidence” presented by employers. As for the method to 
improve this standard, Watnick provides his advice and states: 
    “… employers could be required to present at least some documentary evidence 
to support its adverse action and to defend an employee‟s case of retaliatory ac- 
tion…. I am suggesting a normative shift in perception as to what constitutes 
„clear and convincing evidence‟ in the case of whistleblowing employees under 
Sarbanes-Oxley. This shift in perception, requiring more stringent proof from 
employers to meet the „clear and convincing‟ standard, is necessary in that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is uniquely situated.”
1167
 
Thus, while employers are trying to rebut employees‟ allegations by clear and convin- 
cing evidence, oral defense with no tangible materials should not be allowed and can- 
not satisfy employers‟ evidentiary duty. Not only does the “clear and convincing evid- 
ence” have to be rectified by recordable documents or papers, but the administrative 
agency also has to employ a higher standard to examine the evidence when determin- 
ing whether employers‟ rebuttals are persuasive or not. 
3. Imbalanced Information 
In addition to inadequate resources and few witnesses that whistleblowing 
employees can access, employees also have extra obstacle that makes their situations 
worse. In the administrative procedure, the defendants-employers are allowed to ma- 
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ke a submission to OSHA during the investigation, but employees are unable to make 
a response to those materials.
1168
 Giving employers a privilege to make a submission 
is harmful to employees‟ interests in the administrative procedure because of fourfold 
deficiency. First, it is highly possible that employers will provide OSHA with false in- 
formation. Not only do these inaccurate materials and knowledge fail to be examined 
by employees, but employees also have no chance to know or to make a comment on 
them. Second, an unilateral action affects employees‟ abilities to defend. Since empl- 
oyees are incapable of getting knowledge from employers, they cannot make a comp- 
lete preparation for rebutting employers‟ responses. Third, incorrect information has a 
crucial impact on OSHA to make a preliminary order. Due to wrong materials, the pr- 
ocess that the OSHA investigator to make a decision will be influenced; also, the dec- 
ision made by the investigator will not totally settle the whistleblower dispute, disco- 
ver the truth, and show the actual situation. Fourth, the decision relying on false state- 
ments will not accepted by involved parties. In addition, the rightfulness of the decisi- 
on will be suspected and affect employees‟ willingness to employ SOX Section 806 
to shield their rights and relieve losses. In order to fix those defects and to avoid ineq- 
uitable situation, it is necessary for OSHA to disclose the information that employers 
unilaterally submit to it for employees. 
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    Although OSHA recently has modified its procedure that not only allows emplo- 
yees to access “at least the substance” of employers‟ responses to complaints in SOX, 
but can receive other evidence or at least the substance of such evidence from emplo- 
yers, OSHA still does not permit employees to access complete, actual responses, and 
extra evidence that employers have presented to OSHA.
1169
 In addition, OSHA neith- 
er clearly allows employees to comment on these materials and evidence nor permits 
employees to make a response to the submission made by employers to OSHA.
1170
 In 
this way, OSHA‟s modification on its procedure still cannot make up the defect that 
causes the gap of information between employees and employers, and brings an uneq- 
ual consequence at the same time. 
In order to resolve the problem of imbalanced information, Congress and OSHA 
not only should amend the regulation to allow employees to access whole statements 
that employers submit to OSHA, but have to provide more chances for employees to 
participate in the investigation. As Rankin describes, “Congress and OSHA could pro- 
vide employees more influence and participation in the investigative progress, enabli- 
ng OSHA to consider both sides of the dispute more fully.”
1171
 Likewise, Moberly st- 
ates, “OSHA should amend its regulations to provide itself more authority for inform- 
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ation gathering. Altering OSHA‟s policies and regulations to ensure more employees 
participation in the process may present OSHA with more complete information abo- 
ut the factual circumstances of a case.”
1172
 If Congress and OSHA can refer to the ad-  
vice, the capacity of employees to scrutinize the submission, evidential materials, and 
to make a comment on these information not only can make the investigation be more 
thorough, but also can get closer to the truth by back-and-forth exchanged knowledge, 
and reach an ultimate resolution on whistleblower disputes. 
 4. OSHA Is not a Good Dispute-Resolver under SOX Section 806 
       Although Congress authorized OSHA to address whistleblower disputes in 
SOX, OSHA is not a truly professional agency to resolve issues with regard to the vi- 
olation of securities laws or related frauds.
1173
 This impediment is unable to be easily 
moved away by giving OSHA more resources and authorities to make the investigati- 
on since the lack of expertise significantly affects OSHA to make an appropriate deci- 
sion. Once Moberly made this point as follows: 
    “To the extent OSHA‟s failure is one of will, merely increasing OSHA‟s authori- 
ty and resources may not be sufficiently drastic to respond to the agency‟s fail- 
ure to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley adequately…. In fact, from the Act‟s inception, 
OSHA seemed like an unlikely choice to investigate corporate whistleblower 
claims…. the type of corporate fraud at issue in Sarbanes-Oxley cases seems 
far removed from the worker safety and health issues addressed by many of the 
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other statutes under OSHA‟s purview.”
1174
 
Hence, because corporate fraud is much different from ordinary whistleblower issues 
about the danger of working environments and the safety of coworkers, it is necessary 
for Congress to reconsider whether OSHA is able to act as a good dispute-resolver in 
SOX or not. 
    In order to resolve this problem, it is better for Congress to transfer investigative 
power from OSHA to the SEC to address whistleblower disputes in SOX. The reason 
is twofold. First, the SEC has more knowledge regarding the violation of securities la- 
ws and other accounting tricks taken by companies. Because of the SEC‟s function to 
maintain the discipline of the financial market and to sustain the efficiency or transpa- 
rency of transaction,
1175
 the SEC is much familiar with the operation of public comp- 
anies and has an ability to determine whether corporate misconduct violates securities 
laws or related frauds. Likewise, the SEC perhaps feels comfortable to decide the me- 
rit of employees‟ claims and conclude whether employers‟ rebuttals are persuasive or 
not due to its knowledge on securities violations. 
Second, because the SEC has the power of enforcement against public compani- 
es, it can deter corporations from committing securities violations and reduce retaliat- 
ion imposed on whistleblowing employees since companies fear the punishment ma- 
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de by the SEC. As Moberly notes: 
    “A whistleblower investigation by the SEC, with its ongoing concern for corpor- 
ate fraud, may better deter corporate fraud than the threat of any other agency 
investigation. Through Sarbanes-Oxley investigations, the SEC may learn info- 
rmation that could lead to charges of securities fraud against companies or indi- 
vidual officers, which would have much greater deterrence value than the typic- 
al whistleblower investigation of an employee complaint…. placing the SEC in 
charge of whistleblower investigations might encourage the agency to request 
that the Department of Justice utilize this additional enforcement mechanism to 
deter retaliation against whistleblowers.”
1176
 
Thus, the threat of penalty or sentence made by the SEC not only prevents companies 
from committing securities frauds, but probably also avoids employees from being re- 
taliated against by employers because of their disclosures. 
    However, it does not entirely benefit employees‟ interests when Congress decid- 
es to authorize the SEC to cope with whistleblower disputes in SOX Section 806. The 
reason is that, in reality, the SEC is not as sympathetic as OSHA with damaged empl- 
oyees when addressing whistleblower issues.
1177
 The SEC is inclined to separate cor- 
porate securities violations and reprisals imposed upon whistleblowers into two diffe- 
rent subjects, and puts no emphasis on retaliation. Once Moberly described this inten- 
tion below:  
    “In 2004, … Senators … requested … SEC explain whether the SEC intended to 
use its authority to file civil enforcement actions for violations of Sarbanes- 
Oxley … to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley‟s ant-retaliation provision…. SEC respon- 
ded ... the SEC puts its resources toward „substantive‟ violations of securities 
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laws and … would leave Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation enforcement to the 
Department of Labor.”
1178
 
In this way, even if the SEC has authority to resolve whistleblower disputes under Se- 
ction 806, it probably puts focus on securities violations and pays less attention to the 
relief that grieved employees actually care about. This intention would not only cause 
an unequal consequence and imbalanced interests, but also might fail to satisfy the le- 
gislative purpose that intends to compensate whistleblowing employees‟ losses comp- 
letely after being retaliated against by employers. 
For that reason, I suggest that it is not necessary to give the SEC the whole pow- 
er to settle whistleblower issues from the start to the end; yet, it ought to separate the 
administrative procedure under OSHA into investigation and decision. In the part of 
investigation, the SEC will be given the authority to investigate the violations, to exa- 
mine employees‟ allegations, and to scrutinize employers‟ rebuttals. Once the investi- 
gation is done, in the part of decision, the SEC should hand over the result to OSHA, 
and let OSHA determine the relief when employees‟ claims are the prima facie case 
or dismiss employees‟ claims when their allegations are of no merit. As for the appeal, 
ALJs and the ARB will not be restricted by the investigation made by the SEC, and 
still can start their own investigations to decide the merit of employees‟ claims. Hence, 
giving the SEC the power to make an investigation can actually find the truth of disp- 
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utes; also, letting OSHA make a decision is able to give employees a chance to obtain 
the proper relief. After all, OSHA not only feels more sympathy on employees‟ suffer- 
ing, but it is also familiar with the remedy of retaliation and knows what type of relief 
can truly make up for employees‟ losses. 
C. Corporate Culture 
Not only is SOX required to provide whole protection to shield employees 
from being retaliated against when making a disclosure or participating in the investi- 
gation on pubic companies‟ violations of securities laws or regulated frauds, but it has 
to declare or to establish a section that definitely makes sure corporations will promo- 
te whistleblowing and abide by SOX‟s regulations. For the sake of making the encou- 
ragement of whistleblowing rooted in companies, forming a positive corporate culture 
is an effective means to reach this goal, to protect the values of companies, and to ass- 
ure social interest or welfare. One time, Mavrommati talked about corporate culture 
in his article and stated below: 
“[C]orporate culture describes all the web of relations, procedures and traditions    
within a company. In essence, corporate culture drives the organization and its 
actions, it guides how employees think, act and feel and it has been reckoned as 
the „operating system‟ of the organization. As a matter of fact, corporate culture 
describes all the customs and traditions of a company that fall under the headi- 
ng of „the way we do things here.‟”
1179
 
Thus, corporate culture can be viewed as the consensus made up by the upper level of 
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management and the custom followed by corporate constituents. Managers anticipate 
employees to comply with these norms that employees can employ to address extern- 
al business activities; similarly, fresh employees are able to make use of these custo- 
ms to integrate into corporate internal operation as soon as possible. In addition, these 
values instruct employees how to perceive, to react, and to resolve a problem in a pre- 
ferable way that corporations tend to favor. 
    Corporate culture has a significant influence on whistleblowing, and this impact 
can be divided into two situations. First, when companies have not formed an atmosp- 
here that positively treats employees who blow the whistle on unlawful actions taken 
by managers, whistleblowing is inclined to be suppressed and rarely has a function on 
the disclosure of irregularities. Since the management directs the formation of corpor- 
ate culture, its behaviour and actions probably affect the content of corporate culture. 
As Mavrommati describes: 
    “… a critical factor in the formation of a corporate culture is the extent to which 
a corporate culture is leader-centric…. the culture of a firm is likely to reflect 
the personality and attitude of the company‟s leaders. The behaviour that is mo- 
deled by the leader and the management team profoundly shapes and influences 
the final formation of the culture and the practices adopted thereof by the firm 
and it certainly sets the tone of the culture.”
1180
 
Thus, managers‟ attitudes are associated with the development of whistleblowing and 
affect employees‟ responses or conduct regarding related issues and problems. When 
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the management devalues whistleblowing, ethical objections from employees will be 
ignored and be paid less attention to by supervisors. Such corporate culture may hind- 
er the transparency of companies‟ operation
1181
 and probably makes employers empl- 
oy discrimination to control employees‟ actions in order to keep them silent on corpo- 
rate misconduct.
1182
 Codes of silence reduce the likelihood to detect illegal activities, 
to make outsiders investigate companies, and indirectly imply that the wrongdoing is 
allowable in corporations with impunity.
1183
 In addition, codes of silence impede the 
change of firms and hamper the development of pluralistic companies.
1184
 While co- 
des of silence are predominant in the climate of corporations, “the diverse viewpoints, 
opinions, preferences, and goals … are not likely to be given voice and … not enter 
into the processes by which the organization establishes objectives, decides on appro- 
priate courses of action, and attempts to learn from experience.”
1185
 Because of bloc- 
king different concerns and advice, not only may employers‟ decision-making not be 
promoted, but also the morale of employees may be influenced and affect future busi- 
ness performance. 
                                                     
1181
 Id. at 398. 
1182
 Joyce Rothschild, Freedom of Speech Denied, Dignity Assaulted: What the Whistleblowers 
Experience in the U.S., 56 Current Soc. 884, 885 (2008). 
1183
 Kohn et al., supra note 220, at 3. 
1184
 Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and 
Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 706, 707 (2000). 
1185
 Id. at 719. 
                                                           
 
 
400 
    Second, on the contrary, if employers devote themselves to sustaining the good- 
will of companies, put more emphasis on employees‟ loyalty on entities, and care mo- 
re about the interest of society, employers may be more lenient on whistleblowing. As 
Elliston states this concept below: 
    “When top management emphasizes economic efficiency and accountability, gr- 
owth, and loyalty to the company, to the exclusion of ethical values and social 
responsibilities, they open the door for whistleblowing. Management should re- 
alize that whistleblowers have high ideals that extend beyond their organizatio- 
ns…. Management would do well to change the corporate culture by placing 
greater importance on reporting unethical and questionable practices with the 
organization.”
1186
 
Hence, when the management opens its mind to accept different voices and does not 
inhibit ethical objections from employees, there is highly probable that corporate cult- 
ure will be modeled by a whistleblower-friendly climate. This consequence improves 
corporate abilities to self-detect, self-resolve, and self-prevent misconduct that happe- 
ns in the workplace. Likewise, this atmosphere enhances internal corporate governan- 
ce and ensures corporate operation is on the right track. 
    Thus, I suggest that Congress should add up a new section under SOX. This sec- 
tion not only ought to establish a model for companies to refer when the management 
has no idea how to promote good corporate culture on whistleblowing, but also auth- 
orizes the SEC to have the right of enforcement and punishment when companies do 
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not abide by the regulation and negatively treat whistleblowers. This reference can be 
categorized by three portions. The first portion concerns the issue of corporate intern- 
al policy. The management has to show its intent to support whistleblowing and advo- 
cates this action since it assures corporate interest. As Smith & Oseth note: 
    “… the employer must accord its compliance-related goals (and accommodation 
to whistleblowing protections) equal stature with – and at times explicit priority 
over – traditional private sector management objectives. Managers … must rec- 
ognize … that elevating perceived public interests, and government policies th- 
at serve those interests, is not in conflict with a business calculus ordinarily fo- 
cused intensely on the bottom line.”
1187
 
Similarly, the management has to educate employees to the fact that they are given a 
new role as the foot soldier to fight against corporate securities violations and related 
frauds.
1188
 In this way, not only do employees owe the duty of loyalty to companies, 
but they also bear a higher societal responsibility to protect the health and safety of 
the public. 
    The second portion is in regard to explicit statements in the management‟s chart- 
er to abide by all securities ordinances and the SEC‟s rules. Managers should declare 
that each action, which is able to assist companies in deterring misconduct or prevent- 
ing wrongdoings from going worse, is being supported, such as whistleblowing. Smi- 
th & Oseth mention this point as follows: 
    “… employer … should declare … attitude about compliance with law and regu- 
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lation in a central compliance manager‟s charter and consolidate relevant funct- 
ions under that individual. Such a charter would be developed explicitly to pre- 
vent and detect wrongdoing, ensure regulatory compliance, and eliminate other 
improprieties.”
1189
 
Therefore, not only should the management have positive attitude toward whistleblo- 
wing, but it also has to definitely show its position on supporting the actions taken by 
whistleblowing employees in the workplace. 
    The third portion is specific actions that the management is going to take to pro- 
mote whistleblowing. In order to make companies benefit from whistleblowing, man- 
agers can reward and educate employees to practice such ethical conduct.
1190
 In addi- 
tion, they are able to devise a structure that is capable of promoting the efficiency of 
whistleblowing. It is necessary for the management to set up a system to detect corpo- 
rate misbehavior, to establish a channel for employees to report corporate misconduct, 
and to build up a rapid, transparent, effective proceeding to rectify these mistakes. As 
Smith & Oseth say: 
    “… a compliance manager must devise and execute (1) a system of standards, (2) 
a monitoring strategy that covers appropriate pressure points systematically, 
and (3) communication channels that facilitate early reporting and correction of 
what employees perceive as irregularities. The success of this effort depends 
critically on the nature of the compliance manager‟s charter and on the support 
(and participation) of other leaders within the employer‟s organization.”
1191
 
In this way, it can be concluded that the reporting structure has to accompany a positi- 
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ve attitude of management and a friendly atmosphere in the workplace toward whistl- 
eblowing. Merely establishing a sound reporting system, but forming a corporate cult- 
ure that is negative upon the action of whistleblowers, is still unable to reach the goal 
of the deterrence of corporate misconduct via whistleblowing.  
    Making use of this framework to encourage companies to form positive corpora- 
te culture upon whistleblowing, I expect companies‟ misconduct will decrease becau- 
se not only can the management‟s misbehavior be detected easily, but also employees 
are willing to disclose those unlawful activities. Besides, this framework reduces the 
possibility that whistleblowing employees may suffer adverse employment actions fr- 
om employers since those employees‟ actions are admirable and supported by compa- 
nies‟ policies and norms. 
D. Others 
1. Mandatory Arbitration Agreement 
As mentioned above, whether Congress prohibited mandatory arbitration 
agreements in Section 806 is a significant issue to affect the function of SOX. Since 
there is no expressed language that restricts the dispute of whistleblowing from being 
sent to arbitration agreed by both parties under SOX, it is better to observe if the legi- 
slative history intended to prevent mandatory arbitration agreements from becoming a 
resolution of whistleblower disputes.  
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Initially, SOX‟s earlier draft included a provision that prohibited mandatory arbi- 
tration agreements from resolving the dispute of whistleblowing. Nevertheless, in the 
final version of the bill, this portion seemed to be excised, and there was no reason to 
explain why it was cut out.
1192
 Because it might be inferred that Congress did not wa- 
nt to show its attitude upon pre-dispute arbitration agreements to address the issue of 
whistleblowing, the legislative history did not provide any assistance on clarifying th- 
is ambiguity. Hence, the plaintiff-employee cannot have a persuasive ground to argue 
that Congress had inhibited mandatory arbitration agreements settling whistleblower 
disputes in SOX Section 806. 
Because of no clear language and a negative legislative history on the forbiddan- 
ce of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, it should turn to analyze legislators‟ intentio- 
ns on this issue. The original purpose for Congress to enact Section 806 was because 
it not only wanted to encourage corporate employees to bravely report employers‟ se- 
curities violations, but it promised to relieve employees‟ losses when they suffer adv- 
erse actions because of the disclosure or participation in the investigation in regard to 
those violations. Even if Congress‟s intent to protect corporate employees was quite 
explicit, it did not point out or restrict the method to complete this mission. This omi- 
ssion makes others wonder whether Congress still opened a door for alternative disp- 
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ute resolutions to settle whistleblowers‟ arguments under SOX. Owing to this doubt, 
it leaves space to debate the appropriateness of other dispute resolutions for SOX Se- 
ction 806. Likewise, it increases the difficulty to shield employees from being retalia- 
ted against since employers may avoid SOX‟s whistleblower protection by employing 
mandatory arbitration agreements to resolve whistleblower disputes. Besides, in the 
Boss case, the court also stated that SOX does not restrict the defendant‟s right from 
making use of arbitration to address and to settle the argument, and there was no con- 
flict between arbitration and the statutory purposes.
1193
 As the court notes this point 
as follows: 
    “Congress may override the presumption in favor of arbitration if it manifests its 
intent to do so in the text of the [statute], its legislative history, or „inherent co- 
nflict‟ between arbitration … and the [statute‟s] underlying purposes. There is 
nothing in the text of the statute or the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act evincing intent to preempt arbitration of claims under the act. Nor is there 
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute‟s purposes.”
1194
 
Accordingly, the court stated that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is allowable to 
resolve the issue of Section 806 since Congress did not expressly establish any restri- 
ction on this portion. This court‟s decision, on the one hand, adopted the rationale of 
the U.S. Supreme Court that presumed mandatory arbitration agreements are permiss- 
ible in SOX; on the other hand, it was caused by the failure of Congress that did not 
mention any policy regarding the usage of arbitration on employment issues. Because 
                                                     
1193
 Boss, supra note 130, at 684. 
1194
 Id. at 685 (citation omitted). 
                                                           
 
 
406 
Congress has not given any opinion on this part, courts tend to suppose that not only 
did Congress know arbitration is acceptable in courts, but it also implicitly permitted 
this resolution to settle employment disputes. 
Since all specific materials and the majority of judicial decisions are inclined to 
support arbitration, this seems that arbitration contracts can be allowed to settle whist- 
leblower issues in SOX. Yet, considering the defects of arbitration contract, it is inevi- 
table to worry whether pre-dispute arbitration agreements can truly resolve the empl- 
oyment disputes and protect the rights of employees or not. After all, employees have 
less power to bargain the terms of contracts, and this defect affects their interests wh- 
en the disputes are sent to arbitration. 
    In order to remedy this situation, Congress has to clearly and definitely show its 
intent on the usage of arbitration in SOX Section 806. In my point of view, in princip- 
le, I suggest Congress should prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements from settling 
the dispute of whistleblowing since Section 806 has a functional work to shield whist- 
leblowers from bearing damage. In addition, it is dependent upon the concern of equ- 
ality and the avoidance of one-side negotiation. Once Cherry stated this similar conc- 
ept as follows: 
    “… arbitration of employment disputes should be taken with a healthy dose of 
skepticism, as arbitration in general tends to favor the employer. Many argume- 
nts, both for (efficiency) and against (fairness), have been raised regarding the 
use of mandatory arbitration contracts…. an argument that arbitration of Sarba- 
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nes-Oxley whistleblowing claims should not be foisted on employees at the ti- 
me of hire, when economic realities dictate that it will be a one-side negotiati- 
on…. mandatory arbitration is not the result of parties determining … is the be- 
st way to resolve a dispute; rather, it is a one-sided provision foisted upon emp- 
loyees through a contract of adhesion.”
1195
 
Hence, considering there is highly probable that employers may use their authority to 
make arbitration contracts and have the privilege to control favorable terms of contra- 
cts, Congress should not allow the usage of arbitration to resolve whistleblower disp- 
utes in Section 806. Also, Congress has to take efforts to inhibit any unfair conseque- 
nce happening when the power and resources of involved parties are imbalanced and 
may be extremely discrepant. 
    Nonetheless, thinking of the flexibility and efficiency of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements, when the result is beneficial and impartial to damaged employees, Cong- 
ress can make an exception to permit the usage of arbitration to settle the issue of wh- 
istleblowing under Section 806. As regards the formation of arbitration contract, it sh- 
ould return to contract laws to decide whether the contract is effective and practicab- 
le or not. These factors include: the ability of involved parties to make an arbitration 
contract; the timing or situation to reach the agreement; whether an arbitration contra- 
ct is made due to duress, cheat, unconscionability, or other disadvantages of the pow- 
erless party; whether an arbitration contract is proper and able to resolve the dispute; 
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or whether both parties have reached mutual consent on the critical term of contract, 
such as the appropriateness of arbitrator. The competence of arbitrator is important in 
arbitration since the selection process of arbitrator probably shows the power of invo- 
lved parties. Ramirez explains the significance of arbitrator as follows: 
“Providing the option for alternative dispute resolution before an arbitrator, how- 
ever, may operate as efficient means to avoid the potential duplicity … of an 
administrative investigation followed by a federal district court de novo review. 
Recognizing this potential benefit … statute should include an arbitration alter- 
native … but only if it is specifically limited by … the arbitrator be selected by 
mutual consent to avoid placing the choice solely with the employer.”
1196
 
Because an arbitrator can affect the result of arbitration, when the position of arbitrat- 
or defers to employers‟ thoughts or opinions, the consequence will be harmful and ca- 
use dual damage on employees. In this way, mutual consent on an arbitrator is requir- 
ed since it not only can decrease the likelihood that an arbitrator takes a partial action 
for a given party, but it also can increase the accuracy of decision and avoid later arg- 
uments regarding the appropriateness of arbitrator. 
2. Rewarding 
Even if SOX has provided employees with a sound anti-retaliation scheme 
to keep them from fearing of reprisal, this still cannot motivate their actions to disclo- 
se employers‟ misconduct or companies‟ wrongdoings because of the lack of incenti- 
ve. In the newly-enacted Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 Section 922, Congress authorized 
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the SEC to give a reward up to 30% of monetary sanctions exceeding 1 million dolla- 
rs to an individual who provides original information that leads the SEC to successfu- 
lly enforce its rules, regulations, and related actions.
1197
 If employees receive a rewa- 
rd before being awarded the relief from the administrative agency, not only are they 
able to have a stronger motive to report corporate irregularities since a bounty is guar- 
anteed and foreseeable, but they also can avoid the uncertain result in the administrat- 
ive procedure since employees are unsure whether their claims will be merited or dis- 
missed. Therefore, a proper incentive is necessary because it can enhance employees‟ 
motives to bring corporate misbehavior to light. In general, there are two methods th- 
at have been used to provide employees‟ an incentive for their disclosures. 
    First, the SEC provides bounties for employees who disclose insider trading and 
securities frauds. Congress tried to make use of the reward of bounties to encourage 
employees to report corporate securities violations. According to the Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, the statute gives those employees who 
blow the whistle on regulated crimes a reward up to 10% of the penalty imposed upon 
violators.
1198
 Because the violation of insider trading usually accompanies corporate 
infringement on securities laws and regulations, by reporting the violation of insider 
trading, the SEC is probably able to observe other companies‟ wrongdoings and deter 
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those from going worse.
1199
 Similarly, when employees provide the information abo- 
ut insider trading and other violations of securities ordinances, employees not only 
can receive bounties owing to their disclosures, but also can indirectly bring corporate 
frauds to light.
1200
  
However, this statute still has some deficiencies. On the one hand, the reward th- 
at employees receive is based on a percentage of the penalty imposed upon violators, 
not depending on the profit that violators have gained or the loss they have saved.
1201
 
This consequence affects the amount of bounty that information providers are reward- 
ed, and has an influence on disclosers‟ motives to report insider trading. On the other 
hand, since the SEC has authority to decide whether to reward those informants a bo- 
unty or not, this makes the result harder to predict and has a high likelihood that discl- 
osers probably receive nothing from the SEC, or the rewarded bounty is unable to sat- 
isfy informants‟ expectations. One time, Callahan & Dworkin described this situation 
as follows: 
“… any determination about the awarding of bounties … „including whether, to 
whom, or in what amount to make payments, is in the sole discretion of the Se- 
curities and Exchange Commission.‟ Because there is no guarantee of any reco- 
very, and indeed, no track record of payments, neither of these reward provisio- 
ns are likely to spur much whistleblowing activity.”
1202
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In this way, because not only does the SEC have the discretion on the bounty and ma- 
kes the result uncertain, but also there is no judicial review
1203
 or minimum guarant- 
ee for the reward.
1204
 These problems make this scheme not be practiced as effective- 
ly as Congress initially expected and cannot promote employees‟ incentives to make a 
disclosure. 
    Second, the False Claims Act (FCA) forms a scheme that allows a citizen on be- 
half of federal government to sue an individual or a company that has a business rela- 
tionship with the government, but makes false statements to cheat on business. Besid- 
es, the FCA promises to provide this “relator” a bounty for correct information or dis- 
closure, and this design is called qui tam provision.
1205
 In the FCA, it is prohibited 
“to present knowingly to the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment, to 
make a false record to statement to get a claim paid, or to make a false record or state- 
ment to avoid an obligation to transmit money or property to the government.”
1206
 
There are three required elements to constitute the claim when the relator has a cause 
of action against the violator under the FCA. Those are presentation of a claim, falsity 
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or fraud, and knowledge.
1207
  
The rationale of the FCA‟s qui tam provision resulted from “old-fashioned idea 
of holding out a temptation and setting a rogue to catch a rogue.”
1208
 The reason that 
Congress wanted to make use of a private citizen to disclose an illegal action is not 
because of the lack of resources to detect irregularities, but is based on the belief that 
federal employees probably also participate in those fraudulent activities so that they 
are unable to hamper the occurrence of false actions.
1209
 As to the reward, the share 
is awarded by 15-30% of the government‟s damage from the violation of the FCA,
1210
 
and this bounty is quite attractive for the relator to take an action under the FCA. As 
Rapp says: 
    “The FCA qui tam provision is designed to produce „lucrative bounties‟ for the 
relator…. the relator‟s share has been „enhanced considerably‟ in recent years 
„in an effort to encourage informants to come forward and report fraud.‟ The 
average recovery for a qui tam relator in a successful FCA case is over one mil- 
lion dollars.”
1211
 
Because the rewarded bounty is generous, this monetary incentive makes the relator 
provide his/her knowledge of prohibited activities more actively, and reduces their fe- 
ars of bearing financial plight and mental distress after filing a suit against an individ- 
ual‟s or private companies‟ fraudulent actions. 
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    Compare the SEC‟s bounty scheme and the FCA‟s qui tam provision, it is better 
for Congress to refer to the FCA‟s reward system and give employees more incentives 
on the disclosure. The reason for holding this is twofold. First, employees do not have 
to worry the uncertainty of result concerning whether they are going to be awarded a 
bounty or not because the decision is made by the court, not the SEC. Second, emplo- 
yees appear to receive more rewards from the FCA‟s bounty provision since their sha- 
res will depend on the damage that the company suffers (the damage includes the co- 
mpany‟s actual damage and consequential losses), not just being decided by the pena- 
lty that employers or companies may be imposed upon. As regards the calculation of 
damage, it will leave for the court, and let it follow precedent cases to decide the spe- 
cific amount. 
    Adopting a monetary incentive similar to the FCA‟s qui tam provision for SOX 
Section 806 benefits corporate whistleblowers to make the disclosure and achieves st- 
atutory purposes. First, a monetary incentive enhances potential whistleblowers‟ mot- 
ives to take positive actions on the disclosure of corporate wrongdoing.
1212
 Due to at- 
tractive bounties, it is easier for employees to weigh pros and cons of whistleblowing 
because a specific reward removes the disincentive of being a whistleblower. As Rapp 
states this point as follows: 
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    “… the use of financial incentives can help overcome the disincentives to a pot- 
ential whistleblower. Social psychology research supports the notion that if „str- 
uctured properly, financial incentives should encourage a new type of whistleb- 
lower to step forward.‟ An individual would balance the possibility of … rew- 
ard against the risks of whistleblowing; she would be able to „make a deliberate 
cost/benefit analysis and determine whether the possible hazards are worth bec- 
oming a „snitch.‟”
1213
 
Since a monetary incentive is able to promote employees‟ willingness to blow the wh- 
istle on corporate securities violations, considering the goal of SOX Section 806, it is 
not only to shield whistleblowing employees from being retaliated against, but also to 
encourage those employees to make a disclosure. A bounty scheme can be seen as one 
of effective measures to make SOX achieve its statutory purposes, and bring more co- 
rporate scandals to light. 
    Second, a bounty increases the likelihood that employees are more willing to di- 
sclose serious, significant corporate frauds to the public.
1214
 It is because employees 
recognize that the more harmful damage companies are going to cause, the more bou- 
nties they will be awarded. In addition, compared with the anti-retaliation provision, 
employees would rather bear fewer risks to divulge corporate misconduct when their 
losses are able to be made up by bounties in advance. 
    Third, a monetary incentive changes the role of employees from a corporate mo- 
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nitor to an information collector.
1215
 As Rapp describes: 
    “The bounty model for SOX whistleblowers restructures the role of private acto- 
rs as monitors of corporate misbehavior. Unlike traditional corporate monitors, 
employees have an „information advantage … because they have more comple- 
te knowledge regarding the inner workings of a large corporation.‟ In this 
way … instead of the unconvincing deterrent rationale, private lawsuits in the 
securities context could be justified as information-generating.”
1216
 
Consequently, because of bounty, employees may no longer be passive monitors and 
concern about retaliation when employers or firms discover their reports. By contrast, 
employees will become active information collectors owing to the inspiration of mon- 
etary reward. It is not required for employees to wait for compensation from the adm- 
inistrative agency or courts because of their disclosures, but they are able to take the 
initiative in gaining their bounties when corporate securities violations are proved to 
be true by the authorized agency. 
    Fourth, a bounty makes employees more persistent in finding the truth, even tho- 
ugh wrongdoers attempt to suppress information from being disclosed or released to 
the public.
1217
 Whistleblowing employees not only recognize the disclosure of corpo- 
rate corruption is beneficial to public good, but also, more importantly, those employ- 
ees are looking forward to being given a generous reward if their disclosures are pro- 
ved to be accurate. 
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    Fifth, adopting the qui tam provision, it will strengthen the role of SOX whistle- 
blowers to expose corporate securities violation, and make those employees have a st- 
ronger motive to bring a cause of action against employers in the administrative proc- 
edure. In addition, those employees are not easily manipulated by lawyers due to their 
financial expertise and monetary incentives. Thus, they are able to preclude attorney‟s 
actions from damaging their interests.
1218
 Once Rapp discussed this concept in his ar- 
ticle as follows: 
    “… a qui tam bounty model for SOX whistleblowers increases the role that priv- 
ate actors will play in exposing and deterring securities fraud … Unlike pre- 
PSLRA „lawyer-driven litigation,‟ where lawyers „manage litigation to further 
their own economic interests,‟ the qui tam model offers a hybrid in which a tra- 
ditional client exercises a fair degree of control. The qui tam whistleblower has 
both the interest and the ability to monitor his lawyer, unlike a dispersed plaint- 
iff class.”
1219
 
Because whistleblowers may have the ability to gather and to analyze the information 
they hold, it is not required for them to rely on other professionals to examine these 
materials. At times, whistleblowing employees have financial expertise, and their kn- 
owledge is probably superior to their attorneys‟. Besides, in the qui tam provision, as 
a result of monetary incentives, those employees would like to pay more attention to 
their allegations and to spend more time on gathering persuasive evidence, not simply 
depending on lawyers to address related proceedings. Owing to these factors, the qui 
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tam whistleblower has more power to control litigation and seldom leans on external 
assistance to bring a claim or continue a lawsuit. Likewise, this privilege reduces the 
problem of divergent comprehension on the issues of claims that perhaps happens be- 
tween an attorney and a plaintiff. 
    Considering these advantages brought by the bounty model, Congress should th- 
ink over whether to enact a similar qui tam provision in SOX Section 806. As whistl- 
eblowing employees have original information of securities violations or related frau- 
ds that have not been known by the administrative agency, courts, or the SEC, and th- 
en those violations are proved to be true after the investigation, it is allowable for the- 
se employees to be awarded a bounty for their disclosures. After all, not only does the 
reward system give employees more incentives to unveil companies‟ fraudulent activ- 
ities, but it also can be regarded as an effective tool to promote the actions of potenti- 
al whistleblowers, to hinder corporate scandal, and to sustain the confidence of socie- 
ty in business activities. 
3. Extraterritorial Application Problem 
The application of SOX Section 806 does not cover public companies or 
their subsidiaries located outside U.S. territories, this defect affects the efficiency of 
the statute. In view of the globalization of economy, the laws that regulate domestic 
markets may potentially have an extraterritorial influence on other countries‟ financial 
                                                           
 
 
418 
systems. This phenomenon results from several factors that probably include national 
stock exchanges around the world are linked together; major financial and securities 
organizations have set up a branch or are established in various countries or locations; 
and corporations are able to access foreign and domestic financial markets more easi- 
ly to gather requisite capital than before.
1220
 In addition, the formation of multinatio- 
nal companies provides extra assistance for speeding up the globalization of the fina- 
ncial marker around the world.
1221
 
    Because of above economic features, it is unavoidable for legal jurisdictions to 
face the problem of extraterritorial application of law when addressing related issues. 
Judicial principles prohibit courts from applying the U.S. laws on other jurisdictions 
because of the concern of sovereign rights; however, when the disputed matters have 
a substantial impact on U.S. society or domestic financial markets, courts will interv- 
ene in these matters and employ U.S. laws to regulate those violations, especially on 
the violations of securities regulations. Once Hamlin discussed this point in his article 
as follows: 
“ … courts have attempted to fashion standards and have employed various rati- 
onales in applying the statute in a number of cases involving fraud in transnati- 
onal securities transactions. Generally, the courts have asserted subject matter 
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jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that produces substantial effects within 
the United States and over conduct that occurs in the United Stated and directly 
causes losses to investors outside this country.”
1222
  
Even if courts have formed a principle to regulate extraterritorial issues with regard to 
securities regulations, they still have not extended their authority to other areas that 
also may bring a harmful consequence on U.S. citizens or society. Take SOX Section 
806 for example. In the Carnero case, the court dismissed the plaintiff‟s claim to app- 
ly Section 806 extraterritorially because of his termination caused by the disclosure of 
corporate misbehavior. The court denied the plaintiff‟s request since the company‟s il- 
legal actions did not occur in U.S. and found that Section 806 did not have extraterrit- 
orial effect.
1223
 Although the court made a negative decision on extraterritorial appli- 
cation of Section 806, whether this judgment was appropriate is still up for discussion. 
Considering the nature of whistleblowing, employees blowing the whistle have a fun- 
ction on the deterrence of companies‟ irregularities and promoting public interest; as 
employees cannot be protected by extraterritorial application of Section 806 because 
of their disclosures, the function of SOX is weakened, and is able to be viewed as one 
of the critical deficiencies on the enactment of the statute. As Levy notes this point as 
follows: 
“In light of the fact that one of SOX‟s three main purposes is to protect whistleb- 
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lowers, this exception for foreign companies and subsidiaries is more than just 
a loophole. It is a gaping hole that calls for reconsideration of whether SOX is 
actually doing anything more than placing a burden on domestic companies- 
companies that must comply with all provisions of SOX face consequences if 
they fire employees for blowing the whistle. All the while, foreign companies 
can apparently rid themselves of whistleblowers without consequence…. SOX 
may be doing more harm than good while still allowing defiance of one of its 
most central provisions-a fact that seems to make SOX‟s mission a harmful and 
futile endeavor altogether.”
1224
 
Hence, in order to avoid imbalanced regulations on domestic and foreign companies, 
and to ensure the policy of whistleblower protection in SOX Section 806 to be practi- 
ced, Congress should think about whether it is much better to apply Section 806 extr- 
aterritorially to protect whistleblowing employees serving in public firms or their sub- 
sidiaries, but those are located outside the U.S. territories. 
    As for the method of extraterritorial application on Section 806, there are three 
ways for Congress to consider as resolving this problem. First, Congress can employ 
direct application of Section 806 on foreign corporations.
1225
 Direct application is ab- 
le to be regarded as the most efficient and easiest means to resolve extraterritorial iss- 
ues on whistleblower protection. However, its consequence may be divergent because 
different countries have diverse points of view on whistleblowing. In the U.S., whistl- 
eblowing is important because it not only unveils companies‟ irregularities unknown 
by the public, but also prevents the operation of the financial market from being ruin- 
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ed. By contrast, some countries in Europe rarely adopt the policy of whistleblower pr- 
otection to deter corporate corruption since they put more focus on the protection of 
personal reputation, and avoid an individual from being wrongfully accused.
1226
 This 
tendency arose from European history and could explain why European countries are 
more concerned about the protection of private interests. Once Levy stated this point 
as follows: 
    “The root of the problem in European countries is that SOX contains mandatory 
disclosure requirements and provides hotlines for anonymous whistleblowing. 
Aside from the reasons that American companies might not like these aspects 
of SOX, European countries (especially France and Germany) particularly des- 
pise whistleblower provisions because of their resemblance to past rules from 
darker days in European history…. SOX whistleblower provisions are reminis- 
cent of the types of rules enacted by the Nazis and Soviets. In Germany, the te- 
rm „whistleblower‟ suggests Gestapo-style government, and in France, whistle- 
blowing reminds citizens of Vichy‟s regime, under which neighbors betrayed 
neighbors. All things considered, the Europeans‟ rejection of SOX whistleblow- 
er provisions is understandable.”
1227
 
Due to unpleasant historical experiences, European countries find it difficult to accept 
the whistleblower protection in SOX because this policy perhaps reminds them of ob- 
noxious memories. Also, the similar dispute may happen in other areas since whistle- 
blowing is not a widely-accepted idea in every jurisdiction. Hence, different recognit- 
ions of whistleblowing increase the difficulty for courts and Congress to apply SOX 
Section 806 extraterritorially. 
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Though, different treatment on domestic and foreign companies not only causes 
a loophole in SOX Section 806, but it also opens a back door for domestic companies 
to breach securities laws and related frauds by utilizing foreign firms and subsidiaries. 
In addition, SOX has pushed back companies to issue IPOs in the U.S. capital market 
because of its severe requirements and increased costs of compliance; this trend has 
occurred with no implementation of whistleblower protection. “Adding the burden of 
court implementation [SOX Section 806] could essentially eliminate the presence for- 
eign companies from American exchanges”
1228
 and make this situation worse, and 
seriously reduce the efficiency of the statute.
1229
 Then, in order to avoid the loophole 
and regain foreign companies‟ favor to the U.S. financial market, it is imperative for 
Congress to find other measures to substitute the direct application of SOX Section 
806, and to deter corporate securities violation at the same time. 
    Second, SOX Section 806 can be applied extraterritorially by making a pact with 
countries where foreign companies or subsidiaries are located, but their shares are tra- 
ded on U.S. securities exchange markets.
1230
 However, this type of application is pro- 
blematic because the usage of SOX in other jurisdictions not only probably conflicts 
with the laws of given countries, but various business customs or transaction methods 
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make the U.S. laws hard to adapt to the operation of local companies.
1231
 These cons- 
equences fail the function of SOX. In addition, there is the likelihood that the conflict 
of applied laws perhaps happens when given countries‟ laws or regulations address si- 
milar issues with SOX. 
    Third, compared to above approaches, the practicable method to apply SOX Sec- 
tion 806 to foreign companies or subsidiaries may be decreasing SOX compliance co- 
sts and reducing its onerous requirements for companies to comply with.
1232
 Adopti- 
ng this policy, foreign companies will enhance their willingness to issue IPOs and ga- 
ther requisite capital in the U.S. financial market; also, this will promote the applicati- 
on of SOX on related regulations. As Levy mentions below: 
    “If courts will not apply Section 806 extraterritorially, and thus lessen the effect- 
iveness of SOX, then legislators should amend SOX so that it does not discour- 
age companies from making their IPOs on American exchanges. Legislators sh- 
ould reduce the costs of compliance and consider cutting back on penalties for 
minor infractions…. By doing this, companies could comply with SOX, and 
the government could regulate accounting practices.”
1233
 
Observing this method, it is not necessary to extraterritorially apply SOX Section 806, 
but Congress still can increase the application of SOX on the financial market by lo- 
wering SOX‟s requirements and lessening companies‟ burdens to abide by related re- 
gulations. By means of making the requirements of SOX looser and less costly, com- 
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panies probably reconsider the costs and benefit on filing IPOs, and return the U.S. fi- 
nancial market to gather required assets. This consequence not only halts the trend th- 
at corporations tend to run away from the U.S. market because of severe U.S. regulat- 
ions and expensive compliance fees, but also increases the application of SOX on det- 
erring corporate securities frauds and shielding whistleblowers, and further truly achi- 
eve SOX‟s statutory purposes. 
    In order to make up the deficiency that foreign companies and subsidiaries may 
get rid of SOX Section 806, Congress has to take actions to fix this loophole. Moving 
out duplicate requirement and cutting down the cost of compliance in SOX can regain 
companies‟ interests in the U.S. financial market for gathering funds; also, this conse- 
quence may indirectly promote the application of SOX on related regulations. Hence, 
on the one hand, SOX still plays a significant role in regulating securities violations 
and in maintaining the order of the public market; on the other hand, employees who 
blow the whistle are shielded under SOX as usual. In addition, the public and investo- 
rs are also able to benefit from the healthy financial market, and do not fear being da- 
maged by corporate corruption. 
    Further, in my point of view, for the sake of providing sound protection for whis- 
tleblowers employed by foreign companies or subsidiaries, and of extending the appl- 
ication of SOX, Congress ought to consider the exemption of SOX for foreign firms, 
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and make those companies be more interested in the U.S. financial market. As regards 
the means, Congress can refer to the accommodations made by the SEC since it has 
adopted a similar policy to facilitate foreign listings on the NYSE and NASDQ.
1234
 
Once Dworkin described this issue as follows: 
    “In 1979, the SEC began allowing foreign stock issuers to file some forms and 
exempted them from some sections relating to proxy rules, tender offer rules, 
and short swing profit rules to facilitate foreign listings. Later accommodations 
included the filing of different forms and different disclosure standards. In add- 
ition, the SEC has used informal procedures including the confidential treatme- 
nt of filings and certain disclosures exemptions, and corporate governance issu- 
es have tended to be left to the home jurisdictions.”
1235
 
Hence, by making use of different treatment upon foreign and domestic companies in 
SOX, it is highly probable that foreign firms will be more interested in accessing the 
U.S. financial market. When those foreign firms are listed on the U.S. public market, 
their activities have to be regulated by SOX, securities laws or regulations, and the 
SEC‟s rules. This policy is going to be a win-win situation because it not only enrich- 
es the U.S. financial market, but also fixes the defect that SOX is unable to extend its 
protection to employees who blow the whistle in foreign companies or subsidiaries. 
Also, I suggest Congress ought to add a new provision that clearly states as com- 
panies are listed on the U.S. financial market, no matter whether whistleblowing occ- 
urs in their foreign branches, firms, or subsidiaries, their actions still will be regulated 
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by SOX Section 806 even though retaliation does not happen in America. I think this 
suggestion would resolve the problem made by Carnero court and adjust imbalanced 
regulations. Thus, whether whistleblowing employees‟ damage can be relieved is dec- 
ided by SOX‟s regulations, not depending on the ordinances in different jurisdictions 
where those employees actually suffer adverse actions. 
4. Companies Are Required to Keep Record of Whistleblowers‟ Complaints in the 
Materials That Are Sent to the SEC and to Disclose Employees‟ Arguments in Annual 
Shareholders Meetings 
In my point of view, I suggest Congress has to create a provision that re- 
quires the public company to keep record of employees‟ complaints into the materials 
sent to the SEC, and disclose those arguments in each shareholders meeting. This ap- 
proach not only makes the SEC and shareholders know what has happened regarding 
the matters of corporate control, but also indirectly detects critical violations of secur- 
ities laws by showing employees‟ ordinary concerns. The required disclosure of empl- 
oyees‟ arguments benefits the SEC and stockholders since both parties have interests 
in employees‟ knowledge, and are inclined to pay more attention to related informati- 
on than non-investors. 
    Shareholders, based on the protection of private interests, care about employees‟ 
information because it assists them in knowing potential risks for investment. In addi- 
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tion, they are concerned to the performance of invested companies since they want to 
make sure their investment will be paid back, and can gain more profits at last. More- 
over, the disclosures of employees‟ complaints not only let stockholders control more 
information to supervise the management‟s decision-making or corporate policies, but 
also indirectly promotes shareholders to be more active in participating in companies‟ 
annual meetings and business operation. 
    The SEC has an obligation to protect public interest, and to ensure the transpare- 
ncy of the capital market has been properly maintained. By receiving employees‟ kn- 
owledge in the materials presented by public firms, the SEC can be rapidly aware of 
information regarding corporate operation, and timely makes a quick response or enf- 
orcement on suspected illegal actions. In addition, by knowing employees‟ concerns 
as soon as possible, the SEC may have sufficient time to react and to prevent corpora- 
te misconduct from going worse; also, it is able to avoid the financial market from be- 
ing ruined by corporate corruption, and to sustain the public‟s confidence in the busi- 
ness activity. Moreover, the disclosures of employees‟ arguments strengthen the func- 
tion of SOX Section 806. This scheme not only makes the SEC get more knowledge 
to control corporate misbehavior, but also lets the SEC has more information with re- 
gard to internal corporate governance. Likewise, the SEC can make use of these discl- 
osures to know how the management responds to employees‟ concerns, and which ac- 
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tion has been taken to address those arguments afterward. 
    Hence, by disclosing employees‟ ordinary complaints, it makes the SEC and sha- 
reholders observe corporate irregularity in advance, and precludes companies from ta- 
king further actions to commit securities violations or related frauds. In addition, this 
method not only promotes SOX‟s disclosure system, but also enhances the function of 
whistleblowing and brings more corporate scandals to light. Furthermore, this approa- 
ch hampers employers‟ misconduct to affect employees‟ loyalty on companies, to red- 
uce stockholders‟ reliance on corporate operation, and to influence investors‟ confide- 
nce in the public stock market. Thus, Congress ought to take this suggestion into acc- 
ount for future amendments, and make up the defect that may cause the failure of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
Conclusion 
The positive perception of whistleblowing can be viewed as a phenomenon that 
exists in a progressive society because it shows a more generous attitude on whistleb- 
lowing. Also, this can be inferred that it is allowable for citizens to make use of diffe- 
rent measures to sustain the public‟s confidence in the financial market and business 
activities. This perception encourages an individual, who has valuable information re- 
garding organizations‟ financial frauds, to disclose in order to prevent public good fr- 
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om being harmed by those dishonest organizations. In addition, whistleblowing is cri- 
tical to the exchange of information because it promotes a well-informed society. The 
well-informed society requires diverse information or knowledge to assure the safety 
of transaction, and make economic conduct more efficient. Whistleblowers not only 
bring organizations‟ misconduct, which spoils stockholders‟ investments and damages 
the public stock market, to light, but also act as competent informants providing the 
knowledge that ordinary citizen is difficult to gain.
1236
 Further, whistleblowers decre- 
ase the likelihood that social resources will be wasted on the investigation of organiz- 
ational fraud. Similarly, they are capable of securing the evidence of those irregularit- 
ies before unveiling to the authorized agency or the public. 
In view of the function of whistleblowing on avoiding organizational corruption, 
it is required for Congress to reinforce whistleblower protection in statutes and to ens- 
ure it can play a significant role in the deterrence of illegitimacy. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is the recent statute inclined to restore investors‟ confidence in the financial mar- 
ket, and to sustain the order of securities transaction due to a series of corporate scan- 
dals in the beginning of this century. In SOX, its whistleblower provision shields pri- 
vate employees from bearing adverse employment actions because of the disclosure 
or participation in the investigation on corporate securities violation. However, Cong- 
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ress did not consider several details of this regulation, and this failure reduced the eff- 
iciency of SOX Section 806 to achieve its goals.  
Hence, this dissertation points out these defects and provides advice for the futu- 
re amendments. Those suggestions not only involve the modification of statutory lan- 
guage and the remedy procedure, but also concern the issues with regard to corporate 
culture, rewarding, the usage of arbitration contracts, extraterritorial application, and 
other matters of concern. If Congress can adopt those comments, I sincerely believe 
that internal corporate governance is able to be benefited by sound whistleblower pro- 
tection. Likewise, I wish the modified provision could inspire more potential whistle- 
blowing employees to fight against employers‟ misconduct, to preclude corporate wr- 
ongdoing from happening, to support proper business operation, to promote the integ- 
rity and transparency of the public stock market, and to preserve the public‟s confide- 
nce in economic activities. 
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